Hitler's summer pause 1941

The threat of an encirclment is a threat= a danger,not a reality .

Those who are saying that Kiev had to be abandoned to save the SWF,are thus also saying that Moscow had to be abandoned to save the forces lost at Briansk /Viazma ?It's the same principle : the SWF was lost while/because it tried to defend Kiev, the forces at Briansk/Viazma were lost because/while they tried to defend Moscow .

If you do not want to risk to lose forces,the only option is to not commit them.If you are giving forces the order to fight,there always is a risk to lose them .

 

Yes,and I stick to it .

The Stavka expected a German attack in the direction of Moscow,and it considered that the presence of the SWF at Kiev was an obstacle for a German attack ,and its conclusion was that the SWF had to remain where it was as long as possible,even at the risk that it would be lost .Besides,there were also political arguments against the abandonment of Kiecv .

An other exemple is Malta : at Whitehall,some people proposed to give up Malta,because it was draining British supplies and because its strategical importance was questionable . This proposal was rejected,mainly for political reasons: Malta was a symbol of British imperial power and would not be abandoned .

An other exemple is Leningrad : there was always a danger that Leningrad would be encircled and that the forces defending the city would be lost,but,it was out of the question to abandon the city and evacuate the forces,even if the danger was materializing and was becoming a reality :Leningrad would be defended .

Before WWII,the French strategy was to go north,if Belgium and Holland were invaded,even at the risk that the Germans would break trough in the Ardennes and encircle the forces going north : it was a risk that had to be taken .

 

Stalin made mistakes all the way. For instance he had to agree with Zhukov that all the forces at the border on 22d June would be sacrificed and a new line would be created with new forces with some 300-400 kilometers east of the previous border. And once the war started, Stalin vanished for two weeks. When Zhukov and other top rank Soviet politicians and military people appaeared at his summer cottage, Stalin expected them to kill him, because that´s what he´d done. Instead the "crew" asked him to come back to his office and talk to the people and lead the forces. Just as Kiev, Stalin put troops in all areas to attack the Germans or defend important cities and areas, and for instance before new reserves, the Soviet attacks had drained the troops in front of AGC down to 200,000 men. Another example was the famous winter attack after Typhoon, Stalin attacked with wide front. If he had had areas of concentrated troops, he could have smashed the AGC like that. Now he wasted all the forces to diluting them to a wide front attack, even though the Germans had to retreat, but that was the Germans´weakness more than Red Army´s strength in battle.

If Germans had taken Leningrad, they could have used all the forces to attack Moscow from North, and I´d think that could have made all the difference in that. Unfortunately the Finns stayed away from Leningrad.

 

It was not just a threat; it became a reality. When does the risk become to great to ignore? Each passing day increased the risk, until it was too obvious for even Stalin to ignore, but by which time it was too late.

No one is saying such nonsense. It isn't the same principle. There are better and worse ways to defend a territory. What occurred in Kiev, was one of the worst, but you'll never admit it. Almost an entire front sitting awaiting encirclement. The largest encirclement in history. Undertook to a large degree, a passive, static defence, enforced by Stalin, and the fear of sharing Pavlov's fate.

Briansk/Viazma was a totally different kettle of fish.
The Red Army's 50th and 13th Armies and the Operational Group of General Major A.N. Yermakov withdrew in order to avoid encirclement, and consequently Bryansk was evacuated without significant fighting. Given the size of the forces involved, those encircled in this pocket performed significantly better than those at Kiev.

It is a significant difference between the battles for Kiev, and the pockets of Bryansk/Viazma.

It's not the risk of loosing them, it's needlessly throwing them away. Not allowing them to fight the invaders in the best possible way, to thwart their plans. Much of the material and manpower shuttled into Kiev, may as well have been sent to the moon, for all the good that it did the Soviet cause.

 

The theory that Stalin vanished after the German attack has been proved to be a lie,invented during the destalinisation period .

The theory that on 22 june 1941 the Red Army had to go east instead of going west,sounds convincing (the Germans were afraid that this should happen),but there were other arguments who were pleading for the solution which was adopted = to go west,stop the Germans,expel them and go to Berlin .

For the winter offensive : the problems are

1) that it is impossible to prove that an attack on a more narrow front was possible

2) that it is not so /impossible to prove that a such attack would have resulted in the destruction of AGC : at that period,the German defensive capacities were still greater than the Soviet offensive capacities .One could argue that it was better not to attack,but,I doubt that this was politically possible .

Given the distance between Leningrad and Moscow,and the lack of traffic infrastructure,it would be impossible to attack Moscow from the north;the only thing the Germans could do was to transfer a part of AGN to the area of AGC,but,this would take time and it would overburden the railways of AGC.

 

It was not just a threat : it BECAME a reality:thus,initially,it was a threat,only a threat,and the Stavka decided to take the risk,and,at that moment, the decision of the Stavka was justified .That LATER the result of the decision was negative,does not mean that the decision was wrong .

 

The decision of the Stavka (not only Stalin) was not much different from the decision of Eisenhower at the start of the German offensive in the Ardennes :there it was OBVIOUS FROM THE FIRST DAY that the Germans planned to go to Antwerp,which would result in the encirclment of big US forces and of all British forces:there also,one could say that almost an entire front was sitting awaiting encirclment,because, no order was given to withdraw .Ike took the risk not to withdraw,as was doing the Stavka .


I should also warn against the use of the very questionable story of Zhukov :Zhukov had a big interest in to blaming Stalin for the defeats,during the destalinization period,it was a struggle on life and death and Zhukow knew what was awaiting him if he lost .

On 29 july,Zhukov was fired because he panicked:without any valid reason he proposed to abandon Kiev,and Shapovnikov (the better candidate) returned as chief of staff .Thus,the tales of Zhukov ...........

 

Actually, that is exactly what it means.

 

Proof that the story of Stalin in his dacha was proven as a lie? I've never heard of any other accounting of his whereabouts at all. He definitely wasn't visible, wherever he was. His first radio broadcast after the invasion was on the 3rd of July for goodness sake. In the meantime, Vilna, Brest-Litovsk, Kaunas, Lvov were captured...

Proof that it would overburden the railways of AGC? I find that highly unlikely given the duration and time period under discussion. They managed to strip AGN of a significant part of its mobile forces without causing too much burden to the railways.

 

Hardly the same risk at all.

Even had the Germans managed to penetrate to Antwerp (and they got nowhere near Antwerp), they were insufficient in strength to both destroy the cauldron and resist outward pressure, especially once the bad weather lifted and the Allied Air force took to the air.


Notice how Antwerp figures on this map. No. Neither do I... It's 140 kms away from Dinant...

The exact opposite can be said of Kiev; the Soviets had yet to stop the Germans. Attempting to do so with a static defence (no force re-alignments even within the Front's perimeters) of Kiev, with no hope of supply once encircled is not just counter-intuitive, it is downright criminal.

 

I recall the two week period "truth" was that Stalin was known to be at work in Kreml but he was not doing anything publicly, and the people of the USSR needed his "voice".

https://books.google.fi/books?id=PxiuUGRQhUIC&pg=PA112&lpg=PA112&dq=stalin+and+july+1941+and+dacha+and+molotov&source=bl&ots=UB0xxx8ySe&sig=_XxgtvvBhoUt_mfUnoPZC-Ftf50&hl=fi&sa=X&ei=_cLUVI6ZCqHnyQOSmIGgAg&ved=0CCoQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=stalin%20and%20july%201941%20and%20dacha%20and%20molotov&f=false

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“Lenin founded our state,” he said despondently as he left, “and we’ve fucked it up.” And with that, he retired to his dacha.

a small delegation came knocking at his door. Headed by Molotov (pictured to Stalin’s right), Lavrentii Beria (Stalin’s Chief of Secret Police), Kliment Voroshilov (Defence, to Stalin’s left) and Anastas Mikoyan (Foreign Trade), they found Stalin sitting at his desk. He had on his face a look of fear. Mikoyan later wrote, “I have no doubt – he decided we had come to arrest him.” Stalin was looking thinner, haggard and hadn’t changed his clothes.
“Why have you come?” he asked.
Molotov stepped forward, “We’re asking you to return to work.”
Stalin dithered, “But can I live up to people’s expectations? Can I lead the nation to a final victory? There may be more deserving candidates.”
“There’s none more worthy,” said Voroshilov.

http://www.historyinanhour.com/2011/07/01/stalins-breakdown/

I have read about this incident in several books so I must assume it is true.

 

1) The story originated from Nikita who was very interested to show Stalin in a bad light ,but,sadly for Nikita,reality was different : see the 2 following sources :

"Stalin in june 1941 ":A comment on Cynthia Roberts ny Steven J.Main : in the first week,(22-28 june) Stalin had meetings totalling 88 hours and 40 minutes

"Did Stalin fall in prostation" : the appointment diary of Stalin mentions that on 22 june 1941,he had 29 visitors .:the first (Molotow) was coming in on 5.45 AM and the last (Beria) was leaving on 16.40 PM.

Source : ww2.debello.ca/onslaught/stalin/410622.

 

I have read it also in several books (and everyone was surpassing the other,as one could expect),but ,one should ask the question :who was the first to tell the story? And why ?

The first was Nikita,and the why is obvious :Nikita was involved in a struggle on live and death against the Stalinists,and Nikita knew very well what was awaiting him if he lost : the Gulag,the Lubianka,or,if the executioners were well-disposed: a bullet in the neck,that's why everything that would show Stalin in a bad light,would be used .

 

The point is that at the start of the German attack,noone could know what the outcome would be,noone knew how strong the Germans were,nobody knew how long the bad weather could prevent the allied AirForce to intervene .

 

Anyway, lie said, Staln did work in Kreml but he stayed away from the public view and that made people nervous. He obviously did not have anyone like Göbbels to help him. Then again Hitler did his last broadcasted speech in january 1945 if I recall correctly.

 

The point is, they had a fairly good idea.

By the 20th, the cohesion of the German attack was starting to crumble.
By the 24th, it was all downhill.
So in a little more than a week.

But maybe, if the weather was overcast enough to prevent Allied airforces from coming into play for three months,... umm, not even European weather is that bad.

The Germans failed to reach the Meuse on time, sufficiently intact, with sufficient supplies.
The Germans were surprised by the tenacity of the Americans in Defense across the board.
The Germans were surprised by the ability of the Americans to react, realign forces, and commit reserves.

Hitler and his entourage held as an article of faith that the American commanders, for political reasons, would make no major troop movements, particularly if these involved the British, without prior reference to the White House and Downing Street. This attitude probably explains the German estimate that no major units would be committed by the defense until the third day and that the Allied build-up of a counterattack force would be made west of the Meuse. Not only did the German planners fail to comprehend the degree of initiative that training and tradition have placed in the hands of American corps and army commanders, they also misunderstood the American doctrine, largely unwritten but universally accepted, that major formations having no prebattle relationship may, under fluid conditions, unite on the field after the battle is joined.

The Germans were clutching after straws, and it told. The mess of the third (Northern) Prong.

 

The Ardennes operation was practically over on the first day. The infantry did not make the breakthrough as expected, and the armor was taken into battle, which caused losses and the time used to break the lines was not in the favor of the Germans.

 

LJAD , explain how the SW front was supposed to fight on two different directions at the same time. Moscow wasn't abandoned because it wasn't being threatened from the rear by a full PZ group.
Bastogne is completely different then the east front because it was a limited attack on a limited front. Hitlers plan was based on too many bogus assumptions. A: the Germans would face little opposition as in 1940, B: they would capture all the fuel they would need. C: the allies would fall apart just as in 1940. The allies were surprised, but unlike the French they were able to react

 

I said : at the start of the attack , I was not talking about the situation after a week

 

1) It would be not impossible for the SW Front to defend itself on 2 different directions at the same time : this would depend on

the strength and speed of the PzGr Guderian and Kleist

what would do the German forces on the west side of the SW Front

the strength of the SWF .

2) For Moscow :the Soviets had the intention to abandon Moscow after the defeats of Briansk/Viazma

3) Your question is questionable:at the moment the first reports arrived of the movements of Guderian and Kleist,it was NOT certain that the aim was the encirclment of the SW Front : it could be that Kleist was going north to position himself for an advance to Moscow .

Whatever,at that moment,the great preoccupation of the Stawka was a German advance in the direction of Moscow,which they expected every day,as long as the SW Front remained at Kiew,it was hindering and delaying a German attack in the direction of Moscow .Thus,it was essential that the SW Front would remain where it was,even at the risk that it would be encircled,risk which was considered as low .It was better for the Soviets that Guderian would go to Kiew than to Moscow .