I am not very sure about Omaha beach being the "dumbest" attack of the war. The Germans were well-dug in at commanding heights, previous recon flights over the German positions failed to identify their location, and the loss of amphibious tanks due to rough seas were all factors that were out of Eisenhower/Montgomery's hands. The German counteroffensive at Mortain and (to a lesser extend) Ardenness however were very poorly concieved attacks.
I agree with Joe's previous post that the Pearl Harbor attack ranks high on the list. The Axis clearly did not coordinate their strategy. Pearl was the beginning of the end for each of the Axis powers. If Japan had turned West instead of East, the USA might have stayed out of the war for a bit while Germany and Japan took on the Soviet Union. Indeed, given the concessions made to the Soviet Union after the War, I wonder whether the USA and Great Britain would have bartered with the Axis to take back Western Europe in exchange for Eastern Europe and Russia. (Not sure what would have happened to China.)
From German point of view I would vote for the attack on Poland. Hitler could should have known about Churchills unwillingness to give in. As such a war with England ment that sooner or later the US would get involved. Hitler could have persuaded Stalin and even Slovakia to do the whole job for him - the borders of his mortal enemy comming just next to his, which would have promted of the attack by Hitler sooner or later, but no support for Russia from England and the USA. But Hitler was more of an impatient poker player then a cool strategist. Should this be in the "what if' section? Regards Kruska
Post the retaking of Kursk, Bielgorod and Kharkov in Feb '43 in the roll-up after Stalingrad, the Soviet attack was overoptimistically extended with depleted and unsupported forces. This led to the famous von Manstein's 'backhand slap', or Third Battle of Kharkov, resulting in the destruction of 6th Army (the Soviet one this time) and Mobile Group Popov and re-loss of kharkov, setting the stage for the future battle of Kursk. The Soviet command did not repeat this error See here for a summary.
Omaha was a diificult target but there were mistakes made at all levels The launching of the tanks so far from the beach was a predictable disaster at a staff level rather than senior commanders as was the short launching of bombardment rockets so they missed the beache entirely. The Airforce missed both the defences and the beach. One of the main reasons for the rockets and bombing was to crater the beach and provide cover for the infantry advancing across open beaches. The total refusal to acccept specialist armour when it was offered was a hubristic and expensive mistake it was accompanied by a refusal to accept the British Firefly design using US made 17 pounders and both descisions seem difficult to understand. There were a lot of brave men on Omaha but they were not well served by the planning.
I'd have to give it when barbarossa came around and when Stalin went into a shock and when the Russians had no idea what to do they just counter attacked, but being bypassed by the panzer divisions great encirclements happened and large defeats occurred for Russia.
the rommel attack on medenine.a total balls up.afterwards rommel went home,he was sick ,poor boy.cheers.
mikegb, Was the launch distance for the amphibious tanks significantly different from the four other beaches? And how do you reckon that the 17 pdr. tanks made impact on the fighting in general, since the defending German formation was an infantry division and had little armored support?
On the actual beach the 17 pounder would have been inferior to the usual gun since its HE shell was poor but afterwards a US manufactured 17 pounder in a sherman would have been very handy against tigers and panthers in paticular. The US had adopted the six pounder as a standard infantry TA gun in the form of the 57mm at gun in 1942 but by mid 1944 the US felt it didn't need help from any body and refused any British help including Hobbarts Funnies. This was hubris as cooperation on Radar, Aeroengines jet and piston engines in many areas had benefited both sides. The British took any equipment they thought would help ranging from Shermans to Liberators.
The DD Shermans were launched far further out to sea at Omaha, consequently all but 3 or 4 sank before they reached the beach. The US had no 17pdr tanks.
I am also under the impression that the sea was particularly rough at Omaha. The utility of the 17 pdr in the immediate assault feels dubious to me. That was a confusion of grammar.
Incidentally, the 17pdrs HE shell was superior to the 75mm, it was the 6pdrs shell that was inferior.
The sea wasn't so much"rougher", but the currents and winds were much different than those on the Brit and Canadian beaches. This was also a contributing factor, the "pilots" of the DDs were not trained at sea landings, and stubbornly stuck to the 'landing point' of ref. which was a church steeple. When the waves and wind blew them off course they steered back toward the steeple and ended up being hit by the waves on the sides of the water sheilds, which collapsed and allowed the sea to flood the tanks. An experienced bosun (sp) from the USN or the USCG might well have gone with not against the sea action, and more of the DDs would have made it ashore. Most if not all the others did land on the other four beaches.
The US ships were launched them too early to avoid gunfire but most didn't sink till they moved to correct their landing point they were offline as they turned sideways the sea overwhelmed the canvas screens and they sank.
If I remember correctly the canadians were so keen to get their tanks ashore at least one transport actualy ran ashore to ensure the tanks actually got to the beach the ship was badly damaged but the tanks rolled off into action perfectly pretty brave.
"...farther still to the right, off Omaha, the reckless Americans launched exactly as planned, to see all but three of the swimming tanks founder on the way in. No generals made those decisions, nor did they elsewhere. They were made by comparatively junior officers, sometimes swayed by the feelings of their men. Indeed, Sgt Gariepy´s B squadron of 6th Armoured regiment launched in direct disobedience of orders from assault craft headquarters. There was divided command, the senior army and naval officers being supposed to agree a decision. Gariepy could see his troop leader on the bridge arguing with the CO of the LCT;then he came to tell them that they were to be beached, not launched. The tank men began to argue. The troop leader said it was blowing Force 6 and suicide to swim tanks , while the men replied that they would rather drown than be impaled on the beach defences. The landing craft circled to 7,000 yards, but the sea was still too rough, and at that point craft hq made their own final decision not to launch. But at 3,000 yards the "down doors" bell rang for immediate launching. The order had been given by the CO of the B squadron, who said his men would not have it otherwise, recorded the unit historian. First tank down the ramp was Sergeant Gariepy´s." From Caen Anvil of victory by McKee