Taiwan vs china...

Yes, and with the same results being visited upon her people, without the eventual victory. :-?

 

I don´t think Taiwan will be prepared to take heavy casualties. Nor China would want to destroy taiwanese industry – the real object of any attempt of Anschluss. What China might attempt is to promise Taiwan same terms as in Hong-Kong and start a bluff in the form of visible, massive preparations for an invasion accompanied by loud propaganda about their wishes to give Taiwan the Hong-Kong-like status.
Taiwanese wishing to remain prosperous and seeing Hong-Kong still prosperous might chose to succumb. USA having invested (hundreds of?, more?) billions in China would probably not be prepared for an all-out conflict with China. However, USA might still threaten to help Taiwan locally. China, afraid of escalating the conflict would probably eventually give up. Unless the public opinion in Taiwan gives up first and forces their Establishment to succumb. They have a lot to lose in such a conflict. Each part in such a conflict has too much to loose. And that´s why I don´t think China will actually attempt anything serious. Still, much depends on American resolve to intervene or seem to want to intervene.
If USA gets involved in more than two conflicts simultaneously, the Chinese old men might though still give it a try.

 

A definite possibility, that last.

 

hmm...i got an article in my country saying that china bought mirage 2000,
here...(translated from chinese by google.) zaobao.com

btw...most americans seemes to think that taiwan should be indepent or fighting china over taiwan is a good move(just from some of my friends who think like this)...some even said that taiwan should join USA as the 51st state....problem is...they didn't know what is a number of taiwanese thinking...hiaz...

 

Hi ray243,

that is a very interesting article...
Does anybody have confirmation of that? Castelot?
I know that we (UK) have been selling them tank engines for a few years now.

So... what are many Taiwanese thinking?

 

You should maybe try to use a different translator.

 

The question of lifting the arms embargo against China is a very tricky one.
A majority of EU countries seems to favour to lift it.(Primarily Germany, Italy and France)

As far as I know,Red China considers buying 210 Mirage 2000-9CS.
But nothing is clear yet.
Taiwan has 60 Mirage 2000,the last being delivered in 1998.

 

There was this “Kursk” story, where Russians were allegedly showing the Chinese some super-torpedos able to go 500 km/h and the Americans trying to harass the show. If true, the Reds are slowly but steadily building up in big style.
Lenin said: “ Capitalists will sell us the rope on which we will hang them”. Has anybody heard about these torpedos? Is it hoax?

 

A torpedo - as in an underwater torpedo - at 500 km/h? Nope.
50 knots is the current fastest that I know of - the RN Spearfish (and I think the USN have updated their Mk48 s to a similar speed)

I don't know how you could get an underwater anything to move that fast.

 

Lenin was quite a shrewd man, wasn't he...

 

Not 500km/hr but 350km/hr +, its the Russian Shkval (Squall) underwater rocket - a quick search on GlobalSecurity.org (a very good site by the way) gives me this


http://globalsecurity.org/military/worl ... shkval.htm

In 1995 it was revealed that Russia had developed an exceptionally high-speed unguided underwater missile which has no equivalent in the West. Code-named the Shkval (Squall), the new weapon travels at a velocity that would give a targeted vessel very little chance to perform evasive action. The missile has been characterized as a "revenge" weapon, which would be fired along the bearing of an incoming enemy torpedo. The Shkval may be considered a follow-on to the Russian BGT class of evasion torpedoes, which are fired in the direction of an incoming torpedo to try to force an attacking to evade (and hopefully snap the torpedo's guidance wires). The weapon was deployed in the early 1990s, and had been in service for years when the fact of its existence was disclosed.

Development begain in the 1960s, when the Research Institute NII-24 (Chief Designer Mikhail Merkulov) involved in the artillery ammunition research was instructed to launch the development of underwater high-speed missile to fight nuclear-powered submarines. On 14 May 1969, pursuant to a government resolution, NII-24 and GSKB-47 merged into the Research Institute of Applied Hydromechanics (NII PGM), which formed the basis of the present day 'Region' Scientific Production Association. Advances in the development of jet engines and fuel technologies, as well as outstanding results in the research of body motion under cavitation made it possible to design a unique missile with a dived speed much greater than that of conventional torpedoes.

When the suction on the low-pressure side of the propeller blade dips below ambient pressure [atmospheric plus hydrostatic head] the propeller blade cavitates -- a vacuum cavity forms. There is water vapor in the cavity, and the pressure is not a true vacuum, but equal to the vapor pressure of the water. High-speed propellers are often designed to operate in a fully-cavitating (supercavitating) mode.

A high speed supercavitating projectile, while moving in the forward direction, rotates inside the cavity. This rotation leads to a series of impacts between the projectile tail and the cavity wall. The impacts affect the trajectory as well as the stability of motion of the projectile. The present paper discusses the in-flight dynamics of such a projectile. Despite the impacts with the cavity wall, the projectile nearly follows a straight line path. The frequency of the impacts between the projectile tail and cavity boundary increases initially, reaches a maximum, and then decreases gradually. The frequency of impacts decreases with the projectile's moment of inertia.

Apparently fired from standard 533mm torpedo tubes, Shkval has a range of about 7,500 yards. The weapon clears the tube at fifty knots, upon which its rocket fires, propelling the missile through the water at 360 kph [about 100 m/sec / 230 mph / 200-knots], three or four times as fast as conventional torpedoes. The solid-rocket propelled "torpedo" achieves high speeds by producing a high-pressure stream of bubbles from its nose and skin, which coats the torpedo in a thin layer of gas and forms a local "envelope" of supercavitating bubbles. Carrying a tactical nuclear warhead initiated by a timer, it would destroy the hostile submarine and the torpedo it fired. The Shkval high-speed underwater missile is guided by an auto-pilot rather than by a homing head as on most torpedoes.

There are no evident countermeasures to such a weapon, its employment could put adversary naval forces as a considerable disadvantage. One such scenario is a rapid attack situation wherein a sudden detection of a threat submarine is made, perhaps at relatively short range, requiring an immediate response to achieve weapon on target and to ensure survival. Apparently guidance is a problem, and the initial version of the Shkval was unguided However, the Russians have been advertising a homing version, which runs out at very high speed, then slows to search.

A prototype of the modernised "Shkval", which was exhibited at the 1995 international armaments show in Abu Dhabi, was discarded. An improved model was designed with a conventional (non-nuclear) warhead and a guided targeting system, which substantially enhances its combat effectiveness. The first tests of the modernised Shkval torpedo were held by the Russian Pacific Fleet in the spring of 1998.

The 'Region' Scientific Production Association has developed developed an export modification of the missile, 'Shkval-E'. Russia began marketing this conventionally armed version of the Shkval high-speed underwater rocket at the IDEX 99 exhibition in Abu Dhabi in early 1999. The concept of operations for this missile requires the crew of a submarine, ship or the coast guard define the target's parameters -- speed, distance and vector -- and feeds the data to the missile's automatic pilot. The missile is fired, achieves its optimum depth and switches on its engines. The missile does not have a homing warhead and follows a computer-generated program.

On 05 April 2000 the Russian Federal Security Service [FSB] in Moscow arrested an American businessman, Edmond Pope, and a Russian accomplice, on charges of stealing scientific secrets. A FSB statement said it confiscated "technical drawings of various equipment, recordings of his conversations with Russian citizens relating to their work in the Russian defense industry, and receipts for American dollars received by them." Pope, a retired US Navy captain who spent much of his career working in naval intelligence, was at the time of his arrest the head of a private security firm. On 20 April 2000 the FSB revealed that Pope had been seeking plans the Shkval underwater missile. Pope was detained during an informal contact with a Russian scientist who had participated in the Shkval's creation.

The arrest of Daniel Howard Kiely, deputy head of the Applied Research Laboratory at Pennsylvania State University, came almost simultaneously. The laboratory led by Mr. Kiely has for many years been developing torpedoes for US warships and submarines. Professor Kiely had joined Pope in Moscow to offer technical advice and determine the tasks for Pope's further activity. Kiely was interrogated as a witness. His testimony and objects confiscated during the search proved his involvement in Pope's activities. Later the 68-year-old professor was released and allowed to return to the United States.

The objective of the High-Speed Undersea Weaponry project at the US Office of Naval Research is to develop the vehicle guidance, control and maneuvering capabilities for the quick reaction weapons. High-speed weapons could offer an advantage for Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) "close encounter" scenarios. The overall system response of a high-speed weapon for breaking off engagements with enemy submarines would be measured in seconds, rather than minutes. The High-Speed Undersea Weapons project has three tasks; Vehicle Guidance, Vehicle Control, and Test Bed Development. Vehicle Guidance deals with homing sensors, signal processing, waveform design, and autopilot commands that are used to guide (either autonomously or with external interaction) the weapon to its target. Vehicle control deals with control and maneuvering of the high-speed weapon with emphasis on stabilizing the supercavitating bubble cavity, and optimizing the flow for low drag. Technical issues include instability due to vehicle planing and tail slap, interaction between cavity with propulsion exhaust, and propulsion system transients, including startup. Test Bed Development is an ongoing effort that develops a test platform to test and evaluate S&T candidate systems such as homing systems, vehicle control, and propulsion systems.


References
REGION ENTERPRISE: EXPERT IN HIGH-PRECISION GUIDED WEAPONS Yevgeny Shakhidzhanov, Military Parade Issue 33. May - June 1999
CONCRETE SUBMARINES BY JIM WILSON Popular Mechanics DECEMBER 98


and there is also this

http://www.periscope.ucg.com/mdb-smpl/w ... 4768.shtml

VA-111 Shkval (Squall)
EQUIPMENT CATEGORY: Naval Mines/Torpedoes -- Torpedoes
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: Russia
LATEST UPDATE: 1 December 2001


PICTURES OF: VA-111 Shkval (Squall)




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

DESCRIPTION
The Shkval("squall") is a high-speed supercavitating rocket-propelled torpedo designed to be a rapid-reaction defense against U.S. submarines undetected by sonar. It can also be used as a countermeasure to an incoming torpedo, forcing the hostile projectile to abruptly change course and possibly break its guidance wires.
The solid-rocket propelled torpedo achieves a high velocity of 230 mph (386 kmh) by producing an envelope of supercavitating bubbles from its nose and skin, which coat the entire weapon surface in a thin layer of gas. This causes the metal skin of the weapon to avoid contact with the water, significantly reducing drag and friction.

The Shkval is fired from the standard 533-mm torpedo tube at a depth of up to 328 ft (100 m). The rocket-powered torpedo exits the tube at 50 knots (93 kmh) and then ignites the rocket motor, propelling the weapon to speeds four to five times faster than other conventional torpedoes. The weapon reportedly has an 80 percent kill probability at a range of 7,655 yd (7,000 m).

The torpedo is guided by an autopilot rather than by a homing head as on most torpedoes. The initial version was unguided. However, the Russians have indicated there is a homing version that starts at the higher speed but slows and enters a search mode.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

PICTURES



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

STATUS
The weapon was deployed in the early 1990s, and had been in service for years when its existence was publicly disclosed. In 1995, it was revealed that development had begun in the 1960s, when the Research Institute NII-24, previously involved in artillery ammunition research, was ordered to help develop an underwater high-speed missile to combat nuclear-powered submarines. On May 14, 1969, a government mandate created the Research Institute of Applied Hydromechanics (NII PGM), which was the predecessor of today's Region Scientific Production Association.
A modernized "Shkval" was placed on display at the 1995 international armaments show in Abu Dhabi, but it was discarded. Later, an improved model was designed with a conventional warhead and a guided targeting system. The first tests of this "smart" Shkval torpedo were conducted by the Russian Pacific Fleet in early 1998.

The Region Scientific Production Association has developed an export modification of the missile, the Shkval-E. Russia first marketed this conventionally armed version at the IDEX 99 exhibition in Abu Dhabi in early 1999.

Russia reportedly sold China 40 conventionally armed Shkval-Es in the mid-1990s.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

BUILDER(S)
Region State Research and Production Enterprise, Moscow


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

USERS/PLATFORMS
Russia



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CHARACTERISTICS
DIMENSIONS:
Length 26 ft 11 in (8,200 mm)
Diameter 1 ft 9 in ( 533 mm)
Weight 5,953 lb (2,700 kg)
PERFORMANCE:
Speed
Maximum 230 mph (360 kmh; 100 m/sec; 200 kts)
Some reports say in excess of 300 mph (483 kmh)
Exit from tube 50 kts (93 kmh)
Range
80 percent Pkill 7,655 yd (7,000 m)
WARHEAD:
Explosive
Weight 463 lb (210 kg)
Type TNT
Fuze contact/proximity



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

VARIANTS
Shkval High-Speed Underwater Rocket
Original unguided production model. Uses a tactical nuclear warhead on a timer to destroy incoming torpedoes and/or the submarine that launched them. This model was deployed in 1977; it could only be fired in a straight line and had a range of about 10 miles (16.2 km).
Improved Shkval
Original model with guided targeting system and a conventional warhead.
Shkval-E
Export variant. This model requires the crew of a submarine or ship to define the target's parameters -- speed, distance and vector. The torpedo must also be fed data for the automatic pilot. This variant does not have a homing warhead and must follow a computer-generated program.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ISSUES AND NOTES
U.S. intelligence experts call the nuclear-equipped Shkval a "revenge weapon," as it would destroy its target and the submarine that launched it. Russian sources have disagreed with this assessment, saying that the double-hull construction of Soviet-built submarines could withstand the resultant nuclear shockwave.
On April 5, 2000, an American businessman, Edmond Pope, and a Russian colleague were arrested by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) in Moscow. The men were charged with stealing scientific secrets -- specifically information on the Shkval torpedo. Pope, a retired U.S. Navy captain who spent the majority of his career working in naval intelligence, was then the head of a private security firm. Two weeks after the arrest, the FSB claimed that Pope was seeking plans for the high-speed underwater missile. The retired navy officer was detained during informal contact with one of the Russian scientists who helped to create the torpedo.

Pope spent eight months in the Russian Lefortovo prison awaiting trial. He was convicted of espionage and sentenced to 20 years. On Dec. 14, 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin pardoned Pope on humanitarian grounds; the American has been suffering from bone cancer.

Pope was in Russia as a businessman to purchase Russian technology when he apparently fell prey to a Canadian intelligence operation intent on purchasing the Shkval torpedoes, according to U.S. intelligence sources.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

OPERATIONAL NOTES

 

See Ricky, I am not THAT dumb, after all. The Chinese were actually on board of Russian "Peter the Great" observing the show. And 2 US subs have beeb harassing Kursk. Another time or place I´ll maybe have chance to telll more about the catastrophe.
I don´t know whether the Chinese have actually acquired the torpedo.

 

Reluctantly, I must agree

lol - I just found it very hard to believe that anybody could get an underwater object moving that fast. I still do (not doubting you, just surprised it is possible).

 

Interesting arcticle on the Warships1 board by Nightwatch2

http://p216.ezboard.com/fwarships1discu ... c&index=12

Big Trouble in Little China
Defense Tech <www.defensetech.org/archi...1486.html> asks whether
China will soon "have the teeth to chomp down on Taiwan" and concludes that it will, citing increases in China's amphibious warfare capability. the PLA has shifted focus towards amphibious operations for a significant part of the ground forces ... this has included the reorganisation of two motorised infantry divisions in the Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Regions into amphibious infantry divisions and the transfer of another infantry division to the navy to form a second marine brigade in the late 1990s. ... round a quarter of all PLA manoeuvre units, which number around 20 divisions or brigades, plus supporting artillery and air-defence units, have participated in training exercises for amphibious operations...

The US intelligence community has reported that since 2001, the
Chinese shipbuilding industry has produced 23 new amphibious assault shipsand 13 conventional attack submarines. ... The PLA Navy (PLAN) is rapidlytransforming itself from a coastal force into a bluewater naval power with a force modernisation drive that is unprecedented in the post-Cold War era.

"The range and number of warships the Chinese navy is acquiring can be
compared to the Soviet Union's race to become an ocean-going navy to rival the US in the 1970s," said a China-based foreign naval attaché.
But stop there a moment. "The PLA Navy (PLAN) is rapidly transforming itself from a coastal force into a bluewater naval power with a force modernisation drive that is unprecedented in the post-Cold War era." If China's strategic goal is to take Taiwan why should it need a Blue Water navy? Furthermore, why should Taiwan represent any strategic priority at all? The small island nation poses no credible threat to mainland. The real strategic center of Chinese interests is the South China sea through which the commercial and petroleum lifeblood of China flows. According to the Washington Times <www.washtimes.com/nationa...1929r.htm> , China
understands that the principle national security threat facing it is
disruption of sea lanes bringing oil and commerce to its shores.

China believes the U.S. military will disrupt China's energy imports
in any conflict over Taiwan ... Beijing's leaders see access to oil and gas
resources as vital to economic growth and fear that stalled economic growth could cause instability and ultimately the collapse of their nation of 1.3 billion people. Energy demand, particularly for oil, will increase sharply
in the next 20 years - from 75 million barrels per day last year to 120
million barrels in 2025 -- with Asia consuming 80 percent of the added 45
million barrels, the report said. Eighty percent of China's oil currently
passes through the Strait of Malacca, and the report states that China
believes the sea area is "controlled by the U.S. Navy." Chinese President Hu Jintao recently stated that China faces a "Malacca Dilemma" -- the
vulnerability of its oil supply lines from the Middle East and Africa to
disruption. Oil-tanker traffic through the Strait, which is closest to
Indonesia, is projected to grow from 10 million barrels a day in 2002 to 20
million barrels a day in 2020, the report said. Chinese specialists
interviewed for the report said the United States has the military
capability to cut off Chinese oil imports and could "severely cripple" China
by blocking its energy supplies.

As the Belmont Club argued in an earlier post <belmontclub.blogspot.com/...copy-of.html> , one USN riposte to a Chinese blockade campaign against Taiwan would be to shut the oil flowing to the People's Republic at the spigot, through its control of the Persian Gulf: a counter-blockade. This blue-water threat represents the true strategic threat to the Chinese commercial lifeline. For that reason, recent Chinese efforts to build naval intallations ("a string of pearls") along the route to the Persian Gulf in Cambodia, Rangoon, Burma and Pakistan and develop its oceangoing navy must be understood as going beyond its ambitions against Taiwan.

But even if the United States could be persuaded not to intervene in any
dispute with Taiwan, China's peculiar geographic vulnerability to maritime
disruption means that even Taiwan's small submarine force could pose a major threat. This map www.globalsecurity.org/mi...super.gif from
Global Security underscores how vital the South China Sea is to China's
economy. Virtually all VLCC traffic to China, Japan and South Korea pass
through the Lombok and Malacca Straits. Traffic bound for the cluster of
ports <www.shipsupply.org.cn/gkt_en.htm> (run your mouse along the
Chinese coast and the ports will pop up as circles) around Guangdong
(Hongkong and related ports) can stop 600 km west-southwest of Taiwan, but traffic bound for the port clusters around Shanghai must pass east of
Taiwan, through the Luzon straits before berthing 600 km due north of Taipei-- right past the Bonins -- including Okinawa. Should Taiwan respond to a Chinese threat by deploying its Zwaardvis class diesel electrics along the Bonin littoral, the northern Chinese ports would be blockadaded. Both the Guangdong and Shanghai ports themselves are well within range of the 9,000 nautical mile ranged Taiwanese diesel-electrics.
Here is where some military analysts may have it wrong with their scenarios of a triumphal Chinese descent on a hapless Taiwan. Taiwanese dieselelectrics could respond to mainland saber rattling by taking station to the Bonins northeast of Taiwan and would be far better suited to littoral
warfare than the nuclear attack boats Beijing is building. Moreover, any
combat between Taiwan and China in this area would be exceedingly dangerous, because it would occur virtually within Japanese territorial waters. China would have to be very careful in naval operations or risk attacking Japanesefleet units by accident. Escorting tanker convoys east of Taiwan and through the Bonins would be a nightmare. In fact, Taiwanese naval action need only be threatened: any naval confrontation in the South China sea would almost certainly disrupt commercial and oil traffic not only to China, but to Japan and Korea as well. If that were not enough, the Taiwanese subs could head south as well. All Taiwan would need to do is torpedo one large VLCC in the Malacca straits to block it for months. None of these prospects have been lost on Taiwanese planners. The Taipei Times www.taipeitimes.com/News/...003247677>
says:

"If Taiwan obtains the eight diesel-powered submarines we propose to
purchase through the US, we will have the capability of blockading China's
sea lanes in South China and East China seas," Minister of National Defense Lee Jye said yesterday at the legislature. He said the MND assessed that China will need to import 90 percent of its energy needs by 2020. He said China currently has 30 days of oil reserves, and that it wants to reach 50 days in 2010 and 90 days in 2020. He said, however, that even if China achieves that goal, its oil reserves would be insufficient in comparison with the US' 158-day reserves and Japan's 161-day reserves.

In addition, he said that the MND believes that by the year 2010,
China will need to import 36.29 million tonnes of food, rising to 54.4
million tonnes in 2020 and 118 million tonnes in 2030. He said China
therefore requires secure sea lanes, which the MND believes is one of
China's big weaknesses should it go to war against Taiwan. Lee said the MND calculated that in 2020, Taiwan will require at least 10 submarines to
patrol waters around Taiwan, including waters east of Taiwan, the East China Sea and the South China Sea. He said if China takes military action against Taiwan, the 10 submarines would be able to blockade the sea lanes and attack China's warships and civilian shipping.

The Taiwanese have done the numbers. They understand the capability of their boats is limited by their small numbers but know that if China precipitates a conflict in the South China sea it would run out of energy seventy days before the US and Japan -- though the US will only be inconvenienced because eastbound voyages to the US can be routed through the Torres Straits and the westward route to the East Coast through the Mozambique Channel and around the Horn of Africa will remain open. (See page 8 of this document <people.hofstra.edu/facult...Q_strategicoil.pdf> for a thumbnail chart of world VLCC lanes)

One final thought from the Indian Navy perspective:the navy last month operationalised its first full-fledged UAV base in Kochi in Kerala ... four Heron crafts were ordered from Israel. ... The navy plans to induct at least a dozen Israeli UAVs and set up UAV bases in Port Blair and Lakshwadeep islands as well. In fact, a full-fledged base in the Andaman islands to monitor the Chinese movements in the seas is also being planned. China has, during the last decade, shown increasing eagerness to be present in the Andamans. It has eavesdropping equipment permanently placed in the Coco Islands.

China is the last nation that will want trouble in the Taiwan Straits.

Big Trouble in Little China 2
Once China's real strategic imperative -- securing its energy and trade
routes -- are grasped its activities are more easily interpreted. Increases
in China's amphibious capabilities are usually seen as menacing Taiwan.

But here's what the Navy League
<www.navyleague.org/seapow...today.htm> has to say:

The PLAN's evolving strategy has been described in terms of two
distinct phases. The strategy's first phase is for the PLAN to develop a
"green water active defense strategy" capability. This "green water"
generally is described as being encompassed within an arc swung from
Vladivostok to the north, to the Strait of Malacca to the south, and out to
the "first island chain" (Aleutians, Kuriles, Ryukyus, Taiwan, Philippines,
and Greater Sunda islands) to the east. Analysts have assessed that the PLAN is likely to attain this green water capability early in the 21st century.
Open-source writings also suggest that the PLAN intends to develop a
capability to operate in the "second island chain" (Bonins, Guam, Marianas,
and Palau islands) by the mid-21st century.

In the future, the PLAN also may expand its operations to bases in Myanmar, Burma. These bases will provide the PLAN with direct access to the Strait of Malacca and the Bay of Bengal. These are very same island chains which so preoccupied the Imperial Japanese Navy during the Second World War and for exactly the same reasons. Any attempts to positively control sealanes leading in and out of northeast Asia will involve dominating the Malay Barrier and the Bonins, Guam, Marianas, and Palau islands.

As to the amphibious force, the Navy League has this assessment:

The PLAN's 7,000-man Marine ... Force's ... primary mission is to
safeguard China's island holdings in the South China Sea during times of
peace and to seize and defend islands in the South China Sea during times of war. (Here's where the Spratleys comes in. It sits across the route from the Malay barrier to the East China Sea -- Wretchard). The Marine Force also may be used for amphibious raids or for establishing beachheads in scenarios entailing a military confrontation with Taiwan.

Taiwan is the secondary mission. Keeping China's access to energy is the
primary mission. The devil in the proposition is that as long as China is
seen as representing a threat to Japan, any attempts to reach out to "the
first island chain" (which includes the Aleutians) and the "second island
chain" (which includes the Bonins, which is Japanese territory) will bring a
reaction from Nippon. Like the Anglo-German Naval Race of the 1900s, any serious maritime rivalry will be fraught will grave consequences. One
interesting thing about these developments is that for the first time in 500
years Europe is absent from the maritime strategic equation.

 

What is the bottom line of all this (fantastic material, thanks PMN1)?

Somebody....? Anybody....?

Is China bound to remain peaceful? Will anybody risk a confrontation - a 100% sure economic nightmare for every party? I don´t think so.

 

Much depends on China's leaders, present and future. They might not believe that it would be an economic nightmare for them, especially if another weak US President is elected. If they feel that such a man has been elected and will let them have their way with Taiwan, then they might just go for it, since there would be no one to stop them.

 

But, even a weak president has his Establishment to answer to. Bush was weak and not very active to start with. Now – he is the top sheriff of the world, or so he thinks.
I think the main policy lines don´t change that much with changing presidents.
Sure, the Chinese, having armed heavily might still try to go for it, hoping that USA will not react in order not to risk a global economic upheaval. The Taiwanese can also surrender in order to remain prosperous. I don´t think they would choose to fight just for the Idea of independence.

War of nerves, bluffs plus a war of intelligence services may ensue, where China will try weak spots, maybe try to bribe, where necessary? I don´t believe in a hot war of dimensions, but Taiwan can still end up in Chinese Peoples´ Republican arms.