PzKpfw IV sinks destroyer?

Fair enough. Hopefully the info is preserved here for long enough to be useful

 

Page 136

HMS Sikh
On Sunday 13 September at 0545 the Sikh, Captain Stjohn Micklethwait, and
Zulu, Commander Richard White, sailed from Alexandria with the marines and
their landing craft. By 0300 they were off the beach where the marines were to
make ships appear to resemble Italian destroyers. After landing the marines
Sikh and Zulu were to break through the boom at Tobruk harbour. They were
then to destroy whatever they could in the way of shipping. After that they
would list ship to 15 degrees, light fires on the upper deck, and make smoke. It
was hoped that this ruse would lead enemy aircraft to believe that they were
Italian destroyers in a sinking condition. By 0348 the first contingent of marines
were heading towards the beach. Sikh and Zulu moved seaward for 25 minutes.
They then closed the shore in readiness to meet the returning craft and send a
second detail shoreward. An observer in Zulu comments:
Nothing much happened to us after that for almost an hour. Anti-aircraft fire
ashore ceased and the searchlights went out after a last tired sweep of the sea and
sky. Then Tobruk disappeared in utter darkness and became as silent as a dead city.
We spent some time wondering what was happening to the boys in the landing craft.
Suddenly, just after 0500, a searchlight or two flickered on and began waving
across the sea as if seeking something.
Apparently the alarm had been given on land. We had not long to wait for this to be confirmed.
Bright flashes flickered against the blackness, followed by thumps, and then the eerie
moan of shells came to us on the bridge. The shore batteries were firing at us.
Sikh was the first to be gripped by the searchlights. She then came under fire.
A hit damaged the forced lubrication system to the main engine gearing, making
it likely that the main engines would seize. Further, her steering was put out of
effective control. Fiercely ablaze forward, Sikh at 10 knots went round in
circles. At 0250 Captain Micklethwait signalled Zulu that the Sikh had been
seriously damaged. Twenty-five minutes later White was ordered to take Sikh
in tow. The Zulu, herself damaged by gunfire, closed Sikh. Commander White,
in a fine display of seamanship, brought round Zulu's stern to meet Sikh's bow.
Unfortunately owing to a combination of factors the line from Zulu was not
taken up. The two ships were by now easy targets for the shore batteries and
were repeatedly hit. Another fire broke out aft in Sikh.
In the grey light of dawn the destroyers' activities were clearly visible from
the shore as Commander White manoeuvred for another attempt at passing a
line. Though the line was successfully passed it snapped after being made fast.
White circled and came in to try again. A line was passed and the hawser that
followed made fast in Sikh. Then by a cruel stroke of luck the hawser was parted
by a shell which struck Zulu's quarter-deck. For Sikh the freak hit on the hawser
spelt the end. Both destroyers had received considerable punishment and it was
by then broad daylight. A fourth attempt by Zulu to pass a tow was forbidden
by Captain Micklethwait. Wait Ten Minutes, was his reply to White's signal as
to whether he should draw alongside the Sikh to take off the crew. In Zulu it was
assumed that the order to wait ten minutes was to enable Sikh to make smoke to
cover the transfer. Zulu was also making smoke when towards 0710 she was
signalled by Sikh to leave the area. Coastal guns were hitting both ships with
ease. It was now too hazardous for Zulu to remain within range of the enemy
guns. Commander White with the greatest reluctance, turned away Goodbye.
God Bless You, signalled White. Thanks. Cheerio, was the brief reply A Zulu
eye-witness states:
With heavy hearts we turned out to sea and raced away. There were still a few
landing craft round Sikh, but it was impossible to tell whether those contained
further installments of troops who were to land, or some who had returned from
shore. For the next 10 minutes the batteries continued to fire at us and shells
whistled down fairly close, but now we were moving at high speed and every second
getting farther away. No further hits were scored on this ship, but I fear that Axis
gunners had the easiest target of a lifetime in the Sikh. While we were racing
away, and until she slipped out of sight behind the horizon, shore guns continued
to fire at her. I could see the columns of water leaping up on all sides of the stricken vessel,
and smoke pouring from her. But Sikh refused to give in. For every flash
from the shore guns, I saw a defiant answering flash from the guns of the crippled
ship. I could still see those flashes when she was nothing more than a tiny speck at
the base of a huge column of dirty grey smoke.
X gun, the last of Sikh's 4.7s to keep firing, fell silent only when its ammunition
ran out. With Zulu having gone, Sikh took the full anger of every gun within
range. Around 0800 Captain Micklethwait ordered abandon ship. Sikh had no
boats, their place having been taken up by landing craft. Carley rafts were
lowered for the wounded, and anything floatable was thrown overboard.
Scuttling charges were detonated and Captain Micklethwait went below to
check that Sikh was flooding. Satisfied with the result, he returned to the upper
deck and jumped into the sea. Thirty minutes later he saw his command go
down.


Page 27
John Hasleden was Chief of the LRDG. He
was already in favor of an attack of Tobruk,
in which the oil tanks, safe from bombs,
would be blown up. From this plan there
gradually developed a combined land, air
and sea operation — five hundred kilometers
behind the front lines.
From the very start, Operation
"Agreement" was a risky procedure, but
intelligence reported only a weak garrison of
two Italian battalions, about 1000 Germans
— mostly technical personnel — and
numerous repair shops. But when the British
commandos reached Tobruk, this infor-
mation turned out to be fatally wrong: they
were not able to knock out the decisively
important 88mm batteries on the peninsula
or at the airport. The radio and telephone
centers remained intact. Thus Hasleden and
the fleet were already half beaten.
At 5:10 AM on September 14, Oberleutnant
Vieweg's 88mm battery opened fire on the
destroyer HMS Sikh, which was supporting
the landing. The first salvo went too far, but
the second struck home. "All guns fire
directly on the target at will." It was the
simplest target shooting, even though the
Flak gunners were long out of practice at
firing on sea targets. Via the command
apparatus, Vieweg coordinated the whole
battery and had high Flak shells explode a
few meters over the deck of the "Sikh."
The "Sikh" moved along the coast with its
shoreward side on fire. The destroyer "Zulu"
tried to take the "Sikh" in tow despite its own
damage. Buta lucky hit by an 88 shell cut the
towlines. The crew of the "Sikh" abandoned
ship. Their captain and some of the 350-man
crew were rescued later. The "Zulu" was
also hit and sunk by the Flak guns. Only the
small hunt destroyers got away, some of
them badly damaged.





Page 52

The Flak units scored an unusual victory in
the fighting around Tobruk, where two British
destroyers were sunk by them.

 

According to the info gathered so far, an 88mm battery existed in addition to the 76 and 120 on the "peninsula" . The small chance A force had to disable them disappeared when they failed to land at the right place (Marsa Mresia). B Force was unlikely to get that far as it would need to cross the town and fight all troops stationed there. The book seems to confirm Zulu and Sikh intended to masquerade as Italian ships and pentrate the harbour, but they apparently never made the attempt, possibly they were waiting for the peninsula guns to be silenced before approaching the harbour entrance.
But where is the airfield ?????

 

Good question, didn´t found it!

 

Also note that Sikh and Zulu had intended to start fake fires onboard to try and escape.
Can't be good having that stuff lying around on deck!

 

Yeah, indeed not the best solution!

 

All over the place it seems!

 

Out of which book is this map?

 

I do not know for certain where it originaly appeared but I believe it was on a N. Zealand Government site. It is all over the place if you google it.

 

Thanks, i´ll look for more.

 

Very nice find, I think the one the reports are talking about is the one on the "land strip". Any guns at the other sites would not have a clear view out to sea tough the guns would still be in range. IIRC the 88 and the other "heavy AA" had a range of around 15.000m and those fields are no more than two or three Km inland, the 105 army battery must have had some arangement for "observed fire" so the German batteries may also have had one.

 

I wonder if it is for the same date or if it was later?

 

Forgot to add it is a 1941 map! I don't think the airfields would move about!

 

anything's possible

 

It appears near the bottom of this page


http://www.rememberingscotlandatwar...t-in-Tobruk-Montgomerys-victory-at-El-Alamein

 

While I can't rule it out, the chances of successful indirect observed fire on a moving target with multiple other batteries firing, even after daybreak would have been slim at best.

I think the direct fire batteries would be the only ones with much chance to hit

 

See this:


Feldgrau.net • View topic - Luft attack on UK convoy 14 Sept 42 in the Med


Operation Agreement ": Brit. Raid against Tobruk.

13.9. Destroyers Sikh (Capt. Micklewait) and Zulu run with 350 Marines on board from Alexandria and meet at lake by Fl Coventry and the 5th Flotilla (Hunt class) with Belvoir, Dulverton, Hursley and Croome. This encounter MTB 18 and 3 ML with 150 men landing troops. On the night of 14.9. severe attacks of the RAF to Tobruk.
14.9. Landing attempt. Few soldiers can be placed on land. Sikh to be off the coast of the Flak-Abt. I./43 (Major Wegener) shelled, damaged and sinks were drawn by the Zulu. The bulk of the crew and the surviving Marines taken prisoner. - Ju 87 of 8./StG.3 (Obit Goebel) and Ju 88 I./LG.1 (Capt. Hoffman) will damage the Coventry, then this must be sunk by the Zulu. MC 200 of the Italian 13.Jabo Group (Major Viale) pocket MTB 308, ML 352 and ML 353rd 19 Ju 87 of III./StG.3 (Capt. Kurt Walter) damage the Zulu and sink MTB 310th The destroyer drops later in the towing of Hursley. 20 Ju 88 II./LG.1 from Crete sink MTB 312th Boats of the 6th R-Flotilla (Kptlt Reischauer) MTB 314 is introduced with 117 men on board. A simultaneously scheduled brit commando operations from land sources (Col. Haselden †) also failed. Bring the total ger-ital. Tobruk defenders and capture 576 prisoners a major British radio and key documents.


Note that Zulu's sinking is not mentioned (because it was by the Italians?) and it was captured bombs not a torpedo that sank her!

 

Or, perhaps, it was because the ship, HMS Zulu, was still afloat after the last aircraft left the scene.

 

Still afloat?
How could she be when the 88's sank Zulu in the harbour?
Luckily the heavily damaged Hunts managed to escape!

The "Zulu" was also hit and sunk by the Flak guns. Only the
small Hunt destroyers got away, some of them badly damaged.

 

Another source says Sikh sunk under tow by Zulu, and that Zulu took most of the crew off. I'll find that again and post it