More DO 355 info

On May 23, 1944 Hitler ordered maximum priority to be given to Do 335 production. The main production line was intended to be at Manzel, but an air raid in March destroyed the tooling and forced Dornier to set up a new line at Oberpfaffenhofen. A decision was made to can- cel the Heinkel He 219 and use its production facilities for the Do 335 as well. However, Ernst Heinkel manag- ed to delay, and eventually ignore, its implementation.


The first ten Do 335A-0s were delivered for testing in May. By late 1944 the Do 335A-1 was on the production line. This was similar to the A-0 but with the uprated DB 603E-1 engines and two underwing hard points for ad- ditional ordnance or drop tanks. Capable of a maximum speed of 474 mph (763 km/h) at 21,300 feet with boost, or 426 mph (686 km/h) without boost, and able to climb to 26,250 ft (8,000 m) in less than fifteen minutes, the Dornier Do 335A1 could easily outrun any Allied fighters it encountered. Even using only a single engine it could reach about 350 mph (563 km/h).


Deliveries commenced in January 1945. When the U.S. Army overran the Oberpfaffenhofen factory in late April of 1945, only eleven Do 335A-1 single seat aircraft and two Do 335A-12 conversion trainers had been complet- ed.

 

If the planes were so damned good why didn't we see any US 8th Air Force massacre in the beginning of 1945? And a "maximum priority" production effort started in January 45 until the plant was overrun by ground troops 4 month laters produced only 11 one-seaters?

How do you say "flash in the pan" of "twinkle in Hitler's eye" in German?

 

The old problem with all of the 'wonder weapons' - shortage of materials, shortage of skilled workers, bombed factories, dispersed production with faulty standardisation, etc etc. Too little, too late.

The Do335 is indeed a fascinating aircraft as were so many other Luftwaffe projects ( Heinkel He219, Arado 234, Me163 etc ).

But it seems to me something of a technological dead-end, and was it not in reality superseded by the Me262 ? In my opinion - and certainly the Allied top brass also thought so in early 1945 - the 262 represented a real 'clear and present danger' to the 8th Air Force.

 

I think the post answers your question Za.

A decision was made to can- cel the Heinkel He 219 and use its production facilities for the Do 335 as well. However, Ernst Heinkel manag- ed to delay, and eventually ignore, its implementation.

 

Didn’t the ME163 set a new airspeed record and the pilot in question rec’d a hush, hush award for setting it?

 

Hitler ordering "maximum production" of some new aircraft in mid to late 1944 is like the captain of the Titanic ordering the crew to bail out all the incoming water before the ship sinks! It ain't gonna happen. "Maximum production" of some new aerial plaything means a mere handful get produced in lieu of many more aircraft already in production.

 

It was actually may 44, which is "early" 44, not mid to late.

On May 23, 1944 Hitler ordered maximum priority to be given to Do 335 production.

& no it wasn't better than 262, but no one has inferred that. It 'was' better than UHU or ME 410 though.

Perhaps better than 190 or 109 in bomber interception role as well.

 

If only it were that simple to introduce a new aircraft into service. Aside from just manufacturing it, one must now provide specialized tooling, maintenance manuals, parts, and all of the other paraphenila necessary to keep that aircraft in serivce. Even if Dornier put maximum effort into introducing the Do 335 into service as Hitler wanted it would be mid 1945 before the first squadron was coming online.
Note how this fits with the original timeline.
And, given tweleve months in a year and May being the fifth with June being half a year and the 23rd of May just a week shy of being into June, that is mid not early which would be January to the beginning of April at the latest.
Basically, introducing the Do 335 given Germany's deteriorating position was simply stupid.

 

Not really, since it was a 37 design & had been worked continously since then.

Even with the situation described above, they still managed to deliver some 38 to the Luftwaffe. If Heinkel hadn't ignored the order, more would have been finished.

& UHU did go into production late & only 260 or so were ever built, ending in 44. Better expenditure of time to make DO 355's instead. Time to make one would be less, & materials required to make one less as well.


This book has an interesting comparison table on it vs Arado 234 & 262. Dunno about the speed report though.

http://www.internetmodeler.com/2003/august/new-releases/schi_do335.htm

One of the more fascinating data tables in this book is a performance comparison of the Do 335A-0 against the Me 262A-2a and the Arado Ar 234B, both of which represent Germany's turbine-powered elite. While the Do 335 was heavier than its two jet brothers, it's significantly greater wing area helped to offset that in the air. Nevertheless, the Do 335 was 25 KPH faster than the Me 262 and 30 KPH faster than the Ar 234. The service ceiling of the Dornier was also 100 meters higher than the Messerschmitt and 1900 meters higher than the Arado.

 

"Hitler ordering "maximum production" of some new aircraft in mid to late 1944 is like the captain of the Titanic ordering the crew to bail out all the incoming water before the ship sinks! It ain't gonna happen."

& remember, it wasn't a 'new' aircraft. & there's no way in hell the Germans or the allies could predict a spring 45 end to the war, so you're incorrectly assuming the Germans would plan for that timeline which is ridiculous. They planned to hold allies behind the Rhine & delay their advance as much as possible so as to get as many advanced types into the fray, 262, 162 etc. Ending spring 45 was the last thing to be found in their plans.

 

Don´t forget the Germans did not have any fuel really left to use after autumn 1944. Just more planes to be stuck at the air fields that would have been. It was all over for Germany by autumn 1944 for sure if not earlier.

 

Fuel was low, but they did continue to fly until last day of the war, & underground synthetic fuel plants were also being worked on etc. Ebensee concentration camp & so on.


The main purpose of Ebensee was to provide slave labour for the construction of the enormous underground tunnels which were to be used for research purposes and the development of the A9/A10 Interkontinentalrakete (intercontinental rocket). The original plan had to be given up as other productions of military importance were assigned a higher priority. Those parts of the tunnels, however, that had already been finished were used for fuel production (Tunnel A) and the manufactur-ing of motor parts for tanks and lorries of the Steyr-Daimler-Puch Werke and the Nibelungen Werke (Tunnel B). The pro-duction of fuel from crude oil started within the framework of the Geilenberg programme on 4 February 1945.
In all, 7.6 kilometres of underground facilities were built by camp inmates within about 16 months.


http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary_documents/gvt_reports/BIOS/bios_1697.htm


Effect of Air Attacks.

Dr. Butefisch was unable to say when the shortage of oil was really felt because the position regarding attacks in Germany was always kept a close secret. He was, however, aware of the severe decline in production as soon as the May 1944 bombing of the synthetic oil works started. Up till then there had been no anxiety felt about oil supplies.

According to Butefisch the damage to communications did not seriously interfere with oil production except in the case of the Ruhr plants where rail dislocation hampered production at Scholven and Gelsenberg. In general, the effect of the bombing of communications had only a secondary effect on oil production. The actual bombing of the plants was far more important. Butefisch stated that he was astonished at the rapidity with which bomb damage to railway tracks was repaired. At one time a shortage of railway tank wagons became imminent but this was unexpectedly relieved by the shortening of communications due to the retreat in Russia, and from then on there was an abundant supply of tank wagons.

The damage to communications did not, in general, prove a serious factor in the repair of plants. He felt that any delays in the completion of repairs were due more to lack of materials caused by the muddled priorities of the Geilenberg programme than to difficulties in transporting materials.

Anyway, how much fuel they could've fielded late spring/early summer 45 is an interesting subject, but a bit off the subject at hand & deserves it's own thread.

 

My sources are quite close for top speeds at around 21k feet (about 5-10 kph faster).

 

You also need pilots who can fly the planes...

http://www.bergstrombooks.elknet.pl/nov44.htm

"But there was one decisive negative factor. The hastily trained rookies which were sent from the flight schools barely knew how to fly the aircraft, not to mention how little they knew of combat tactics. The negative effect of the shortened pilot training schemes was further aggravated through a desperate lack of fuel. The bombings of German oil targets resulted in a rapid decline in the amount of fuel stock. The amount of fuel which was assigned to the flight training schools plummeted from 50,000 tons in April 1944 to 15,000 tons in August and merely 7,000 tons in October 1944.

Many of the German fighter pilots who were sent up against the US formations in November 1944 had only three to five flight hours on a Bf 109 or an Fw 190. (Prien, "IV./JG 3", p. 250.)"

 

Yes Kai, I believe Luftwaffe shortages at these times were more about fuel and trained pilots than planes themselves.

 

Yes a prob it would be, however, if Galland had had his way & 109 began to be phased out as 355 & 262 were phased in, then those old 109 pilots would switch over to those planes. Same goes for ME 410 pilots if it was phased out. They'd jump into DO 355s.

& DO 355 would not have had the same teething troubles 262 did & as well the long runways needed to operate.

 

The Do 335 program is an excellent example of just how poorly managed German aircraft production really was. This program, regardless of the merits of the aircraft, was simply a waste of resources. Here is a recap:

10/26/43 the V-1 prototype flew for the first time. Shortly after that orders were placed for 10 Do 335A-0 pre-production models, 14 V experimental aircraft, 11 A-1 production aircraft and 3 A-10/12 twin seat trainers.

Between the above date and 5/44 (about 7 months) the following aircraft were completed:

V-2 / 3 additional testing prototypes
V-4 Allocated as prototype of Do 435 not completed
V5,6,7,8 Used for engineering, testing, armament and engine trials. Completed but generally used only in static trials (non-flying).
V-9 A-0 prototype.

In May 1944 Do-335A-0 production started. In September 1944 (4 months) 10 A-0 aircraft were completed. Most of these were assigned to EBK 335 for service trials.

In September 44 the first A-1 production aircraft began assembly. Additional A-2 and 3 models were dropped from planning replaced by various B models on the drawing boards.

The V11 was converted to A-10 standards as a twin seat model.

In conjunction with A-1 production A-10/12 production began. Prototype construction also continued.

The V-10 was a twin seat prototype for the A-6 nightfighter.

The V-11 and 12 were prototypes for a DB 603A-2 engined twin variant.

The V-13 and 14 were armament trials aircraft for the B-1 and 2 respectively.

In all, 14 V prototypes, 10 A-0 pre-production aircraft, 11 A-1 production fighters, and 2 A-10/12 twin trainers were completed by 5/45 when the war ended. This is a total of 37 aircraft 65% of which were experimental models.
An additional 9 A-1, 4 A-4, and 2 A-12 aircraft were in production at the end of the war.
This gives an overall rate of production of roughly just 2 aircraft per month through the 19 months the Do 335 program ran.

The German penchant for one-off experimental aircraft in this program is highlighted. The sheer number of aircraft wasted in prototype testing and for minor changes in systems (engines or armament) is simply astounding. The low rate of production is largely due simply to the necessary handmade nature of these aircraft. Where virtually every airplane on the assembly line is being built with some variation, major or minor, it is inevidable that hand work would be the norm.
Basically, this aircraft was a waste of material and resources. Thirty or forty aircraft would make absolutely no difference to the German war effort no matter their capacity. It was simply too little too late in the face of thousand bomber raids escorted by a thousand fighters.
That the German leadership could not recognize this shows just how myopic they truly were. Dornier should have been put on producing one of a veritable handful of "best" designs like the Me 262 or He 162 in quantity to a frozen set of production plans.
This is a clear case of better being the enemy of good enough. It is a lesson the Germans did not learn during the war.

 

The Allies altogether made their best effort to defeat the Germans, but the Germans certainly did their utmost to lose the war, didn't they?

 

Yes, Hitler insisted on bombers and vengeance weapons being built which really did not change anything at that stage of war.

 

The Do 335 program is an excellent example of just how poorly managed German aircraft production really was. This program, regardless of the merits of the aircraft, was simply a waste of resources. Here is a recap:


Let's not forget the "why" of this slow production, Heinkels refusal to implement the order to make them.


There were rivalries between the a/c makers in germany. Be like trying to get professor Tank to make 109's or something.


A decision was made to can- cel the Heinkel He 219 and use its production facilities for the Do 335 as well. However, Ernst Heinkel manag- ed to delay, and eventually ignore, its implementation.