Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

You're correct. I got it right, (see below) but some of the names can be confusing so what I did was assigned pennant numbers to all IJN vessels when I was doing the mods to prevent errors when we are issuing orders. I can get everyone a complete list when we start so that you Admirals can make sure we're all talking the same ship. I'll make sure Steve gets one.

Excellent suggestion sir. We have sufficient numbers of experienced aircrews and the types mentioned are still comparable or better than most of the allied opposition they are likely to encounter. If the council has no objections I will issue the orders for them to deploy to marry up with the Taiyo and begin carrier qualifications and training for their proposed mission.

There are a series of diplomatic and suggested treaty proposals that I had planned to use leading up to war, in order to make it appear that our actions were taken as a last resort. If we get our position before the American people regularly enough and convincingly enough, we can make it appear that the Roosevelt administration is the bad guy. We must first get our diplomats to get Germany to agree to pressuring the Vichy French into cooperating with us. If Australia sides with Britain, I assume she will. Then she is a belligerent in a declared war and if the US insists on supporting Britain and Australia in the Pacific, we can use US public opinion to place him in a bad situation politically, as if he were directly provoking us.
I intend to use the time between the seizure of Noumea and the US entry into the war, it will happen eventually, to make the retaking of Noumea an extremely costly exercise.
What I have outlined is only the opening moves. Phase II which will begin immediately upon securing the primary objectives will in the southwest pacific area include taking Efate and Espiritu Santo (Luganville) in the New Hebrides as forward logistics bases and ports where our surface naval forces can be based. far enough back from the primary objective that they cannot be simultaneously attacked by the US in conjunction with a Noumea attack. Close enough that air and naval assets can quickly and decisively counter attack. Phase III is the taking of Tulagi and Lunga, Guadalcanal and Ndeni in the Santa Cruz islands. Noumea and Efate/Luganville are surrounded by small islands suitable for excellent airfield and close enough to be supplied from the main base by barges. Isle of Pines, Mare', Lifou and Ouv'ea around New Caledonia and Anatom, Tanna, Erromango, Aoba Is., Vanua Lava and Torres around Efate/Luganville. Medium sized airfields at these surrounding islands are part of the strategy. For the US to neutralize our airpower at anyone of the major locations would subject their carriers to counter-strikes from all the others. Kido Butai and strong local surface forces would finish off damaged carriers and savage enemy troop carriers. Long range patrol aircraft, Betty's carrying torpedoes, etc. will force the US to not attack a single objective but have to fight through interconnecting defensive rings in order to bring their land forces to bear.

 

I would like to make one thing clear: I had included the battleship division strictly as training in amphibious fire support. I do not believe two venerable battleships, or even two new ones, would be remotely necessary to the defense of a group already operating in concert with modern aircraft and aircraft carriers. In the odd extremity that the proposed group faced enemy naval units the logical counterstroke should come from our carriers far out of gun range. But I envisaged the entire operation as a massive amphibious training exercise that simultaneously secured a genuinely useful military asset.

Given the presumed state of enemy readiness in the South Pacific perhaps there is no need for an operation to season our air groups and amphibious doctrines. Presuming this to be true, and wishing to strike all objectives more or less simultaneously I think Bobimoto's much slenderer operation will more than suffice. And the assaults against Singapore, Java, Borneo, and Sumatra can serve as the training exercises, albeit rather more rigorous ones.

 

Domo arigato, Bobimoto-san, for that exposition of your plan. I am a bit concerned about the Southern Force, comprising our four smaller carriers with about 160 aircraft. By Day 3 they will be in the Java Sea, at the heart of the Dutch East Indies, taking on most of the air and naval strength of our opponents. I realize the enemy do not have a lot of ships or aircraft, but we will have very little margin for error.

Side note, I suggest that the southern force include Cruiser Division 8, Tone and Chikuma, to augment their air reconnaissance capability. Each carrier force should also have two of the Kongo class fast battleships.

It may seem a bit ironic, but one way to minimize risk is to put more combat power at the danger point. It's better to go all in than halfway. In that context, perhaps we should consider having the main carrier force continue south into the Java Sea after attacking the Malaya-Singapore area. This could also support our operations in eastern Sumatra.

Carrier forces in the Java Sea will need refueling, so I suggest that a fast tanker group follow the Southern Force; that route should be safer that running past Singapore while fighting is ongoing.

Earlier I had offered to make several of our H6K long-range aircraft available for dropping paratroops on Palembang or Djambi, about 800 and 700 nautical miles from southern Indochina, preferably before enemy defenses are alerted. We could also land H6Ks on lakes or rivers if the area is secured (I do not want to make a habit of taking the H6Ks away from their primary duties, but an occasional special mission could be accepted). Paratroops would need to be prompty reinforced by sea, so I suggested using our fast destroyer transports for the first reinforcement echelon. At one point our intelligence indicated two Dutch light cruisers at Palembang which would need to be thoroughly destroyed; even lying on the river bottom, their guns could still be a threat. Carrier dive bombers are probably the best means of achieving this.

It would be useful to have submarines on station at the outbreak of hostilities, but submarines are covert, not invisible. They spend most of their time on the surface. We cannot expect to deploy large numbers of submarines in heavily travelled waters without being detected.

You probably noticed that Noka-san's plan for Operation NoGo uses some of the same carriers, so I suggest the two of you consult and resolve this.

 

This really is a non-issue. Noka advanced his plan when we were still considering having the Noumea Operation as a preliminary to the SRA Operation. As he has stated, he included larger forces than needed because he saw it as a training opportunity. Which was a reasonable decision if that operation was a prelude to the SRA operation.

The basic concept for the carrier forces is to strike ahead as we enter contested waters, suppress and destroy enemy aircraft and airfields, as we seize enemy air bases, repair if required, fly in land based air and continue support and air suppression missions with these aircraft. Our carrier aircraft outrange the enemys land based air and we can strike at the airfields while still out of range, then move forward and strike the next set. The Southern Strike force will be the primary air asset in that area. The Northern Strike force carriers are an augment for the land based air in that area. The Commonwealth aircraft are the bigger threat and that is why I wanted additional aircraft for that area. I am in favor of your suggestion for having the two carrier forces marrying up, I think it's a very good idea. They can strike whatever Dutch, Australian, British naval forces that aren't destroyed during the initial assault and depart back through the Makassar Strait to the Palaus and then Truk. I'd pull the main carriers out and leave, CVL-02 Ryujo, CVL-03 Zuiho and CVE-02 Taiyo as a task force in the area for continued support.

I haven't addressed the planned individual task force compositions, but since you broached it, here goes. Yes, you are correct as to the need for replenishment. The northern area can easily re-fuel/resupply at Saigon or Cam Rahn Bay. We will have two replenishment task forces for the southern force, AO's, AD's and AKE's, to replenish torpedoes, ammunition, supplies and fuel. They will rotate as their materials are used up, a new one replacing the previous one while the empty replenishment force returns to Babeldaob to reload and return. I intend for them to follow the Balikpapan invasion force and anchor at that harbor as a forward resupply point. We can replenish ship main battery ammo up to heavy cruiser size, the battleships will have to return to a large harbor for main battery ammo replenishment. If we go with your suggestion of having the Northern Force carriers continuing on into the Java Sea, let's leave all four fast battleships, BB-07 Kongo, BB-08 Hiei, BB-09 Kirishima and BB-10 Haruna with the northern strike force. They have the biggest chance for coming into contact with major enemy surface forces and will be protecting our largest carriers. When this force joins with the two Kido Butai Southern Force carriers we will have our best, most able force heading for Truk in case the US decides to intervene.
The Malay operation will consist of two columns driving south, one along each coast, on D-Day from Singora and Patani Thailand. At dawn an amphibious force will land just south of Kota Bharu to cut off a retreat by Commonwealth forces, to serve as a blocking force and one unit will continue to drive south towards Kuantan, keeping ahead of the British ability to react. BB-05 Nagato and BB-06 Mutsu will provide cover for the Kota Bharu force. BB-03 Ise and BB-4 Hyuga for the Palembang invasion. BTW, currently the only warship at Palembang is a Coastal Mine Sweeper (CMc). BB-01 Fuso and BB-02 Yamashiro are the cover force for the invasion force landing north of Soerabaja. I haven't gotten into cruiser dispositions yet because much depends on approval of the Noumea operation.
As for immediate air/asw coverage for the invasion forces, CS-02 Chitose for Kota Bharu. CS-01 Mizuho for Balikpapan, released once land based aircraft arrive, then she'll move to join with the Soerabaja force to which the CS-03 Chiyoda is attached. The F1M "Pete" they carry is a formidable, multi-role float aircraft.

Well we are ostensibly at peace so anti-submarine patrols will be minimal pre-war. However, we will move to position as stealthily as possible, running submerged during the day or lying silently, and running surfaced at night, even if it requires a long inbound cruise. They should arrive on station on the night of the 27th, observe on the 28th, surface and report on the night of the 28th, be prepared to attack on the 29th.

I greatly appreciate your input as it helps to flesh out the plan. Hopefully, the rest of the council is following the discussion so that they will be fully informed about the plan, the possible dangers, our counters to those areas of risk, and be ready to vote up or down once we're done.

Respectfully,

 

I'm still looking at that. We have 63 in service and 9 of the -L transport prototypes. I am looking at the time required to convert the patrol version to paradrop capable configuration or if we can go ahead and start production on the -L and have sufficient numbers to pull off the drop. As best as I can figure, even using destroyers as transports the airborne forces will need to hold for at least three days. If I think we can land a large enough force and fly in sufficient supplies and reinforcements, I'll recommend going forward with the plan. Palembang is the #1 most important target and it is worth some risk. I am still toying with resupply/reinforcement by submarine. If I can get that to work I'll be more confident in not hanging our paratroopers out to dry. I'll keep you updated.

 

I have been content to allow the experts to flesh out our options but will interject my thoughts at this point.

Of the two options for Noumea I prefer to strike concurrent with our other strikes aimed at the SRA. I also prefer the smaller force detailed by Colonel Bobimoto as it is more in line with my perception of its value to the Empire. Like the Colonel, I am reasonably confident that moving on Noumea will not become a casus belli for the United States to declare war upon us if our other movements fail to. Indeed in the short term within American perception it may prove to be lost in the mist due to action at more notable locations such as Java and Singapore.

If this is agreeable to the other Council members, I too will add my positive vote.

It is tempting to dispense with the Vichy French pretense since it still seem of a part with our other moves and it would remove a complication in co-ordination between Imperial and Vichy forces, especially as at least part of it (the Vichy) will need to sail across the very area we will be moving our primary task forces and in doing so tip off inadvertently Anglo-Dutch forces.

Still, perhaps something can be salvaged diplomatically from the ruse. The council may recall we discussed at length the very real difficulties we are likely to encounter in having to care for European non-combatants and secure western PoW's due to both the climate we operate in and the limitations of our resources in a prolonged total war we expect to wage. We had hoped to engage the United States diplomatically to accept both the civilian internees and perhaps the ordinary ranks of the western military we may take into custody. This being to generate good will in all neutral counties, give the American's a credible reason to remain at peace and free us of a unwanted burdern we may not be able to bear.

Noumea might be one of the first places we can secure fully and repatriating De Gaulleist's quickly to the US might be a early test of the concept and possibly divert public attention briefly within the American press away from less palatable aspects of our drive to secure resources to the south. I would be will to accept a American flagged vessel (merchant or passenger) to actually stop at some place within our control in New Caladonia to collect them. The intelligence they might gain and pass to on to Anglo-Dutch forces seem worth the prize of continued peace with the US and in any event we will have plenty of time to readjust our dispositions before any Allied counterstrike.

 

Dutch air units are few and of minimal value. They are obsolete, limited range and mostly based in Java. One suggestion is Pontiak is available as an air base and would be in range for our fighters to give additional support.

 

The Allies may surprise us in 1942, given that their options will be somewhat limited, so I would not discount any threat to a "conquered" Noumea.

Further along those lines, Noumea will be in a rather untenable position being at the rather long end of the supply line. It would take some time to move air units to support and/or defend that location. Then we would have to deal with the problems in maintaining a sufficient logistical chain to sustain extended operations from that location. And that does not even begin to address turning it it a reasonable naval facility - even if only used by our submarines. Then we have to consider what will be the requirement of maintaining a sizable military garrison there - although this would be the easiest of the three to maintain. At the time, IIRC, I believe that are supply of aircraft, especially the flying boats, is relatively low, so again this will take time to build up. I believe the same goes for the G4M Rikko. Not to mention trained and experienced pilots to fly these aircraft. Again, it will take time for these aircraft to become operational at Noumea. Thus, it is with regret that I cannot reach the same conclusion that, if we lose our carriers, Noumea will be a strategic block. Because once we lose our carriers, we lose control of the sea lanes supplying Noumea, and we lose the protection provided by a rapid influx of aircraft into the battle for the island.


I also cannot agree with your statement - "As long as we can maintain that threat, we hold the initiative and we can use the time gained to strengthen our defensive perimeter in other areas, train more pilots, produce more and better aircraft, possibly resolve the China problem, etc. In this case, time is our best ally." At this point, we will be taking a defensive position and the initiative has already passed to the Americans. With the US Pacific Battle Fleet only 4000 miles away, we will be faced with committing the major carriers and most if not all of our battleships to maintaining a close proximity to Noumea to repel the American invaders...Are we willing to make that commitment? Because by presenting a "threat" to the Americans, we will be making Noumea the area most likely to be stuck first and somewhat quickly, thereby excising the "threat" before it becomes something much more than just a "threat."


With regardes to the nickle, don't forget the sizable deposits of chrome. Unfortunately, most of this is going to the United States - the Nickle by way of Canadian resale, and the Chrome, IIRC, goes directly, and I believe supplies about 17% of the US demand for Chrome. Regretfully, another reason the United States will want the island back under "Allied" control.

Roosevelt may personally dislike DeGaulle, but many of FDR's top advisers favor the Free French, and their opinions are slowly changing FDR's outlook on things. Not to mention support of the Vichy gains him very little in Europe and Africa(after all the French in Africa will fight just as long as they deem necessary to satisfy their pride, then surrender). Meanwhile, with a full blown war in the Pacific, he will need all the Allies he can get - and most of the French territories have already gone with the Free French. As to "pushing" the Vichy into the German camp, regretfully they are already there - should the Germans decide to take control of the situation, the French are not capable of stopping them, just as the French will be incapable of stopping any Allied invasion of France. Just as the French were in no position to oppose our moves into Indochina.

As to putting political "spin" on this, is it really worth it? We would be fooling no one, and any diplomatic "currency" we have with Germany would be better spent in other places(like technology). Also, along the line of "establishing national pride," that would be a pretty neat trick since everyone would no that it was Japan and not Vichy that brought about their "salvation." Further along those lines, as I mentioned before, given our past treatment of Indochina, I doubt that the Noumean locals put much faith in Japanese words.

With regret, I believe that you are in error concerning the American reaction to a Noumean invasion.

The goings on in French Africa are of little concern to them right now, as they have no immediate vested interest in who controls what in Vichy Africa.

However, the situation regarding Noumea is quite, quite different. First, the Americans have a vested interest in maintaining the air route that runs through there as it is the air route that they fly to get to the Philippines. Also, it is their prime shipping route from the West Coast to Australia and the Philippines. The severing of this line would have dire consequences for maintaining a direct line to the Philippines, as well as the movement of reinforcements there. Second, and this ties in with the first, it effectively severs the Philippines from the United States, a situation the United States cannot allow to be maintained, especially since they are rapidly moving forces there. Third, we are encroaching on United States interests in this area, thus any attempt by us to "spin" this favorable will, in all likelihood fall on "deaf" American ears. Further, given the anti-Japanese feeling that is running strong in the United States also hampers our chances of any "spin."

So, to conclude - How can they, the US, allow the seizure of sovereign French territory, specifically Noumea? Because it is in their enlightened self-interest to do so.

 

Perhaps you missed the polls that indicated, as of August, 1941, that 70% of Americans favored risking war if it prevented Japan from becoming stronger, although it dipped a bit by October to 64%, and this is without any provocative moves by us. Now, if we take New Caledonia and sever American links to the Philippines, this will most likely provoke US entry into the war. For, while the isolationists are not in favor of war, they are strong on it's defense, and are not likely to take kindly to us effectively enveloping the Philippines without a fight. Nor, I believe, will they stand idly by to let US Forces wither on the Philippine vine. Further, since you mention that the US population will not fight to maintain the overseas colonies of Britain and the Netherlands, I doubt that the will stand idly by as [cough]Imperial[cough] Japan replaces one imperialist power with another, while at the same time endangering all United States Colonies in the Pacific.

What would the situation be?

Yes, we have seized New Caledonia, but not in force, nor with sufficient organic air power to prevent any retaking of the island. We are, in all likelihood, forcing a titanic naval battle that is the exact opposite of what we had planned for for twenty some years, while at the same time risking losses that we, at the moment, can ill afford.

Thus, we are faced with a choice, either we do this in a manner so as not to provoke the Americans - such as providing Vichy Indochina with some transports and a few overage destroyers, duly purchased of course, and let them do what they will. Or, we move in with our troops, naval, and air forces, and provoke the United States into war, and all that entails.

 

I don't think that Noumea's Chromium or Nickel production is vital to the US though. In 1941 the US only mined like 3,000 tons of Chromite,before that year only a few hundred tons a year ,but it managed to mine up to 43,000 tons in 1943 however it went down to about 12,000 tons in 1944.It was much the same story in WW1 where the US managed briefly to become the number one Chromite producer in the world with plans to even expand production even more before the Great War ended.I also can pretty surely say that Canada had some Chromite deposits which could be tapped in an emergency while supplying large totals of Nickel,to also which Cuba has large supplies.

http://minerals.usgs.gov/ds/2005/140/ds140-chrom.pdf

 

Thank you Icki-san for the useful data.

 

Admiral Takao, I have always had the utmost respect for your opinion. I have read and pondered your arguments. I do however feel that you are overstating the United States and Commonwealth's present capabilities. I feel you are not giving sufficient weight to the possibility that given a well planned, effectively executed propaganda campaign, that we can manipulate American public opinion, and are looking at our options from a regional conflict perspective, when we need to be working from a global perspective.

There are risks, but they are calculated risks, and risks that failure to take will have a detrimental effect on our ability to be successful in this war. Unlike many in our military, and the planning the previous regime had developed, I think this will be a long war, not a short one. We can not match the United States industrially, so our only option to have a reasonable chance of a negotiated settlement is to make it a war of attrition. If we drag it out the American public will become war weary, if we make the costs in material and personnel losses more than the American public is willing to spend.

I am not discounting any threat to Noumea, but initially the United States lacks sufficient fleet support to mount a major attempt to retake it. I estimate that we have until mid' 1942 before they could mount an operation with sufficient strength to have a hope of being successful. Even then it would strain their capabilities to the limit. So we have six to eight months to improve our defensive posture there, enough time to make it very formidable, but we will begin strengthening our position from day one.

No more so than other options that have been investigated during our predecessors planning. It is no more of a supply issue than locations in the Solomons, and I will suggest that it would in fact serve to reduce the logistics difficulties of supplying those locations. To the US though it's possession would be necessary for a successful campaign to retake the Solomons. It will be no harder than the massive effort planned for our invasion of New Guinea, in fact a good deal less demanding.

It is as good a natural harbor as Rabaul, which previous plans have looked at as a forward base. Existing port infrastructure is nearly as good, supporting infrastructure is better. It is superior to Kavieng another location that has been previously planned for, though I still think Kavieng would be a good intermediate base for our supply lines. Additionally, Noumea should not be analyzed as a stand alone proposition, but as a key location to regional strategy including Efate and Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides, locations in the Santa Cruz chain and as a blocking position for expansion and base development all up the Solomons chain. From a "long war" point of view, our strategy needs to be a series of formidable defensive positions that must be reduced one after another, to buy time and increase costs to our enemies in hopes of making them war weary. These positions should have such strategic importance that they cannot be bypassed as part of a US strategy as has been proposed by Lieutenant Colonel Earl Hancock Ellis, USMC, in his 712H Operation Plan, "ADVANCED BASE OPERATIONS IN MICRONESIA", 1921. Noumea meets this criteria, they have to have it to take the New Hebrides, the New Hebrides to re-take the lower Solomons, etc.

The US Pacific fleet is the main source of US strength in the region. We will never be stronger in comparison to the US than we presently are, best case scenario for us is that they make an attempt to re-take Noumea and their fleet can be destroyed by Kido Butai. With each passing month the US will have more ships, more planes, more men. If we are to engage them it needs to be from a position where we hold the advantages. Noumea would subject a US Fleet to detection and attrition before they come within range to utilize their carrier aircraft. Kido Butai would have intelligence on US Fleet locations, and dispositions prior to the US having the ability to detect and react to them. Kido Butai would be free to maneuver into position for an advantageous attack. Friendly damaged ships would have nearby port facilities to retire to, enemy ships would be subjected to additional attacks by long range air when attempting to withdraw, plus attacks by our submarines that can be vectored into location using reports by search aircraft from our island bases. The IJN has long sought a decisive battle with the US Fleet, this would provide it, on the most favorable terms. A US invasion force would also be subjected to additional attacks from supporting positions in the New Hebrides, and counter-landings by quick reaction forces stationed there. Additionally, we lack the oil/fuel resources the United States has, naval operations use huge amounts. We can base the fleet out of Truk, near the probable point of action and reduce our fuel needs. If we need Kido Butai for operations in other areas, we can pull them out, for the hub of land based airfields on and around Noumea will still provide a strong defense. We can also, temporarily, shift smaller or less capable carriers into the area to stage air raids on isolated allied locations to make it appear Kido Butai is still present while we shift it to another area where it is needed, complete the operation and return. Over the next six to eight months, the time I estimate it will take the US to mount an amphibious operation with minimal chances of success, we will be gaining the additional carriers CVL-04 Junyo, Nov 41, CVE-03 Unyo, Jan 42, CVE-04 Chuyo, Feb 42, CV(a)-08 Junyo May 42 and CV(a)-09 Hiyo in Jul 42, enough decks and aircraft to make the deception believable, and that is not considering the carriers we currently have that are not part of Kido Butai, Hosho, and CVL-02 Ryujo, CVL-03 Zuiho and CVE-02 Taiyo.

I do not foresee us losing our carriers, if employed in conjunction with land based air from island bases. In fact this strategy is intended to minimize our risk of losing this critical asset. My actual comment was based upon a "worst case" scenario.

If we lose our carriers all our positions are exposed. With Noumea we still threaten the enemy's supply lines to Australia. If we develop the Noumea defensive hub, land based air there will equal many more aircraft than the US can bring to bear with it's available carrier decks. This is considering what we can develop easily and quickly, we can invest more money, engineering troops and time and develop it even further, but what we can develop readily and quickly is airfields capable of supporting 1700 aircraft. Additionally, these aircraft have longer range than US carrier based air, if we consider the G3M "Nell", with a 2722 mi range, which we have in numbers, our A6M fighter has a range of 1162 miles or 1930 miles with a drop tank, our D3A1 "Val" with a 915 mile range, B5N "Kate" 608 miles, vs. 1130 miles for the SBD and 435 miles for the TBD and 860 miles for their F4F fighter. We can commence unescorted strikes on the enemy at over twice the range they can strike us with unescorted dive bombers. We can begin escorted strikes before they are within range for unescorted strikes. If they wait until they can deliver escorted strikes they are now within range of both the G4M and D3A. Then if they desire to utilize their torpedo aircraft to attack shipping in the harbor, we have a 1/3 range advantage there also. The enemy can extend the range of it's fighters to 1690 miles with drop tanks, but this gets into cutting back on aviation munitions stores on her carriers, the space issue is something we do not have with land based air.

I'll address more of your points later. Work to do.

 

IT is well to remember that we are not capable of sustaining long term combat operations in Noumea until Rabaul is operational and is well built up. Truk only has limited repair facilities so most ships will have to go home for major repairs. Do we want the Us to start working on building up Samoa as a base because they perceive a threat?

 

Also is not the objective to avoid a war with the US? I would rather go with out Noumea then have it provoke a fight that we do not want yet.

 

Do you think it anymore likely that taking Noumea will cause the US to declare war on us than our attacking Singapore and the DEI? I think that in the US view our taking of Noumea is less of a provocation than our other targets. However, if we do not attack Singapore and seize the oil resources in the DEI, we need to pull out of China in order to get the US to remove it's sanctions or let our economy collapse and our people starve. Those are our options. If anyone see's additional options please put them forward.

Why? What makes Rabaul critical to our long term combat operations? I do intend for the capture of Rabaul, it will be a secondary or tertiary target, in the meantime cutting it off and isolating it will suffice. As for repair facilities, the council has already approved construction of repair shipyards at Truk. I have already issued orders for the necessary construction personnel, materials and supplies to be sent there, construction should begin in a few days. I have authorized the construction of three repair docks, the largest which can accommodate any ship in service except the Yamato's.

 

We need Rabaul because of the danger of over loading Truk. Its not just types but numbers. What happens if there are 15 or 20 ships that need work? Rabaul also is needed for its air base capacity. If the US does decide to intervene we will be very vulnerable if we do not have air bases ready asap. The Solomon chain islands will need work to be able to handle more then basic recon. I don't like the idea of reaching for Noumea with out having bases to cover the distance. We need our carriers to complete the conquest of the DEI and we cant have them in two places at once
Finally if we get in a fight with the US we will have to deal with the Philippines before we can fight in the S Pacific

 

There are currently no repair facilities at Rabaul or Kavieng, so repair capacity is a non-issue.

The current airfield capacity at Rabaul is only slightly larger than the current airfield capacity at Noumea. The amount of work required to make either location into a large airbase is comparable, as is time required. The surrounding islands at Noumea are favorable for airfield construction so there is greater potential in the Noumea area, than at Rabaul and it's surrounding locations. The only advantage to Rabaul is that it's remoteness would give additional time for improvements before the US could strike at it, allowing more time for improvements.

And using Rabaul for basing aircraft for covering the lower Solomons, forces us to do so at extreme ranges, increasing the potential for operational losses and increasing non-combat attrition. I do consider Rabaul important for a defense of the northern Solomons, that is why I stated it needed to be a secondary or tertiary target. Because the US can't undertake a Solomons offensive without neutralizing Noumea, that buys us additional time to build up the base.

And the plan we abandoned from our predecessors had the carriers tied up with an attack on Hawaii, after that they were planned to support the seizure of Rabaul and Kavieng. We are actually proposing to use them, initially, for the Malaya/DEI operation, then having them move to Truk to be prepared to respond to a possible US declaration of war. Where is the difference in their location related to having them available to complete the conquest of the DEI. We can support that operation, after the initial attacks with land based air. In our predecessor's original plans, air support of the DEI operation was strictly land based, from the beginning. If there is not an immediate US declaration of war, we can use the carriers to seize Rabaul. They will still be located in the vicinity, where we need them. I do not think the US will attack us without a war declaration, this will give us time to return to Truk, replenish and be ready to meet an American attack.

I have four divisions slated to remain in Formosa as operational reserve for our initial operations. If the US declares war some or all can be used against the Philippines. I would prefer that we do not immediately invade them. First, I would like to attempt to reach a separate, diplomatic agreement for neutrality from the Philippine government. We will have them surrounded and the US is in no position to be able to successfully defend them. We will offer guaranteed neutrality and independence and offer to open trade with them. We will also, if not at war, offer to repatriate all American military personnel. If this fails I would invade a number of the smaller surrounding islands, and Mindanao. We would establish a naval and air blockade of the main islands of Luzon and Leyte, and allow them to wither on the vine and we can retake them if and when we decide to do so. US air and naval strength will not survive long without re-supply and reinforcement. Any attempt by the US fleet to fight it's way through to relieve the Philippines only plays into our hands and gives us the opportunity to destroy the Pacific fleet. I do not think American war planners are that foolish.

 

Has it not always been our intention to improve facilities at Truk? Presently I believe we have one large floating drydock there. There appear to be sites adequate for the construction of several large graving docks, significant machine and boiler shops, stores yards, and all the supporting facilities for a large modern repair yard. With investment it could be the equal of Pearl Harbor, or even it's superior in some ways. It will always require a considerable effort to supply, but the same is true of any forward base we might build in the Pacific. (And the same goes for our enemies.) Truk is a bit removed from Noumea, but it is close enough to be useful. And it has been and I presume remains our intention to seize and develop a supporting base at Rabaul should we find ourselves at war with Australia or the Commonwealth. In fact, looking at a map I crafted some months back of Pacific Bases, it appears to me that the whole of the South Pacific could be made into a very defensible area with interior lines to Truk by the seizure of strategic points in the Solomons and the Gilberts, which are sparsely populated and lightly defended to undefended, and Noumea. The Solomons and Gilberts are already in our plans. Noumea is the missing piece in the line. If our early plans are sufficiently successful there are further objectives that we could add at little cost, helping to consolidate and secure our lines. While I have no desire to confront Australia directly, and little desire to invade the Philippines, working to control lines of communications to both of these two locales seems to me wise. The fact that Noumea sits astride these lines seems to me more of a feature than a flaw. I find I still support Colonel Bibimoto's plan, even if it hastens war with the United States, though I still hope it might not. I fear that such war is eventually inevitable. If we must go to war with them, let it be both soon and a war of their instigation. Speed plays to our strengths, so long as we continue to prepare for a long war. If they declare war on us out of retaliation to an indirect threat then the ensuing war will probably not have the political support that it otherwise might. I do not wish war with the Americans, but we must not fear it so much that it that we let them tie our hands to our sides. We must have the freedom to draw our sword even if we point it at the ground.

 

Very good work on the Truk plan Admiral!

Some questions.
1.) In order to distribute facilities to make an air raid on the base more complicated, could we build a large airbase with auxiliary airfields on Fefan and Weno?
2.) Weno looks to be an excellent location for a large seaplane base. We could also build facilities for the stationing of our land combat units there. Instead of attempting to make all locations we control across the Pacific, into impregnable fortresses, I would like to go with smaller garrisons, with sufficient fortifications to delay enemy conquest for two-three days allowing us to attack their invasion fleet and make a counter-landing. We could station our main reaction force there, to be forward deployed when enemy activity is discovered. this will also lessen our logistical burden attempting to supply large forces at too many far flung locations.
3.) A small fighter airstrip at Udot to support the main airfields.
4.) Turn Uman into an field exercise, live fire range. We could practice landings, hold field problems, practice naval gunfire and have bombing ranges. We have an initial qualitative advantage in several areas. Continuous training will allow us to maintain the advantage.

All could be supported by small craft like the 14 and 17 meter Daihatsu's from the main naval base or small coastal freighters. Logistics would be streamlined. Your thoughts?

 

I just do not think we should risk fighting near Noumea until we have bases ready to support the operations. If we do find the US responding we should not be caught fighting on such a distant area especially when Truk would be needed to support other operations.