Stalingrad airlift points.

"Gliders"? Have never read about that before. So much for trying to get the wounded out.
Guess they could use them to keep warm and burn them? How were the Germans to keep the fields clear of 1 use gliders?

 

Now I started wondering; what did the Soviets do with the German gliders as they were bound to end in their hands?

 

http://www.fiddlersgreen.net/AC/aircraft/Messerschmitt-Me321/gigant.php

 

Well, this is another case of incompetent generals blaming Hitler for the débâcles...

When Hitler asked if the Luftwaffe could supply the pocket, as it had done a year earlier at Demiansk, colonel general Hans Jeschonnek, chief of staff of the Luftwaffe, immediately said it could. Göring agreed.

If the C-in-C is told by his sub-ordinates, the ones who know their business, that it could be done and he gives the order... How can Historians still blame it on him?

 

http://www.joelhayward.org/stalingradairlift.htm

No verbatim records of Hitler's conversation with Jeschonnek have surfaced, but the basic facts are known: Hitler explained that Sixth Army would probably be totally cut off within days, that he had organized a new army group under von Manstein, and that it would launch a relief effort as soon as possible. He hoped not only to free Sixth Army within a short time, but also to regain lost territory and rebuild a strong defensive line. Apparently understanding Sixth Army's encirclement to be temporary, Jeschonnek assured Hitler that if both transport planes and bombers were used, and if adequate airfields inside and outside the pocket could be maintained, the Luftwaffe could airlift sufficient supplies to the army.

Jeschonnek's spontaneous and ill--considered assurance that the air force could sustain Sixth Army at Stalingrad pleased Hitler. He could hardly allow the army to abandon that city after he had proclaimed to the entire German nation in September that “you can be certain no one will get us away from there!”

Von Richthofen considered it sheer madness for Paulus and his staff to plan an all--around defense at Stalingrad and pin their hopes on the Luftwaffe to sustain their army. The air force simply lacked the ability to keep it supplied, he frantically warned everyone who would listen. “Sixth Army believes that it will be supplied by the air fleet in its hedgehog positions,” he complained in his diary on the 21st. “I make every effort to convince it that this cannot be accomplished, because the necessary transport resources are not available.” During “dreadfully many telephone calls . . . until late in the night,” he emphatically insisted to almost every relevant air force and army leader—including Göring in Berlin, Zeitzler in East Prussia, Jeschonnek at Berchtesgaden, and von Weichs at Army Group B headquarters—that he lacked the means to supply Paulus's army. It should immediately attempt to break out.

The firmness of Hitler's conviction that the “fortress” should stand fast and that the Luftwaffe could keep it adequately supplied had grown considerably in the two days since Jeschonnek had first mentioned it. One of the main reasons for his increased conviction was the almost unanimous support for the decision expressed by those around him. At Berchtesgaden, and during his long train journey to East Prussia on the 23d, Hitler had no contact—personal or telegraphic—with the army and air force commanders at the front. During that critical decision--making period, he did not speak to von Richthofen, Fiebig, or Pickert, whose air forces would have to carry out the massive supply operation and who were now frantically warning almost everyone else that they lacked the means to sustain Sixth Army. Nor did he communicate with von Weichs, who shared their view and advocated an immediate breakout. Hitler learned of their views from Zeitzler, who had finally “come around” and now defended their assessment. Yet, because their warnings were not delivered personally, but only passed on by the army's “overanxious” chief of staff, they carried little weight. Hitler merely accused Zeitzler of being too pessimistic and advised him to stop paying heed to “defeatist” commanders who couldn't see the forest for the trees.

Aside from Zeitzler's, the only dissenting voice Hitler heard during his last two days in Berchtesgaden and his long journey north to East Prussia belonged to Jeschonnek, who had abandoned his earlier position and now meekly suggested that Sixth Army should break out. He regretted his earlier assurances to Hitler. Almost as soon as the words were out of his mouth, he wished he could swallow them again. After having his staff check his figures and after talking with von Richthofen several times by telephone, he quickly realized that nothing close to adequate logistical support of Sixth Army by air would be possible, even with consistently favorable weather and taking no account of VVS action. He and von Richthofen were close friends, but the latter clearly dominated their relationship and, when they disagreed on matters, usually managed to win Jeschonnek over. This was clearly one such case. However, although Jeschonnek notified Hitler that he might have been too hasty when he made his earlier assessment, his retraction carried no weight. Not only did Keitel and Jodl believe Sixth Army should stay, Hitler retorted, but Jeschonnek's own superior, Reichsmarschall Göring, had now given his personal assurance that the air force could fully meet the army's supply needs.

And:

..on 11 February 1943, almost two weeks after Paulus surrendered and his surviving troops staggered into Soviet captivity. Hitler admitted to von Richthofen that Göring was not entirely to blame for the failed airlift; he had himself promised Sixth Army that it would be supplied by air, “without the Reichsmarschall's knowledge.”

 

Foot in the mouth disease? Big mouth syndrome?

 

Gliders in a supply role in the snow of Russia? What if the snow[and it snowed an average of 11inches/day]was soft? They'd plow right through it,probably jamming the cargo doors shut.
The ex-glider pilot is now "in the army".....given a gun and told good luck!

 

You know FramerT, just sucks for that guy, one more for the party.

 

Very, very interesting source, Kai! It shows perfectly how the German High Command simply lacked cohesion and co-operation... Form Hitler downwards.

 

Thanx Friedrich!

It´s all in the book " Stopped at Stalingrad Luftwaffe in the East 1942-43 ".


BTW, guess what Göring did after the first info came about the Stalingrad being surrounded...He went shopping to Paris for some four days after saying the air supply system works. Instead of staying with his generals and Hitler to study the situation more carefully. Can you trust this sorta guy at any level really?

 

Ok, so here are the air fields for the air lift

To start with

Tatsinskaya- the Ju 52´s

Morozorskaya- All he 111´s

Stalino- All long range bombers and reconnaissance aircraft

On 24th Dec the Red Army overran Tatsinskaya and Ju 52´s went to Salsk.

At the same time Stukas and He 111´s were flown to Novocherkassk, near Rostov, on 24th, but once the Soviet threat was removed, the most He 111´s returned to Morozorskaya on 26th Dec.On January 1st they went to Novocherkassk for good.

Later on on 16th January Salsk was evacuated and the Ju 52´s went to Zverevo.

 

Ha, that's what I wanted to know, Kai. The upshot is the promises made were flimsy enough already, what with the weather, the Sov air force and flak, the normal friction, the accidents.

Now factor in the lenghtened routes, the friction involved in moving to a different field (more than once) and rerouting the land supply route there, and the final result is an utter mess.

 

Some general notes on the Stalingrad airlift:

AGS, and in particular 6th Army, had been getting a portion of its daily supply requirement by air prior to the encirclement. This was due to the lack of a rail line (as noted previously, the single rail line available ended at Stalino about 400 km to the rear of the German advance at Stalingrad) and the shortage of motor vehicles to haul supplies forward.
Initially, the Germans alloted approxmately 11,000 trucks in general headquarters units to lift supplies for the offensive. This was done in part by stripping the civilian economy in occupied areas and by stripping most divisions not in the assault of all or most of their motor transport. Of course, after weeks of use many of these trucks were no longer runners most having already seen extensive use before this point in the war.
Up through the encirclement of 6th Army the Luftwaffe had flown in 9,223 tons of supplies and had also had to airlift a good portion of their own supply needs in addition to that.

As for aircraft committed, the first week saw only a handful of locally available aircraft in use. Sorties per day hovered around 30 or so in this period.
By December 5 (about 10 days after the operation started) there were 11 Gruppen of Ju 52, 2 more formed with Ju 86 from bomber schools manned by the instructors, and four of He 111.
As the airlift progressed, the Henkel proponet grew to 14 Gruppen basically stripping the Luftwaffe of any offensive capacity it might have had. In addition, aircraft from Fleiger Führer Atlantic were flown in (primarily Fw 200s) along with the prototype Ju 290 and several He 177. The total aircraft on hand quickly reached over 600 with about a 20% operational rate on any given day.
On January 13 for example, there were 317 Ju 52, 181 He 111, 20 Fw 200, 1 Ju 290, and 10 He 177 available for the airlift. In addition 87 Ju 52 and 219 He 111 were enroute from other portions of the Reich to augment this lift.
Of the above, only 47 aircraft were deemed operational and these managed 69 sorties delivering 224.5 tons of supplies. In all, this was one of the better days of the airlift.

 

Is all "this" Glider info in that book,Kia?? Sorry, but I just find this new to me info on Gliders interesting.

T.A. said there were roughly 90 planes air-worthy in early January yet they were still bringing gliders to the front?

 

yes, FramerT,

according to " Stopped at Stalingrad" Milch´s idea was to make supply flights with gliders, all in all some 100 ended at the Stalingrad front but before any use Milch abandoned the idea. However the trains were still bringing the gliders to the area.