Hitler's summer pause 1941

LOL!!

Can you not see the difference between waiting to invade an Island, and enveloping an Army Front, in a city on a landmass, as part of an ongoing invasion of a continental power?

 

The US decision to reiforce the Philipines however was made before the war started and at the time they had every reason to believe they would get those extra few months.

 

I missed so many of the last messages..but I didn' t miss anything it seems if you are tripping over idiom;
it is EITHER surrounding and attack OR storming..not both .
Like in medieval times; it is either laying Siege and finally attack....or storming AT ONCE...

My 2 $$.


(and what's with Hitler 's summer pause in 1941? He was in Berchtesgarden enjoying the summer, no ? )

 

Interesting bitterness in Wehrmacht: " Field marshal von Kluge was a bitter rival of Guderian and something of a pariah himself. Indeed, Kluge had such ill-feeling towards Bock that it has been suggested he supported Hitler´s drive to the south , at least in part, to escape Bock´s area of control, According to the Chief of Staff at Fourth Army, Major-general Blumentritt, Kluge´s motives were astonishingly self-centered. Writing after the war Blumentritt stated: It was Kluge´s idea , and desire, that his own Fourth Army should swing south to carry out this pincer movement along with Guderian´s panzer forces. When setting forth the argument for this plan, he said to me, with emphasis: It would also mean that we should be under Field Marshal von Rundstedt, instead of Field marshal von Bock. This was an interesting example of the influence of the personal factor in strategy."

Stahel and Kiev 1941

 

I see no difference between storming and attacking .

 

Blumentriit is not the most reliable witness,he said a lot of things after the war,a lot of things of which he knew they were not correct .

 

Of topic : the point is that the US political leadership decided before PH and AFTER PH not to abandon the Philippines(for political and other reasons)although the chances to hold the Philippines were meagre,and that nobody reproached FDR for this decision .

The same happened with Singapore,Calais,Sevastopol,Leningrad .

It was the préwar Soviet doctrine in case of invasion never to abandon voluntarily a square inch of Soviet territory,thus,why would Stalin give up Kiev (the third city of the SU)?After all,the SWF was blocking AGS,and even more,it was counter-attacking,no one could foreseen what would happen ..

in december 1944,the 101 AB was sent to hold Bastogne,although the chances to hold the city were questionable:if Bastogne had been captured and the 101 been lost,would you say that Eisenhower's decision was wrong ?

 

Which illustrates how thorouhly you have missed the point.

 

I'll agree it's off topic. It's also wrong. After PH the US essentially did abandon the Philippines. Ships that were headed that way turned around or were diverted to other ports. The US didn't evacuate them but that was impossible with the resources at hand. There was little FDR could do so no reason to reproach him.

 

Was it impossible on 9 december 1941 to evacuate the Philippines ?

 

Yes.

 

Germany had not the means to encircle/attack/storm Moscow .

Besides,even it had the means,it would be very stupid to do it : the conditio sine qua non for the success of Typhoon was the collaps of the Soviet regime after the battles of Briansk/Viazma,if this happened,this would mean that no Soviet soldier would fight for Moscow,thus,there was no need to encircle Moscow;if the Germans planned to encircle/attack Moscow,this would mean that after the battles of Briansk/Viazma,the opinion of the OKH was that Typhoon had failed,which wasn't,or that before these battles,the opinion of the OKH was that Typhoon would fail,and,this wasn't so .

 

Proof ?

Besides,even if it was possible,would FDR give the order to abandon the Philippines ? From what I know,the answer is : no .The Philippines would not be abandoned,even if it was possible . It is the same for Kiev .

 

I agree but it is also completely irrelevant to the line of discussion you replied to.

That's your opinion. Supporting such an overly broad statement by hypothesisinig an event where it won't happen doesn't really support it..

???? You think it was? Then you present the proof. I'd like to see how you propose moving the necessary transport safely through waters under the influence if not outright control of Japanese naval and air power twice (the ships have to make it there then make it out).

News flash for you. The Philippines were abandoned no order was necessary all it took was the realization that the capability to reinforce them wasn't there. Eventually of course there was an order for Mac and at least some of the forces there to withdraw as they could a few got out via sub, PT boats, and B-17s.

 

I beg your pardon?!?! Off topic???

How is anything that happened on the Phillipines on topic? You need to re-read the original post, before you start lecturing people about what is on or off topic. Furthermore your peculiar ideas on the Phillipines have been repudiated.

The same did most definitely not occur with Singapore, Calais, or Sevastopol.

It was foreseen, at least from early August, thereof the requests to stavka to shift/realign forces in response to German actions.

Your reference to Bastogne is yet another ill-thought, irrelevant, and incomplete example, the only purpose which can be to obfuscate the issue for any uninitiated: The 101st represented a very small percentage of the Western Allies forces in Europe. The South Western Front represents roughly 1/6th to 1/7th of the USSR's forces under arms at the time. Bastogne was an bottleneck, an obstruction of German plans. Kiev was the opposite: the fulfillment of German ambitions with regards to the forces on AGC right flank, and the largest encirclement in history. The purpose of the Battle of Kiev was not the capture of Kiev per se, but the encirclement and consequent destruction of Red Army units. The German purpose of the Battle of the Bulge, was not to get tied down attempting to destroy the 101st.

 

The US navy had clearly stated there was no way to reinforce the Philippines and the best approach was to hunker down in Bataan. Mac, decided to try to hold all of the Philippines and Washington had no say, they were trying to build up the Philippine forces, but Japan struck a year early.

 

No : it was possible before PH to change strategy in the Pacific and to evacuate the Philippines ,because,if there was war,they were lost . Even after PH,it still was possible to evacuate a part of the forces on the Philippines .
This was not done,because there were other arguments who were considered to be more important .

It was the same for Kiev : it was decided not to give up Kiev and not to evacuate the SWF because the danger of encirclment was considered not to be critical and the disadvantage of giving up Kiev was considered to be greater than the theoretical danger that the SWF would be lost .

 

The question is not if it was possible to reinforce the Philippines: the point is that before the war,it was decided (for political reasons mainly) that if there was war,the Philippines would not be abandoned/the US forces would not be evacuated,and,if this meant that these forces would be lost,well,it would happen .

It was the same for Hongkong : even if the British garrison could be evacuated,it would not be evacuated,for political reasons :Britain could not afford to give up territories without fighting .

 

Wrong :

It was not foreseen:because,noone could foresee that the Germans would TRY to encircle the SWF

The principle was the same for Bastogne and for Kiev :Eisenhower took the risky decision to send 101 AB to Bastogne,the Stavka took the risky decision not to give up Kiev.

Also wrong : Bastogne was NOT a bottleneck and obstruction for the German plans : the German plan was to go to Antwerp via Liège,not via Bastogne/ Brussels ,Kiev OTOH,was an obstruction for the German plan :the Germans considered it to risky to go to Moscow without first having eliminated Kiev .

Saying that there was a danger that the SWF could be lost,is no argument to abandon Kiev: the danger that the forces on the Philippines would be lost was much greater and notwithstanding this,the decision was taken not to give up the Philippines,there was no danger that the forces at Hongkong would be lost: this was a certainty,but still,the decision was not to abandon Hongkong

 

In other posts, you're so happy to point out that the focus of Operation Barbarossa, was to destroy Red Army units, not the capture of Moscow.

Your narrative of the German operation and intention with the Battle of Kiev is very confused, and filled with contradictions. Unlike the generally accepted alternative to your view.

The SW Front and Kiev was lost too easily, because of Soviet command paralysis post Pavlov's murder. Few if any were willing to contradict the Great Leader.

This is born out, not just in the Soviet Generals' accusations against Stalin post the dictators death, but also in the diaries of the German Generals, at their wonderment at the static nature of Soviet defences in and around Kiev, as previously posted in this thread.

For goodness sake, the threatened encirclement was so obvious by 5th August 1941, that it was being reported in Western Newspapers. So much for "no one could forsee".