Role of resistance in western Europe

What is your opinion about resistance in western Europe ?

 

Perhaps not as aggressive as on Ostfront but did do very important work. I recall about reading a book about the guy who stole a map of a V1-station and risked his life to get a copy to send to the British.

Unfortunately been a while since I last read on this subject.

 

Like I said in the eastern front thread, the french resistance did great work during D-day.

 

Every thing was more brutal and agressive in the East. In the East, the resistance was maybe stronger, but the german and soviet armies were much greater than the armies in the West.

 

that doesnt that make the western partisans job any less important or less dangerous though

 

Geography was a major factor. One of the reasons why there was such a stong resistance ein France was because their were forests, mountains etc.. In Holland there no such hiding places, so the resistants there had to orgnise differently (urban warfare, illegal newspapers, spying etc..). In Germany resisting was almost impossible ,but some did: going from the White Rose to the july20th 1944 bombing. One of the reasons that Partisans were so active in the East was the treatment the Germans inflicted to their people. Hatred was a powerful fueling for the Resistance. Another factor was fate: one day an airman knocks on your door: you open it , save him and become involved. Had noone knocked, you would not have joined.

 

I just wanted to say that the resistance role was proportionnal to the intensity and the importance of the front.

In the East, the war was very violent, the battles were gigantic, and the resistance was very fierce and strong.

In the West, the war was violent, the battles were big and intense, the resistance was strong.

 

SOUTHERN FRANCE

LOCATION: France south of the Loire River.

TIME PERIODS: First six months of 1944; July-August 1944.

GENERAL TACTICAL SITUATION: Having occupied France since the armistice of 1940, the Germans had prepared fortified positions along the coasts to guard against Allied invasion. French insurgency had been increasing rapidly through 1943 and the first half of 1944 and was a serious problem over the entire country, despite the presence in all of France of some 160,000 German police. After Allied landings in Normandy in June, 1944, an army of insurgents estimated at about 70,000 men continued to operate in the region south of the Loire until German withdrawal from southern France in the last half of August.

TYPE OF LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS: The main road and rail route ran south from Dijon down the valley of the Rhone River for about 350 airline miles through territory infested with insurgents amid a populace hostile to the Germans. Another critical line was the road and rail route across southwestern France from Bordeaux to Carcassonne, the Carcassonne Gap, route of contact between German forces in southwestern France and those along the southern coast.

NUMBER OF COMBAT TROOPS IN THEATER OR SECTOR: Until June, approximately 220,000; after the end of June, about 150,000.

NUMBER OF COMBAT TROOPS DEPLOYED TO PROTECT LoC: Until Allied landings in Normandy on 6 June, two divisions (one of which was only at about half strength) were always held out for general security tasks. There was in addition a group of separate battalions making up a so-called Ost Legion, which all together represented approximately division strength. And a "reserve" corps of about one division strength was assigned permanently to keeping open the Carcassonne Gap. Thus, about 31 divisions out of the line at all times on security tasks, about 30,000 men. After the Allied landings in Normandy, the Germans in southern France lost the equivalent of 5 divisions to the northern front, including one of the divisions that had been on security duty; but from time to time additional units were pulled out of the line for security assignments, so that the average employed on this task probably remained at about 30,000.

PERCENTAGE OF COMBAT TROOPS EMPLOYED TO PROTECT LoC: Until June, approximately 13 percent; after the end of June, about 20 percent.

DEGREE OF SUCCESS IN PROTECTING LoC: The Germans were never able to make their lines of communications secure. All convoys and rail movements had to be protected by armed escorts. By the time of Allied landings in southern France on 15 August, no rail routes to the south were open. As the Germans fell back from southern France, they were constantly harassed and attacked by insurgent groups. Retreating columns as large as 20,000 men were kept under almost constant harassment and attack.

 

I know that on June 6, all the rail routes were cut, but was it the action of the FFI or of the bombers ? (I know they were 500 derailments and 3000 sabotage by the FFI).

 

It was both. The airforce targetted bridges and entire rail junctions, the Maquis targetted isolated tracks, blew up tracks when trains arrived, sabotaged the railroads that had been missed by the allies. In June 1944 the was a Resistance attack somewhere in france every hour. They caused tremendous delays for the Germans. When thye could not destroy a place they sned spies and told the allies where to drop the bombs.

 

I dont want to sound like a sceptic but lets not blow the efforts of the Western resistance forces up too much... While some of the acts to me were virtually suicidal for little gain... The attempt to stop elements of Das Reich for example.

While they did perform notable efforts in certain areas (the lead upto D-Day and securing vital plans/info) they were never in the same scale as the Soviets or indeed the Balkans. Part of the reason is geography and the nature of the terrain and also the size of the forces involved.

Also the west of europe had a certain part of the population that was just as happy to go along with the Germans as resist them... Dont forget the large numbers of western european volunteers in the SS and Wehrmacht... Although the same can be said of the Soviets and the Balkans! My point is that the Western Resistance was easier for the Germans to break than in the East.

They did some great acts of bravery but the western resistance could never compare to the scale of the Soviets and the Balkans.

 

One of the reasons was the drastic lack of arms in the west.

Who was happy with the German occupation? Maybe the Fascists and the collaborators, but they were a minority.

 

OSS, SOE, etc. had a hellish job in attempting to coordinate the disparate resistance groupings in France and create outcomes that actually had some military significance. The consensus among them seemed to be that a great deal more could have been achieved than actually was.
It's also worth considering that the ranks of the resistance were swollen far more in 1943 by the STO than they ever were by some burning ideological need to fight the invader.

I have little interest in denigrating the brave people that fought with them, but do think the Resistance has to be approached with some caution as it's actions, for good or ill, are so closely bound up with France's pride, both politically & socially, and therefore sometimes quite difficult to quantify after 60 years of legend. Some stuff was a great success, but many cases were less so, and in my opinion, caused considerably more trouble for the civilian population than the outcome was worth.


French resistance Memorial at the National Memorial Arboretum near Lichfield, UK


Cheers,
Adam.

 

Interesting thoughts Adam, you are however referring to the French, let us not forget that there were resistants everywhere ,including Germany.

As to the STO there is a distinct word for those who refused to go to Germany. they are called REFRACTAIRES and unless they effectively joined the Resistance they are not considered as Resistants. Some did join, but either because they had personnally involved and had to make a choice, but others because they had no choice.

Others made up their minds to join after Barbarossa, at least the Communist groups. These included the former Spanish republican refugees too.

I think their action was worth it, it cost lives, but it also saved many more.

3000 allied airmen were saved for example.

Would the Elster collumn have surrended without fighting if it had not been harrassed and massacred for weeks before it got to the Amercian lines ?

It besides gave the Germans a tremendous feeling of insecurity. They knew they could be attacked in the streets, in a train at any time. In 1944 there was a "Terrorist" (that's the German word) attack every hour.

 

Yes, but soviets partisans had to help much gretar armies than the FFI. I think the eastern front was the most important front in every aspect, not only resistance. Yes, the role of the partisans may be more important that the role of the western resistants, as the role of the soviet soldiers was more important than the role of the allies soldiers.

The gravity center of the war in europe is not in France or Italy, but in Ukraine or Belarus. And in the balkans, they weren't many elite german unities, while in France they were the 7th, the 15th, the 1st and the 19th german armies at least. The role of the yougoslavain resistance may have been very important but not in a major front so the influence on the war may have been less important than the role of French and italian resistance whose role was surely less important than the role of the partisans in URSS.

Eisenhower said the resistance role was as important as the role of 15 infantry divisions. Surely, he overestimated the role of the resistance but this quotation is quite important.

 

You are right to quote the Yougoslavians here, although are they to be considered west east or south front? Whatever, they did a good job too.

 

What does that have to do with effective resistance? Those German forces were not deployed there because of the resistance...




I would say the Yugoslavian front is very important given its location and drain on German manpower. As for 'Elite' units being deployed there... I dont see what differance that makes but SS-FJ 600 deployed their at Drvar after Tito, 7th SS-Prinz Eugen fought their entire war in the Balkans and various other units took part... Although on the whole they were second rate. The point is though they couldnt be used elsewhere.

The Balkans were a big drain on the Germans but not as much as the Soviet partisans. To guard areas in the West took a fraction of the amount of anti-partisan units deployed in the East.

As for the western resistance units, they had a major role in 'Overlord' but what else did they achieve and what else could they have achieved? Did they act at their full capacity or could they have done more?

As for willing people in western europe to be ruled by the Third Reich... Yes there was quite a few... Look at the amount of volunteers from Holland, Belgium, Flanders and France that joined the Waffen-SS. Plenty of fascists in Europe at that time...

Also the western resistance could be easier penetrated by the Germans which was something far harder to do in regards the Soviet or Balkan partisans. The Dutch network was virtually crippled till early 1944 by German counter-espionage. Over 300 SOE agents dropped in to their deaths in Holland and it was the reason the British distrusted Dutch intel before 'Market-Garden'.

In terms of what was the more effective, I would have to say the resistance in the East sucked in more men and materials.

 

In France, the LVF wanted 100,000 volunteers, they had 16,000... No comment. The milicians were 35,000. In June 1944, they were more then 400,000 french soldiers on the ally side and 175,000 FFI.

In France, i agree the resistance didn't had an important impact before June 1944 but between June and October 1944, they played an important role. A german general said it was a real army that stabbed them in the back while general Blaskowitz said that his army was always harassed by the FFI during the retreat to the East.

Eisenhower himself said that a group of german divisions based in poland took much more time travelling from Alsace to Normandy than travelling Poland and Germany.

Yes the ation was less vilent than in Yougoslavia but it was still important, and in yougloslavia they were more men helping the german army than in France (as I say 16,000 in the LVF, the same number in the Waffen SS and 35,000 milicians). In Holland ,they were 20,000 SS I think.

The allies themself, and not only the french (Eisenhower, Marshall, Bradley, Patton, Patch, montgomery) said that the resistance was a very important help. The allies would had won without the resistant but with more loss and time (allowing maybe the soviet to make more important progress).

 

Any idea whether the AMGOT plan had influence on the resistance movement? I recall De Gaulle would have stopped French communication officers (?) from helping during Overlord but not absolutely sure about this.

Allied Military Government for Occupied Territories - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

I wasnt just talking about French resistance...