Barbarossa is well planned & executed, much like the sickle cut was.

Again, look at the performance of the numerous STUG in Kursk and the Bulge (among the few German offensives after Stalingrad) and the few Tiger and Panther.

During Bagration, Normandy, etc, the WM would have certainly been much better off wth a lot of STUG than with a few luxury Panzer.

The STUG also performed very well defensively in Kurland, where they exceeded medium and heavy Panzers by a lot.

Rommel could certainly have used dozens of STUG with long barrel guns much better than Pz II and III against Tobruk, etc, in 1941. Rommel had to make do with masterful deployment of 88 mm guns for years, for want of enough long barrel 75 mm guns on armored vehicles. In a sense 88 mm guns were overkill in N Africa and the shells much more expensive and heavier and hence more difficult to transport the long distance to el Alamein.

 

Uh, I have. Do you know what the ACSDB and the KDB are? Please enlighten me about the performance of the StuG at Kursk, the Bulge, Bagration, Normandy, etc...preferably with details about the units and the numbers. I can hardly wait.

Rommel certainly could have used dozens more tanks as well, along with trucks, logistical support. So it was the lack of StuG which saved Tobruk in April 1941. Fascinating.

Oh, and of course we can't forget the difficulty of transporting 88mm ammunition over 75mm ammunition.

 

I still find it amazing that someone who has demonstrated so little real knowledge or understanding of the material starts to lecture a professional, who has spent a good portion of his career studying the topic,with a post like this.

 

Dear friends, let's get back to the topic and kill the dead horse.

First of all, the idea of the present theme isn't novel as the author of the opening post suggests. Such a plan was proposed by Adolf Hitler himself at Berghoff on July, 31 1940. At that conference with OKH and OKW staff he proposed a five month campaign starting in May 1941. According to his plan, 120 divisions should have attacked in two directions: towards Kiew and the Dnepr whilst in the north, second group would attack along the Baltic and then would turn south towards Moscow. The result would have been a giant envelopment towards the center of the USSR. Although, there were no objections, the proposal was unanonimously and silently abandoned, by the OKH, OKW and the Führer, Adolf Hitler himself.

Above mentioned is simple historic fact, well documented. (*)

And, now, Mjölnir wants us to believe, that the Barbarossa would have ended successfully, had the Germans acted more wisely. He blames Paulus and the Führer for the failure in the best tradition of the Neo-you-know-who. The truth is that it was the German military elite who has conceived a plan that led the entire German nation into an utter failure.That is how it was. Even the "Mjölnir's idea" was considered but abandoned.

Are there any further questions left regarding this subject?

(*) Warlimont, Inside, pp. 112-113, 135

 

The july proposal was wisely abandoned because logistically it was impossible .

 

Attacking excessively strong and strategically useless Kiev (OTL the bane of Barbarossa) with all flanks exposed has nothing to do with attacking along the 2 weak coasts with a flank covered and Leningrad from Finland and using shipping to assist supplies and reinforcements. Capturing invaluable Leningrad and Kharkov (tank production centers) and converging on Moscow.

 

You are co cute, aren't you? The Führer wouldn't give up before five past twelve. You still persist five week past midnight.

 

If you want to argue present relevant arguments, not absurd BS and what only you consider funny remarks.

 

Who is talking about relevant arguments ? The man who proposed a big German attack on Leningrad which would start from Finland .

 

You can expect a fair amount more in regards to replies if you weren't committing the same faults you mention above in spades (with the possible exception of the "funny remarks" part, some of your posts are so off the wall I can't tell). It would also help if you responded to relevant questions and supported your position with sources when asked. So far I can't really tell if your problem is a massive ego combined with a very very limited understanding of WW2 or you are simply and under bridge dweller. The "or" could be of the inclusive nature.

 

Belasar, please close all my threads.

 

Why? I see no reason not to allow others to comment on these threads. While you may have initiated them that in no way implies that you own them.

 

Mjolnir you clearly have no understanding of planning or military affairs. Besides not doing research such as your blatant error in the P38 e and f, you think like Hitler does in pretending that moving arrows around is all you need in strategy. Finland and north Russia has too limited of a rail net and virtually no road net to support any more forces then were there. The reason there was no plan after the taking of Smolensk is that Germany had too few forces and too limited of logistics to move beyond on such a broad front. You call Eisenhower a limited strategist and yet he understood something you don't. When you attack on a narrow front you allow your opponent to also concentrate on a narrow front. The reason the Germans had to attack on a broad front is that the Soviets had the manpower to attack on multiple fronts and thus force the Germans to fight numerous small battles that drained their manpower. The main reason for the German failure is their lack of logistical support. They had too few trucks to support their blitzkrieg, about 90% of their army was dependent on horse and thus could only move at that rate. Do you know why Manstein was not involved in planning? He hadn't been to the general staff school and thus wasn't qualified since he had never studied the immense difficulties in logistical planning. He was a great operational commander, but not a very good strategic commander. Amateurs study strategy professionals study logistics

 

Mjolnir, if you do some basic research you would know the Soviets did produce stug like vehicles, SU 85, SU 122, SU 100 and SU 76.

 

1)This is not correct

2) Yes and no

3 ) One should be careful with this statement

 

source, US military study of the planning of Barbarossa. Paulus was actually the one who predicted the need to go north and south after Smolensk to clear the flanks of AGC. To go directly after Moscow with out going north would leave some very long flanks for AGC and thus the need to leave infantry to guard them.

 

1)There was a plan for the after Smolensk period : after the fall of Smolensk (which implied the collaps of the SU),the Ostheer would have a break,and than some 50 infantry divisions would occupy the SU til the AA line,the other divisions would return to Germany /be disbanded .

2) The main reason for the German failure is not a lack of logistical support but the fact that the SU did not collaps in the summer: if the SU had collapsed in the summer,there would be no logistical problems .

The same happened 3 years later in France : Patton failed to invade Germany and blamed logistics,while the truth was that he was stopped by the Germans.

3) The well-known quote about amateurs and professionals is misleading, because it implies that better logistics results in victory .The truth is that amateurs study strategy and professionals strategy and logistics .

4)Paulus was wrong : if the SU had collapsed, there would be no need to protect flancs.What happened is that the only scenario that would result in German victory failed to occur and that the Germans had to improvise ,and what the defenders of the German generals may claim, there was very quickly an agreement : the main axe of the attacl would be in the direction of MOscow,to lure the Red Army iin a decisive battle :the Germans hoped that Typhon would do what Barbarossa failed to do .The forces of AGN and AGS could not participate in Typhoon, the only thing they could do was to protect the flancs of AGC against a danger that was imaginary after the fall of Kiew .

 

But the reason the Germans decided the Soviets had to collapse is because of the lack of troops and supplies to overcome resistance to reach the AA line. Sorry but not having gas is the reason for the allied stop in France. Yes there was resistance finally building, but with full supplies the allies may have been to reach the line. Regarding Kiev, the turn south was to protect the flanks, it was Guderian that demanded his full panzer group go south and that it not be split up.

 

Patton did not need more gas : if the Germans had collapsed, his soldiers could cross the Rhine by foot .

 

irrelevant, if there had been enough gas then as I stated the allies could have got to the Rhine. Crossing the river would have required a stop in order to get the right equipment.