LONE WOLVES: British Submarine History In WW2 + Action "Capsule" Reports

Good Evening to all......

Tonight, a special presentation highlighting British submarine operations in World War Two. I will also present, for the first time, "After Action Capsules" that gie you a look at typical operations of British Submarines, with a quick description of the action involved just to put you in the picture.

So, sit back and enjoy this surprising article. Why so surprising? Well, the operational difficulties that the British overcame qualify their branch of the Royal Navy with a true "stiff upper lip", as they doggedly pursued their theater objectives in the face of an Axis opponent who got more efficient and deadly as time went on.....

Enjoy......



:tinysmile_classes_tLONE WOLVES: THE ROYAL NAVY'S SUBMARINES........BY CHARLES MARKUSS.

British submariners deserve much credit for depriving the Axis of transports and warships. Rommel's Chief of Staff would complain after capture,
"We should have taken Alexandria and reached the Suez Canal if it had not been for the work of your submarines."
Approximately 70% of all British successes were in the Mediterranean, and in some months 60% or more of rommel's supplies were lost, largely due to submarine attack. British submariners did not just attack transport shipping, they helped make the German invasion of Norway very costly by sinking 21 ships.

Britain began the war with roughly the same submarine strength as the OKM, about 58 boats. The Royal Navy put another 157 into service through the war, losing some 74 through various causes. This represents less than 10% of German submarine losses, but does not include the 8 Dutch, 3 French, 4 Greek, 2 Polish and one Norwegian submarines lost while under British command. In exchange for these losses, British submariners accounted for 6 enemy cruisers, 16 destroyers, 36 submarines, 112 minor warships and 493 merchantmen. Another 38 merchantmen, a U-boat, a destroyer, a corvette and 3 torpedo boats are known to have been sunk by mines placed by British submarines.
By American or German standards, these figures appear unimpressive. But it should be remembered that British submarines were deployed as "mobile minefields" or "lone wolves". Too, the quality of the opposition must be kept in mind. The German and Italian escorts were efficient and deadly; there was no "happy time" for British submariners of the kind enjoyed by their German and American counterparts. Very few large, slow, weakly defended convoys came their way. When Rommel began to lose supplies, German influence transformed Italy's poor ASW capabilities; by the end of 1941, the Italians were....
..."dangerous"
as one British sub commander typically understated.
Whatever Allied propaganda may have said about the Regia Marina, their escort vessels were not to be underestimated and sank some of Britain's great submarine crews- Wanklyn's "Upholder", Linton's "Turbulent" and Tomkinson's "Urge" among them.
Not surprisingly, Britain's heaviest losses in their submarine arm were in the Mediterranean. Only the rare Allied submarine lasted longer than 12 months in these waters. Unbeknownst to the British, the Italians had perfected minelaying in waters up to 600 feet deep and so laid mines on such a scale that one British Flotilla commander stated that,
"...it is difficult to see how we could have operated our submarines in the Mediterranean at all."....**:evil:see note below)
At least 21 of 45 submarines lost in this area were mined.

The Mediterranean was also the scene for Britain's greatest blunder in submarine deployment, and the fate of the large classes of British submarines - designed for operations in the Pacific - makes depressing reading. Had these boats, with their long range capability, designed for depths of 500ft and the ability to reload all bow tubes in 7 minutes, been available in the Pacific to support the few Dutch and American boats thrown against the Japanese invasion convoys in December, much subsequent bloodshed might have been avoided. They were capable of diving in 40 seconds and could stay far below the maximum Japanese depth charge setting (295ft). Their commanders, due to intensive peacetime training, could operate as a flotilla in near perfect coordination to form British "wolf packs".
Instead, when Italy declared war these boats were sent to the Mediterranean - tanamount to keeping a killer-whale in a garden pond. Their size, relative sluggishness, noisy auxilliary machinery and leaky fuel tanks were a fatal combination in an area where exactly the opposite features were necessary for survival. With their commanders used to murky Pacific waters, and crews exhausted from lack of shore-leave, they were hunted down and sunk one after another. By the end of 1940, 9 of the 15 initially committed to the theater had been lost.
Losses and successes were fewer in other areas; about 20% of the sinkings and 36% of the losses were in northern waters, and the remaining 10% of sinkings and 4% of losses occurred in Far East. The German invasion of Norway provided plentiful, if tough targets. In the North Sea, the British submariners usually encountered fast, elusive blockade runners or the thick-skinned German warships or Axis submarines. If American submariners specialized in destroyer demolition, British submariners can be regarded as specialists in sinking their own kind, accounting for one French, 15 German, 2 Japnese and- in error- one British submarine.
Patrols into the North Sea or in the Mediterranean were shorter than those in the Atlantic or Pacific, but not without numerous hazards. Apart from the enemy, the waters in these two regions are treacherous and shallow: only 80-90ft off the Low Countries, 105ft in the Helgoland Bight and no deeper than 150ft in the Kattegat. In deeper areas the varying seasonal salinity densities off Norway and in the Mediterranean played havoc with the trim of the submarines and would send them very deep, out of control, or liable to broach and then remain stubbornly afloat. In calm weather the Norway Deep is clear enough to betray submarines down to 90ft, and the Mediterranean's crystalline waters can display a sub as deep as 100ft. Most British submarines based in Malta were painted blue in an effort to counteract this very fact.
Certain, uniquely British features compounded the dangers and handicaps. Most British submarines had periscopes only about 30ft long, and this forced them much closer to the surface, increasing chances of detection. This came about because British designers demanded solid bronze conning towers and periscopes to minimize interference with the magnetic compass and so, being weaker than steel, the periscopes had to be both shorter and better supported with heavy, distinctive framing. In addition, the commander of a British submarine directed attacks from the control room, not from the more central location in the conning tower (as in American and German boats).

But the true "Achilles Heel" of all standard British submarines was their slow surface speed and relatively poor range - the excess weight of all that bronze had to be balanced somehow, although economy measures also played a part in the designs. After building three fast, long-ranged but expensive River-class submarines, production was stopped by the admiralty in favour of the slower and cheaper T-class designs. Unfortunately, the loss of Singapore as the primary Far East base was not forseen. The even slower U-class were not designed for wartime service, but for use in training and to act as "clockwork mice" for escort vessels. As it was, they became ideal for service in the Mediterranean and North Sea waters, but remained pitifully slow. Nor was diving depth a strong point for British submarine designs, largely because the British fitted elaborate safety devices that increased weight and weakened the pressure hull. Moreover, Anglo-American insistance on heavy torpedo armament demanded the fitting of a bulbous, and hence weaker, pressure hull than German boats.

But, British designs also had some strong points in their favor. British submarines with their distinctive high, narrow casings could dive about 10 seconds faster than most U-boats of comparible size, and roughly twice as fast as the submarines of most other nationalities. In the North Sea and Mediterranean this became essential for survival. Diving procedures also helped, for in British (and German subs) it was the first man down the hatch who pressed the diving alarm, not the last as in American boats. In effect, the British and German boats began their dives with hatches open and the mad scramble to get below brought minor injuries, but the pay-off was a better chance of escape. The little U-class boats could dive in 12-15 second, the S-boats in 20-25 seconds, and the T-class in under 30 seconds. (By comparison, a U.S. Gato-class boat took 50-60 seconds to dive.)

Where the British excelled was not, however, in the technical aspects of submarine warfare, but in the non-technical "human" side. Most notably, in the selection and training of captains and in tactical doctrine. Implicit in this was the recognition that there would be few "easy" targets to attack, and as a result the daylight periscope attack was emphasized to the exclusion of all other methods. Although night surface attacks were a wartime feature, no training was given in this method. Training emphasized minimal use of the periscope against fast-moving, escorted targets sailing a zig-zag course and the uniquely British feature of a built in gunnery type range finder avoided the need to judge the distance to target on the basis of apparent size (which submariners of all nations tended to overestimate).
No British officer was given command of a submarine unless he had passed an intensive, exhausting, training course known with good reason as "The Perisher"**olice:see note below). No matter how good a candidate was in other respects, he had to excell on this course; the mediocre and those unable to keep a rapid mental track of the targets and the escorts were quickly weeded out. All simulated attacks, first with models and then with training vessels, were critically assessed by instructors who themselves were experienced submariners. The British system contrasts sharply with those adopted by other submarine services (except, notably, the German).
The British never made the mistake of trying to 'mass-produce' submarine commanders.

Like their fire control systems, British torpedoes were unsophisticated but effective, due largely to the high number of test firing by trainees before the war. The standard Mk-VIII "steam" torpedo was capable of only 45 kts but had a range of about 10,000 yards (twice that of it's American and German counterpart). As in the US Navy, TORPEX, the best explosive available, was used but the warhead was larger. Much WW2 torpedo data is contradictory, but it appears that the Mk-VIII warheads were 550 (later 660lbs). By comparison, the German torpedo warheads were all either 604lbs (the T-5) or 617lbs, while the first American torpedoes of the war carried 500-507lbs.
Most of the time, British detonators worked, but being the non-magnetic types were of much lower destruction potential than the American Mk-14. Britain had already learned much about torpedoes running below their set depth during the First World War the hard way, and this aspect of performance was expected. The Admiralty had developed a magnetic triggered warhead as early as 1924 (which was successfully used at Taranto), but these were issued for use in submarines only in limited numbers comparitively late in the war. Like it's foreign sisters, the British magnetic torpedo was extremely unreliable and, being rarer, never caused such large-scale mischief inflicted on other submarine services. Official orders to ban the use of magnetic warheads were issued to British submariners in November 1944. The main fault was the premature explosion of the detonator and only one British commander, Ben Bryant, claimed a sinking by magnetic warhead (August 1942)**:razz:see note below).
Using contact exploders, it is not surprising that no major capital ships were sunk by British torpedoes (although several were damaged). Too, poor maintenance caused a number of torpedoes to run wild or simply sink, even though the former proved to be effective against enemy shipping on occasions. During 1942, a torpedo "shortage" forced the use of stocks of old Mk-IVs, then 20 years old. These were capable of only 35kts, and once loaded into the tube could not have their depth settings altered without removal. Long storage made them very unreliable and at least one submarine, the legendary "Upholder", was issued with warheads so badly swollen that they would not fit into the torpedo tube.

But real weakness in British torpedo technology lay in the fact that gyroscope settings were limited to either 0 degrees or 90 degrees only. The latter angle was found to be unreliable and it's use was quickly abandoned. British submariners tended thereafter to use their torpedoes to fire "hose-pipe" salvos as opposed to "fans". The "hose-pipe" can be likened to a stream of bullets, in line ahead. These salvos were achieved by firing torpedoes at regular intervals in sequence, and a "fan" could be achieved, despite the limitations of the gyros, by firing torpedoes while the sub was turning. However, this technique was not ideal as close range since the target's course would be changeing rapidly, in large increments, while the submerged sub moved slowly and needed four minutes to complete a 90 degree turn. The advantage of the "hose-pipe" lay solely in the fact that it minimized errors in estimating target course and speed and eliminated the errors common in gyro-torpedoes.

Another distinctly British aspect was the enthusiasm for surface gunnery by submarine crews. By comparison, American and German commanders made little use of their guns. In pre-war exercises the rapid "battle-surface" technique was well rehearsed, especially in the Far-East squadrons. Ben Bryant, serving in the North Sea and Mediterranean, estimated he sank an average of ten tons of shipping for every 16lb shell fired from the 3 inch guns of "Safari" and "Sealion". Many later built S-class and all T-class submarines mounted the much more effective 4 inch gun. As targets decreased in size in the latter stages of the Mediterranean and Pacific campaigns, these guns played an increasing role and targets were attacked in waters as shallow as 20 feet. Indeed, prior to the lifting of restrictions, British submarines were forced to use the gun to stop targets before sinking those that could be justified. (Torpedo attacks without warning were not allowed until 9 April 1940 in the North, and not before July in the Mediterranean.

What of the men themselves?

Many of the common seamen and junior officers were pressed into submarine service against their will to replace the heavy losses, and most took to their new job and performed admirably. British captains tended to be very young (the youngest was 22 years old). They were regarded as being at their peak between 25 and 30 years of age, after which it was thought they became too cautious. Only one commander served in submarines from the start of the war to the finish (and he was ashore for an extended 8 month leave for illness). Two of Britain's aces were comparitively old, however; Linton was 37 when he was killed, and Bryant commanded "Safari" until he was 38 years old. By November 1940, most of the submarine commanders when the war began were gone - either to their graves, to command surface ships ("The Grey Funnel Line"), or to staff appointments ("Aquired a polished arse").

Such was the British submarine service and submariners. Clearly their story is rather different from the usual tales of disaster, hurried improvisation and "muddling through" that other British arms of service suffered. There was much more to the Royal Navy than just the white ensign above the waves.

Let us, at long last, honour these fine sailors and heirs of Nelson.


Notes....B5N2Kate

-**:evil: From the beginning of the Mediterranean War st Sea (11 June 1940) until Italy's Armistace (8 September, 1943), Italian warships laid 49,796 mines during 387 missions, of which 45 were carried out by cruisers, 206 by destroyers, 81 by torpedo boats and 55 by armed merchant cruisers, in addtion to the missions effected by naval minelayers and by the auxiliary ones, plus minelayer submarines.
-**olice: "The Perisher" is still in action today. It is regarded as the toughest submarine commanders qualifying course in any Navy, still. Candidates are ruthlessly pushed to their limits of knowledge and physical endurance, and failure of this course, for a multitude of reasons, ultimately means the candidate officer will NEVER go to sea in a submarine again. Truly, you either "Pass or Perish".
-** Contrast the modest claims of highly skeptical and cynical British submarine captains with an example from the Italian Navy Submarine service, the Marina Squadra Sommergibili.
Commander Enzo Grossi of the Marcello-class submarine "BARBARIGO" was particularly well known. Grossi claimed to have sunk two American battleships in May 1942 and in October 1942.


ACTION "CAPSULES": AFTER ACTION REPORTS :tinysmile_classes_t

FIASCO
On 13 December 1939, four German destroyers were returning from minelaying off the Tyne, escorted by a fifth. Three light Cruisers under Konteadmiral Lutjens were dispatched to accompany them on the last leg from the entrance of the Skaggerak, a tactic often used in the First World War, but a major blunder now. Before the two groups converged, Z8 suffered a mishap and caught fire and it took over an hour to extinguish the blaze while stopped. Meanwhile, 13 miles away the cruisers were spotted by Lt. Cdr Bickford's "Salmon" at long range; his slim chance of attacking them improved when they changed course. At 5000 yards six torpedoes were fired, one of which destroyed the "Leipzig"s forward boiler room and another blew off the "Nurnberg"s bows as she swung away to avoid the torpedoes. Over two hours later the destroyers at last arrived to render assistance, much too late to punish "Salmon".

A TOUGH CUSTOMER
At the hieght of a gale on 2 April, 1941, Cdr. Bone's "Tigris" came upon the Axis tanker "Thorn" 70 miles off St.Naziare in the Bay of Biscay. The tanker altered course moments after the first torpedoes were fired, and another salvo three minutes later also missed. Falling behind, Bone decided to give chase on the surface, opening fire with the deck gun at 1000 yards. Although hit quickly and often, "Thorn" fought back with it's own guns for nearly four hours. Her valiant captain tried to ram his assailant four times. It was very nearly midnight by the time "Thorn"s guns were silenced, and then it took another ten waterline hits to bring her to a stop. Only after still more shells and a torpedo amidships did the tough tanker sink.

A BOLT FROM THE BLUE
The "Capitano Tarantini" was one of 32 Italian submarines which, at one time or another, operated in the Atlantic from Bordueaux, under German direction. Exactly half of these were lost, but they sank 101 merchant ships and several escorts. The "Tarantini"s first patrol was also her last. Arriving off Bordeaux on 15 December, 1940 after a futile patrol she was met by Lt.Cdr Crouch in the "Thunderbolt", also on his first patrol. Crouch fired from 5,000 yards. One of the torpedoes surfaced in the swell but was not seen. "Capitano Tarantini" was hit in the stern and sank immediately.

AN AUSPICIOUS START
Lt.Cdr Tomkinson was to become one of the greatest British 'aces' of the submarine service while in the Mediterranean, but he began his career while on passage to Malta in his brand new command, the "Urge". Making a meandering passage through the Bay of Biscay to Gibraltar, he was rewarded on 18 April 1941 when he intercepted the Axis blockade runner "Franco Martello", homeward bound from Brazil on the last leg of her journey home. Thompkinson, firing four torpedoes and hitting square amidships from 1000 yards made sure she never arrived.

A HELPING HAND
At Russia's request, British submarines moved operations to the lanes between Tromso and Kirkenes to attack German troop ships. Having already sunk one ship, Cdr Sladen in the "Trident" used his last two torpedoes against another convoy on 30th August 1941. In what the German convoy commander described as a "skilled, cold-blooded attack", the "Trident" put one torpedo into the "Donau II" and another into the ammunition ship "Bahai Laura". German destroyers homed in, but "Tigris" suffered only minor damage from the depth charging.

THE HALF SPRUNG TRAP
Forewarned by intelligence that German warships were being sent northwards for use against Russian-bound convoys, Cdr. Sladen's "Trident" was one of 5 Allied submarines deployed across the expected path of the German ships. While surfaced on 23 February, 1942, her lookouts spotted the "Admiral Scheer", "Prinz Eugen" and 2 destroyers off Kristiansand. A salvo of torpedoes was hastily prepared, but the target speed was underestimated."Trident" dived as the third torpedo was fired. Two collided and exploded, but the third hit "Prinz Eugen" and blew off 20ft of her stern, including her rudder but leaving her screws intact. Thinking it a mine or errant depth charge, the other ships departed to leave the cruiser limping erratically towards Trondheim. "Prinz Eugen" was not repaired until May.

THINGS TO COME
Lt.Cdr Launders already had one enemy submarine to his credit. On 9 February, 1945, while at periscope depth off Bergen, "Venturer"s crew heard faint engine noises indicative of a U-boat. Launders tracked his quarry for over an hour without the use of ASDIC. Having figured out the target's course and speed, Launders stole away southwards to gain a firing position ahead. One hour later, contact was re-established. Launders waited as the range shrank to about a mile. He fired four torpedoes spaced at 12 second intervals. U-864 had the dubious distinction of being the first submarine to be sunk by another submarine while both were submerged.

STEALTH AND PATIENCE
While on her way to land agents in Malaya, Lt.Cdr. Bennington's "Tally Ho" spotted the cruiser "Kuma" off Penang Island on 9 January, 1944, but the Japanese cruiser escaped into harbor. As the surrounding waters were very restricted, a resumption of the Japanese training exercise was expected, and the next day "Kuma" again eluded her hunter. The next morning, this time with a destroyer as escort, the "Kuma" again ventured out along the route indicated by her seaplane aloft. Taking advantage of this observation, Bennington lay in wait and fired seven torpedoes at about 1,900 yards range. Two hit. Bennington now under attack by the destroyer, crept away as the Japanese cruiser sank in a cloud of smoke.

STILL ON PATROL
Only three British submarines were lost in the Far East. One of these, Lt.Cdr Pelly's "Strategem" was caught in shallow water in the Malaccan Straits by Japanese destroyers on 22 November, 1944. Damaged in the initial attack, her position was given away by leaking oil from her external fuel tanks, (fitted as an economy measure). Finally forced to the surface, only 8 men escaped from the wreck. Service in the beautiful Pacific had it's dangers as well.

A BLOODY NOSE
Before leaving the Mediterranean, "Shakespeare", under Lt. Ainslie, had had a good run and sunk the Italian sub "Velella" only minutes before the Italian surrender in 1943. In action against the Japanese, however, she got rather more than she bargained for. On 3 January, 1945, an unescorted 700 ton merchant was sighted off the Andaman Islands. Having missed with torpedoes, the stubborn British decided to surface and attack with the 3 inch gun. The freighter fired back but was getting the worst of it when a Japanese sub-chaser answered the call for help. Just as "Shakespeare" was readying to dive to safety, a 12lb shell pentetrated the pressure hull and forced the sub to fight it out. The freighter was soon left burning, and a hit on the sub-chaser's engine room brought it to a standstill. But "Shakespeare" had taken four hits and was unable to dive. The battered British made their escape while they could. As she limped towards Ceylon, the submarine fought off some 25 air attacks, none of which sent her to the bottom.


ACCIDENT: BRITISH SUBMARINES LOST TO WARTIME ACCIDENTS......#/# = lost/survived

"OXLEY"....10 SEPTEMBER, 1939....54 (est.)/2
Torpedoed in error off Norway by HMS "Triton".

"UNITY".....29 APRIL, 1940........2/25
Collided with SS "Alte Jarl" off the River Tyne

"UMPIRE"....19 JULY, 1941.......22/16
Collision off The Wash with trawler "Peter Hendricks".

"P-514"....21 JUN, 1942..........42(est.)/0
Sunk in error by HMCS "Georgian" NW of Cape Breton.

"UNBEATEN"....11 NOVEMBER, 1942......37/0
Sunk in error by RAF aircraft, Bay of Biscay

"VANDAL"....24 FEBRUARY, 1943.........37/0
Diving failure off Isle of Arran, cause unknown.

"UNTAMED"....30 MAY, 1943.........37/0
Equipment failure off West Coast of Scotland.

"GRAPH".....20 MARCH, 1944..........-/-
Sank in tow after accident damage in dock, west coast, Scotland.