Hitler's summer pause 1941

AGS only had one PZ group and since Stalin had placed more troops in the Ukraine they were in better shape to handle the Germans. Kirponnos skillfully handle the German attacks, thus leaving the Germans with a choice. During the planning it was forseen by the Germans that AGC would be at risk of its flanks being over extended as it pushed east. There were contingencies to have AGC move north and or south to help clear the flanks. The original German plan was for part of Guderians PZ group to go south and the rest to continue east. Guderian went and tried to talk Hitler out of going south, when Hitler refused, Guderian then insisted he could not split up his group and that he had to go south will all or none.

 

Your questions are absurd, what is the difference between taking a city from the front or by surrounding it.

 

I am glad that you agree with me and that you disagree with posts 36 and 47 where it was said :"The Germans planned to surround and invest the city BEFORE STORMING IT",which is the same as saying : after the investment and surrounding of the city,the Germans would storm it .

I have said several times that the Germans woud not invest/surround and storm the city because they had neither the time nor the manpower to do it .

What the Germans assumed was that after the battle of Viazma,a lieutenant and 6 men would knock at the gates of Moscow,that the gates would be opened and that they would receive the keyes of the city by the new mayor (the old one would hang on a tree).

 

A big difference : one can try to take a city from the front with the forces available at the moment,even if they were limited to one batallion,speculating that chaos would rule in the city,while to surround a city,one would not need a batallion but several divisions,something which would take time,which would give the enemy the possibility to fortify the city .

Afaics, in august 1914,the city of Liège was taken by a coup de main : small German forces commanded by Ludendorf took the city.

 

It seems (no,it is obvious) that certain people still are unable to grasp the essence of Typhoon ,which was : after the battles of Briansk/Viazma there would no longer be an organized Soviet resistance,the Soviet state would collaps and Germany would use this golden opportunity (=opening of the window) to pursue the defeated enemy : Ivan was on the run,keep him running,and do not wast time by surround/conquer/capture Moscow .The railways of Moscow would not be needed,because only limited resources were available/were needed for the pursuit.

 

For Kiev : the city was saved in august/september 1941 by the presence of the SW Front;why would it not be saved in october if the SW Front remained where it was ? That it was not so,does not mean that Stalin's decision was wrong .Winston refused to evacuate Singapore and ordered to send reinforcements ;the result was negative,but,that does not mean that the decision was a mistake .

The alternative (=giving up Kiev and withdrawal of the SW Front;WHEN?) had also very negative results : political and military,which,for Stalin were more important than te risk of the loss of the SWFront :the préwar Soviet strategy was to not abandon voluntarily a square mile of Soviet territory but always to fight .That there was a danger that the SW Front would be encircled? There is always such a danger . There was also a danger that the armies defending Moscow (Briansk/Viazma) would be encircled,would that mean that they should retreat and abandon Moscow ?

 

In august 1914,British troops were sent to Ostend;result : Ostend and the British troops were lost . Bad decision or not ? And why ?

In may 1940,British troops were sent to Calais;result:Calais and the troops were lost .Bad decision or not ? And why ?

In december 1944,101 AB was sent to Bastogne;result : both were saved . Bad decision or not ?And why ?

In 1941,it was decided not to abandon Tobruk,in 1942,it also was decided not to abandon Tobruk .Was the 1942 decision wrong ? And why ?

In 1942,it was decided not to abandon Sebastopol;Bad decision or not ? And why ?

In 1944,Hitler ordered not to abandon Sebastopol .Bad decision or not ? And why ?

In 1968,it was decided tot to abandon Hue,but to hold the city,although there was a risk that the forces in Hue could be encircled.Bad decision or not ? And why ?

In 1941,Stalin ordered not to abandon Kiev,although there was a risk that the SW Front could be encircled .Bad decision ? And why ?

 

The political and military consequences of losing Kiev, was less than the consequences of the destruction of South West Front.

It's not just a matter of an encirclement, but how the entire defence was allowed to be negated by Stalin's imposed inactivity.

"In spite of all his warnings and desperate pleas to shore up the flanks, Kirponos had been surrounded, and yet he still could not secure permission to break out to the east. Meanwhile his front was already in an advanced state of disintegration. The Northern flanks had largely collapsed, and his strongest army, (the 37th), remained meaningslessly tied to Kiev, some 200 kilometers from the new Soviet line. With his hands firmly tied, Kirponos faced an excruciating choice - either risk sharing Pavlov's fate by openly defying Stalin, or go on rejecting the pleas of his subordinates and accepting the steady suffocation of his entire front."

"There was also a degree of wonderment expressed at the static nature of the Soviet response, which the German command could only guess ersulted from 'complete surprise', on the part of the Soviets, as well as a lack of orders about what to do next. General Heinrici expressed his utter incredulity at Soviet actions 'In an incomprehensible manner the Russian has left his troops to remain in a situation which must result in their capture...' "

 

Obvious answers are obvious

There was never enough supplies in Kiev to maintain the number of forces shoe horned into the area, upon encirclement. Further, the refusal to allow force realignments in response to (or in anticipation of) German actions was criminal.

Tobruk was receiving supplies from the sea during the entire period. Sevastopol was a fortress city, which also received supplies,and was massively stocked at the beginning of the conflict.

 

No ne should not use the results of a decision to judge that decision .

Not that I have much respect for Stolpi,but,one must admit that there is something good in everyone:

Stolpi writes the following :

On 8 august,Kirponos told Stalin that Kiev could be defended .

On 19 august the Stavka ordered a partial retreat

On 9 september,Stalin ordered to retreat and to give up Kiev,order wgich was annulled on 11 september.

Comment of Stolpi : on 11 september,Stalin was right when he pointed out to Kirponos that it was impossible to withdraw the SWF behind the Psel River line in order to prevent its encirclment.

During this period,Stalin was supported by the chief of staff : Shapovnikof.

And for those who want to judge Stalin's order using the results : the result was not that bad for the SU:it lost a lot of men,but,men can be replaced,while Germany lost a lot of time,and time could not be replaced .

Thus,the question remains (and there is still no answer given) :why would it be better to withdraw( if it was possible) the SWF and to give up Kiev ?

 

1)If there were not enough supplies in Kiev,why should there be enough supplies if Kiev was abandoned?

2)Were force realignments possible ?

 

Not for Stalin,and he was the only who could judge : political repercussions were always as much important as military repercussions .

 

Indeed. Which sort of brings to the fore Stalin's sudden decision to not leave Moscow, at the nadir.

After the number of mistakes and bad decisions made by Stalin, throughout the preceeding 3 months, make it apparent that he was rapidly loosing credibility as leader.

There is more to the story than is currently available.

Or as the Swede's say: "There is a dog buried there somewhere."

 

About the mistakes/bad decisions from Stalin in the summer of 1941,this is propaganda by the generals who,after the death of Stalin,decided to blame the dictator for the initial defeats .They had learnt from the German generals,who blamed Hitler for the defeats and claimed the victories .

 

Perhaps it's time to post the often made but seldom acceeded internet rerquest to refrain from supplying nutrient to those who dwell under bridges.

 

Kirponos could defend against AGS, he could not also deal with the attack that was coming from his rear.

 

That's judging by hindsight :how could the Stavka know that Kirponos could not deal with the attack that was coming from his rear ? Did the Stavka know the strength of the 2 German pincers (Kleist and Guderian)?

Besides,even if the Stavka knew,that one can argue that the Stavka decision was defendable :was it not better to sacrifice the SWFront? Remember Sevastopol: 2 times,the forces at Sevastopol were sacrifice: first by Stalin,than by Hitler :was this a bad decision ?

Before PH,Washington decided that the Philippines would not be abandoned,they would be defended,although there was not much chance to prevent the Japannese to conquer the Philippines .

 

That very much depended on when the Japanese attacked. If they had waited another few months they might not have been able to take the them.

 

Stalin could have at least given a fighting chance to the troops in Kiev. By fighting their way out in good time they would have made a huge blow to the Germans troops.Now they were out of ammo and supplies running through the gaps in German lines. A good example is that by autumn 1942 Stalin had learnt his lesson and troops were retreating in good order at the same time causing losses to the Germans following them. But not without the massive Soviet losses in Kiev may 1942 and Crimea later that year.

 

That could also said for Kiew : i the Germans had waited,.....