Dieppe and the 'Failure of Inter-Service Co-operation'

One of the oft-cited reasons for the failure of Operation Jubilee is the failure by the three services, the RAF, RN and the Army, to co-operate effectively on the day. It has often been argued that each of the services had their own agenda when going into the operation. This so-called agenda can be best represented by the role of the RAF during the operation; therefore, this is what shall be looked at first.



The RAF’s central agenda for engaging in the Dieppe operations was the need to bring the Luftwaffe to battle. This is shown in the composition of the RAF forces that were committed to the battle. Leigh-Mallory’s forces consisted of approximately sixty fighter squadrons and nine other squadrons. The nine other squadrons comprised of four Army Co-Operation Command squadrons equipped with the new North American Mustang tactical reconnaissance aircraft. The remaining five were equipped with Douglas Boston and Bristol Blenheim light bombers form No. 2 Group. The structure of this forces show that the RAF was more intent on dog fighting with the Luftwaffe over the battle area than providing support for the troops on the beach. The most notable feature missing from the force structure are any medium or heavy bombers. As Loring Villa comments

‘The role of the RAF in Dieppe appears…to have been a strange combination of heavy investment in fighter effort with…indifference to the necessity for bombardment.’



Much of the failure to employ the right force structure at Dieppe lay in the failure of inter-war planning. The RAF was still by this time deep rooted in its’ Trenchrdian ethos that the bomber would always get through and that it alone would win the war. This ethos was developed during a period in the RAF’s history were it was struggling to survive. In order to survive the RAF searched for its raison d’etre. For the Air Staff this was strategic bombing and as Williamson Murray has commented ‘…senior [RAF] air leaders held fast to Trenchard’s ideological belief in the bomber. This approach rejected co-operation with the other services.’[ii] Also as has been commented elsewhere the Air Staff’s hostility to the development of Close Air Support doctrine lay in it’s ‘…confidence that a fully-developed strategic bomber offensive could win the war on its own account.’[iii]



Thus by the outbreak of war the RAF found itself unable to deal with CAS operations for the army. Many of these failures were shown up during the Battle for France in 1940. The RAF’s experience in France can be summed as ‘…that it had neither the aircraft, doctrine nor training to be effective’[iv] because ‘…the RAF had spent the previous twenty years planning to fight a war quite different…’[v]



On the 1 December 1940, the RAF formed the Army Co-operation Command. This was a belated attempt to rectify the failures found in France and under its aegis; many lessons were learned, but unfortunately not used during Operation Jubilee as seen by its force structure, which only consisted of nine squadrons from this Command. A Command that could have possibly added much to the operation because as has been commented this Command did ‘…some of the most significant theoretical work on battlefield cooperation between the two services…’[vi]



As commented before the failure to use heavy bombers in a fire support role needs to be addressed. The failure to use them does not come down to either Air Marshal Mountbatten[vii] or Leigh-Mallory, the air commander on the day, but much rather to the intervention of the chief of Bomber Command, Air Chief Marshal Harris. When Leigh Mallory requested the use three hundred bombers for pre-bombardment, he was rebuked by Harris, who was acutely aware of the inadequacy of his command to currently achieve its primary goal, the bombing of Germany’s industrial heartland. Therefore, he was unwillingly to divert a sizable section of his command to a raid which he considered as hopeless as attacking U-Boat pens. His position can be understood when looking at the assault on Normandy because bombing patterns from heavy and medium bombers were found to be ‘…uneven, with some areas overhit and others relatively untouched.’[viii] Thus by looking at the example of Normandy it is hard to wonder whether they would have much of an effect.



Thus, the main burden for support of the operation fell the fighter squadrons that made up the bulk of Leigh-Mallory’s command and as the Official History of the RAF comments the ‘…squadrons did what was expected of them…’[ix] and that was in some way to seek air superiority over the beach areas. In this respect, Leigh-Mallory’s command did a valiant effort but as recent revelations has shown not as well as could have been hoped for. At the time, it was believed that the RAF had shot down ninety-one aircraft, forty-four probable and one hundred fifty one destroyed on the ground, but as later research has shown the figure is actually somewhere nearer forty-eight destroyed and twenty-four damaged.[x] When compared to RAF losses on the day of one hundred six aircraft this was a heavy price to pay. In terms of Close Air Support, the picture was also much worse. As so much of Leigh-Mallory’s command was made up of fighters, it was found to be very hard to support the troops on the beach as the cannon armed fighters could make little impression on the concrete casemates that made up the bulk of the German defences.



Thus to perceive whether the RAF had an agenda on Dieppe, as Loring Villa claims is top judge whether it was more a fault in its command and the force structure that was given to the operation. Loring Villa argues that aerial bombardment may have made a difference, but if the experience of Normandy two years later is examined then it is hard to see whether it would have made a difference, because as previously commented heavy bombers tended to be uneven and could often over hit their targets. In addition, the bombing of urban areas, which Dieppe was, can be a hindrance to attacking troops as was to be seen two years later in the rubble of Caen. Thus, it is doubtful whether three hundred bombers would have been of much help to the attackers. While the use of bombers was unlikely to help the operation, the miss-allocation of tactical air assets was the biggest failure and one of the greatest lessons of the operation. While the troops on the ground went unhindered by the Luftwaffe, they also faced a hard time attacking defensive positions. If the force structure had taken into account the many advances by the Army Co-operation Command and given more attention to CAS operations the operations may have been more of a success. Thus as the Official History comments;

‘…the close support…was not entirely effective…because the cannon of our fighters made little impression on concrete [and] because…the military commanders were unable to indicate…targets for attack.’[xi]



After the operation, one of the main criticisms and lessons was the need for massive fire support during the landing phase of any operation. To this end the RN provided both cruisers and battleships for all future amphibious landings, but the question was asked why none for the raid on Dieppe. The RN position during the raid on Dieppe can best be surmised by the attitude of the First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound. Pound was weary of providing capital ships for any raid for fear of losing one in the English Channel; Pound viewed this as unacceptable to the RN at that time and as the papers of Rear-Admiral Baillie-Grohman comment, when he asked Mountbatten why there were no battleships Mountbatten told him that he had been that ‘…should the battleship be sunk, we could never claim Dieppe as a victory…’[xii]



Pounds position is understandable; to place a battleship of the coast of France in daylight and within reach of the Luftwaffe would have been asking for it to be attacked. 1942 was not 1944 and the allies yet had not achieved complete aerial supremacy, which gave them the advantage of doing virtually as they pleased during Operation Overlord. If Pound had acquiesced to the request he would have placed one of his most valuable ships within striking distant of an air force that had as yet not been crippled, as it would be by 1944 and as has been commented, ‘…perfect air cover was impossible until the Luftwaffe was decisively defeated.’ [xiii]



Stephen Roskill, the Official Historian of the RN, also offers another possible explanation why a capital ship was not used and that was as he comments, ‘…because our long experience of engaging coast defences…had not generally produced happy results.’[xiv] This is a possible reference to the failure of the assault on Gallipoli during the First World War. If this is the case, we have an instance of previous failure permeating into the mind of the head of the RN. By letting, this into his mind Pound obviously allowed a previous naval failure to cloud his judgement. Unfortunately though there is little evidence as to whether this is true because like the other service chiefs, Pound has left little detail as to his thoughts on the raid and why he may not have allowed the use of a battleship.



In addition, Pounds reason to not use a battleship can be seen by the deployment of his ships. The RN started the war with thirteen capital ships and by 1942 it was down to nine, and these were spread all over the globe. Two were in-home waters; four were temporarily in the Indian Ocean while the rest were in the Mediterranean. Thus, it can be seen why it was hard to deploy a major ship in support of what was in Pounds mind a minor operation. Pounds major concerns at this time were the protection of vital convoys and attempting to defeat or at least keep in check the forces of the Axis navies. As such, Pound’s fleets were already stretched to their limits, but also the commander was as, Churchill consistently harassed Pound for information on every aspect of the naval war and as such felt the pressure like all member of the COS.



The one area where lessons were learned from Dieppe was in the necessity to form permanent amphibious groups for future operation. By doing this mistakes such as those that happened at most of the beaches during the operation would not be repeated, and as such the Admiralty agreed after the raid to form ‘permanent naval assault forces’,[xv] in doing this many lives were probably saved in most of the subsequent combined operations of the war.


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Loring Villa B (1994) Unauthorised Action, p. 128

[ii] Murray W (1999) War in the Air 1914 – 45¸ p. 88

[iii]Jacobs W A ‘Air Support for the British Army, 1939-1943’, Military Affairs, 46:4 (1982: Dec) p. 175

[iv] Lloyd Clark ‘War in the Air 1939-45’ in Trew S and Sheffield G (Eds.) (2000) 100 Years of Conflict 1900-2000, p. 225

[v] John Buckley ‘The Air War in France’ in Bond B and Taylor M (Eds.) (2001) The Battle for France and Flanders Sixty Years On, p. 117

[vi] Terraine J (1997) Op Cit, p. 351

[vii] Mountbatten on becoming the Chief of Combined Operations held titles in each of the three services; being Vice Admiral of the Navy, Lieutenant General of the Army and Air Marshal of the RAF.

[viii] Gooderson I (1998) Air Power at the Battlefront: Allied Close Air Support 1943-45, p. 240

[ix] Richards D and Saunders H St G (1953) Op Cit, p. 144

[x] Richards D and Saunders H St G (1953) Ibid

[xi] Richards D and Saunders H St G (1953) Op Cit, pp. 144-145

[xii] Cited in Loring Villa B (1994) Op Cit, p. 95. This comes from the Baille-Grohman papers which are held in the National Maritime Museum Archives, Greenwich

[xiii] Loring Villa B (1994) Ibid

[xiv] Roskill D.S.C Captain S W (1956) Op Cit, p. 241

[xv] Roskill D.S.C Captain S W (1956) Op Cit, p. 251

 

*bump*

 

Just read a while ago Neillands´ Dieppe raid book. It seems , at least according to him, that the troops were left without cover for the operation even though alot of action happened in the air, the sea etc.

1. Some bombing of Dieppe took place beforehand but this only warned the Germans that something was going to happen

2.Once the Hurricanes had attacked the defensive positions before the beginning of invasion there was no more actual protection from the sky to the troops

3. The ships giving naval artillery protection were too lightly armed and could not put out the bunkers etc and could not help the troops by their fire power.

4. The planning was not good in case something went wrong. The only time the operation could be cancelled was around 3 o´clock a.m. and after that it was all go-go-go without a possibility to cancel the operation.

5. Mostly losses took place during retreat and thus all the planning beforehand was not done properly

Neillands considers that also the command structure was weak with every section doing their own decisions ( the RN not giving a cruiser, the RAF doing air battles etc )during the planning, and also that Mountbatten was not in any way qualified to command this kind of job, and once he heard there would not be enough protection for the attacking troops he should have cancelled the operation immediately or at least required it be cancelled.

 

From the Neillands´ book

" One of the minor myths of the Dieppe operation is that the tanks remained stuck on the shingle. In fact, there were 29 tanks put ashore, and of these fifteen got off the beach and onto the promenade. It was here where their problems really began. The exits were blocked with AT obstacles, the task of removing which belonged to the Canadian engineers, and most of them had been killed..."

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Just wondering what would have happened if the tanks could have kept on going...

 

From the Neillands´ book " Dieppe "

Brigadier Peter Young, of No 3 Commando :

" Describe a typical WW2 landing operation? Well, it would be pitch dark, with no lights permitted. There would be a sea running, so most people would be sea-sick. It would take twice as long as we thought it would to get the chaps into the landing craft and then half the landing craft would disappear in the darkness and never be seen again. When the rest of us embarked we would bounce around for a while and then be landed on the wrong beach and while we were working out where we actually were we would be shelled by the Royal Navy. And that was on a good day!"

 

Neillands´view on Mountbatten:

" Indeed, Mountbatten´s initial appointment in October 1941 was as "Adviser" on Combined Operations, not "Director" or "Commander" . This is a point we shall return to but it raises an obvious question: as a former destroyer captain, flotilla commander and naval Signals expert, it is hard to see from where Mountbatten drew the experience required to advise anyone on amphibious operations, let alone the British Chiefs of Staff.

When one considers that the PM was surrounded by generals, admirals and air marshals, the selection of a mere naval captain for one of the most important posts available -is more than a little surprising, until one considers the fate of Roger Keyes. That episode suggests that Churchill did not appoint Mountbatten to COHQ because of his expertise in amphibious warfare - Mountbatten had no amphibious expertise - but because he thought he was the man to short-circuit the road blocks in the Whitehall machine.

Whatever his title, an "advisory" post was not the role Churchill had in mind when he selected Mountbatten for this job. Mountbatten´s job was to "think offensively" and carry the war to the enemy, always bearing in mind the eventual need for a cross-Channel invasion. Even without the warnings from Keyes, the PM had noticed that the Chiefs of Staff and their subordinate rank and file at the war office were frequently dragging their feet over his raiding concept and where the accumulated experience might lead.

 

Does anyone also have any information in regards to how the US Army Rangers fared during this disastrous raid on Dieppe?

 

There seems to be little info about their participation at Dieppe except that they did very well for such a small number. Approxiamately 50 took part but they were spread across a number of British units. So, they did as well as their respective parent units. Three were killed, including Lieutenant E.V. Loustalot.

The full list of Rangers who took part:

http://www.rangerfamily.org/History/History/Battalion Pages/Rangers on Dieppe Raid.htm

 

thanks much man, appreciated

 

Thank-you Mahross for that well documented and insightful post.

The conclusion is always the same. The operation should have been squashed for lack of proper support from the RN and RAF, regardless of their reasoning.

It was pushed ahead for reasons that had nothing to do with sound military doctrine.

 

Why should the operation have been squashed ?

 

Hi guys,what was the R.N.bombardment force made up of,exactly.? Thanks.Lee.

 

8 destroyers!

 

Not even cruisers?oh Lordy.

 

Yup,

The idea was to rely on surprise, which had worked quite well at the Lofoten islands and St Nazaire. (And incidentally would be . the similar approach in all of the landings in the Mediterranean until Op Anvil/Dragoon) Had Dieppe achieved surprise, then it is likely that a similar tactic would have been used for any cross channel invasion.

The RN had lost too many ships operation in coastal waters to be happy with anything bigger than a destroyer in the channel in 1942. The previous year they had lost cruisers and Battlefields to land based bombers and seen an aircraft carrier put out of the war for months. Earlier in 12942 the German warship Gneisenau had stuck an air dropped mine and would never sail again.

 

Do you think too much emphasis was placed on heavies,and not enough on twin engine tactical bombers in 1942?,cheers.Lee.

 

I guess the twins were in the D.A.F.

 

There were 8 "Hunt" class destroyers used for the raid, each having four pounder guns (inadequate, according to naval authorities of the time to knock out any hidden gun emplacements in the cliff caves above Puys.

Only 4 of these destroyers actually engaged the beaches to offer cover fire as two were used as command ships and two were escort craft stationned on the wings of the excusion force to defend the hospital ships and watch out for U-boats.

 

The operation was badly planned, from a military point of view. Refer back to first post. It started as a worthy idea on the page provided there was a sufficient commitment on the part of all the armed forces involved and all the support groups.

The intelligence was shoddy from top to bottom. There was constant politicking going on behind the scenes pushing the flawed planning forward. Then there was a series of compromises that turned the plan into a piece of wishful crap.

Denis Whitaker presents the arguement that Churchill saw Dieppe as a sacrificial operation to get the Russians off his back about a second front.

Churchill, who was on a trip to Russia at the time of the raid, informed Stalin that he expected 10,000 casualties at Dieppe, despite having only 5000 to 6000 troops committed. (Great optimism on his part, eh?). Dieppe was presented to the Russian leader as a feint to get Hitler looking at Western Europe while Churchill and Roosevelte prepared a real second front in North Africa (operation Torch). This tactic worked to mollify Stalin somewhat, but committed Churchill to the raid NO MATTER WHAT.

 

I am presently re reading James Leassor's "Green Beach" about Jack Nissenthal's operation against the German Freya (radar) station. Leassor interviewed Lord Mountbatten about this operation in preperation for his book. (p.235) :

"I was horrified to learn that a man was chosen who knew about the cavity magnetron and put in a position where he might have been tortured to the point of giving away this secret, and so it was arranged for ten men to shoot him so he would not be captured."

According to Leassor, "What concerned Mountbatten particularly was the fact that while Combined Operations maintained an organization for the purpose of providing former German Jews enlisted in the commandos, and selected for particularly hazardous assignments with completely false identities, even to letters, bckgrounds, and relations, no use whatever was made of these sophisticated facilities on Jack Nissenthal's behalf. He could easily have been given a complete Canadian identity, but this was never requested."

The fact that Mountbatten was never informed of this mission, indeed even the commander of the South Saskatchewan regiment in which Jack was embedded and who was responsible for providing the ten man escort-cum-firing squad was only dimly aware of Jack's existence, let alone his mission. Most of the Canadians with Jack thought the instructions were a cruel joke, just another snafu in a mission that was fubar.

Mountbatten : ... "Never at any time have I heard of sending someone out with instructions to kill their own men. Another failure of the machine below me was that nobody told me afterwards that Nissenthal had returned safely..."

This examople demonstrates how the intelligence services were acting independantly of each other, putting together a bunch of ideas for operations that had nothing to do with the main thrust of the raid (capturing a port and holding it it for a couple of hours). All these distracting side shows were put together hastily, they were not thought out or planned thoroughly. The rest of the raid was equally thrown together by combined operations.

The men at the pointy end of the stick had to do the best they could with what they were given.

The best prepared group that day were Lovat's #3 and #4 commandos who diregarded the rest of the planning and took their little part of the operation away from the combined operations staff and did most of their training and logistics themselves. Even they encountered major problems with the royal navy's ineptitude. One of the two groups was landed in the wrong place and the other was scattered and never got to Dieppe at all. This was a small group of less than a thousand men who had previous amphibious landing experience. These are the highly trained men who thrust home at St-Nazaire and in smaller operations along the coast.