Could France have survived?

Why?, the French are cut off from their industrial and population base and are going to get progressively weaker, the Germans are limited in the maximum number of troops they can supply but have large reserves to keep them up to strength. And if you look at a map you will realize they can supply a lot more troops in Tunisia than in Egypt, Commonwealth troops will not be available in any significant numbers before well into 1941 as the priority is still rebuilding the forces in the British Isles.
If you immagine the French collapse in Europe by the end of July, the Germans will be in position to start offensive operations in NA by early September, sooner with just the airmobile units. So they have four months before we can expect any significant CW ground forces even assuming the Brits are willing to commit them to what to me looks like a hopeless battle.
Historically the RN already had a large global superiority versus the combined axis fleets even without adding the French, what it lacked was the capability for sustained operations without control of the air, ie carriers with modern planes, and the French fleet is going to add very little to that so it's unlikely to accomplish much more than it historically did.
The Germans would be facing roughly the same forces that historically opposed the Torch landings, with possibly a better morale but with a lot more disorganization after the retreat from mainland Europe than after two years of R&R, not exactly an impossible opponent.

 

You've missed out one vital word there... "a reason behind not sending Spitfires to France was lack of SUITABLE bases"; the BEF Air Element/AASF were based on some very cra@ppy fields, fields that couldn't have handled the narrow-track undercarriaged Spitfires - which actually had as bad (if not worse!) a groundlooping issue compared to the Bf109. Conversely the Hurricane was able tooperate in a much wider range of terrain conditions...

And long grass, mud and regular precipitation are things not common to the North African littoral. Instead the problem there was what hardpacked sand/gravel/cleared boulder field did to undercarriages...TOO hard at times!

1/ remember the lack of Ju52s in this time window...

2/ Bf110s were typical of the second month of the Norway campaign, because of the ranges the Luftwaffe had to fly to operate over Narvik. However, 109s flew to Norway from Aalborg on the second morning of WESERUBUNG and operated in Southern Norway.

1/ ALL airforces have problems with unsuitable surfaces; look at the patchwork of extended/repaired runway and apron that is STILL the modern Brest Airport even so many decades after KG40 stopped operating there. Or the bumpy, jute mat runway that Rudolf Hess reported in England that he took off from at Augsburg. Or the desperately bumpy rocky strip at Maleme that caused the British as many crackups prior to MERKUR as it did the LW during it.

While the LW flew a VERY high frequncy of transport flights into North Africa in mid 1941 and 1942 to hardpacked and cleared makeshift strips...so did the Desert Air Force .

2/ I don't think POL would be a problem; if the British are prepared to convoy it to Malta with all the attendant effort and problems, they'll be as happy to dock convoyed tankers etc. straight from the Carribean into Algiers or Oran.

3/ In fact - in a worst case Malta can supply the RAF in Tunisia until a direct supply chain is eastablished The RAF seem to have quite large stocks bunkered there in 1940, enough to operate several Bomber Command squadrons at a time at the end of 1940 for a few weeks each, raiding Italy and Sicily before staging on through to the Delta.

 

Nope - note I said "second hand"......

In 1939 the Turks ordered 15 MkIs, but the order was cancelled in the post-Dunkirk panic after two from the batch had been sent...

It appears that in Turkish use, with 42. Aviation Company of VIII. Aviation Battalion, 4th Air Regiment at Corlu airport, Istanbul - sans spares kits! - they soon went U/S, and eventually in December 1940 were offered back to the British, who repaired them (they had a very small covert mission in Turkey instructing Turkish pilots on their handful of these plus Hurricanes) and flew them back to the Delta. There they seem to have hovered around 73 OTU at RAF Fayid/Abu Sueir for some time until they were flown to the Fighter School at El Ballah by none other than Dan Dare himself, Neville Duke!

The twelve from remained in the UK from that initial batch (the first of the 15 had actually been sent in late 1939!) had quite an eventful life too...

They were uncrated, modified at Woolston to full RAF standard...and trucked to Castle Bromwich where in a bit of administrative sleight-of-hand, Beaverbrook claimed they were the first month's production there! - with Woolston staff being encouraged to keep mum about the whole affair. Thus the first Spitfires that "left" Castle Bromwich were this dozen MkIAs....not MkIIs! Here are the service histories of ten of them...

 

For me this is an issue of time and terrain. I am guessing that the German move on N.A. comes after the defeat of French forces on the continent. If the French offer resistance all the way to the southern ports (reasonable in my thinking if they intend to withdraw to N.A.) so as to allow as much time to send all they can for the defence of the colony, then it could be as late as early to mid August before the area is secured by German troops. As soon as, and perhaps even a little before, French resistance has ended the 2 light Inf. Divisions can be sent to N.A. The same is not the case for the 2 Panzer/motorized divisions. First they will need a week, perhaps 2 to rest and refit to become fully operational again. They are likely stuck in south or central France and will need to road march to a working railhead. Travel by rail to Italy as you cannot count on using French ports. Load on ships and sail to N.A. Unload and reform, then attack. This sounds like 6 weeks or more, all organized on the fly, in Italian ports which did not break any records for efficientcy during the war.

All of these moves would signal that there was little or no chance for an invasion of Britain. In the late summer of 1940 Britain did not have many combat ready divisions, but they did have some, and Churchill would be itching to get back into the fray. We know now that the RN was better than the Italian navy, but after the French surrender (historical), the odds in the Med looked even at first. No Sealion frees RN ships to the Med, add those already deployed and the French fleet, you have overwhelming superiority at sea. Perhaps enough to make the Italians balk at deploying their fleet. Sheer numbers, plus an element of desparation, ( France's last chance) might see Anglo-French ships press their attacks on Axis shipping even against Axis air superiority.

For Germany once the troops are assembled to attack they face the Battle of North Africa all over again. A long march with each step taking them farther away from their supply head. Going west instead of east. Over ground that is better suited to defence. I would guess that Britain could ship somewhere between 2 independent Brigades to 1 full division in the time it takes Germany to send 2 Panzer Divs. All the Anglo-French forces must do is stop a Axis army of say 4 German and 3 Italian divs. short of the Atlantic ports.

If the Anglo-French forces can survive the initial blow, and I think its possible, then Axis forces will find themselves between two Allied forces in North Africa, and with Hitler already looking to invading Russia.

 

I agree that the panzers will not ship before the final French collapse, but if going west they will not have the long road march to Agedabia and probably less trouble than the historical AK had because of lack of "desert filters" and the like so a September start of the offensive is reasonable.
French resistance is a double edged sword, the more they commit to slowing the Germans southern trust, the less they can actually move to NA. When the move to NA becomes evident I can see the Germans putting a lot of pressure on the retreating forces, they will want to avoid a repeat of Dunkirk. Also the convoys to NA risk interference from the Regia Marina and/or Axis air forces in Sardinia.
We can expect the the Germans in NA to have around six month of "headlines" and priority for support before redeployment for Barbarossa, always assuming Hitler is mad enough to start Barbarossa while still having "unfinished business" with the French. As this is Germany's only land front the committed strength is more likely to resemble the 5th panzer army than the early 1941 DAK. And until they get well past Tunis advancing is going to shorten their lines not lenghten them.

Four to ten divisions sent to NA will not diminish the Sea Lion threat one bit, despite demobilization the Germans have still more troops than they can possibly use (they had 10 Pz divs and were raising 10 more at the end of the French campaign), so a Commonwealth estimate of brigade to division strength before mid 1941 is reasonable.
The Italian 5th army is already in Tripolitania, and is stronger than 3 Divs, as it doesn't suffer from disorganization like the French it may actually accomplish something in the sort of mountainous terrain the Italians had mostly trained for.
IIRC the allied air forces after torch had a sort of "airbase crysis" when heavy rains turned most fields in the Algiers area to mud, AFAIK the axis forces near Tunis were not so badly affected, so who holds Tunis in late November may be critical.

BTW very nice info about those Spitfires .

 

Two more major issues -

The condition French ports are left in; I would assume that a fighting retreat to North Africa would see the southern Metropolitan ports completely trashed - IIRC Halder noted in his diary that when he inspected Dunkirk in early September 1940 to check on progress there, little or nothing had been done to recommission the port's cranes and quays...over three months after they were last used

Rail transport to Italy - would this require passing through the Swiss rail tunnels??? Switzerland ws less Neutral through 1939-early 1940 than most people assume, she was a de facto French ally; although the VAST majority of the working-up for a French intervention in Switzerland was covert, and of course plans fell apart within days of May 10th when the French divisions alloted for this were sent elsewhere in a panic, IIRC Switzerland was shut for any sort of military trafic at this point The Swiss weren't to reopen the tunnels to this 'til later in the late summer, when they also came under German pressure to close the "Neutrality Hole" from the Swiss end that actually allowed her to keep trading with Great Britain OTL! See Willi Gautschi's "General Henri Guisan". A further complication for this route is that one of the major levers the Germans had against the Swiss was finding several railcars'-worth of evacuated documents, maps and military conventions stranded at La Charitie after the Armistice; in the event of a fighting retreat across France, and some degree of planning to the withdrawal, I doubt the major stroke of luck the Germans had in finding this lever would occur at all So even less pressure on the Swiss to facilitiate the movement of troops via the Swiss tunnels....and instead the far longer, and time consuming route via the Tyrol.

Don't forget what the British decided to send abroad first....and OTL decided as early as the end of July 1940!

In other words -

The Australian and NZ "short" infantry brigades in the UK were also begun to be sent, parts of which were retained in the UK for several months ONLY because of the protracted Sealion threat - something that would not be present ATL. Also, the infrantry divisions of the BEF II, tho' short in vehicles and guns after their withdrawal from south of the Somme again were otherwise completely formated and could be sent abroad - thinking here particularly of 1st Canadian....

And these too could be landed in Oran or Algiers rather than be delayed any further by going to the Middle East via the Cape!

In other words - with no apparent Sealion threat, the British can make the decision to reinforce the Med...and support their Ally there!...far earlier - probably before the end of June, even earlier if requested by the French BEFORE they abandon Metropolitan France!...and they can send them earlier and with a much shorter travel time than historically.

 

In fact - it's not impossible that the CYCLE and ARIEL military shipping that evacuated the BEF II to England could be sent direct to North Africa!

Historically, those forces came home and sat in trenches on beaches for weeks until they received replacement equipment, and were fully mobile enough to be put in Brookie's Reserves; ATL they can go sit in trenches on the Tunisian Border instead, and have their new equipment sent to North Africa!

 

What's wrong with the coastal route ? even assuming Marseilles is wrecked, and it would take a lot to do that as it's a BIG port, Genoa is intact, truck the troops or even rail them there. I believe the coastal railroad from Nice to Genoa allready existed, and could be repaired, the French are NOT going to enact a "sorched earth" policy in the Cote d'Azur, even with no railroad the tanks could be loaded on Italian coastal barges or train ferries from beaches.

In June/August the British have NO way of knowing if the Germans, that have the advantage of interior lines, are going to North Africa or attempt a cross channel invasin, they actually have ample troops to do both, though obviously not the air and naval resources, if presented with an alternative it would make a lot of sense for them to go South, the mission would now be "finish the French", not "bail out Mussolini", something that's going to sit a lot better with Hitler even more with a chance to bag substantial Commonwealth forces if they get committed.

 

Check out how many times the RN intruded on italian coastal waters to shell shore targets in 1940 Again, they proved willing and able to risk any loss involved. Remember, the ONLY forces in the Med capable of doing anything about this at that point are the RA and the RM - both of which, at Calabria, were to prove less than capable....in the case of the RA VERY incapable despite its record of attacking shipping in the SCW. (I'm discounting the LW at this point, because Norway proved - despite the fears of Their Lordships - how difficult it actually was to level-bomb targets with searoom, speed, trim, and enough AA munitions; Crete proved the same - only when one or more of these were compromised did the RN take losses due to air attack )

See above.

Wrong. See David Newbold's thesis on Anti-invasion preparations; the British were inside the LW's ENIGMA-encrypted signals by the end of June, and were reading whatever the LW were communicating by radio about Sealion preparations they they were minuted on or sat in on meetings on - and that proved to be a LOT; the LW severely compromised the Wehrmacht's secrecy on Sealion. SIGINT was actually the British main source of intelligence at this time, apart from photo recce....

And its EXACTLY the same problem for the Germans if they head south instead of across the Channel - everything the LW discuss about it or send signals about it will be read at Bletchley. Orders to move squadrons, to move aircraft and airfields maintenance units, scheduling of transport, timetabling of moves...liaison with the Heer and KM regarding the arrangement of fighter cover and escorts....

 

Would not the redeployment of the Luftwaffe be the signal that Sealion was a sham? Germany had a fairly narrow window for a cross channel attack, Would light diversionary air attacks be enough to convince England that Sealion was for real? If Italy sends its best troops along with the German army West, how do they hold the East, against the Western Desert Force? Can the Axis attack both in the east and west during September 1940? If the Italians attack east in Sept. 1940, how are they available for an attack in the west alongside a German army? I just do not see the WDF staying idle indefinately.

 

No - because of that wrinkle that Bletchely was intercepting and decrypting LW signals....which of course the Luftwaffe wasn't ware of Yes, they'd be reading the operational orders, post-attack recce reports, intelligence analyses etc. for the light raids that the LW was sending back and forth...but they'd ALSO be reading everything else, Bletchley would be prodviding the Staff Chiefs and the War Cabinet with the big picture.

 

With the Germans in Southern France the LW is going to be very much of a factor. And with the closest port in NA (we are assuming the trasfer to take place after the fall right?) venturing that far North in the hope of stopping trains is sheer folly. Moot point anyway as the Frejus tunnel was available. The Regia Areonautica had no effective anti shipping doctrine in 1940, the highly innaccurate level bombers, and using very light bombs to boot, were close to useless. But the first torpedo bomber squadrons were fomed in August, well ahead of the German ones, and a Stuka group was also formed a little later time that had a reasonable anti shipping capability.
Where did you get your info on the Swiss? part of my family spent the war there and AFAIK the German and Italian speakers were not pro-French.

It takes a couple of weeks, more likely a full month, to redeploy forces from England to French NA, add a few more weeks sailing time for Egypt, knowing what's going to happen via ENIGMA is little use if you don't have forces in theater to react with. ENIGMA was behind most allied naval successes, but if the transport ops are under Italian control, as historically, it will not matter much, Italian codes were mostly unbroken. ULTRA SIGINT were mostly tactical orders, the decision to go North or South is strategic and not likely to go through ENIGMA machines until the last implementation phase. What you are assuming is that the British will know of German intentions before end of August, so as to have troops in the right place in September, not likely as the final decisions are still on Hitler's table.

If the 7th Armoured is going to French NA forget completely about Compass, it's going to find itself instead going head to head with a couple of experienced Panzer divisions in September/October 1940 as it will not be ready for action before then despite the shorter trip.

Italy had two distinct armies in NA the 10th facing Egypt and the 5th facing Tunisia, the latter provided the forces that eventually fought with Rommel, no need to make a choice, it's the British who have to decide were to send the few available forces, bolster the French OR protect Egypt? .

 

I agree Germay has a chance, but then all the Allies have to do is hold them short of the NA atlantic ports. If they do the Axis face a two front war in NA with the allies only getting stronger.

 

I doubt it - take a look at their sucess vs. Allied warships off Norway. I'm not talking about the 6-7-knot convoys of the Kanalkampf, but trimmed, fast destroyers etc. capable of dashing ing, shelling shore targets and docked vessels, then dashing out before dawn...

Remember again - the RN did it a couple of times against barges in the Channel ports, and the Suffolk did it at Stavanger-Sola; the Suffolk DID take damage...bu from only TWO HITS out of a HUGE number of aircraft sent chasing after it!

Why - in this ATL - would the conquest of Metropolitan France automatically mean the fall of Corsica??? Remember, the Armee De L'Air flew its aircraft into Corsica, staging through there to North Africa; historically they left a lot of materiel there....but in this ATL, I don't think the French are going to be willing to abandon the island. After all, in the end they fought quite hard for Madagascar...

Oh I know that - but they thought, given their SCW experience, that they were far better than they really were! Look at their inflated claims at Calabria, for example.

Formed, yes - but operational/effective???

...whose first reasonable sucess IIRC was the Illustrious - what, 7-8 months after the period under discussion?

 

Did you note I used the word "covert"? Secret from the German-speaking officers in the Swiss Army as much as the international community!

As I said - see Willi Gautschi's biograpghy of the Swiss C-in-C "General Henri Guisan" - he spends several chapters on both the planning AND the fallout when the files were discovered at La Charitie.

It's worth noting that while there WAS considerable pro-German sentiment in Eastern Switzerland, and several Nazi and pro-Nazi movements...and even conspiracies within the Swiss Army!...all these were effectively dealt with during the war, and only French-speaking officers Guisan trusted were involved in the planning and coordination with the French; and it's worth noting that Guisan did have the support of the Federal cabinet in this

Remember - OTL the British were dealing with sending forces TO THE DELTA...

Here, ATL, they only have to send them to French North Africa to more directly threaten Tripolitania and left-foot the Italians' plans for Egypt, and threaten the DAK's historcial debarkation ports.

See Newbold and its role in anticipating Sealion.

Unless the Germans were intending to leave the Luftwaffe out of the operation ENTIRELY and not even mention it to them in any way at any level...they'd be signalling back and forth about THEIR involvement just as they hsitorically did about their involvement in Sealion planning.

No - what I'm assuming is that the British will know about them within hours of the Luftwaffe becoming involved at ANY level in the planning and preparations - tactical/strategic, transport, movement, whatever.

OTL, the reason for the delay was that their tanks were sent separately from their personnel, and the long way round! And the same thing happened for the TIGER convoy in 1941...further complicated in THAT case because the tanks were sent straight through the Med - but their crews sent via the Cape!!! ATL - both can be landed together in Oran/Algiers.

Do you honestly see the ITALIANS of all people going ahead with Grazziani's forces crossing into Egypt with the British in their rear???

 

I don't see the gain for the Germans,if they occupied the French Mediterranean coast :to send troops to Algeria was impossible,and,they did not need Marseille,etc to send troops to Libya .

 

Graziani's 10th army is not going to move if there's fighting in Tripolitania, without the 7th Armoured neither are the British. If the 7th armoured is going to Egypt after all they may attempt Compass but with lots of German planes alrready in theater it's likely to fail and fail badly.
If the 7th goes to Tunisia if/when Babini does form his planned armoured division he may attempt to do something if things are going well for the axis on the Tunisian front. He has lots of troops and though they are very short of modern equipment the British forces facing them are not exactly lavishly equipped either.
The Germans and 5t Army are going to attack west with full LW support, don't think the French and the few Commonwealth forces available for oversea service will last long, historically they needed significant numerical superiority to beat German ground forces in 1941/42 and they don't have that. Do not discount the Italian forces completely, their biggest weakness was a terrible officer corps, a nearly unsurmountable handicap when you need to react to enemy action, but not fatal if you are holding the initiative, the French had similar problems but in their case is was more doctrine than people that created reaction times incompatible with mecanized warfare.

 

Corsica is an interesting nugget, could the German Air-mobile/Air landing troops get sucked into there ala Crete?

 

<tech note> Had enough,switching back to IE8 after repeted hangs of the browser </tech note>

We are assuming the French don't surrender so it's logical for the Germans to continue to attack until they reach the Mediterranean coast. They will then have to decide if to pusue to NA, knowing Hitler the answer il likely to be yes,the objective is French defeat not NA of itself.

No need of airmobile forces to take Corsica, the only similarity with Crete is that a lot of what the allies commit there is never going to go back, Sardinia is between Corsica and possible allied bases in North Africa and has some pretty good airfields so any forces there are automatically cut off.
Crossing the Bonifacio straits under the support of the Italian coastal batteries (the straits are narrow enough for that) and possibly a Regia Marina squadron as well, is nothing like Crete, a heavily supported landing on the Tirrenian coast is also possible, intervention by allied naval forces would be very risky as they have to sail past Sardinia on the way back, the Bonifacio straits are controlled by coastal batteries so the only way in is either between axis Sardinia and Sicily or North between Corsica and German occupied mainland France.

One big question is how good was the LW was at killing ships in 1940, IMO the Regia Areonautica didn't have much capability before 1941 but I see little difference between the 1940 LW and the one that was very effective off Crete in terms of doctrine and training, actually I think the improvements in British naval AA were greater than the LW in naval attack for the period, while it's true that the specialized ship killers like KG 26 and KG 40 came much later the "standard" stukas and bombers proved deadly.

 

But what the British WILL do is what they did OTL before the reinforcements arrived in the autumn - keep raiding/hitting/coattail-dragging, enough to prevent Grazziani releasing any forces to Babini.

It's far more likely the british arrive before any Axis movement. Why? Well, for several pages we've discussed how fast the britishcan react to events in the MEd and reinforce their own and the FRench position there...

But what if they're not reacting??? What if they decide to move forces there LONG before the Germans are able to I.E. once the French decide to fight on - and ask the British for support in Tunisia/the Western Med? Then the otherwise-pointless BEF II gets sent to Algeria/Tunisia instead of Metropolitan France! THAT puts British forces in North Africa at the start of June...

Something to remember is - every time Gen. Kirke got a trained division into HIS Reserve for pre-May 10th anti-invasion precautions - it got immediately sent to France! Depending on what the French decide....or PLAN...to do, the last of those might get sent to North Africa...

In other words - there is a range of movement options and times available to the Allies for reinforcing the Med.