BEF captured at Dunkirk...

The attack on the Rock is a really bad idea withou Spain on-side, and even in that case it would entail bringing up a huge mass of siege artillery, which would hamper the effort against Sevastopol & St Petersburg. The campaign against Gib would be a huge drain on resources, including building the weak Spanish rail net to accomodate the supplies.

And the capture of Gibraltar does not really help the Axis, as the British would take the Canaries in retaliation, and probably the Azores & Madeira as well. (on pretext). The Germans would expend huge effort, and the British would likely be left in a better position.

The main weakness in the axis Med strategy is the reliance on Italian shipping, after Taranto & Matapan the Italians had difficulty preventing the RN from disrupting Axis shipping

 

I always thought of that until you point it out. Italian shipping could only be secured if the eastern Med was off-zone by capturing Gib. If the British were blocked from sea transport across the med it would have been a severe blow and strangle hold on the Mainland's efficiency to conduct war and would make their empire more vulnerable to dissolvation . The RN was transporting supply ships with armed escorts at the time of the campaign. Securing the Mediterranean would be costly, but could be a better alternative than attempting to sack Britain and wasting the lives of thousands of experienced pilots that would have been very reliable in air offensives against the Soviets and the Med front. Goering was right on this.

 

Not by the fall. Indeed they were shipping troops and equipment to North Africa by then.

Not at all sure how much of a factor this was.

The channel was a poor place to operate subs in any case. The lost German destroyers wouldn't have helped all that much when you look at what the RN could field there.

Not really. It may have actually been worse then due to the wet conditions.

 

nice bbc film BBC - History - Animations - WW2 Movies: Dunkirk

Above link taken from this site.. http://www.dlsrt.org.uk/dunkirk.htm

 

They may have been aware of Italian intentions that doesn't mean that they could control them. It's also highly unlikely that a campaign in African and the Mid East would be a war winner for the Germans even if they could have won there. The latter, at least to the level you describe, was also almost impossible for them.

 

??? Capturing Gib does almost nothing to secure the Eastern Med. The RN was based in Alexandria, and supplied through Suez, so only the Axis capturing Egypt will secure the Eastern Med. Gibraltar was used as a base to secuse axis surface naval forces from entering or exiting the Med, and as an airbase for transit to Malta. Should Gib be lost, the British would have to rout air transit via Chad & sudan, but most certainly could keep control of the approaches to the Med, from the Atlantic Islands.

If they couldn't supply through Gibraltar, they would have to supply via Africa & Egypt, Malta would also have to be supplied via Egypt. A setback, but not critical.

Problem is, in 1940 when the Germans were attempting "Sealion", there was no need to worry about the Med, as the Italians were going to take care of it.

 

What made Hitler loose is striking the strong instead of the weaker and vulnerable Mediterranean first.

 

A succesfull Sealion depended on the following:
1)Air-superiority above south-east England
2) Availability of transport ships for the troops
3) the same for tanks,horses,artillery,ammunition,fuel,etc..
4)capture of an intact harbour to disembark tanks,etc...:you can't disembark them on the shores
5)protection for 2 and 3 by the Kriegsmarine
6)several weeks of good weather in september(!):the build-up would take weeks.
7)I was forgetting the role of Bomber Command (still intact)
All those points were needed for a success of SeaLion:if ONE fell away:SeaLion was impossible .NONE was fulfilled.Thus:a successfull SeaLion was impossible.
About Barbarossa:the Germans,having only the means for a quick campaign,gambled on a quick victory (a campaign of 10 weeks):they failed,and after september,their chances to win were fading away .
There were no 30 extra divisions available,besides,they could not supply them .
Last point :the Siberian divisions ,of which the importance only is a myth:most of them were engaged before december,and their numbers were not that important. The units engaged in the winter offensive were mostly NON Siberian divisions,and the winteroffensive was a failure.
The assumption that Stalin was withholding the Siberian divisions till he got the confirmation by Sorge that Japan would not attack the SU,and that they were arriving on time to save Moscow and that they formed the bulk of the units engaged in the Winteroffensive,is only a myth propagated by writers with more imagination then knowledge .

 

Securing Gib was very decisive if you were to check the desperate balance sheets of bribery offered to Franco. Britain's African route was costlier and longer so it would definably hamper the ability to conduct war and maintain imperial stability before the Marines came to their aid in 1942. Securing the East Med would relieve the axis the burden to effectively ship supplies and war materials to the north African front and leave the British only a one way route(the Red sea) which was largely deserted at the time and would require a long redeployment. Sea lion is not possible, the RN would have intercepted the invasion and the RAF would strike from the inpentrable north. The Kreigsmarine was short on aircraft carriers and had weak armored escorts. Submarines and dive bombers would have to face 200 RN warships and radar guided spitfire from evacuated air stations in the North. The best solution to their British problem is refusing a halt order in May 24-26 that would have disseminated morale at home, unrestricted submarine warfare from u-boat ports in North Africa and Gib, and securing the Suez canal in 1940 when the British were less prepared and largely outnumbered, and creating airbases in the Malta. The Balkans campaign would also be unnecessary afterwords since it was intended to secure the axis from British influence from the Med.

 

The Med. and the Suez were largely out of the British shipping use for cargo after 1940 when Italy declared war on France, but at any rate, by then about 80 to 90% of all commercial shipping to and from the home island was going around the African Cape. The little going into the Med was for suppy of Malta, and while its loss would have been a PR blow to the British, just as the loss of the Suez Canal would have been, neither would have been devastating to their war effort.

 

The importance of Gibraltar(already been discussed,extensively on this Forum):IMHO :neglectable :notwithstanding having the possession of Gibraltar,Britain did NOT use the shorter mediterranean route (since june 1940):thus I see no gain for the Germans if they captured Gibraltar .
A sea marine warfare by UBoats from ports in North Africa would assume
1) that the Germans would be able to conquer,supply and protect such ports(very unlikely)
2)that the Germans would have an extra number of UBoats,which they did not have ,otherwise UBoats operating from North Africa would mean less UBoats operating on the Atlantic(where they were more useful)
What would be the benefit for the Germans of the capture of Malta and the canal? The opposite is true :the more resources directed to the Mediterranean,the less were available for the war against the SU.
Germany was not strong enough to force a decision and in the Mediterranean and in the East :it had to choose.In which theatre of war could they have more benefits ?

 

Blocking British shipment was not the main concern hence the U-boats were targeting them in the Northern Atlantic Ocean. The major concern was that an insecure Med would be penetrable for an invasion fleet to use against the Axis and a indirect route for encirclement like a blockade. Italy was incompetent to handle an assault by her own.

 

The Germans weren't even preparing all their reserves and resources for the East, hence multitudes of unused divisions. They were underestimating the Soviets. They weren't even technically in a war economy because Hitler was confident of a quick victory over lesser people. Resources for the Med would be easily replenishable at that time by the generous Soviet trade aggrements at German request, but it wouldn't easily replace experienced pilots, armor, and crew like in the Battle of Britain.

 

In any case eliminating the BEF and completely removing British presence in the Med would lead to Britain exiting the war for the sake of its future in 1940.

 

The Med would have never been a diversion for the British if it was invaluable, but it wasn't.

North Africa would make the Atlantic Ocean more efficient and accessible for U-boat movement.

If Hitler hadn't declared war on the US there wouldn't be a chance that Britain would attempt to recapture the Med by herself if it means going to war with Vichy France that were positioned with 3 armed divisions defending the outskirts of the North Africa and German U-boats. The Med would be a less costlier campaign than the battle of Britain. Germany used her allies navies for transports in the Med anyway and all they would have to do was it in their behinds. The general staff were no fools, they knew that securing the Med would help to gain direct access to would be Islamic collaborators and Iranian Oil. It was obvious to the British high command hence the British build up in the Med.

 

The Germans had earmarked all that was available for the East :3.3 million of a field arme of 3.8 million.29 of the 31 PD and MotD .The remaining divisions were unfit for front duties,only usefull as occupation divisions.

 

the Germans gaining access to the Iranian oil was out of the question and,of course,there was nothing they could do with the Iranian oil.
the importance of the Islamic collaborators was NIHIL

 

ANY PROOF ????

 

The Mediterranean sea route was essentially closed to the British from Italy's entry into the war until her capitulation in 1943. Prior to the arrival of the Luftwaffe in Sicily and the January 1941 actions in which Illustrious was crippled and Southampton sunk, a few cargo ships were run through to Alexandria or Greece. From Jan '41-August '43 there was precisely one through convoy, Operation Tiger, which carried urgently needed tanks and aircraft. All other British convoy operations in the period were for support of Malta.

Until Torch, about the only contribution Gibraltar made to the Mediterranean campaign was dispatching convoys and aircraft to Malta. Interdiction of Axis supply convoys was by forces from Malta or Alexandria. If the Axis were going to conduct an additional major operation in the Med, it would have been more useful to take Malta and leave Gibraltar alone.

Similarly the only use of the Suez Canal was for shipping coming from India, Australia, or the long way around Africa to reach Alexandria for unloading.

Axis victory in the Med or North Africa would not relieve them of an ongoing commitment in the south; whether the lines were in Suez, Palestine, Iraq, or wherever, there would be an active fighting front against the British Empire. Indeed the Axis advance would push the British army back onto its bases of support while lengthening their own supply lines. 8th Army and its supplies were largely Indian, Australian, New Zealand, South African, etc., and it made little difference to ships from Britain if they unloaded in Alexandria, Basra, or Karachi.

 

German war machine was consuming oil from a oil wells from Romania that were of lesser quality. Reaching Persia would be welcomed with open arms and the ability to disrupt lend lease routes and launch air raids against Soviet oil wells during operation Barbarossa.