Battle of Britain, won by the Navy.

To qoute my tv: "Completly and totally useless"

 

Keep in mind the RN would be reacting to the Germans here. Capital ships and cruisers would be kept away (as far as Scapa for some) until the invasion was "on" then would have to sail immediately, so their time of arrival in the Channel would depend on their speed and the distance they had to steam. Ultra might give some warning, but there would then be the perennial problem of whether it is better NOT to react to Ultra intercepts because of the risk of the Germans realising their comms were penetrated.

I know we've done this topic to death before, but can anyone quickly recall how long the Wehrmacht expected the Channel crossing to take? IIRC it was about 24 hours?

 

i belive stuka ace RUDEL sank a russian battleship in 41 with a single bomb ..the stukas were certainly able to hit a battleship ,was the development of an AP bomb beyond the abilties of LW boffins ..how about a few HEs on the signal bridge for starters or perhaps a lucky one down the stack ? no big hurry ..nice long summer days and booming uboat nights ...with no raf fighters arround they could really practice their dives all day long on the same flameing hulks while the 109s swept the aa crews away and the he111s could perfect their skip bombing ..the RN wouldnt die in 200 minutes like the POW and repulse off siam ,it seems one small airmail detonation near the rudder crippled the mighty bismark ...it would prolly take the novice LW a few days to line the channels bottom with the "blind "and helpless royal navy ...the LW and KM being able to keep it in sight from the moment it fired its boilers in scapa ...now if the BOB could be pushed back to 1915 or 1890 even ...then the BBS of the RN would have walloped some german butt...tsushima ,jutland theres the time of fearless dreadnoughts !!!..its those pesky tiny flying machines that ruined everything ..gravity intead of gunpower ??? u boats skulking about ? its unsportsmanlike ..damned infernal spoilers !!!

 

I still find it hard to know when you are being sarcastic or not Majorwoody...

Note that this event happened a year after the events we are talking about... What has been stated is that in 1940 no Stuka crews had been given anti-ship training, so (aside from a few marvels like Rudel) they would not do all that well.

No, particularly because they did develop one. Hoever getting it developed, tested and produced in significant amounts in time is... unlikely.

To achieve such an occurance with every RN ship using aircrew untrained in attacking ships would be nothing short of miraculous.

RAF fighters would still be around, as would FAA fighters. And what flaming hulks (see above). And what skip-bombing? TRhe tactyic was not invented until ~1942...
Sure, the RN would take damage, but nothing like enough to stop them. And the Germans only have the time it takes the RN to sail to Dover...

Delivered by an aerial torpedo... which the Germans did not have in 1940

See above.

 

Also a lucky hit down the stack was exactly what Rudel got with the Marat. So you have one example of the most decorated and famous dive bomber pilot in the Luftwaffe scoring a lucky hit against a single warship in shallow water and in port a year after the alternative history being discussed against a major fleet manouevring at sea.

Also, the point needs to be made again that the Luftwaffe was not trying to destroy the RAF or British Aviation as a whole, and was basically incapable of even destroying fighter command. Bomber Command was largely unaffected, save for a few bombing attacks made in error, Coastal Command, ditto. The Fleet Air Arm was barely touched and whilst 11 Group was hit hard, the still significant 12 Group and the much smaller 13 Group was beyond the reach of effective Luftwaffe strikes and 10 Group was hit much less hard than 11. There were plenty of fighters to hand to provide a fighter umbrella for the sorties of the Home Fleet. Even Sea Gladiators and Skuas would be capable enough of downing Stukas.

On ULTRA, this would be a real do-or-die for Britain, I really cannot see there being much to chose between for the high command given the severity of the threat and the desperation the UK would be in if Seelöwe were launched. Every possible means would be used to repel the invasion including apparently (It is mentioned in one of the other threads IIRC), Chemical Weapons. I think they'd take a chance on ULTRA personally, rather than risk a Churchill trying to establish a De Gaulle style Free-British Government in Exile in Canada.

(Editted for spelling.)

 

Try 11 days to get 9 infantry divisions and 250 tanks across.

 

No. He was one of 3 pilots who hit the stationary battleship that day. A old battleship which had already been hit in a previous air raid a few days before, and which the Soviets had decided not to repair, but use as a floating battery to defend Leningrad.
While the attack in which Rudel took part did sink the battleship, she sank in shallow water, and the Soviets were still able to use her as an artillery battery with 3 of her four main turrets still operational

:lol: The Luftwaffe couldn't stop the RN from rescuing the majority of the British army at Dunkirk over a two week period, yet you seem to think they would be able to stop the RN from reaching the invasion forces even though they have only a couple of hours at most to do it

I don't know what you are drinking, but it must be strong stuff

 

It makes you chuckle when you read opposing views by blokes depending on what service they belonged to.

Hobbs [Navy] said the battle won by the Navy, and then explains what the Navy ''would'' have done if it got to fire a shot.

And plenty of R.A.F. fellas like Group Capt Sir Hugh Dundas [11 kills in the Battle] says it's probable that the invasion would have succeeded if the Navy had no air cover, citing the Navy carnage at Crete in May '41 as an example.
He goes on to say that even if the invasion was defeated, the Luftwaffe roaming over Britain unhindered, destroying vital industry and convoys approaching harbour would have Britain in a bit of a pickle.

Other prominent R.A.F. figures like Air Vice Marshall Crowley- Miller doesnt even acknowledge the R.N. in his appraisal of the R.A.F. being the only saviour for Britain.

 

Sorry, I meant one trip over, not the whole build up

 

That is just the time it would have taken just to get the first wave across.
Once the attack started the German naval forces would have been involved in around the clock mission to land the forces and attempt to keep them supplied, how long it would take the first units to reach the invasion beaches would of course depend on what type of vessel they travelled in, and from what port. The total of 3 infantry divisions is the total estimated to be capable of being landed within the first 24 hours,

 

its strange how the LW chose to ignore anti shipping tactics and equipment for so long ..its not like the germans were ignorant of aircraft and torpedo design ..it seems to me almost all ww2 surface fleets came to a bad end if they traveled without aircover while in range of enemy bomber forces ..if bismark ,tirpetz and PE had been laid down as carriers instead of gun platforms the battle of the atlantic might have come out differently ...

 

My guess is that the Luftwaffe ignored anti-shipping because they were essentially an Army Tactical Airforce.

As for Tirpitz etc being finished as Carriers, to be honest I can't imagine that it would have made a huge difference to the Battle of the Atlantic, they didn't have the surface support and would simply have been too few and Germany had no experience of operating aircraft carriers.

Had they made any impact the Allies, the US especially, were more than capable of stepping up the number of fighter and Scout-bomber equipped CVEs among the Convoys.

 

Indeed
Here's an article by the poster 'Rich' from the Armchair General forums on the practical difficulties the Germans would have faced with carriers.
" I’ll be the first to admit I don’t know much about WWII in Europe, not something in which I’ve ever had a heck of a lot of interest, but I do know carrier operations in WWII and what worked and what didn’t and why.

The Kriegsmarine had no naval doctrine that included carriers. Great Britain, Japan, and the US, the major players in the aircraft carrier business, had been operating pure aircraft carriers since the 1920’s in case of the later two and, without looking it up, about 1918 for Great Britain. By "pure carrier" I mean carriers whose airplanes are wheeled, are recovered aboard ship by some sort of arrestor arrangement (however primitive in the early years), and could also be operated from land bases. Further, the aircraft in use (again except for the very early models) were specifically designed for carrier operations. The navies of these three nations worked out the problems and challenges of carrier operations in the 20’s and 30’s and became, each in their own way, the best in the business. The feeble attempts of the Germans (and the Italians) to, first of all, develop aircraft carriers, much less carrier aircraft, were, frankly, laughable in retrospect.

Graf Zeppelin was, in theory, anyway, to have incorporated the best features of IJN, USN and RN carriers (circa 1936, remember), but managed to end up a glopping together of some of the worst carrier ideas that had already been discarded by those services.

All you have to do is look at the main guns and their placement aboard Graf Zeppelin and it’s obvious that the Kreigsmarine considered surface vessels as the major threat to their carrier. Even pre-war, the RN, IJN, and USN could have told them that that was a waste of time and effort; that the real threat to the ship was in the air. The USN went down that road with Lexington class and their 8” turrets. By the mid 1930’s it was recognized that those guns were so much dead weight. Note that as soon after the Japanese attacked Pearl the 8-inchers were removed and replaced on Saratoga with 5-inch dual purpose and on Lexington with temporary 1.1 in AAA mounts (Lexington was scheduled to receive 5-inch mounts, but she was sunk at Coral Sea before that could happen).

Another major failing in the Graf Zeppelin design was in an incomprehensibly low avgas storage capacity. The smallest and oldest carrier in the IJN, Hosho, had a capacity of 98,000 gallons and carried but 22 planes. Essex class carrier contemporaries of Graf Zeppelin had up to 240,000 gallons avgas capacity and, in practice, were replenished every three to four days during combat operations. And Graf Zeppelin . . . carried a paltry 65,000 gallons. How do you suppose they were planning on replenishing their avgas supply, not to mention their bunker fuel? Yes, yes, I know, the Germans had successfully experimented with underway replenishment, but I’d suggest they never experimented on the scale necessary to maintain carrier operations and especially in the face of some very aggressive enemy carriers looking to put that scalp on their lodge pole. Ideally, one likes to pull off to some out of the way corner of the ocean for such evolutions . . . once Graf Zeppelin hits the Atlantic, there no out of the way corners.

Further, how many pilots, crew, and aircraft was Germany prepared to sacrifice to bring their carrier into operational being? Carrier aviation, though somewhat safer today, and "safer" is an extremely subjective term, in the 1930’s, 40’s and 50’s was an extremely dangerous profession. Where were the Germans planning on training their folks to operate their hybrid craft off carriers? In the Baltic? How nice for them, nice enclosed seas with, compared to the reaches of the North Atlantic, nice calm waters. What’s going to happen when a pilot who has trained in calm waters is suddenly faced with crappy North Atlantic weather with the horizon a short 5 miles away and a flight deck that rises and falls 25 to 30 feet as he attempts to land. Did the Kreigsmarine have a plan for training LSOs to deal with this problem as they coaxed the pilots aboard? Were there flight deck officers who knew by feel just when to launch a plane so that it doesn’t just “thuup” into a wave? News flash, the folks doing these jobs in the USN, RN, and IJN had had a lot of practice at this and even they made mistakes. And what of the poor pilots? Do you suppose their training included flying their craft to their extremes of range; fighting an action; making their way back to where they think their carrier is going to be; if they’re lucky, finding it; and then trying to land in the dark on a pitching deck with their engine running on fumes?

The development of carrier aviation in the "big three" over the years pushed operational limits such as these. Leaders in carrier operations knew that conditions would never be perfect and would probably be the worst imaginable. USN fleet exercises in the 1920s and 30’s often had admirals such as Reeves and King wondering if they’d ever see their planes again as they were sent off on long missions to attack the make-believe "enemy." Even so, non-combat aircraft losses combined with combat operational losses, i.e., aircraft lost through accident not related to combat damage, but on combat missions, were high.

For example, in the USN, for the entire war, in the course of some 388,000 plus flights (of which 147,000 plus were combat action sorties) there were 4,863 losses of carrier-based aircraft. 1,877 were directly related to in combat losses, either in combat with enemy aircraft or to enemy AAA; 1,001 were combat operational losses; and 1,985 were non- combat related. 61.4% of losses did not result from holes being poked in aircraft or pilots. What do you suppose the rates would be for a single operating aircraft carrier whose entire crew and air group has maybe six months experience in carrier operations? What do you suppose their losses would be like in just achieving that six months of operational training? And for that matter, once in action, how do you suppose this aircraft carrier is supposed to make up it’s losses when, to be effective and strike the enemy it must operated outside the range of any land-base re-supply or support?

Making the comparison a little more manageable, looking again at the USN experience, in calendar year 1942, for all carriers in action, in some 6775 flights, including 2559 action sorties there were 155 combat losses, 63 combat related operational losses, and 66 non- combat flight losses.

Statistically, one can take the numbers of carriers in action per month during the period and come up with a composite carrier’s operating numbers: Flights: 2755; action sorties 1043; combat losses: 61; combat operational losses: 26; non-combat related losses: 28; for a total of 115 aircraft lost in a 12 month period. For 1942, that means a US carrier, had it been in action for all 12 months, be it Lexington class, Yorktown class, Ranger or Wasp could have experienced aircraft losses in excess of an entire air group. The USN had the means and flexibility to make up such losses with new planes and pilots. How do you suppose a single German aircraft carrier could continue to operate with those kind of losses? What would be their plan for such replenishment? Where would the additional trained carrier pilots come from? Was the German navy aware that the majority of aircraft losses would be from flight deck crack-ups, launch failures, and pilots simply getting lost and never seen again? Somehow, I just don’t think so.

The Germans had no tactical doctrine for carrier operations, whereas the RN, IJN, and USN had had twenty years to develop, refine, and hone the same. While actual combat led to the out and out abandonment of some cherished carrier operations doctrinal theories (the concept of deferred departure comes to mind), development and adoption of new doctrines (compare the USF-74 of 1941 to USF-74 of 1943 and 1944) went along rather quickly, at least in the USN, largely pushed by squadron commanders and pilots who had seen what had worked and what hadn’t and were in a position to do something about it by virtue if being responsible for the Fleet doctrine re-writes.

Germany had no plan that I’m aware of for underway replenishment of flight stores (ordnance, avgas, etc) or aircraft. And there appears to be little thought as to how many vessels could be committed to any underway replenishment and how were they to make their rendezvous with the Graf Zeppelin task group? Who was going to protect them? How were they to get past a now energized RN or combined RN USN search and destroy operation? And just how were they intending to get replacement aircraft aboard Graf Zeppelin? In any case, they apparently had no sufficient inventory of replacement aircraft. They were apparently not really aware, or at least refused to recognize, of all the pitfalls in developing a carrier arm. This especially obvious in their building/conversion programs; they simply didn’t plan for enough carriers, nor screening vessels. One or two carriers, committed piecemeal, won’t do it. They’d be attacked and sunk, either together or in detail.

Much of the sort of thinking about how successful a Kreigsmarine carrier would be IMO goes along with the “what-if” scenarios where the guys who never did XYZ suddenly have perfect knowledge and are able to pull off XYZ event while the other side is securely tied to their historic ABC position.

Doesn’t work that way. If Graf Zeppelin had ever ventured out into the Atlantic it would have lasted less time than Bismarck. An untried, unrealistically trained, understrengthed, and hybrid aircraft equipped air group, with no operational doctrine, flying off an equally untried aircraft carrier, and undoubtedly insufficiently screened (look at Kriegsmarine destroyer losses), facing two, three, or even four RN carriers with air groups having all the advantages the Germans would not. If they don’t come out until 1942 maybe even a couple of USN carriers would get into the act as well. Remember all the US Essex class CV’s were built on the east coast and did their pre-commissioning and shake down cruises in the Atlantic. They would have the same advantages as the RN (exception being that USN air groups might tend to have a higher percentage of nuggets, but their leadership in squadrons were generally combat experienced or naval aviators with 8 to 10 years experience behind them. And even the old USS Ranger, all by itself, was more than a match for Graf Zeppelin and had the experience pool to do the job. This is a no-brainer and in short order . . . score Allies 1 Axis 0.

I think folks tend to give the German’s far too much credit or benefit of the doubt. In this case, I’m sorry, but for all their technology, know-how, and all their supposed skill, it would make absolutely no difference what-so-ever. Here is a ship type they have never before operated. Here’s a ship that is already a less than optimal design, carrying an insufficiently sized air group. Here are planes that are, perhaps somewhat hastily, modified from land-based types to operate in a carrier-based environment. Here is a command structure where the Kreigsmarine commands the ship and the planes are commanded and flown by the Luftwaffe. (The RN experience of the FAA being part and parcel of the RAF for so many years was ample evidence that that particular arrangement is a logistical disaster looking for a place to happen. Looks like the Germans didn’t get that message.) And here’s an operating environment that is totally alien to anything done before by the Luftwaffe. Do you really think the good Reich’s Air Marshal Fatty is going to send his best and brightest? I suspect he already saw the writing on the wall and did as little as possible to encourage the project.

To expect either the Kreigsmarine or the Luftwaffe to absorb the lessons of a generation of institutional knowledge in carrier operations as acquired, the hard way, by the RN, USN and IJN, to, in a blinding flash of insight, foresee all the potential problems, I think, is asking a bit too much, even for the Germans. Not that the RN or USN were likely to provide them any short cuts. And do you really think they’d really, I mean, really, listen to the advise from the Japanese . . . remember this is Nazi Germany here.

And folks can talk until you’re blue in the face about how good the Me 109Ts, Fi 167s and the Ju 87Cs were, but, I’m sorry, the 87’s and the 167s would be hopelessly outclassed and the 109s would be in for the fight of their lives. By the time GZ could have put to sea it would probably be late 1942. RN carriers were already carrying F4Fs. The Seafires were coming on line, but suffered throughout the war with severe structural problems resultant from the repeated bruising of carrier landings (see Brown, The Forgotten Fleet). Gee, do you suppose the Me 109T might suffer the same problem? Not to mention it’s overall unsat ergonomics in terms of carrier operations. Its one thing for the German’s to structurally reinforce a design and test it a couple of times; repeated violent exposures are another matter all together. Just how many landings do you think these hybrid aircraft would be able to withstand? Sure would be embarrassing to have them start pulling apart when operating under at-sea combat conditions and not from their nice safe test site landing field.

And what about the GZ air group? Some 40 airplanes comprised of, roughly, 10 109s, 13 87s, and 20 167s. The performance statistics for the 109s, on paper, weren’t too bad, but the 87s and the 167s look like a top end of somewhat more than 175 knots … sitting ducks for FM-2s. And only 10 (!!) fighters … oh, please! Let’s see, that’s 5 to protect the ship and 5 to escort strikes … oh, boy, that will work real good won’t it? I can tell you, anybody in World War II who thought they could adequately defend a carrier with only five fighters or adequately escort a strike with five fighters was dreaming or desperate. The USN and the RN put more fighters that that on their CVEs! And the first time you lose one of these 109Ts, be it a combat or not-combat loss, you’ve cut your fighter strength by 10%; that’s what we call ‘decimate’. Lose another and you’re down 20%, the traditional cut off for unit capability. How long do you think that could go on? This during a period when fighters on USN fleet carriers were going from 18 to 28 to 36 as a regular complement.

And what about pilot training? Sure, fighter pilots can fly fighters and dive bomber pilots can dive bomb, and torpedo plane pilots can drop torpedoes or even glide bomb, but how do they get where they need to go and, more importantly how do they get back? I strongly suspect, largely because they never had to, the Germans never thought that one through, either. Navigation over water was, in those days, pretty much a matter of a plotting board, a compass, a clock, and knowledge of how fast the plane is flying. The FAA, for a long time, held that even fighters had to be two-seaters so that that one fellow could handle the navigation while the other fellow drove the plane. In USN practice, individual pilots did their own navigation; of course, some were better than others. And what was to be the German doctrine? Were individual pilots responsible for their own navigation? Were the fighter pilots to use one of the 87C or 167 pilots as a guide? What if he gets shot down? What was to be their scout doctrine? How many of the, oh, so few, 167s would be delegated for scouting as opposed to strikes? And how were they to find their point option (the place where the carrier is supposed to be when a mission is over)? Had they worked all that out? What if the carrier wasn’t where they thought it would be? Did they have a standardized search pattern? Did they have a homing signal system? There’s no railroad tracks or roads to follow. There’s no “just head east until you see land” method … there’d be no land, just miles and miles of an empty ocean.

Finally, in the real world, in their only encounter with Luftwaffe fighters, FM pilots (FM’s being a slightly souped up F4F) from HMS Searcher’s 882 squadron were credited with 4 Me 109s to one loss (26 March 1945). The FMs were dealing with German fighters that were attacking strike planes they were escorting … i.e, they were on the receiving end of an attack, a decided disadvantage in the fighter world, yet, they seemed to do alright anyway.

Lambs to the slaughter. The Germans may have dreamed of the GZ doing well as a convoy killer, but the reality would have been that as soon as she had set to sea, the RN carriers would be all over her. If she comes out any time in 1942 or later, then it would be the RN and the USN finishing her off in short order.

Regards,

Rich
__________________
hmmm . . . I wonder what THIS button does . . . uh oh "

 

Unsupported carrier operations in the North Atlantic against an enemy that can bring far greater sea and air power to bear - hmmmm - suicide I think - bring 'em on.

 

on second thought... mabey not

 

I believe Rich occasionally posts on another forum as R Leonard, he is certainly very knowledgable about the USN and carriers in general.

The only very slight issue I would have with what was posted is that the decline in standard of the average Luftwaffe pilot would pretty much inevitably mean that those 109 pilots encountered by FM-2 Wildcats in March 45 would be nowhere near as good as if that engagement would have occured in March 1942 and there's every liklihood that the Wildcat/Martlet pilots would have come of worse than they did.

That said, there is no way this could have made any significant difference at all to GZ's prospects had she been launched and at sea in 1942 instead.

 

And what about paratroopers? supplying by air? That has to count for something. With the luftwaffe in controle over the channel and a part inland, the germans could transport soldiers by plane.

 

The Airspace over Kent would be 'contested' at best, and Transport planes are easy prey for fighters.

Besides, given that the main German transport plane of the time (Ju 52) carried around 30 men, there is no way that they could either mount a serious invasion or resupply an active invasion by air, let alone both at the same time.

 

Don't forget the Luftwaffe's transport arm had already been quite badly mauled over Norway, France and the Benelux nations (Something like 70+ Ju52s lost over Norway alone), with not too much time to replace the losses.

As Ricky said the skies would still be contested and RAF fighters could have a field day amongst the poorly armed and slow Ju52s, plus the more you put into the air the greater the strain on the Luftwaffe's fighter arm.

Unless you want your paratroopers to be quickly isolated, surrounded and destroyed you have to break out of the beachhead and relieve them with conventional infantry very quickly. If you can't or the breakout stalls for any reason, the fate of the paratroopers is pretty much sealed.

Lastly there is the extra burden of logistics, maintaining any kind of long term airbridge to the paras is going to be costly in terms of planes and pilots, bring additional strain to the fighter arm and is likely to do the British as much good as the Paras. Historically airdropping supplies is very hit and miss with often as much if not more going to the enemy as friendly units.

You say they've got to count for something and whilst I wont disagree with that statement on face value,(Since any additional soldier with a rifle on the ground will count for something, albeit briefly if you can't resupply him) overall what difference do you think they'd make?

 

An interesting Wiki article (With all the usual caveats that applies to Wiki):

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luftwaffe_ ... 40-1945%29

A grand total of 226 transport aircraft available in August 1940 which at roughly 30 men a plane would be able to transport something a bit under 6,800 men. In other words if it devoted every available transport aircraft to that task and that task alone and not a single aircraft was shot down, grounded or had to turn back due to mechanical trouble the Luftwaffe still would be incapable of transporting a single infantry division across the channel in one go.

The moment you start actually trying to transport supplies (Food, munitions other than what the men are carrying, etc) or you start to lose planes your airlift capacity is in real difficulty. The casualty rate for a combat parachute drop IIRC is reckoned to be around 1/3rd killed or wounded just in the drop.

So for a miraculous total effort of the entire transport fleet you'll probably get an effective fighting force of around 4,500 men on the ground after typical casualties with only the kit on their back, roughly a couple of regiments worth plus some.

Less if you want to supply them, certainly less in reality (Accidents but especially mechanical defects), and much less in any subsequent drops once your transport fleet starts taking damage and losses.

You can of course supplement this a bit with Gliders, but gliders are a one way ticket, Kent fields were strewn with glider wrecking obstacles, gliders would be extremely vulnerable to RAF fighters (The saving grace that they wouldn't have engines or fuel tanks to catch fire) and for every glider you lose a bomber that's supposed to be area bombing the Royal Navy out of the English channel.

Parachute resupply is also problematic due to the inherent inaccuracy of parachuting in equipment. A lot of Luftwaffe equipment would end up in the waiting hands of British Army and LDV troops this way.

A bit rambling I know, but this is sort of thinking out loud.