Moscow the impossible dream

I recall having read some interesting points on the Typhoon operation:

Considering the circumstances I don´t know if any German commander could have succeeded really.

However, I found in Forczyk´s book Moscow 1941 it is being mentioned that "..after the annihilation of the Vyazma pocket von Kluge´s 4th Army accomplished virtually nothing."

"Kluge´s troops were the best prepared of any AGC´s formations to face the winter and the Soviet counteroffensive, but his selfish behaviour contributed to the ultimate failure of Typhoon."
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Also I have read mentioned that there were several operations made by the troops taking part in Typhoon in the
perimeter of the "attack zone", which actually did not help capture Moscow at all. Were Germans too confident that
Moscow was easy to take?

Then again They could not have kept Moscow even if it was taken, as the Red Army attack would have kicked them
out of the city. And If Zhukov had been able to create those penetrating attacks the whole AGC might have been
destroyed but Stalin wanted to attack using the whole front.

 

From reading Guderian I believe he and most of the other generals wanted to fall back and take a defensive position during the winter. Appararently that was prudent staff officers thinking. Even if Moscow Fell I could hardly see the Soviets folding, They were even going to move Lenin's corpse out of the city for pete's sake. Russian Winter, Lack of Russian infrastructure (Paved roads, Railroads (different than the german gauge), Rainy season I can't remember what the Russians call it.

 

Which is something I would not advise

 

But why? Good old "Schneller" Heinz was an eyewitness! He was personally involved in the matter. But, do you really suggest that the good old Heinz was a liar?

 

Actually for someone interested in the topic rading him is probably a good idea just don't go into it with the premise that he is telling the whole unvarnished truth. Of course one should always approach biographical information with that in the back of ones mind at least. With Guderian one might want to move it towards the front though.

 

Panzerleader is a pack of lies and stupidities from a swollen-headed vain creature

 

According to Guderian, he tanks would be magically refueled and rearmed no matter how far he moved forward, there would never be any enemy troops on his flanks or in his read(because he was just bypassing them) and resistance would just disappear when he advanced. Guderian's book is a self serving. pat my self on the shoulder over how I magically could have defeated the Soviet Union saying boo. He wrote his book when the cold war was going and it made him popular with the crowd that thought we should launch thousands of nuclear missiles to save the world from communism.

 

Some might say the same about some commentary on this site, as well...

 

From what I've read of Typhoon the Germans after clearing the initial pockets suffered from a pretty bad case of overconfidence, not sure they might have achieved more by not going after multiple objectives at the same time as they did.
Many units were seriously understrength with overtired soldiers and worn equipment, not to mention the huge losses in horses that severely limited the mobility of the Infantry divisions whose artillery was horse drawn. There are multiple reports of panzer units going to the attack after receiving a few planeloads of fuel, and having to stop after a day or so when it ran out and no more arrived, that sort of shoestring operation is terribly vulnerable to counterattacks if the enemy manages to assemble enough troops to mount one. Attacking in those conditions was a gamble, but allowing the Soviets to regroup earlier by reducing the pressure was not a great idea either, the Soviets had already shown that given time to plan and organize they could mount pretty dangerous attacks, the biggest German advantage was training and leadership but in a static situation that is a lot less useful than in a mobile one.

A good what if would be the Germans aborting Typhoon after the initial pockets and giving AGS enough reinforcements to allow them to hang onto Rostov, the resulting frontline at the beginning of the 1942 offensive may be a lot more favourable to the Axis, if the Germans start Fall Blau already in Rostov they may have time to complete the plan before the bad weather reduces the effectiveness of the Luftwaffe.

 

No need to be that harsh for your self

 

That is correct. I guess you have recognized sarcasm in my post.

 

Guderian is especially important for this conversation because he could be held directly responsible for the German gamble and defeat in winter 1941. What Guderian fails to admit in his memoirs is that it was him who convinced Hitler to resume the attack towards Moscow. (Bradley, Generaloberst Guderian, pp. 229)

 

"In deciding to write a new book on Operation Typhoon I guess the first question is why bother? Reading books in some other areas of the Second World War one has at times the impression that authors are struggling to find anything new to say in order to distinguish themselves from the mass of previous writings. This not to suggest that new and exciting books could not be written on such well-worn topics as D-Day or the British war in North Africa, but it is clear that matching an exciting original perspective with academic credibility is becoming increasingly difficult. One of the exciting things about researching Germany’s war in the east between 1941 and 1945 is that the field is still at such an early stage of its development with many more questions than answers.
Perhaps the most striking thing about Hitler’s war in the east is the sheer scale of the operations under way. This can, however, also be a daunting, even frightening, prospect for the researcher. Million man armies produce millions of pieces of paper and distilling these down into a coherent and accessible manuscript is no mean feat. Operation Typhoon involved some 1.9 million men on the German side alone and almost three million in total took part in the fighting. When one then considers that this was only the central part of the eastern front, one gains an appreciation for just how vast this war really was. As researchers it also tells us to think critically about what we know – or think we know – about any given period. Exhaustive research on any aspect of the war in the east is a grand claim and my visits to the main German military archive in Freiburg always feel like a frantic ‘smash and grab’ heist – so many riches and so little time to get them.
Since I researched and wrote my first book on Germany’s war in the east I have found just how much room for reinterpretation there really is (prospective PhD students take note). Writing Operation Typhoon required six solid months of research and note taking and I soon came to the conclusion that only the month of October could be tackled in this book (with another to follow on the period November 1 to December 5 1941). If the devil is in the detail, as they say, then this approach is the only way we can begin to comprehend what was really going on inside such a massive force as the German Ostheer (eastern army). More importantly, to return to our starting point, historians of Nazi Germany should expect to encounter – and for decades to come – many new and exciting revelations about the eastern front. The archives no doubt hold the keys to many long-standing mysteries and forgotten battles, all just waiting to be discovered. Far from being an exhausted topic, I am of the opinion that we’ve barely scratched the surface and it is my hope that Operation Typhoon is one insight into that new world of discovery.
- See more at: http://www.cambridgeblog.org/2013/04/why-bother-historian-david-stahel-on-why-operation-typhoon-matters/#sthash.r23U4f8l.dpuf

 

If only it was I, that I was referring to...

Guderian, at least had reason for his vanity. What's your claim to fame?

 

What reasons did Guderian have ?

The fact that he was collaborating after the war with a shady customer as Basil Hart, is nothing to be proud of .As the proverb is saying : birds of a feather flock together.Guderian nrver learnt the first rule of a soldier : obedience .

 

The subject of mud, no all weather roads and it's effect on the course of Operation 'Typhoon' has been much written about.

No other general has more to say concerning this than Zhukov. His caustic remarks I will give you....

"In the years since the war Nazi generals and Bourgeois historians have had a great deal to say about Russian bad roads and mud on the one hand, and the Russian frost on the other. This kind of myth-making has already been properly discredited, nevertheless I would like to, yet again, draw the attention of readers to what General Tippelskirch has written, claiming it as the element which prevented the Nazi forces from capturing Moscow; "To move along the roads became impossible," he writes, "the mud stuck to our feet, to the hooves of animals, to the wheels of the carts and vehicles....the offensive came to a halt."
When the Nazi generals were planning their expedition to the east, did they really expect to ride the whole way to Moscow and beyond on smooth and well surfaced roads? Well, if they did, so much the worse for them and for the Nazi forces which, as Tippelkirch complains, were brought to a halt by the mud on the approaches to Moscow. In those days I saw thousands of women citizens of Moscow, most of whom were not accustomed to heavey civil-engineering, and who had come lightly clothed from their apartments in the city; in that same bad weather and mud they were digging anti-tank ditches and trenches, erecting anti-tank obstacles, and putting up barricades and entanglements, and dragging sandbags. The mud stuck to their feet too, and to the wheels of the barrows in which they transported the earth, and made the shovels, which were not fashioned for women's hands anyway, incomparibly heavier......I don't think I need push the comparison any further, but I may add, for the benefit of those that want to hide the real reasons for thier drefeat under the mud, that in October of 1941 the season of bad roads was relatively short. The cold weather began early in November, snow fell, and terrain and roads became passable everywhere. In the November days of the German 'general offensive' the temperature in the Moscow combat area levelled out at seven to ten degrees of frost, and everybody knows that in those temperatures there isn't any mud.

Clearly, according to Zhukov, the German Armee Group Center has no-one or nothing to blame excepting itself for its failure, which he attributes to two main factors...

1/ Failure to provide adequate flank protection with infantry for the two arms of the pincers. He cites Guderian's efforts around Tula as a particular example of this. He states that, time and again, panzer formations were thrown forward without being properly supported, leading to assault groups being severly overstretched.
2/ The need to do something about the approx. 700,000 soviet troops trapped in the Vyazma pocket. Delays were caused that should have seen their units moving on. To much attention was given to Vyazma, when the German units should have been gaining ground, and sweeping aside the partially constructed fortifications of the Moscow front. Then, when Vyazma was finished, the time used to further advance was used as a logistic 'pause', a period that gave Zukhov a much needed 'breather'.

I sort of feel the same way as Zukhov. When you have an operation with more men than most Allied operations, well supported and with air superiority, it's no use blaming all and sundry for your lack of results. And blaming Hitler isn't much use either, when people like Guderian were going out of their way to disobey High Command orders anyway.
Good ol' Heinz was pretty good at shifting blame, as were many German Eastern generals.

 

About Guderian ;what would one think about some one who in october 1942 was spending his time in occupied Poland searching an estate which Adolf promised him (he found one, by chance,the owner had disappeared somewhere in Dachau),hiding this in his biography,and accused Adolf of being the responsible for the defeat(Adolf is bad,but his money was good) ?

The answer is that this some one had no notion of the meaning of decency .

The same some one hided his participation in the preparation of Barbarossa (under the motto:what remains unknown,does not hurt).

The same some one accused Adolf of being the responsible for the halt order of Dunkirk ,protecting von Rundstedt (alte kameraden,you know)

The same one told the lie that the doubling of the number of PzD after june 1940 resulted in the halving of the number of tanks per division,while the truth is that in may 1940,the average divisional tank strength was 260 and in june 1941 200.

The same one told tat the number of tanks per division was the only thing that counted(now, it is obvious why Germany lost the war ,with a charlatan as IG of the Panzertruppe)

The same charlatan told (Panzerleader PP 136/137) that he knew how to win the war (but as usual Hitler did not follow his advice) : no armistice with France,advance to the Mediterranean,cross the Mediterranean,occupy Algeria and Tunesia,and finally advance with 4/6 PzD to the Nile,meanwhile occupy Malta with non existant airborne units.


And, in Panzerleader, he attacked Kluge (who was dead) ,the man who dared to sack him (him Guderian) ,for something trivial : he (Guderian) only had disobeyed a plain order from his superior.(von Sponeck was getting of less cheaply when he disobeyed an order from Manstein)

The Commissar order :AGC had decided not to forward it,never reached my Panzergruppe (here Guderian is proving that he was descending from baron von Münchhausen,or maybe the brothers Grimm)


I could continue,but I have wasted enough of my time with this "crook,arrogant,self-possessed,ruthless" person (not my words, but a description I would not consider as wrong.

 

Apparently the Bundesarchiv has a thick file of correspondance from one Heinz Guderian, motoring through conquered territory and looking for an estate to purchace. The letters feature Guderian claiming that the estate offered him by the Reich was "not grand enough", or "unsuitable for a man of my stature."

The point you make about Hitler's money being very agreeable is a good one, and Guderian wasn't the only officer in Hitler's entourage to benefit from substantial payments made to them throughout the course of the war.

These are the same men that would make very little in the way of concrete moves to remove Hitler, claiming that their "oath to the state" was "sacred and binding." They forgot, conveniently, about other 'sacred and binding' oaths they had made previously to the Weimar government. But of course, Weimar wasn't guaranteeing their loyalty with 'slush' payments, nor providing them with a war to make their names and speed their promotions up the greasy pole.

 

There seems to be a fair amount of literature focussing on climatic factors, as well as those of military strategy, tactics, operations and logistics that may have contributed to the actual outcome of the 1941 campaign in the Eastern USSR. I am yet to come across a piece that addresses the distribution of "quality" within the Ostheer. Basically, in every team, be it civilian or military, the ability to contribute to the common objective will not be uniformly distributed. This leads me to think that exhaustion and losses of more able troupes and individuals in the Ostheer over the course of the entire campaign may have played a non-negligible role in the failure to capture Moscow. Just wondering if anyone has stumbled upon a study that attempts to quantify the impact of losses and exhaustion of the more able to troupes and individuals on the combat effectiveness of the German military expedition. The losses and wear and tear on the equipment would have also affected combat effectiveness irrespective of individuals' capabilities. Furthermore, the Soviets would have suffered the same predicament, as their losses in personnel and equipment were mounting, making any such analysis difficult. However, if anyone has come up with a way of measuring this, I would be interesting to learn more about it.