France fights on in North Africa

That's why I have a certain fascination for good what if scenarios, especially the really plausible ones.

 

I'll go on a limb here.
At first glance, I personally doubt that such an attempt would be successful. It would be a seating duck for air attack or sub attack and there is no guarantee that it could survive the voyage. Such a voyage would be very slow, perfect for a canny U-boat commander. Logically it would have to be heavily escorted, thus diverting needed naval units for more vital missions.
I don't think it would have been worth the effort or risk to bring it to another shipyard for completion.

 

Darlan in any case could have been one of the key persons in 1940 to push towards evacuation instead of armistice.
Concerning the availability ships for evacuation, without having any statistics at hand, I would assume with northern Africa being part of the mother country, there was a regular passenger services between all major ports and that the Mediterranean was quite busy with regular cruisers and cargos.
It is not only a question of technical capacities, but also a question of time, though. One of the big points of the Monnet plan, was indeed that by unifying France and Britain, there would have been neither cease fire nor surrender. And it is indeed a difference if you think the scenario for southern France from the the 15th of june or from the 22nd. If there was no armistice, no Petain and no radio proclamation by Petain, but perhaps a different proclamation like Churchill's blood sweat there would have been a perspective for resistance. Somebody mentioned the impressing figures for captured soldiers before and after Petain's speech. Furthermore it is to consider that the Rhone Valley south of Valence is a bottle neck between the Alps and the Massif Central, where all the major infrastructure is concentrated. The occupant could have taken the long way via Bordeaux, Toulouse, Narbonne, but also at Carcassonnne and before Montpellier it would have gotten very tight. the major ports, Marseille and Toulon were quite well situated, much better than the channel ports a couple of weeks before. I still think that with time going by, this part of the campaign would have gotten very close to call even. Italy was not a real threat, no way to deploy its army, the fighting in the Alps and at the Côte d'Azur could have gone on forever and once a supply system had been built up between Algeria and Southern France. No to forget also, that the control of the occupied territory would have been much more complicated. With no national WWI hero backing up the occupant, resistance would have been the only patriotic attitude, right from the beginning.

 

We all know how minimal a threat Italy really was in World War II because we have the benefit of hindsight. But looking at it from the writings of that period, Italian military strength was viewed differently, at least before the involvement in Greece.

This article appeared on Sept. 30, 1940 in the weekly news magazine Time. I'll put in a few excerpts.

Fighting in Africa's deserts is like playing chess with nothing but rooks and pawns. Water is as vital as ammunition; sand finer than talcum makes its way into the eyes. . . Mirages, blistering wind, sand blizzards, germs, all constitute hazards more dangerous than point blank enemy fire.

From Libya, a fortnight ago, started the Italian spearhead--a long thin line of ight Fiat tanks in Indian file, three infantry regiments, a machinegun battalion, an artiller regiment, sapper companies, communication units, bringing total strength to about 250,000. This well-balanced striking force drove first for Salum, five miles across the border inside Egypt.

The defenders--perhaps 70,000 Britons, Australians, New Zealanders, Rhodesians, Indians--have been braced for the attack for some time. The British defense was apparently to fall back, harassing the invaders and avoiding serious action until the British were in an area with good supply lines and the Italians were far from their base.

The Italian press cried that this was a "war for Egyptian independence"--"liberating Egypt from the oppressing domination of the English." One reason for Italian confidence was apparent superiority in the air. With a pronounced margin in numbers, the Italians also had at least parity in quality, since the British use mostly planes like the Gloster Gladiators in Egypt, where dust and sand jam modern retractacble landing gear. There was no question that these hopeful factors had made the Italians a little giddy. Wrote Benito Mussolini's mouthpiece Virginio Gayda: "Nothing can save Britain now."
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As for establishing a supply line from North Africa to Southern France, it's been pointed out earlier in this thread that Algeria didn't have the industrial base to support a large force, let alone supply those French units that would remain in Southern France.
I think what would have been better was turn this French position into a large logistical base with Allied help but that would take time. Remember that at this stage of the war, only Roosevelt's administration was pushing for US involvement in World War II. There existed a very strong anti-war sentiment among Americans before Japan came into the picture.

 

Yes, not chance of supplying a French army from Africa in any meaningfull manner. This route works for saving a small portion of the French army and the better part of the air forces.

"I think what would have been better was turn this French position into a large logistical base with Allied help but that would take time."

How much time is part of this. The Allied effort is greatly aided if they rid Lybia of the Italian army. Using their airforces and navy is the key here, for interdicting the sea route. I'm convinced they had a fair chance of this interdiction if reasonablly well led. That leaves a realatively weak Italian land defense to face a Allied attack sometime in the late autum or winter.

Of course if the italians can defeat the combined Anglo/French fleet then they are in a much better position.

 

about the conditions: true for Libya and Egypt, but not the same for algeria north of the Atlas, which is more comparable to the northern Mediterranean. The Algerian desert, south of the Atlas was not of any strategic relevance.


about the supply: 100% agreeing on the logistical base. A supply sourced in Algeria was out of question. But the logistical base was a tremendous asset: Big ports in Oran and Alger, communication lines running to the west out of reach of the ennemy. Even the port of Casablanca could have been used in order to receive supply directly from the Atlantic, that could have been shipped to alger by road transport.


the US involvement was reluctant, but the land lease agreement already started in march 41, the destroyers for bases agreement right after the French surrender! One of the advantages of the Monnet plan was also, that no specific agreement for France would have been necessary and that the supply from North America (not only US, also Canada, that as a dominion was already involved in the war), could have been shipped directly to Northern Africa.

 

If the Allied air and naval fleets suceeed in isolating Lybia, even only partially then all the French need to capture Tripoli are trucks. If I recall correctly there was a narrow gage rail road running from Oran-Algers-Tunis-Sfax (or Gabes?). That would be suffcient for a methodical advance the 300 kilometers from Sfax to Tripoli if there are trucks to supplement the railroad and cover that last interval.

So several months to organize a field force of a couple corps with heavy artillery and truck transport, establish a a forward supply base near Sfax, then a couple more months to hammer their way to Tripoli. The British might make things easier by sending their armored force there to help, rather than all the way to Egypt.

German aid, or a lucky Italian naval or air victory could halt this, but without German intervention the odds seem to be on the Allies side.

 

With the US policy of 'Cash & CArry' still in force in the summer of 1940, what resources would France have remaining to keep the aircraft, and other things it had ordered flowing? Vehicals and any US weapons available would be necessary to turn the remaining ground forces in NW Africa into a viable field army. What remained to France to pay until Rossevelt changed the US policy?

I'm assuming there were considerable raw materials in the various colonys that could be bartered, am I correct? Did France have much in the way of gold reserves? I have been told the forigen currency reserves had been slight even in 1939.

 

a good scenario. With its Navy being still more inferior in the Mediterranean because of the French fleet and by hostile forces in the East and West, Italy would not dare to attack from Libya.
For the Allies it could have made sense to conquer the whole Southern Mediterranean rim, but on the other hand with no ceasefire and France still being involved as the French/British Union and large parts if not all of the mainland occupied, could they politically afford to focus on anything else but reconquering the mainland ?

 

it seems like the Rossevelt administration was quite creative to find new agreements in order to overcome payment shortages. After cas and carry there was immediately destroyers for bases and afterwards lend and lease. At least for the destroyers for bases France had to offer French guyana, Guadeloupe, Martinique... So perhaps some US-bases would have been established in the French DOM TOM? Interesting also from the point of view of postwar history.


Another point to be examined could be the future of the French/UK co-operation. Monnet meant both countries literally to unify. Could this have been a core of European political Union? Would it have changed the British and the French postwar attitude towards each other, towards Europe and America? probably the Germans would have tried to exploit this issue by presenting it as French submission to Britain. In a second phase, if resistance was growing in the occupied territories this could have been the main propaganda item for a collaborationist French government...

 

Yes the return to Paris and defeat of Germany would be the ultimate goal. In the short term the Allies have many limits of resources. It will still take several years.

Differing stratigic goals and operational thinking would make any form of alliance imperfect. So much depends on who the specific leaders are.

Taking a different direction... I'm told the French aircraft carrier might not escape France. What was the condition of the rest of the navy? Can anyone provide details, or recomend several good sources to read?

 

My old national Geographic map shows a narrow gage railroad running from Tunis south to Gabes or Sfax. Its not clear which is the actual terminus.

Since supply is the foundation ofthe offence this railroad would be important to the Allied effort to capture Tripoli. So, was there in fact a railroad from Tunis to the Gabes/Sfax region, and what gage was it?

Also are there any sources showng the location and nature of the airfields in Tunisia and Lybia?

 

Some casual checks have revealed little of what the French air force did send and planned to send to Africa. Does anyone have some usefull refrrences or number they can post for this?

Also, how far had France progressed in the development of air dropped torpedos?

thanks

 

Weygand wanted to sent and hide weapons in Africa but he thought it was impossible to send men.

 

I think that for a French government to continue the fight Weygand would have to be replaced quickly. Several others as well. This is not to say many soldiers could have been evacuated. But, that much more aggresive leaders would be needed. Which brings me back to the question of who might have taken the senior military positons?

To change the subject. Does anyone have any relaible information on the condition and location for the French navy and cargo fleet in the summer of 1940? nominal orders of battle for the navy are easy to find, but I am not finding much for the condition and other details, at least in English language literture.

 

Here goes a link to an interesting page:

France Fights On!

Just what this thread is all about...

 

Yes I've read the first chapter with interest. It has some estimates of the aircraft avialble to the air force. The rest of it I've not read deeply. Wish they had cited their sources better & included more data.

 

Could have been general Petrelat or general Doumenc who were competent and brave but not so agressives too, maybe already general De Lattre or Bethouart, more offensive but they hadn't great commands in 1940 with a division for the first and a half-brigade for the second. We'll never know how good was general Corap (perhaps he wasn't bad nut he was under general Huntziger).

De Lattre de Tassigny too was a great commander who fought victoriously in Rethel in 1940 and had sophisticated positions about tank warfare. But he was close to Weygand and he only commanded a division.

Not so much choice. General George was pathetic, Huntziger too, Molinié, Frere and Giraud were captured...

 

I notice Huntzinger has his name as command of the remaining group of field armys in central France during June. Chapman also mentions him as considered by Daladier to be a candadate for Gamelins replacement. Are these items correct? Competency aside he seems to have the favor of Daladier. I know nothing of Petrelat or general Doumenc other than they were peers of Billotte & Huntzinger.

For the air forces were there likely replacements for Vulleimin? Would the replacement of the air forces chief made much difference?

 

Whilst studying the disposition of the Fremnch navy in June 1940 I noticed only a single light crusier and a few coastal patrol craft or gunboats were stationed in Indochina. Was this normal for France, or was a larger squadron or fleet withdrawn earlier in 1939?