Crazy you must be one happy guy, becuase you get amused a lot. heehee I agree with Erich, I'd much rather be in a Panther or a Tiger than a T-34. Those german tanks could reach out and touch the T-34 when the 34 was still not in effective range. I'm not even going to delve into things like the lack of a commander's cupola, inferior optics, no radio, and bad command and control associated with the T-34, (and all Soviet tanks for that matter). Issues that were somehwat solved later in the war. To my mind srvivability is determined based on an individual tank by tank basis. Overall I'd take the Tiger/Panther combo over anything else. Seems to me like they survived a hell of a lot of abuse, and dished out their fair share. This is my whole argument here: if you match a single T-34 vs a single Tiger, the Tiger's gonna drive away the victor in the overwhelming majority or engangements.
Amused ? interesting......sorry for the complete lack of grammar on my part, you will not see me here again.
That is a valid comparison on the Tiger and T-34. In a combat engagement, odds are the Tiger would win. Especially considering the optics advantage mentioned- the Tiger would have a far better chance of hitting it's target! BUT- I would add to this... If the Tiger was unable to make it to the combat engagement, the isue is moot. If the mechanical problems notorious to Tiger Is and IIs reared their head, the Tiger would not be engaging the T-34- it would be getting towed back to the shop, or, almost as common, abandoned. If the Tiger ran out of fuel- fuel which the T-34 consumed at about 1/4 the rate- again, the Tiger would not arrive to the location of cambat, again giving the advantage to the T-34. I'd say looking at battlefield surviveability must take into account the entire combat action. Not just the actual direct fighting- but approaching the combat zone, engageing the enemy, and resolving the combat (retreat, dig in, advance, etc.). In the "engaging the enemy" category, in many cases the german tanks win out. But in the "approaching the combat zone" category, many of the heavier german tanks (including the Panther) had major trouble (the best example immediately coming to mind would be the 200 Panthers at Kursk "approaching" the combat zone- and only about half making it there). And in the final category- "resolving the combat"- this would be the real area where german heavy tanks would have major trouble surviving. Breakdowns in these vehicles were especially common as a result of combat action. Vehicles get stuck in the heat of combat, vehicles take damage, constant varied engine use leads to more engine damage... And I'd just have the feeling that if one considers all these aspects, the T-34 still comes off with a bit of an edge. And keep in mind here I'm not really looking at crew surviveability. Essentially, from my point of view, in looking at the tanks like this, once the crew exits the tanks the "equation" is done. If the crew is not operating the vehicle after the battle, obviously it has not "survived" in serviceable condition. [ 12. May 2003, 05:48 PM: Message edited by: CrazyD ]
C : Have you been able to find the article(s) covering "Spring Awakening" yet ? Would like to follow up on this for my own files. Please share if available. E
*bump* Erich, I found some stuff. Don't have it at work though- I'll post tonight. Off the top of my head- Erickson makes mention of the Heavies during Spring Awakening being lost due mainly to xxxxxxx and becoming immobilized in the soft ground- don't recall the other reason Erickson notes (the xxxxxx). Ripley (Steel Storm: Armored Campaigns of the Waffen SS)(again, sources at home so I may not be remembering the titles exactly. tonight...), although likely less relaible than Erickson, goes into more detail- even claiming that some of the tanks sunk in the mud up to their turret rings. Again, I'll grab some quotes tonight and throw 'em in here. (and I'm still sticking with my guns... in the overall sphere of "battlefield surviveability", I'm still going with the T-34/85!)
Up to the turret rings ! that's wild ! hmmmmm? now I am going to have to find the German pages in the 12th SS Pz book and another multi-page article done in the 70's which seemed pretty right on to the theories given. Theories is not a good word I know but it was a multi faceted failure. Crazy, I believe that mud did carry a role though not singular to the failure of the offensive. New recruits, unfamiliar vehicles but still high moral. A very stiff and heavy Soviet pak front, unfamiliar terrain. Snow, sleet, rain, muck, swill and schlect weather, as no real Luftwaffe softening up of Soviet positions and lastly no follow up of any fuel reserves for the attacking panzer front......shades of the Ardennes campaign. Please post the materials when you are able. I'll look for materials by the weekend, though I will be out of town Saturday/Sunday. E
100% agree. The terrain was only one of the factors. From what I have read, the paranoia associated with the operation was also a major problem. Correct me if I'm wrong- Didn't Hitler insist on such ridiculous levels of secrecy that even some of the commanders for the operation were not allowed to go near the front lines before the operation for fear of them being spotted by the russians? Good points also about the new recruits and equipment, not to mention the soviet defenses. Methinks that Spring Awakening would be one of those operations that really was "doomed to failure" from the beginning. My main point on bringing up the terrain in relation to Spring Awakening was in relation to the King Tiger's ground pressure problem. From AchtungPanzer on the King Tiger- This looks to be a nice stat relating to this issue. Wow... only 10 HP for each TON!?!? Almost suprising that A King Tiger could move at all! And- Oh my... On the sinking up to the turret ring- I would imagine that this is a bit of exagerration. Maybe- maybe a VERY small number of tanks actually sank that deep. I would imagine that in general the tanks only sank a meter or two. Not up to the turret ring, but still enough to immobilize. I'll have those quotes up later tonight.
I think the only recon meausres were done for anticipating the conditions for the roads of attack. Still not being able to do much with a /shelling, so there wasn't ample time to do anything when the word was given for the attack. I seemed to have read somewhere that the W-SS units did there duty with an understanding that losses would be awfully high in men and material. And I cannot remember if this was the short attack that caused many of the offiziers including Dietrich ? to dump their awards and send back to the higher authorities in a chamber pot ?........ up yours Hitler ! E
Again, I don't have sources with me, but... I was under the impression that it was actually Hitler who ordered the SS men to remove their badges and medals. Apparently, Hitler was infuriated at the failure of Spriong Awakening. In his anger, he decided that the soldiers of the SS had failed him (we all know how much Hitler too inot account the actual conditions his soldiers experienced ). Thus he ordered them to remove all their badges as punishment. Do we already have a thread specifically for Spring Awakening? Methinks maybe we could start one... an interesting operation to study, no doubt about that.
March 14 1945 Hitler, enraged at the failure of the Platensee attack, orders the SS divisions LSSAH, Das Reich, Totenkopf and Hohenstaufen to remove the honor cufffbands from their uniforms. Dietrich doesn't pass the order down. Not 100% sure, but I think I read somewhere where Dietrich asks Hitler.."Does that include the dead ones"
Checking on the battle scene in spring awakening...some interesting info... SS-Werfer Abteilung 102/502 The Waffen-SS, despite the firm opposition of the German Army artillery corps, was determined to have its own rocket launcher units. As the Army would not give the SS any "Nebelwerfers" from the Army rocket launcher battalions, the SS developed their own - the fin stabilized, "Raken-Vielfachwerfer," which was essentially a copy of the Russian "Katyusha" mounted on captured Somua French Army halftracks This unit was an an example of the often intense rivalry between the German Army and the Waffen-SS, their frequent competition for materiel, and their duplication of efforts and units with overlapping responsibility. 4 Batteries of 6 15cm rocket launchers - 24 launchers, 144 barrels total 5th Battery added 07/43 of 4 8cm rocket launchers March 1945: Unit provides support during "Spring Awakening" campaign, then retreats westward along with remmnants of 6 SS-Panzer Army. http://www.wssob.com/102batvie.html
something real brief..... German units of 6 SS Pz. Armee I Kav. Korps with 4th and 3rd KD as well as 25 Hungarian D. Ist SS Pz. K with 1st and 12th SS Pz. D. II SS Pz. Korps with 2nd and 9th SS Pz. D. geezo now for the Soviets......93, 151, 74, 66 Guard, ? 236, 209 St.G. Brigade, 233, 202, 320, 316, 68th guard, 21, 122nd and 156th divisions. Do ya think the Germans had any chance of defeating this force from March 6 through the 13th of 1945 ? From my crumy map which is narrow and hard to read, the 12th Ss Pz. seemed to have had the furthest encrouchment upon the Soviet defences getting as far as Ozora and Simontornya, Sar Egres along the west to east road line. The Sarviz Canal was the demarcation line between the two SS Panzer Korps. Anyone have the huge book by Georg Meier.....Drama Between Budapest and Vienna in Deutsch ? JJF was suppose to have translated and added new material to the work for publication 5 years ago and as far as I am aware it is still being worked on also inclusion of 100 new pics of late war personalities and combat in Hungary and Austria till surrender. E
It seems due to the weather conditions all the troops did not even reach the starting points for the attack in time (!!!): SS Hohenstaufen: At the end of February the division reached Falubattyan in Hungary and was now poised to attack on 6th of March. Due however to the swampy roads the division could not reach its starting position for the attack in time http://www.feldgrau.com/9ss.html 6th march 1945 On the Eastern Front... The German forces in Hungary launch a major counteroffensive in the area just north of Lake Balaton. The 6th SS Panzer Army, which was withdrawn from the Ardennes battle early in January, has been moved here to spearhead the attack. Other units from Army Group South (Wohler) also take part in the offensive. The operation is code named Fruhlingserwachen or Spring Awakening. The German aim is to retake all the territory between Lake Balaton and the Danube. The Soviet 27th Army, defending along the targeted line of advance, is forced to give ground initially. However, 3rd Ukrainian Front (Tolbukhin) responds with the allotment of reserves to slow the advance down. http://www.onwar.com/chrono/1945/mar45/06mar45.htm 7th march On the Eastern Front... In Hungary, the German offensive by Army Group South continues and achieves more gains. To the north of Lake Balaton, attacks are by 6th SS Panzer Army while to the south of the lake, there are attacks by units of the German 2nd Panzer Army toward Kaposvar. Farther south, in occupied Yugoslavia, elements of German Army Group E (Lohr) attack northeast of the Drava River against allied forces of 3rd Ukrainian Front. 10th march 1945 On the Eastern Front... The German forces of Army Group South advancing around Lake Balaton encounter heavy resistance from Soviet air and ground forces of 3rd Ukrainian Front and make limited progress. German progress is also hindered by muddy conditions and a lack of fuel for the tanks and other vehicles. 13th march On the Eastern Front... The German offensive to the north and south of Lake Balaton, in Hungary, begins to lose momentum. 14th march Meanwhile, in Hungary, German Army Group South (Wohler) commits its remaining reserves to battle. The force is based on the 6th Panzer Division and consists of a mixed grouping of 200 tanks and assault guns which engage the Soviet 27th Army (Trofimenko). http://www.onwar.com/chrono/1945/mar45/14mar45.htm 16th march On the Eastern Front... The Soviet forces in Hungary, of 3rd Ukrainian Front, have regrouped following the German attacks, of Army Group South, around Lake Balaton and begin an offensive against the northern flank of the recently won German salient. The Hungarian 3rd Army takes the brunt of the first assaults and is soon in great difficulty. ------------------- 1st SS-Aufklärungs-Abteilung Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler" by Richard Murphy & Timo Worst http://www.skalman.nu/third-reich/ss-1-aa.htm by the time Frühlingserwachen, the main attack south-east of Budapest, was launched in early March the whole unit was again in action, again as part of Hansen’s Battle Group. The attack by I SS-Panzerkorps, passing down the west bank of the Sarviz Canal, progressed well, forcing the Russians to divert significant forces in an attempt to stop them, but, on the east bank, where II SS-Pzk. was operating, it was much slower, giving a major headache to the staff of 6th Panzerarmee as Prieß’s left flank became more and more exposed. Nevertheless, the battalion spent the period 12th-14th March supporting Hitler Jugend’s assault across the Sio Canal, but by the 15th, unaware that the Red Army was building up a considerable force to the north with the intention of cutting off the SS men’s spearhead from the base, the advance, despite achieving a small bridgehead, had stalled and Wawrczinek’s men went back the way they had come to join a Kampfgruppe from the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" which was fighting in the Kaloz area, approximately 20 Km. to the north. Later that same day the Soviet 4th and 9th Guards Armies supported by the 6th Guards Tank Army launched their counter-attack, aiming to cut Dietrich’s forces off. The whole Panzerarmee, facing an annihilation comparable to that suffered at Falaise six months before, was forced to pull back and the Aufklärungs Abteilung attempted to maintain some form contact between I SS-Pzk and both IV SS-Pzk. and I Kav. Korps operating to their right as they fell back through the Bakony Forest noth of Lake Balaton -------------- Dmitriy Loza "Emcha" Commander "Emchas", from M4 [in Russian, em chetyrye]. http://www.iremember.ru/tankers/loza/loza1.html In the Lake Balaton area we broke into the German rear and it turned out that we fired up a German tank column, destroying 19 tanks, 11 of which were heavy tanks. Many wheeled vehicles. Altogether we counted 29 destroyed combat vehicles. We received 1000 rubles for each destroyed AFV And map for the operations as well: http://www.onwar.com/maps/wwii/eastfront2/1balaton-vienna45.htm [ 13. February 2003, 02:25 PM: Message edited by: Kai-Petri ]
Russian view on the the matter: Was the Tiger really "King?" Testing the King Tiger at Kubinka http://www.battlefield.ru/library/bookshelf/weapons/weapons7.html The first "Tiger-B" tanks captured by Soviet forces were sent to the Chief Armored Vehicle Directorate's (GBTU) Armored Vehicle Research and Development proving ground (NIIBT) at Kubinka for comprehensive study. There were vehicles numbered 102 and 502. The very movement of these tanks to the loading station under their own power revealed numerous defects. At 86 kilometers, the left idler wheel went out of commission (when the bearings failed), as well as the left drive sprocket (when all the mounting bolts sheared). The high temperatures at the time, which reached 30 degrees Celsius (86 F), turned out to be too much for the cooling system. This led the right engine block to overheat and to continual overheating in the gearbox. The tank was repaired, but after that the right side running gear had completely failed. It was replaced with one scavenged from another tank, but this one almost immediately went out of commission again when the drive shaft roller bearings failed. Besides this, time and again it was necessary to change the track's elements, which were constantly breaking (cracking) due to the tank's colossal weight, especially when the vehicle was turning. The design of the track tensioning mechanism hadn't been completely perfected. As a result, the tension had to be adjusted after every 10-15 km of travel. Shortcomings: The chassis is complex and is not durable. The steering mechanism is complex and expensive. The side running gear is extremely unreliable. The radius of action is 25% inferior to the "IS"-tanks. The ammunition (except in the turret recess) is awkwardly located. The excessive size and weight of the tank do not correspond to the tank's armor protection and firepower."
It seems due to the weather conditions all the troops did not even reach the starting points for the attack in time (!!!): Yup, this is much the same as what I have read. Along the same lines as the commanders- the commanders (including Dietrich) were not even allowed into the operational area until the night before, for fear of discovery. And it does seem like the weather was a big factor in the whole operation. It would make sense that difficult ground would impede all aspects of the operation- from deployment and preparation all the way through to the actaul combat. If the heavy vehicles were having problems, most of the transports and prime movers were likely in rough shape as well. In addition, gas was short by this time, so soft ground would be an added problem there. Vehicles use more power when they have to plow through mud and whatnot, and this would have further impeded mobility throughout the operation. Btw, Kai- nice stuff on the chronology. I've seen onwar.com before, but hadn't checked that part. Have to take more of a look there...
Funny they didn't say that the Königstiger had a better long range gun and ammo and superior optics and....wonder if this beast had been sabotaged first ? They probably fired at both tanks from about 50 yards to see if their ammo would penetrate the hull.... E
And back to the Tanks issue... Good points from the russians! I think the last one really sums up the problems with the King Tiger. Yes, it had an incredible gun. And yes, the King Tiger had nearly impenetrable armor. But in action, those factors were outweighed by all of the other problems the tank had. It is a tough call though. I'd say as far as "battlefield surviveability" goes, the T-34/85, the Tiger I and the Tiger II would all be in contention, with no clear winner. Each has advantages over the others (optics Erich mentions being a MAJOR advantage for the Tigers...), but each also has glaring drawbacks. T-34 was probably the most likely to survive in my opinion, but it is hard to mess with a Tiger...
As you both have mentioned some incredible, major faults the Königstiger's chief advantage was the long honker of a 8.8.cm and the hard hitting ammo and optics. Being able to load and fire and load and fire again while a JS II could only fire off one if lucky was of major importance. The highlight of the German system was probably defence and this is where it really excelled, especailly in the defence of Pommerania, Danzig, Seelowe heights and of course Berlin. JS II units found it quite difficult to negotiate some of the narrow streets of Berlin and were often cuaght by the maurauding Panzerfaust teams, ah but I am getting off the topic, sorry...... I have a small note I wrote back in the early 70's about Plattensse offensive. German drivers and gunners cannot see due to high wind, blowing snow and ever increasing fog banks. Sitting ducks if you ask me ! Still looking for the multi-page article... E
this is a bit strange but here goes nothing..... March 6-15th 1945 Unternehmen Frühlingserwachen A battle group, after stealing gas from another unit had made the deepest penetration through the morass and mud of the central Hungary-sio Canal, but after 4 days and 45 miles it's lead tank with the exhaust pipes shot off, was still some 20 miles from the Danube. reported the position and was told why was he so far ahead of everyone else, and at once to retreat. Don't you know the Russians are attacking towards Vienna ? dietrich had begun his attack the same time marshall Tolbukhin with the 26 and 27th armies launched and even greater one. The battle group retreated with the rest of the 6th Ss Pz. army toward the Vertes Mountains......this appears to be a later date ? //// By March 23rd with a remaining 25 Panthers astride the Budapest-Vienna Highway , where Tolbukhin's spearhead smased straight into him with such reckless abandon that the out gunned Panthers were able to knock out 125 ? JS II Stalins ? .....like I said a bit strange. Anyone know of this Abteilung Kommandeur ? E
Erich, that is an odd one. 125 IS IIs? Reliable source? That's an impressive number! Got a couple quotes on the tanks... (Tim Ripley- SS Steel Storm, ISBN 0-7603-0937-X) (Know anything about this source?) "On 7 March... II SS Panzer Corps' attack did not get very far before it ground to a halt in waterlogged ground. One tank even sank up to its turret ring in the mud!" p. 191 (John Erickson, Road to Berlin, ISBN 0-300-07813-7) "The main German assault lumbered to a final halt on 15 March, the tanks badly shot up or marooned in the muddy marsh of the low-lying ground of central Hungary." p. 514
