Strategic halt for Barbarossa?

Lo;
That too-plus the sheer momentum that followed an unbroken string of land victories. It would have been difficult for the Wehrmacht to stop in SEPT '41-politically speaking-regardless of who the leadership might be (and there was NO chance of stopping with Adolf Hitler at the helm of state). A hard look at the depleted German divisions, lack of winter gear; and the increasingly difficult supply situation might have induced some in OKW to advise caution; but would their advice have been heeded?

JeffinMNUSA

 

I know i posted on why they didnt do this before but i am reminded of an important reason why they did not and could not halt - the reason is the Crimea. What worried Hitler most, the Soviets in the Crimea were within bomber range of the vital oil fields in Ploesti, Rumania. This was such a concern than Hitler and Manstein devoted much time, men and resources in 1942 in clearing the "aircraft carrier" (as Hitler called the Crimea).

Operation "Bustard Hunt" as Manstein called it, was a bitter, costly campaign for all sides but the army and the luftwaffe performed brilliantly against superior forces in conquering the Crimea. Succesful completion of "Bustard Hunt" was considered as the minimal preliminary for further German operations in the East, namely Operation Blau with the objective being the capture of the Caucases oil fields.

As ultimately happened, after the hard-won, costly, but absolutely necessary success of the Crimean campaign (Hitler ordered a special medal struck for soldiers who fought in it), Hitler became overly impressed with his own Generalship and too contemptuous of the Russians', and proceeded, to make the worst mistake that could have been made: He split his forces by having half driving toward Stalingrad and the other half toward the Caucases, and we all know the name of the German defeat that came only a few months later.

 

Not a whole truth. During 1941 to 1943 the soviet union lost more men than it could replace and by 1944 they had a severe manpower shortage. Yes, they put more men in the front lines in July 1943 than 2 years before, but their strategic reserve of manpower was running lower.

Note that after July 1943 the number of men that the soviets could put in the front was slowly decreasing, from 7 million that month, to 6.1 million in may 1945. While they didn't lose many men as prisoners, the loss in terms of wounded and killed was so great that they couldn't replace then all (yes, the germans indeed lost even more in proportion, with strength failing from 3.4 million in July 1943 to 1.5 million in May 1945).

 

Once again your numbers contradict those of Glantz. The Red Army never stopped growing. This is solely due to the 14 million citizens which received at least basic training due to Stalin's new draft. In 1942 the Red Army was larger than what she was in 41'. In 1943 she was larger than in 42' and so on.

THE RED ARMY NEVER SHRANK IN SIZE. Unless you can provide a source which would prove Glantz to be incorrect, I will continue to use him and Erickson as reliable sources.