Great point Martin,although it was Monty's plan it had to be sanctioned by Eisenhower,who obviously thought that the risks were worth taking. It does seem to me that to Bash Montgomery alone over the failure at Arnhem is very unfair as the descision to Go was not his alone,and after North Africa and Normandy i think he knew that grabbing the "Limelight" even if successful was a costly business in lives,and although he accepted the responsibility of Command it did not sit easily with his own conscience. If the battle had been won then the American Airborne,Polish Paras and XXX Corps would have all been bathed in the "Limelight" of victory,an Allied victory not a British one!! Paul
G'day Taking a decision to risk soldiers life is I think one of the horrors for a commander. You win some but you loose men, sons, fathers. Montgomery has seen plenty of men get killed or wounded in WW1 and would always keep this in mind. Popski
G'day Smoke No, just was a privat in the Dutch army. That was fun enough for me. But Popski didn't have an army, just some soldiers on a hot vacation. Popski
G'day It is interesting how he got to get a privat army and wandered around the desert but his fighting skill's weren't that great according to professionel soldiers working with him in the desert. But a russian belgian in british service in egypt etc. is interesting. And it is a fun name Popski
Actually very few people know or care about Arnheim in Germany. For Germany it was highly irrevelant whether Market Garden succeeded or failed. The war was lost thrice by then. And in any case, a German victory cannot be politically correct per se. Perhaps we should ask the history writers to change that to something more acceptable.
Good point, Andreas. If it hadn't been for the film, it wouldn't be so 'popular' over here ! As for 'political correctness', I think nearly every book written here about Arnhem ( certainly during the last 15 years ) has given full credit to the German forces involved for a very skillfully-fought action. Books written by participants, too ( such as Frost ) have commented on the soldierly conduct of their opponents. Let me quote again Brigadier John Hackett of 4 Para :- ' ( Market Garden) can be expected to attract the interest of students of war for some time yet to come.... The separability of this operation as a .. whole from,so to speak, the rest of the war.. the dramatic combination of mischance and mistake which marked its course, and the notable conduct of many who fought in it combine to make of 'Market Garden' a particularly interesting problem in war and a specially inviting subject for study'. ( Introduction to 'Arnhem: A Case Study' by M. Tugwell ) Speaking personally, I agree. I find Arnhem almost endlessly fascinating.
G'day As it is nearly in my backyard it never stops to amase me, and there is still a lot to talk about and still material coming out of the archive's, so it will keep on going. Popski
I actually like the Market Garden plan. And I like Monty. I feel he did a credible job leading the fighting around Caen, and in the process, his chewing up of 12th SS, 2nd SS, Panzer Lehr, and other crack German units ultimately made COBRA the wild success that it was. In effect, I see Monty "taking one for the team" so as to allow the US units to breakout once any appreciable German strength to repel the attack had been whittled away to nothing. And, remember, Monty was saddled with trying to keep casualties as low as possible. He, and England, could ill-afford to allow the war in Western Europe to degenerate into another WWI style stalemate. His country had neither the resources in terms of men or equipment, nor the stomach, to endure such a turn of events. He was a product of WWI himself, and I am sure the events of that time period weighed heavily upon him and his decision making. As for Market Garden, here Monty proposes a daring plan, and he get's slammed for it. Yet when he is conservative in his approach, he gets slammed for it. The guy can't get a break! It was a daring plan, no doubt, and totally out of character for Monty. It was a risk, but, ON THE SURFACE, it seemed justifiable. A quick blow to outflank the Reich while the German forces were still retreating. Sure, it was hastily organized, but then, speed was of the essence. If the Allied forces took more time to organize things, it surely would have allowed the congealing of the front and further defensive preparations of the German forces. Don't forget, the initial drop was supposed to have jeeps with twin machine guns race ahead and secure the Arnhem bridge while the foot borne soldiers slogged their way to reinforce them. Again, on paper, it was a daring plan that, on the surface, looks no more risky then Eban Emal. And blame the RAF which would not bring their planes in closer to Arnhem for fear of AA fire more then Monty. Do you really think he wanted them to drop 8 miles away? The fact is that no one expected 9th SS and 10th SS to be there. They were severly depleted, down to about 15 to 20% of their normal strength, but they recovered well when they heard the news. They detrained their vehicles and quickly sped towards the bridge. All in all, a variety of events and action caused Market Garden to fail. One could chastise Horrocks' XXX corps and their lethargy in relieving the para's, the lack of intelligence interpretation, poor communications, etc. All contributed, but honestly, I can not see how Montgomery is responsible for Bittrich's presence, or for having the correct radio communications. Don't just watch the movie-Read up on it, and you'll see it was just a plan that essentially didn't work out. But I have to admire Monty's uncharacterstic and original plan. A shame for him and the Allies that it just didn't come off the way it was supposed to. (And no, I am not British nor a British Sympathizer nor a Monty Apologist-He was, from all accounts I have read, a vain, arrogant, difficult man to work with and be around. I fully recognize his faults and problems.)
Very nice points, Hohenstaufen! (Can I call you that?) Monty was raised in the butchery called WWI. I understand why he did not want to waste men. Because he saw how entire batallion were smashed within minutes in the trenchers days. He actually wrote his thoughts on this in his "Infantry Manual". Great Britain indeed could not afford casualties as WWI's. We must remember that France, by example, had not recovered the 4.500.000 men she lost in WWI by 1940. Germany and Great Britain had recovered already, but still, Great Britain was not willing to lose another 2.500.000 men, nor Canada the 20% of its population (1.000.000). It is very good for Monty to care about their men. Grat Britain did not have the stomach nor the human resources to bear that. USA did have the human resources but not the stomach and the Soviet Union had both. We only had the stomach. But getting to Market Garden. As I have said in this thread; it was a clever operation, very well conceived an planned. It just needed more coordination between the forces and an impetous commander. And we know that Monty was all but impetous. That is the ironny. He designed a risky an impetous plan but performed it quietly and non-impetously... Welcome again, 9th SS!
Yes indeed, 9th Waffen SS - welcome ! Thanks for the Monty points - I didn't dare post anything like this, I'd have been jumped on as a biased Brit apologist ! I shan't go on about 'the plan' again - but as I said before, where was Monty while it was going on ? Dempsey, too - they just seemed to 'vanish' leaving the execution to Horrocks, Browning, Gavin et al . Just seems a bit odd to me . . . .
Thanks for the kind words-And a special thanks to one of the regular's here, Bish, who turned me on to this forum. I agree, it was rather hastily thrown together, and it suffered accordingly. But I think the need to strike quickly and keep the Germans off balance took precedence. As for Monty's MIA-status during the operation-Good question. I really have no plausible explanation other then he was taking a "hands off" approach. But I honestly don't recall him being infinitely acquainted with every detail of EPSOM or GOODWOOD, especially once they got rolling. Remember, at the end of it, he claimed it was 90% successful... All in all, as I see it, MG was a roll of the dice that didn't pan out. Quite frankly, I prefer boldness and initiative, even if that means every now and again you have to endure a less then favorable result. And thanks again for your kind words. Just wondering, since we're on the topic of Arnhem, anyone have a chance to read the new Schiffer book on Arnhem "Arnhem: Defeat and Glory" by G.S.W. DeLillio? Great book with a very interesting "look" at things. Currently, I am reading "Sons of the Reich-History of II SS Panzer Corps" by Michael Reynolds. Have not gotten up to Arnhem yet, but it is extensively covered. It might shed some further insights into why MG failed as an operation.
I had a quick look through the DeLillo book - it's the one with all the pics of models. Looked neat - but expensive ! Over here, we're all waiting with bated breath for 'After The Battle's' 2-volume magnum opus on Market Garden due out in September. Everyone's hoping it'll be another 'Battle of the Bulge Then & Now' ie a definitive work.
The 'where were they' question has been bugging me so I've done some 'digging' in Nigel Hamilton's massive, three-volume 'Monty'. Hamilton says : - 'Many writers have questioned why Monty, so strict in his insistence on remaining on the field of battle in France, should have failed to visit Horrocks, or to put personal 'ginger' into the troops struggling to relieve Urquhart... The real reason was straightforward. He sent Brigadier Richardson to visit the front personally and report back; for thirty-six hours Richardson was cut off by a counterattack. And Dempsey's Chief of Staff flew up by air and the aircraft was shot down...' Finally, Hamilton concedes that : 'Had Monty had the firmness to reassess the military situation in the final days before Arnhem...the Allied campaign in North West Europe might have been very different....In this sense it may justly be said that Monty did not rise to the heights of military greatness he had shown in...Normandy..at a time when greatness was most needed.' And that's the word from his official biographer. ( Oh, and I've always thought the '90% successful' was a bit of a lame face-saver. rather like saying someone's a 'little bit pregnant'. Without the Arnhem bridge - it wasn't worth going ) [ 17 July 2002, 02:25 PM: Message edited by: Martin Bull ]
Too true--That "90% successful" line is like saying "We won the first half of the game 2-0" without saying that the other side scored 4 to your 0 in the second half... I guess that explains it. He sent others in his place. I wonder then, if he got cold feet, seeing how dangerous it was for him to get closer to the action. Still, it does not excuse not having even a showing of a rousing "pep rally" to the troops before the start of the battle. I think this quote: 'Had Monty had the firmness to reassess the military situation in the final days before Arnhem...the Allied campaign in North West Europe might have been very different....In this sense it may justly be said that Monty did not rise to the heights of military greatness he had shown in...Normandy..at a time when greatness was most needed.' ...is a bit harsh. From most accounts I have read, EVERYONE thought that with the German armies if France in headlong retreat, that their fighting power was finished. I seem to recall numerous instances where folks felt that the war was for intents and purposes, over, and that there was a real sense that the boys would be home for X-mas 1944. I don't quite see where he failed the Allied cause, quite frankly. I think, in the context of the times, he swung for the fences but hit a deep pop-up instead, to use a baseball analogy. This biographer makes it seem as if he struck out totally. Now, his actions during the Battle of the Bulge, that is another story..... Thanks for the info-I had not realized Monty was as "hands on" in Normandy as he was. Good to keep in mind. I thought only the Germans micro managed (Rommel, Hitler)...
Market Garden in its concieved form could have worked. The main reason for its failure, in my belief, is the weather which stopped flights from England and the use of a single road for the ground advance. I have recently completed a war Studies degree and one of my main topics was Arnhem. I have an article on the failure of Arnhem if anyone wants it.
Hi again, 9thWaffenSS I think that Hamilton was referring mainly to intelligence gathered about the presence of strong German forces at Arnhem, plus further appreciation about the situation of Antwerp. You're right, though - ultimately this is 'armchair generalship'. During actions, Monty operated by sending teams of liaison officers to 'hot spots' to report back to him quickly and personally. Obviously, this system failed him at Arnhem. PS : Red Baron - as a (very) amateur Arnhem hobbyist I'm deeply impressed ! can we hear more . . . ?