Soviet attack in 1941

Of course there was. Enough independent sources were stateing that a German attack was in the works that that a rational person would have given it some weight. The build up of German forces along the border was also detected. Now whether or not the details of what they reported were correct is an open question but there was a signifiant amount of intel that pointed to a German attack in the late spring/early summer of 41.

 

As for Stalin's "breakdown" I suspect it both was and was not, or to be more precise it was a temporary period of Command Paralysis brought on by the shock and scope of the German attack. Greatly exaggerated by Khrushchev for domestic political reasons, the underlining condition/situation is completely understandable. Further I am reluctant to rely too heavily upon Appointment Diaries in and of themselves, due to the fact that much of the Soviet era documentation is suspect when it comes to Stalin himself. He did have a facility to rewrite history to serve his cult of personality. But even if completely true on face value it has limited meaning. Seeing people is easy, making informed and rational decisions is another matter.

I believe Herr Hitler was still having command briefings and giving orders up to 36 to 48 hours before he put a bullet in his brain.

 

An other one about Sorge :
on 1 june ,he was sending a message with the following content : expected start of German-Soviet war is exclusively based on informations which colonel Scholl brought with him from Berlin,which he left on 6 MAY for Bangkok,where he is taking up a post of attaché. (Scholl was arriving in Tokyo on 29 may)

1) Afaics,the start date for Barbarossa was determined on 29 may.

2)There are no informations that Scholl was involved in the planning of Barbarossa

3) If he was,Berlin would not send him to Thailand = a voyage of 3 weeks through the SU

4) Why should Scholl tell Ott (ambassador,he did not meet Sorge) anything about Barbarossa:Hitler had explicitly forbidden to inform Japan,thus also Ott .

5) The German community in Japan was totally isolated and had no informations about what was happening

6) Thus,why should Sorge have any informations about a top secret German war plan (the man was a civilian) ?

Source :Stalin's Spy; Richard Sorge and the Tokyo Espionnage Ring P 338

 

An other good one about Sorge : the story that in october he warned Washington about the attack on PH,and that Roosevelt,Marshall,Stark,etc had received the report. Stalin decided to warn Washington in return for US informations about Barbarossa . (there is no limit on the capacity of mankind to invent tomfoolery ).
Of course,the whole story was based on e newspaper article .

Source :the final secret of Pearl Harbour (PP 77/80) by Admiral Theobald = the good old conspiracy theory .

Sorge and Barbarossa is on the same level : the genial spy sending warnings ,but the stupid Stalin refusing to believe him ,because he TRUSTED Hitler . Stalin trusting Hitler !!

 

Still there was massive German activity, as the telephone lines were cut on the Soviet side by spies and German reconnaissance planes were taking photos deep into the Soviet territory during the last week and especially the 24 to 48 hrs before the operation. Stalin must have given an order that these must be ignored.

A good book on the subject:

http://www.amazon.com/Stalins-Folly-Tragic-First-Eastern/dp/0618367012

 

Thanks LJAD for a hint! I'll buy that book for my winter vacations. Conspiracy theories relax me.

It is quite amazing how many people want to believe such outright unbelievable stories. There are at least two human characteristics that make Sorge's fiction literature so popular:

1. Fiction usually sounds and looks 'better' than reality
2. Wishful thinking
...
...
I have an idea for new conspiracy theory book: Hitler trusted Stalin ...

 

It is interesting how the attempt has been made to make Sorge THE matter under discussion when it started out as a much more general discussion about intellligence and spys. Any one source of intel has to be carefully scrutinized, afterall a single spy can be mislead, misunderstand, or even be turned. However when multiple independent sources are repeating the same thing it is much harder to just wave them away. I think one of the books refered to in one of the links I supplied propsed that Stalin was indeed worried about a German offensive and some of the moves just prior to the onset of Barbarrossa were intended as a warning to Hitler. I have no idea how valid this is but the fact that the Soviets were completely unprepaired locally for the German attack would seem to bring this to question.

 

The attack on FInland showed Stalin just how badly the Soviet army needed changing. Barbarossa caught the Soviets in the middle of a massive overhaul that came about from the Finland attack.

 

Indeed I very much doubt Stalin had any plan to attack in 1941. Even without the above Stalin wasn't inclined to gamble and attacking Germany that wasn't fully involved with ground combat elsewhere would be a big gamble especially in light of the above. In case it hasn't been clear my opinon on this is that if he gave the Red Army the order to attack and couldn't be talked out of it they would indeed attack but there was no way he was going to give such an order.

 

Everything is starting from the following from post 20 by Armchair Historian :

Only after the repeated re-assurances from his spy rings and with the German troops advancing on Moscow itself,did Stalin reluctantly divert these divisions to throw off the Germans in the west .


This is more than questionable : Stalin was not waiting on the reports of Sorge,etc,to take political and military measures:yes,Stalin was worried;but,there were NO concrete and reliable informations about an imminent German attack,and,given the situation of the Red Army,there was not much Stalin could do .Remember:the official Soviet strategy was that if the Germans attacked,the Red Army would go to the border,stop the Germans,expell them and march to Berlin .

Now,given the situation of the Red army,this was out of the question.Thus,Stalin's margin was very small.

 

I guess the "escape" can be considered this move by Stalin:

"The surrender of Minsk had a disproportionately devastating effect on Stalin. Even given the city´s inflated stature in the Soviet propaganda machine and Stalin´s own mind, he still seemed to overreact. In all likelihood, the surrender of the city was the last straw for him, completely shattering his fantasy world and tossing him into abyss of despair. After he visited the General Staff on June 29 and unleashed his rage on Zhukov and Timoshenko, he headed for his dacha. He didn´t show up in his office the next day either, and he refused to answer the phone."

Stalin´s folly by Pleshakov

The next day Molotov,Beria etc visited Stalin and Stalin returned to "work"...

 

Also Stalin was not in his office much early June 1941, perhaps trying to stay away from the gossips of Germany´s attack...

" Judging by Stalin´s schedule, the vozhd was nearly in hiding. In the first half of June, he spent eight days away from his office, and between June 11 and 18, he din´t grant Timoshenko and Zhukov a single audience.This outraged the generals. Whether or not they were right or wrong in sounding the alarm, they still needed daily contact."

Stalin´s folly by Pleshakov

PS. more info from the book can be found here by using Pleshakov for the search function button. I read the book in July 2006 and info from the book can be found here elsewhere.

 

I have "Stalin's Follies",and, I am not convinced .

 

Stalin ordered to shoot Popov: not a sign of a nervous breakdown .

The Germans hoped for/expected a collaps of Stamin,which would result in Beria trying to take power,the others shooting Beria and shooting at each other,resulting in the collaps of the SU,but,it did not happen : no collaps of Stalin, no civil war,no collaps of the SU .

The first to have a nervous breakdown was ...Adolf,a month after Barbarossa .

 

There is no way to prove conclusively either way, it is possible, but we don't know how reliable the stories are.

 

Besides Pleshakov, there is, according to reviews, yet another essential book which discredits the "preventive war" thesis; Grand Delusion:
Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia by Gabriel Gorodetsky. It is the 1st on my buying list.
It appears that among serious historians Suvorovs Icebreaker is nothing but conspiracy theory.

 

I meant as regards Stalin having a breakdown. There is no evidence of a planned Soviet attack in 1941

 

I thought I read somewhere that there were a couple of plans for it, of course they may well have been like some of the US color plans. Basically training exercises with no intent to actually follow through. That is of course if they existed.

 

There was the plan from Timochenko/Meretzkow (october 1940)and the plan from Timochenko/Zhukov(may 1941):they were pleading to abandon the idea of a counter-offensive and to start a preventive attack,something that,given the situation of the Red Army ,was preposterous