How about German heavy long range bombers

What if the German Airforce had sizable number of long range bombers at the beginning of the war ? Would this have an impact on the war ?

 

Yes, depending on how they were deployed.

If Göring were prepared to let the navy use them, they could have considerably improved the effectiveness of the North Atlantic commerce war.

In the land battle, they could have enabled the Luftwaffe to strike strategic production facilities deep in the USSR. Especially if they weren't handicapped by all the weight needed to allow them to dive bomb...

Of course, that then begs the question 'what would they have made less of in order to afford them?'

As it happens, I did put such a force in 'The Foresight War' - they replaced most of the medium bombers in production, except for the Ju 88 family.

 

Germany did produce a long range bomber the DO-19 Ural Bomber but the project was cancelled. See here for information Dornier Do 19

 

I do think the Germans cancelled the strategic bomber program because it was so costly and they needed an air force that could be built fast to quite big numbers. Thus the dive bomber ideas was like God sent to them but it also made many of their planes quite slow as almost every plane type was expected to dive bomb.

Also the previous chief of Luftwaffe died in ca. 1936 who was the Ural bomber idea´s father and thus the program was forgotten.

So the long range bomber idea was not financially possible for Reich.

 

Yes.
Due to the fact that larger bombers are more difficult to build and that the German aircraft industry was at full stretch, it would have meant a sizable fewer number of bombers in Luftwaffe service.
This of course would have effected the level of tactical support given to the army.
In the battle of Britain it would also haven't have helped the Luftwaffe.
Their medium bombers had the range to attack any target in the British Isles.
Larger bombers could carry more bombs, but there would be less of them, so they don't gain anything.
Also with heavies the British don't have to shoot down as many, as they did with the medium bombers to effect Luftwaffe operations.


If you accept the idea that you can't have everything, the decision not to build a strategic bomber force was sensible.

 

Also I think the Ju 87 was a great design for the Blitzkrieg tactics. With heavy bombers I don´t know if the Blitzkrieg would have been as effective.

 

In any case, the heavy bombing of Germany by the Allies did not have a very great effect as industry always had the opportunity to disperse and recover. It took years of continued effort to have the effect felt, and even then for instance tank production always recovered and in fact never stopped increasing. Practical effects were felt only after the systematic campaign againts the oil industry.

Assuming the LW did manage to put in service a sizable heavy bomber fleet, why do we think they would have managed any better with smaller assets against farther flung targets?

US Strategic Bombing Survey

 

I think that you are ignoring what German production would have been had not the bombing taken place. Professor Richard Overy presented a paper on this issue at that Bomber Command Association Symposium reported to the RAF Historical Society, and finished off with the following:

"Bombing: The Balance Sheet

The effects of the bombing campaign went far beyond the mere physical destruction of factories and dwelling-houses, although these effects should not be underestimated in a complex and technically sophisticated industrial economy stretched taut by the demands of war. The bombing produced serious social dislocation and a high cost in terms of man-hours (or woman-hours in many cases). Evacuation, rehabilitation and welfare provision were carried out on the largest scale in an economy struggling with serious manpower losses and cuts in civilian production. Bombing also encouraged a strategic response from Hitler which placed a further strain on the war economy by diverting vast resources to projects of little advantage to the German war effort.

The net effect of the many ways in which bombing directly or indirectly impeded economic mobilisation cannot be calculated precisely. But in the absence of physical destruction and dislocation, without expensive programmes for secret weapons and underground production and without the diversion of four-fifths of the fighter force, one-third of all guns and one-fifth of all ammunition to the anti-bombing war the German armed forces could have been supplied with at least 50% more equipment in the last two years of war, perhaps much more. In an environment entirely free of bomb attack the German authorities and German industrial managers would have had the opportunity to exploit Germany’s resource-rich empire in Europe to the full. In 1942 the air force had begun to plan the production of 7000 aircraft a month, yet at the peak in 1944 a little over 3000 were produced, of which one-quarter were destroyed before even reaching the front-line.

Bombing took the strategic initiative away from German forces, and compelled Germany to divert an ever-increasing share of its manpower and resources away from production for the battlefield. As it was, German forces proved a formidable barrier to the end of the war. With more men, more heavily armed, an intact transport system and an uninterrupted flow of industrial resources Germany might well have kept the Allies at bay in 1945. Then the Allies would have faced the agonising decision about whether or not to drop atomic weapons on German cities rather than on Hiroshima and Nagasaki."

 

I have to agree with Tony here. Bombing did have effects far beyond just the destruction of certain portions of the economy and, it had that effect well before the oil industry was targeted. Some examples include:

An ever increasing rate of absenteeism from work. As workers homes were bombed, damaged or, destroyed more and more of them fled the cities under attack. Even where they stayed put they had to expend more time and effort in repairing their homes often missing work. The increased stress of bombing raids also played havoc with their sleep patterns increasing fatuge and mistakes at work. Absenteeism by 1944 became so prevelant and widespread that draconian measures were taken by the government. Missing work could get you a one way ticket to a concentration camp.

Disruption of the transportation system. Roads and railroads were frequently damaged in attacks, both those directed at these systems and often just as a coincidnece of bombing raids on other targets. This frequently meant that one supplier could not deliver materials to a manufacturer on time due simply to disruptions in the rail system. Say, a tank manufacturer that does not get a shipment of fuel tanks is left waiting for these before the otherwise complete tanks can be shipped.

The cost of repairs to workers homes and non-war production shops and stores also hit the economy. How much effort and supplies went into such repairs? Even such basic construction supplies as concrete, wood and, rebar used for the civilian economy took away from the military's need for these items.

It all adds up. As an interesting microcausm of this I remember reading about Kurt Tank and testing the Ta 152. One of the few prototypes suffered a fuel pump failure after a test flight. A messenger on bicycle (!) was sent from the airfield to ride to the fuel pump manufacturer to pick up another fuel pump. This was something like a 60 mile trip one way. It took the messenger about a week to return. There were no vehicles available both because of fuel shortages and just insufficient production of vehicles. The rail system was too disrupted and unreliable to use. Aside from that, the rail system would also have required alot of buearucratic red tape to obtain travel passes etc so a bicycle messenger was used.
Such delays were common place throughout Germany by late 1943 let alone 1944. The loss of efficency and production enormous.

 

Hi all,changing the subject a little what if in 1940 the Germans had developed fighter planes with jetengines on them.Would this of changed the outcome of ww2 for the Germans or not.?

 

The problem at that time they saw no need yet another error. They had this one in 1941 Heinkel HE-280 More info

By the way welcome.

[ 02. April 2006, 04:39 PM: Message edited by: Richard42 ]

 

Before the war started there was a General Weaver who was in the German Air Force and he was pushing for heavy bombers but he was killed in an aircrash and no one took up the cause after that until the He-177 was born and that was a huge mistake.

As for jets, you have to have both a good airframe and pilot and jet engine to make it all work. The USA had the P-59 but it was slower than piston fighters. The British had an experimental jet and so did the Italians. The Germans had several jets but only the Me-262 was a workable weapon. Not sure how to judge the Arado bombers as they only flew a few missions that I know about trying to bomb a bridge.

I think after General Weaver died someone decided the war would be won with only medium bombers and dive bombers. The early war successes helped strenthen this theory.

 

The Italian jet aircraft.

http://www.museoscienza.org/english/aereo/caproni.html

 

it really isnt the most attractive plane i have seen... but it is their first jet plane...

 

Thanks for the link, Ta ; I had been totally unaware of this aircraft. Interesting, but - as the article says - a historical curiosity.

 

Jet Engine Development

 

It (the Caproni) is not really a "jet" airplane either. It is a ducted fan. That is it uses a piston engine to run a fan inside the fuselage. It does not use gas turbine technology which is how "jet" technology is normally defined.

 

No, it would not have changed the outcome. The problem is that it is a technological solution. The usual pattern for technological advances in military systems is that they produce a short term advantage for the inventing nation. What follows is that other nations recognize the technology and respond by producing their own versions of it.
The more important and decisive a new technology is the more rapidly it will be countered by other nations. This may cost a nation a great deal of capital and effort but it generally is the pattern.
In the case of jet engines, the British were running about equal to the Germans in development in 1939. The US had the metallurgical edge with the development of turbocharging technology and needed only get some British input or see the German developments to make the leap to jets themselves. The result would have been had Germany really pushed jet aircraft development then the British and US would have followed with their own similar developments to keep pace.
The Soviets would have had a real problem initially in trying to keep up. They lacked the developmental experiance of the US or Britain. The likely result would have been to try and purchase or otherwise obtain sample engines from one country or another then simply produce either licsensed or unlicsensed copies of their own. Thus, the Soviets would have soon had jets too.

If you want really earth shattering changes look to developments in organization, tactics and, other areas where these developments effect the structure and methods a military uses. These are the ones that really change things. This is what made the Germans so effective early in the war.

 

You hit the nail right on the head with the last paragraph.

 

Ya they look ugly but wow they would cause problems a bit like a pain in the u no wat but never ending thus a pain