Could France have survived?

There were only 2 allies in 1939 and after Dunkirk,many French felt let down by the British(rightfully or wrongfully )

 

France could not have survived without some Napolean coming along. The socialists, communists, and republicans (like today) shared the government. The Maginot line was intended to keep the germans out but political necessity of not wanting to antagonize their "good" socialist friends in the Nederlands stopped the Maginot line short of their mutual borders. And yes, the germans successfully assaulted and breached 1-2 sections of the Maginot Line. Once you welded the 75mm and MG cupolas with shaped charges, who cared about the 400,000 troops living underground. They couldn't affect ground operations above.
When I played HOI2 the only strategy to keep the French in the game was to build industry and such in North Africa and rescue some of the better military units. Bide your time. France and Italy have about the same amount of resources and chance of winning this game. The only winnning strategy was to build 200 divisions and attack germany in 1939. Overrun the germans! I am still getting used to the new game....not sure if I like yet.

 

Very true, although when one compares the German casualty figures following Dunkirk, versus before, one soon sees that the French Army fought incredibly hard, with the fiercesome pride, expertise and old WWI elan in the final weeks of the campaign. They caused the attacking Germans some real concern and high casualties with their "hedge hog, strong point defenses" along the Somme River Line until Rommel finally broke out and pushed south into metropolitan France. Alas for the French, it was a matter of "too little, too late."

 

I am quite young and although I love history, I will in fact be starting a degree in history this fall, i have not studied this very much. The Blitzkrieg doctrine the Germans use is quite amazing. They completely overwhelmed their opposition. It was brilliant. It seems to me that most of the world still wanted to follow the WWI doctrines of digging in and sitting around. The Germans used this to their advantage and just mowed right over the enemy. Of course this is a quick observation with not much study. As I said, I have not studyied it too deeply. I think, however, that I could help in the game.
I have played the game Hearts of Iron 2 and I once managed to stop the Germans advance into France, of course this is only the game and i had a beforehand knowledge of the Blitzkrieg the Germans would use. This was only managed however by gathering nearly the entire British Army out of Great Britian to bulk up my front lines. I would not suggest extending the Maginot Line, in the game it takes too long and takes too much effort away from building up forces that could stop the invasion. In the game, if you match div. for div. on the maginot line and move most of your forces north into the low countries, of course to do that you must ally yourself with them, then you could stop the German assult and possibly begin your own offensive. Also, when the German forces are preoccupied with Poland, that may be the best time to break out. Of course, its the breaking out part thats hard isnt it lol?
I am no expert but I do love history and I do love the game. From what I know from high school, the French were highly outmatched and stood little chance because of their military doctrines, their reliance on the Maginot line, and superior German forces and advancements. I personally do not believe the French stood much of a chance in surviving.

 

The thing about Blitzkreig, is that it only works when your opponent is not ready for you. Consider the Battle of the Bulge. Initial success followed by defeat.

Could the French have overcome their initial stupidity, and like the Soviets, trade land for time as they got their act together?

 

Hm,the Sovjets did not trade land for time (what the Germans feared initially ),from the first day they tried to drive back the Germans and fought offensively

 

Of course they did, but even Stalin admitted they traded land for time, and then attacked with concentrated forces. They needed time to build up the armies, weapons, and bleed the Germans.

 

Do you know of their strategy of Defense in Depth?

 

I don't think the Battle of the Bulge serves as a good example. First of all, the Allies weren't exactly expecting or ready for an attack in that area. Second, the attack was seriously hindered by a lack of supplies and the proper equipment needed for a proper blitzkrieg offensive.

 

Their mobilisation started on june 22 (the reason why Barbarossa failed,the Germans were thinking that they could only have mobilised after 10 weeks ,as in 1914, )and they send till september 250000 men average to the front,from the first week on .

 

As a Frenchman, the consistency of your post would be the same as mine if I said that the Brits could have held Crete for a year.
Having 3M soldiers and "defensive lines" as you call them, is a great thing. Coordinating , modernizing and having strong communication systems is another matter. Only General de Gaulle, the father of French Armor Tactics, was trying desperately to convert generals to the ideal of using tanks WITH infantry, not as two separate and distinct forces.
my 2c

 

UN Spacy,perhaps you'll find something of interest in 12. of February 2009. article of this section, ' What if Germans executed original plan for case yellow? '.

 

Just to nitpick... Glantz & Pleshhakov describe the Soivet mobilization extending far back before 22 June. The 13th Army assembling in White Russia was made up of mostly reserve units that had been called up in May and early June. Other units from that spring 'mobilization' of reservists had been distributed to the armies along the borders. This 13th Army comprised a large part of the soldiers that attempted to defend Minsk & environs from Guderians mechanized group in July.

Other reserve units had been called up earlier in the spring, tho my impression is that was on a much smaller scale than the May/June group. Warning orders and preliminary steps had been taken for activating many more reserve formations during June, before the 22.

Seperate from these reserve units was the bulk of the class of conscripts due to be ordered to reserve status in the first half of 1941 were retained on active service. A portion of those conscripts scheduled for rotation to reserve units in 1940 were retained on active service as well into 1941. That retention of 'trained' conscripts in the standing formations served to help expand the standing army and made the later mobilization of reserve units faster.

Last, the call up of conscripts in 1939, 1940 and the first half of 1941 was increased over the usual numbers of the 1930s. That also allowed the expansion of the quantity of ground combat and service or support units in those years. So, in Stratigic terms the Soviet mobilization went back into 1940. In operational or tactical terms the decision to not alert the standing armies and to keep them in the barracks offset much of the advantage of the extra soldiers available in June 1941.

 

I find it interesting that many here have lauded the Germans for the quick decision-making. Later in the war, we're told, the Allies (or at least the Americans) enjoy a huge advantage over the Germans because decisions can be made at a much lower level. For example, on D-Day no one wanted to wake Hitler. Had German decision-making become more centralized during the course of the war, or were the Americans just that far ahead in their thinking?

 

the story that no one wanted to wake Hitler (popularised by The Longest Day ) has been disputed .

 

It importance has also been disputed. During the landings at Salerno there were armored divisions present including the Herman Goering armored division but the invasion was still successful. Also, on June 6 the 12th SS Panzer division did attempt an assault between sword and Juno beach but was heavily slowed by Allied air superiority and was ultimately repulsed.

 

Hitler was a notorious insomniac, and in spite of Dr. Morrel’s injections of the German version of Demerol he rarely went to bed before 2:00 am, and rarely arose before 10:00 am. As the invasion became more and more likely he would stay awake pontificating until 5:00 am, and only arise by 2:00 pm, on that morning, he may well have just gone to bed when the first reports started coming in from the Normandy coast. Whether or not he was "asleep" and others feared to wake him, or simply not functioning at the time of the Normandy invasion it is of little moment.


He (Hitler) remained convinced for most of June that the Normandy invasion was a diversion and the real invasion was yet to occur at the Pas d’Calais. Either way, his reaction would be to hold the forces needed to thrown the allies back into the sea.

And I myself think this whole "the Germans were hide-bound, waiting for orders from superiors" is hogwash. At least from the Captain rank down, from the Colonel ranks up, perhaps. From the mid-level officers through the NCO and enlisted personnel they thought and acted well on their own without specific orders, or by improvising. Brokaw’s book (Greatest Generation)simply echoed the words of Stephan Ambrose (Citzen Soldier), and that work was influenced by his own rabid pro-Americanism as to their contributions to the allied cause.

 

The rapid decision making thing is misunderstood. Read Doughty 'The Seeds of Disaster' to understand what this is about. In simple terms a French commander & his staff were trained to write detailed orders with full blown annexes and appendices specifing in detail what the subordinante units were to do. Back in my officer days I was trained to do the same. It takes hours to compile these things for even a simple battalion attack.

The Germans were also trained to write such orders, detailed written attack plans have thier place. HOWEVER like me the German commander & staff were also trained to operate using fragmentary orders, simple mission statements, and brief messages that outlined what was to be done. To operate sucessfully this way the commanders and subordinate have to have a degree of understanding and have to have a fair ammount of training time with this method.

The French, with the exception or the cavalry, were not trained beyond the detailed order and elaborate coordinating measures that went with it. When things evolved faster than the commanders staff could rewrite new orders to change the scheme of manuver they fell behind in the OBSERVATION DECISION ACTION loop. When some of the French commanders attempted to react quickly with brief orders that simply outlined intent and which left out all the details their subordiantes usually failed to understand and floundered about in confusion.

My summary here is overly simplified and leaves a lot out, but try to understand the French doctrine of 'The Methodical Battle' made their tactical operations deliberate and much slower than the Germans. (Again the French cavalry being a exception) The actions of the highest commanders like Hitler or Gamelin are a seperate issue.

 

Well I believe France could've survived if America was in the war.

 

In 1940 , with an army that was a the time smaller than the Romanian one?
The U.S army started recruiting massively in November 1940 only and they were not at war, nor had they the intention to jump in, unless they were attacked.