US Army Division Casualty Turnover ETO

Been reading up on US Army performance in the ETO and was stunned at the personnel turn over in some of the infantry divisions.

Here is a few samples...

Division - days in combat - % of Turnover

1st - 292 - 205.9%
2nd - 303 - 183.7%
3rd - 233 - 201.6%
4th - 299 - 252.3%
5th - 270 - 166.7%
90th - 308 - 196.0%

I have figures for all the divisions in the ETO but this is a brief synopsis,

Half of all Infantry Divisions spent over 150 days in combat, and 40% spent over 200 days. Two divisions saw more than 300 days of action.
Over 78% of the entire ETO losses came from the fighting divisions.

The infantry divisions suffered the worse. Of the sixty one divisions in the theatre...

20 had a personnel turnover rate of 100% or higher due to battle and non battle casualties.
18 out of 46 lost the equivalent of an entire division's worth of infantry.
5 divisions suffered over 200% casualties in the ETO.

The 3rd and 6th Armoured Divisions had a turnover rate exceeding 100%
Three others had casualty rates above 95%.
One third of the Armoured Divisions had a turnover rate of 95% or higher.

The Infantryman represented 14% of the armys overseas strength but suffered 70% of the battle casualties.
Riflemen accounted for 68% of a divisions strength, but suffered 95% of its caualties.
An AGF study concluded that in a typical battle, 90% of a divisions casualties took place in the forward sectors assigned to the rifle battalions.

As a comparison, artillerymen comprised 16% of an infanrty divisions strength but absorbed only 3% casualties. The lions share of these casualties occered in the FO teams on the frontline.

Will write some more up soon. All figures from US Army in WW2 - ETO. December 1945.

 

VERY interesting, Red! Keep it coming. Going through the information available on the men buried at Margraten, certain divisions and dates keep coming up. Am amazed by the number of casualties sustained in April of 1945 for example.

 

Some examples of casualties per division. If anyone has any particular requests let me know.

Division - battle - non-battle - total

1st - 15,003 - 14,002 - 29,005
2nd - 15,066 - 10,818 - 25,884
3rd - 13,101 - 15,299 - 28,400
4th - 22,454 - 13,091 - 35,545
5th - 12,475 - 11,012 - 23,487

As for April 1945...

division - date enters combat - days in combat - casualties

97th - 01/04/45 - 31 - 1,318

Thats a 9.4% turnover in a month...

I also have similar data for the armoured divisions in the ETO.

This comes from the findings of Colonel S. L. A. Marshall...

"in an average experienced infantry company only 15% of soldiers fired their weapons, while the best units under extreme, heavy comabt managed to produce fire from 25% of all soldiers." Taken from 'Men Against Fire'.

A survey of 277 wounded in the ETO revealed that some symptom of fear at one time or another kept 65% of them from performing adequetly, and almost half admitted recurring incidents of disruptive fear reactions. From Stouffer 'American Soldier'.

 

From www.11tharmoreddivision.com

 

Hey Red, really good stuff man, I had no idea that the numbers were that high. Keep the rythm!

 

Armoured Divisions Casualty turnover.

division - days in combat - % of turnover - entered Combat

2nd AD - 223 - 95.9% - 02/07/44
3rd AD - 231 - 111.5% - 09/07/44
4th AD - 230 - 98.4% - 28/07/44
5th AD - 161 - 67.0% - 02/08/44
6th AD - 226 - 120.1% - 28/07/44
7th AD - 172 - 98.4% - 14/08/44
10th AD - 124 - 78.5% - 02/11/44

Intresting numbers, some divisions suffered worse than others, and the length of time in combat is no reckoner of casualty turnover.

Compare 4th to 6th and compare 4th to 7th...

 

This from 12th Army Group, Battle Experiences...

"Actual combat revealed a number of defects in American battlefield performance. New units experiencing their baptism of fire in the ETO failed to follow close behind supporting artillery, tended to slow down upon initial enemy contact, and allowed German indirect fire to pin them down in the open. Tank-Infantry cooperation was poor across the board but improved over time. Commanders put excessive emphasis on protecting the flanks and maintaining contact with adjacent units. Units put too much faith in artillery firepower and often failed to generate enough fire with their own organic weapons. The performance of the individual soldier indicated other training weaknesses. The tendency of soldiers to bunch together under fire was a universal complaint. American troops displayed carelessness in close proximity to the enemy and tended to expose their locations because of poor noise and light discipline".

Lt. Colonel John Hentges, commander of 3rd Divisions 7th Infantry, summed up the view as to why soldiers did not shoot enough...

"Our greatest need in training is to get riflemen to fire their weapons. New men will not fire. This is primarily caused by not wanting to disclose their position and inability to see the enemy or something to aim at. I believe our policy of putting so much of our basic training on known distance ranges where men are cautioned so often on holding, squeezing and marking the target causes this".

A training memo from the 78th Division told its officers...

"new men must be told and re-indoctrinated that aggresive fire keeos the Germans pinned down and allows their own units to advance. Remind the soldiers that the M-1 and BAR throw alot of lead and the unit that keeps firing intelligently can always move on the battlefield".


Gonna have a look at officer casualties next...

 

Psychiatric Casualties

The US army in the ETO evacuated 151,920 cases of neuropsychiatric disorders in 1944 and 1945.

First Army suffered a combat exhaustion epidemic in July and August during Normandy breakout and Mortain. Cases peaked in early August with comabt exhaustion accounting for 17% of all hospital admissions.

Third Army suffered its epidemic in September when trying to cross the Moselle. Combat exhaustion reached 11% of admissions.

The Huertgen campaign again forced First Armys admission rate to double figures.

The Battle of the Bulge saw a decline in the cases of combat exhaustion. After this about 5% of all casualties were battle exhaustion and this rate dropped after the Remagen bridgehead was seized and trailed off towards the end of the war.

 

I just read An Infantryman Remembers by of former BAR man of the 104th Infantry Division, who had their batism in Holland. He describes it exactly as above: Their first attack was an night attack on some woods that were said to be unoccupied. Said by their recon unit, which never went beyong their own front line. Mr. Light describes their noise-discipline as; " The coloumn of men marching through the field of crisp sugar beets made as much noise as a herd of stampeding elephants, even though we were instructed to maintain complete silence".

Obviously, the Germans had NOT retreated and MGs opened up. The Company Comander and another officer were killed and no one stepped up to take command. The men just laid there, not moving, waiting for orders that didn't come. They just laid down and waited. The author actually fell asleep and was woken up by a buddy saying that they were to withdraw. at first they crawled but soon the first got up and started running, quickly followed by the others. After a while most stopped and set up a defense perimeter, expecting a counter-attack, which didn't come.

Most units actually retreated to well beyong the starting point and didn't show up untill next morning. One man retreated "as far as Paris" and was AWOL for two weeks.

I wonder if this was typical.

Very interesting thread, Red! Also the numbers on battle exhaustion are very interesting. I am trying to get a book on the psychological results of combat, written just after the war. I must have a PDF on something like that as well...Will dig...

Red, was at Margraten again today. A lot of guys from 83, 79, 8, 29 divs. Also 101, 82 and 30, which is not strange as they fought a lot in Holland. Again, a VERY high number KIA in April 1945.

Interesting numbers on the Armored Divs too. Notice that a lot were KIA on certain dates, so I guess that heavy pitched battles were fought by several Arm Divs during which they lost a lot of men.

Very interesting, Red! Keep it coming. I will try and add to this as well....

 

Stevin,

From what I have read, that seems a fairly typical example of an action in the ETO.

On the psycological side try these...

Ben Shephard - A War of Nerves
Emil Dinter - Hero or Coward

The first book by Shephard is very good and has a massive bibliography.

As for the divisions you mentioned...

division - entered combat - days in combat - total casualties - % turnover

8th - 08/07/44 - 266 - 21,056 - 149.4%
29th - 06/06/44 - 242 - 28,776 - 204.2%
30th - 15/06/44 - 282 - 26,038 - 184.8%
79th - 19/06/44 - 248 - 23,457 - 166.5%
83rd - 27/06/44 = 244 - 23,980 - 170.2%

 

Stevin,

Also trying to find casualty lists for April 1945.

 

Thanks Red....Amazing...

The book I was reffering to: Psychiatry in a Troubled World: Yesterday's War and Today's Challenge by William C. Menninger.

Through the years I've come across stories you usually don't read in books (although the last few years a few have bene published that do "lift the veil" a bit), about guys cracking up and doing strange things, like the time a B17 pilot wanted to fly to Sweden on the pretense that his plane was hit (it wasn't) and his navigator sat behind him all the way back to England with his gun drawn.

This is an aspect that really interest me, the psychological one. Wonder if the high casualty rates can also be brought back to bad leadership or 'just' tough engagements.

Ah, just remembered. Corresponded with a rifleman (or MG gunner, am not sure) of the 100th Division. He was with the division from the beginning and wrote he shot his gun only three times in the time from landing in France to VE-day....

You would think that with those turn over rates the average rifleman would have seen a lot of action...Guess not...Makes you think about the completely different experiences men from different units (in maybe even teh same division) must have had.

 

Hmmm...

100th - 09/11/44 - 163 - 12,215 - 86.7%

I have a bit of stuff on fear reactions, will try to post some that is relevant...

But this one sticks in the memory...

"A replacement in the elite 2nd Ranger Battalion saw the head of a fellow soldier less than three feet away blown completely off. He did not know the soldier. The replacement became speechless, did not know his own name and could not recognise anyone around him. The replacment was evacuated and ended up in a Stateside psyciatric ward".

Will read up on combat exhaustion and fear reactions tonight...

 

Steven brings up an interesting topic,Red. "Battle-fatigue"...spell that right? Be it from artillery bombardments,watching your buddies go down in B-17s or wondering when your Sherman is going to penetrated.No where to hide.

 

Framert,

See my early notes on 'Combat Exhaustion'

RED

 

Different sources have different numbers. Here is what's found in Stanton's "Order of Battle WW II" for the divisions referenced above:

Division Combat Entry KIA WIA DOW
2nd Armd Div 8Nov42 981 4557 202
3rd Armd Div 23Jun44 1810 6963 316
4th Armd Div 13Jun44 1143 4551 213
5th Armd Div 25Jul44 570 2442 140
6th Armd Div 19Jul44 833 3666 156
7th Armd Div 11Aug44 898 3831 200
10th Armd Div 23Sep44 642 3109 132
1st Inf Div 8Nov42 3616 15208 664
2nd Inf Div 7Jun44 3031 12765 457
3rd Inf Div 8Nov42 4922 18766 636
4th Inf Div 6Jun44 4097 17371 757
5th Inf Div 11Jun44 2298 9549 358
8th Inf Div 3Jul44 2532 10057 288
29th Inf Div 6Jun44 3887 15541 899
30th Inf Div 10Jun44 3003 13376 513
79th Inf Div 14Jun44 2476 10971 467
83rd Inf Div 19Jun44 3161 11807 459
90th Inf Div 8Jun44 3342 14386 588
97th Inf Div 1Mar45 188 721 26
104th Inf Div 7Sep44 971 3657 143

The 'Combat Entry' date above is the date a division first entered a country of hostile action, but may not reflect their first day in command of a sector. Stanton does not list 'combat days'.

Now, demonstrating differences between sources, let's look at data for the Division with which I'm most familiar:

- Stanton "Order of Battle WW II":
34th Inf Div 8Nov42 2866 KIA, 11545 WIA, 484 DOW.

- 34th Division history, "Dogfaces Who Smiled Through Tears":
511 days on the line for the Division, with up to
611 days on the line for elements;
3737 KIA, 14165 WIA 3460 MIA.

- The detailed roster of the Division's death casualties,
with witness reports for many of them,
lists by name 4271 deaths, all causes, including
246 for the 100th Infantry Battalion (Nisei) while assigned and
144 for the 442nd Regimental Combat Team (Nisei) while attached.
(3881 deaths, all causes, if we exclude the Nisei warriors)
This roster is maintained by and for the 34th Inf Div Assn.

Who are you going to believe?

 

Military History Network,

Thats quite a difference for the 34th. But aint it always the same!

The figures I quoted come from Order of battle, united states army in WW2 - ETO operations.

Out of interest can you recommend a good book on the 442nd combat team? Its been on my 'must read more about list' for years...

 

Lost Battalions, Franz Steidl, Presidio Press, Novato, California, 1997
Honor By Fire, Lyn Crost, Presidio Press, Novato, California, 1994
Ambassadors in Arms, Thomas B. Murphy
AMERICANS, The Story of The 442d Combat Team, Orville C. Shirey, Infantry Journal Press, Washington, 1946

Never one to plug mu own site but check http://www.basher82.nl/Data/margraten/sasaoka.htm . I have just done some research on them.

MHN, does your sources mention S/Sgt Itmusu Sasaoka? He was wounded and MIA in the Vosges, 22 Oct. 1944, just before the Lost Battalion episode. Vets from the 442nd were VERY helpful with my request for info, but I wonder if your sources can add to the story I have so far.

Thanks,

STevin

 

Cheers Stevin!

Will drop by your site tonite for a good mooch around!