Finally, I've gotten some free time for posting again, and completed more computer upgrades. Although it was hard to resist some of the wonderfully intellectual WW2 debates in the FFZ... think I'd rather keep this thread going. And hopefully this weekend I'll have time to put all this together into one doc. Nice stuff on the recent posts. Thanks for the translation, Stevin! More from Ripley... not Spring Awakening yet- Operation SouthWind. German attack against the Gran Bridgehead to make way for Spring Awakening. One interesting note that I don't think has been mentioned... "For the first time, six SS Panzer divisions would be committed to an operation on the Eastern Front under the command of SS panzer corps, and two of those corps would be under the command of the Sixth SS Panzer Army." Sepp Dietrich commanded Sixth SS Pz Army, and according to Ripley, "... he did not relish such a high-level command. He left most of the day-to-day running of the army to his staff... Not suprisingly, therefore, many army generals -and some Waffen-SS ones as well- thought Dietrich had been promoted way beyond his ability." I SS Panzer Corps Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, led by SS Gruppenfuhrer Hermann Priess Leibstandarte - 27 Panzer IV tanks, 41 Panthers, and eight "antiaircraft tanks". Also, a "full battalion of 36 of the new Tiger II tanks." Hitlerjugend - 40 Panzer IVs, 44 Panthers, 20 Jagdpanzer IVs, "plus more than 150 armored halftracks." Also attached was the 560th Heavy AntiTank Battalion, which fielded 31 Jagdpanzer IVs and 16 Jagdpanthers. II SS Panzer Corps, led by SS Gruppenfuhrer Willi Bittrich. Das Reich and Hohenstaufen divisions. "Like I SS Panzer Corps, Bittirch's command had a heavy artillery regiment equipped with towed 210mm howitzers, and a rocket launcher regiment with Nebelwerfers..." (So this would apply to both SS Panzer corps.) "Bittrich's panzer regiments were short of tanks, but the shortfall was made up with Sturmgeshutz (StuG) assault guns. They were distributed to the panzer regiments second battalions to augment their Panzer IVs." (Hmmm... now there's a problem, especially in bad ground. Having to turn your vehicle to engage the enemy in mud could present problems) Das Reich 34 Panthers, 19 Panzer IVs, and 28 StuG IIIs Hohenstaufen 31 Panthers, 26 Panzer IVs, and 25 StuG IIIs. (as mentioned above, these strengths I think are for Southwind, NOT S.A.) "The German offensive would be conducted in two phases. It was to kick off with a preliminary operation, code-named South Wind, by I SS Panzer corps to destroy the Soviet bridgehead on the western bank of the river Gran, which threatened the German left flank along the banks of the Danube. The Soviet bridgehead held by seven infantry divisions and a number of armored units, was to be bludgeoned out of existence by a head-on attack by the Leibstandarte and Hitlerjugend divisions." Battle was commenced evening of 16/17 February. German troops achieved suprise, and were able to penetrate 8km before they raninto the first enemy Pak-front. King Tigers were brought up to deal with the enemy. 76mm Antitank shells were unable to knock out any of the King Tigers, and the attack progressed. Hitlerjugend engineers were able to sieze a bridge over the Parizs Canal capable of carrying "Panzer IV and Panther tanks", and penetrated a further 16km. "Armored kampfgruppen from both divisions advanced on 19 February, employing panzerkeil tactics. With the heavy King Tigers and Panthers in the lead... By early afternoon the Waffen-SS tank crews were at the Danube, in the eastern bottom corner of the bridgehead." (This brings up an interesting issue... Ripley earlier noted only a bridge capable of carrying Panthers- not King Tigers. I'm curious as to how the Germans managed to get the King Tigers across the canals...) Damn... out of time for tonight already. More to come tomorrow and this weekend... [ 01. April 2003, 02:18 PM: Message edited by: CrazyD ]
Crazy : Keep adding to this please and I will try my best to continue Steve's article from earlier. If the CT will hold off I'll spend some quality time here instead of even looking at FFZ crock..... E
Heh heh... luckily, my work has calmed for at least a couple weeks, and I'm finally looking at some free time. So no rush! I'm going to finish Ripley this week, and then branch out a bit further and see what else I can find. Late war period is proving to be very interesting... Course, paying off library fines would be the first order of business... And hey, without the FFZ, we might not realise how VERY interesting and impressive the WW2 knowledge ammassed here is. (btw- any book recommendations on this area that would maybe be found in an OK library?)
ah books.......hmmmmm, I do know of two books, one from Russia and the other from Hungary on the Gran bridgehead. As to the title names..... still waiting for the promised translated book from JJF on Budapest to Vienna which I think will gather all our info collected into one tremendous volume but appears to be out next year...maybe ? E
Next year "maybe"? "Hopefully"!!! The last year of the war seems ot be an area of little research. At least as compared to other subjects. More books would certainly be nice... (Of course, you know we'll go through this whole thread, post a bunch of stuff... and as soon as the thread is done, the book will come out. ) More from Ripley... 20th February. "Armored spearhead" (LAH) ordered to turn North to deal with Russian IV Guards Mechanized Corps entrenched on west bankof Gran. Pieper decides on a nighttime attack to minimize German armor losses. The attack proceeds forward, and "several German tanks were lost, but the route north was opened". Leibstandarte stops to re-fuel and re-arm Feb. 21st. Evening of 22/23 Feb., HitlerJugend 25th Panzergrenadier Regiment ordered into action against northern flank of IV Guards. "Attacking southwards during the evening of 22/23 Feb., the combined panzer-infantry operation degenerated into confusion when German units failed to recognize each other in the darkness and strated trading fire." (Aside... this sounds odd. Would be nice to get more info on this "freindly fire" incident. Haven't heard of this happening too often in German forces.) This fire attracted Russian artillery, which began shelling the German troops, and stalled the planned attack for at least an hour. Following this, the "assault tanks" (Tanks or s.p.g.?) quickly ran into a minefield, "losing several". Only a daring flank attack by the Regiment's armored personell carrier battalion saved the german troops. The APCs managed to infiltrate a village beyond the minefields. The panzergrenadiers were hence able to engage the russian tanks in armor-unfriendly urban conditions. The russian tanks were forced to flee. Another aside- Ripley's tone makes it sound as if the german APC troops took little or no casualties. Accurate? This left only a contracted Russian position on the west bank of the Gran. Feb. 23- preparations for the final assault on the Gran bridgehead. Germans commence final phase of Southwind, the complete elimination of Russian bridgehead, evening of Feb. 23. In only six hours of fighting, the final pocket of Russian troops at 8:30 hours Feb 24th are forced to withdraw their bridgehead across to east bank of the Gran. Operation Southwind- Russian losses- 2000 killed, 6000 wounded, 500 taken prisoner, 71 tanks lost and 180 artillery pieces lost. Waffen-SS losses- 3000 "casualties" (no distinction between killed, wounded, and captured), "dozen" tanks destroyed, "scores more" german tanks seriously damaged and sent back for repairs. (I would tend not to trust Riplye's number too much. Dosen't seem to exact, and he also does not at all clarify numbers for Waffen SS.) In relation to the losses during Southwind, Ripley doea make note of the lower quality of the replacements for the Germans. Personell replacements in the Waffen-SS divisions came at this point in part from Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine- and hence had far less training or morale than regular Waffen-SS troops. One also has to wonder about the panzers by this point. If AFVs had to be "sent back for repairs"... how thorough and well-done were the repairs? On to Spring Awakening... Waffen SS units involved... IV SS Panzer Corps, led by Gille, Totenkopf and Wiking divisions. Sixth SS Panzer Army, led by Dietrich. I SS Panzer Corps, led by Preiss, Leibstandarte and HitlerJugend II SS Panzer Corps, led by Bittrich, Das Reich and Hohenstaufen Total- 400,000 troops, 7,000 artillery pieces, 965 aircraft, and 400 "tanks and self-propelled guns". (another vague reference from Ripley. I'd like to know an approximate ratio of tanks to SPGs.) Hmmmm... a better-researched OoB would be nice here... [back to work... more to come tonight...]
good point, once we gather what we can on these last ops they should be edited and formulated from front to finish and sources used and it should be archived in some way. you ahve brought up also an interesting point and that bing the numbers of Stug's in the Panzer kompanies. Besides forming a strong Sturmgeschütze Abteilung, many of the W-SS panzer divisions now have one to two Kompanies of stugs to replace the dewindling amount of Pz. IV H and J variants. E
And by early 45, armor in general was in short supply- making a larger number of StuGs even more noticeable. Also, further problems in difficult terrain- especially wetlands. Since the StuG (or any TD for that matter...) has to swing the entire vehicle to sight the gun, becoming immobilized is even worse. At least a tank can still make use of the turret weapons! I put together some numbers really quick (so they could be added wrong )(and keep in mind these numbers are from Ripley, and we don't know how relaible he is...). For Southwind, the I and II SS Panzer Corps had 262 tanks and 53 StuGs. This number does not include the independent battalions- the Tiger company (s.SS.Pz.Abt 101 (501)) and the 560th s.JgdPz.Abt. So- that makes about a 5:1 ratio of tanks to StuGs. BUT- this does not account for the fact that the LAH and HJ had a disproportionate number of tanks for the start of Southwind. The II SS Panzer Corps is likely more representative of the W-SS's "tank strength- 110 tanks and 53 StuGs, or about 2:1. Now Ripley lists for Southwind "scores" of tanks needing to be sent back for repairs. Then, he lists 400 "tanks and self-propelled guns" for Spring Awakening. SO if many of the tanks had to be repaired after Southwind, what were they replaced with? It could be, that for Spring Awakening, the numbers of tanks had dwindled drastically. We know the 101(501) still had a few Tigers... and there was still some number of Panthers still battle-ready. But I wonder what some of the numbers were- maybe S.A. had far fewer tanks than it seems, and the SS troops had to rely almost entirely on SPGs. Where to get this info? (If it's somewhere earlier in this thread, I WILL kick myself in the ass!) btw, in regards to my earlier post, Southwind operation was to eliminate Russian bridgehead on Gran river Also- I had to note this down to get things clear... this has kind of strayed onto the entire Budapest relief attemt, as opposed to just Spring Awakening (in NO way a problem- just pointing it out!! ). So far, Ripley's stuff has touched on three operations- Konrad - IV SS Panzer Corps (Totenkopf and Wiking commanded by Gille attempt to relieve Budapest- unsuccessful. 1 Jan 45 -> 27 Jan 45 Southwind - I SS Panzer Corps (Leibstandarte and Hitlerjugend commanded by Priess) eliminates Russian bridgehead over River Gran. 16 Feb 45 -> 24 Feb 45 Spring Awakening - Sixth SS Panzer Army (I and II SS Panzer Corps commanded by Dietrich) and IV SS Panzer Corps attempt to relieve Budapest (and according to Hitler win the war or some such nonsense )- unsuccessful. OK OK, back to Ripley on Spring Awakening The main effort of the German attack was to be directed between Lakes Balaton and Valencei. This would be the attack area of the Sixth SS Pz. Army. I SS Pz. Corps would advance north on Budapest while II SS Pz Corps would move east to protect the right flank. Gille's men (IV SS Pz Corps) were to suppport the operation on the left flank of Dietrich's army. Ripley has some thoughts/analysis about the op... "They [Germans] were expected to advance over waterlogged terrain, which was dissected by numerous canals and rivers. Of greater concern, was the fact that the Russians knew they were coming." Interesting... according to Ripley, despite the paranoia security and secrecy surrounding S.A., the Russians found out anyway. In the ~month since Operation Konrad, the russians had re-fortified the approaches to Budapest with new Anti tank guns and dug-in infantry positions (in Pak-front arrangement). The russians also based their defences south of Budapest (the direction the germans would be attacking from) on the river and canal system, making advances bridge and road dependent. "Some 16 Russian rifle divisions were in the path of Dietrich's panzers, with two tank corps and two mechanized corps, with some 150 tanks, in direct suppport just behind the frontline southwest of Lake Balaton itself." Whats more, the Russians were also building up armor (1000+ tanks) north of Budapest for their own offensive along the Danube valley. The Germans were essentially wlaking into a giant armored trap, even if they could have succeeded in relieving Budapest. Enough for tonight. I'll post actual operation tomorrow, and then start examining further sources. [And I do plan on putting all this together for my (and anyone else's!) files. This late war stuff is really fascinating. Tragic, in a way- the germans really couldn't accomplish anything by this point, and yet Hitler still had them going on a suicide mission...]
http://preview.thehistorynet.com/mhq/articles/1999/winter99_text.htm The siege of Budapest By Peter B. Zwack On December 24, 1944, Hitler, over the heated objections of much of his staff, ordered SS Obergruppenführer (Lt. Gen.) Herbert Gille to immediately prepare his formidable Fourth SS Panzer Corps, then refitting in the Warsaw area, for deployment to Hungary to relieve the encircled German corps in Budapest. Thus began the disproportionate buildup of German panzer forces in Hungary during a period of extreme peril on both the Eastern and Western fronts. By March 1945 six elite Waffen SS panzer divisions and a quarter of all available Wehrmacht panzer divisions would be committed to Hungary, ostensibly to retain the Reich's last remaining strategic oil reserves. On New Year's Day the lead elements of the newly arrived Third SS Totenkopf (Death's Head) and Fifth SS Wiking (Viking) Panzer Divisions, advancing in column and without initial artillery preparation, crashed into the overextended Soviet Fourth Guards Army near Táta. Although Soviet Intelligence was aware that Gille's corps had recently redeployed into Hungary from Poland, it had lost track of the two elite SS divisions, mainly because they used different radio security procedures than the more numerous Wehrmacht units. The Soviet failure to track these dangerous units enabled the Germans to achieve full tactical surprise and a quick breakthrough. This attack from the northwest heralded an extraordinary month of maneuver warfare, coupled with strikes and counterstrikes in western Hungary, with Székesfehérvár and Bicske as the hubs and Budapest always the prize. Although strategically the war was clearly lost, January 1945 would be the last month of the war during which the Germans fought the Soviets with some possibility of securing any sort of tactical victory. With the loss of Budapest's main airport on December 27, the supply situation became critical. Eighty tons of provisions per day were needed to supply the garrison alone. The Germans threw everything they could into the support of Budapest. A racetrack in Pest was hurriedly converted into a makeshift airport where venerable Junkers Ju-52s flew in rations, ammunition, and gasoline and evacuated the seriously wounded, including the son of German Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel. When Soviet tanks overran the racetrack on January 9, the Germans converted the Vérmezö, an eight-hundred-yard-long park directly below Castle Hill, into a last-ditch landing zone. This narrow park, appropriately called the Blutwiese (bloody meadow), drew constant fire as light aircraft, frequently gliders piloted by daredevil teenage Hitler Youth members drawn from junior flying clubs across Germany, continued to recklessly land by night. Both sides recognized that the Battle of Budapest was developing into the bloodiest and most sustained siege since Stalingrad. Consequently, psychological warfare increased as the battle intensified. Through loudspeakers and airdropped leaflets, the Soviet chipped away at the morale of the garrison. While Gille told the beleaguered garrison, "Hang on, we're coming!" the Soviets broadcasted, "Gille kommt aber kille [sic] Gille" (Gille's coming but we're going to kill him). Another leaflet read, "Die Schwarzen Raben fliegen aus Stalingrad" (The black ravens are flying from Stalingrad). The Germans generally were unfazed by these psychological operations, whereas Hungarian units, especially those formed from recently mustered recruits, suffered heavily from desertion. Despite the protestations of General Ivan Hindy, the senior Hungarian commander, German sappers blew up the magnificent Chain and Elizabeth bridges into the Danube in the early dawn hours of the 18th. While the defense of Pest collapsed, the Germans were surreptitiously disengaging Gille's bloodied but still dangerous corps from the northern sector and stealthily redeploying it south by rail. Although weakened from the failure of their northern option they now planned a belated execution of the southern option. Once again, Soviet signal intercepts failed to track the SS corps. Four panzer divisions, including those comprising the veteran Third Panzer Corps, flattened the unprepared Soviet 135th Rifle Corps, rending a fifteen mile hole in the Soviet line. German armor rampaged through the enemy positions, gaining a dozen miles the first day. By January 20, in the last great German panzer raid of the war, lead elements of the Third Panzer Division pushed almost seventy miles into the Soviet rear, reaching the Danube near Dunapentele, where they shot up enemy river traffic. The storied First Panzer Division, with its infantry augmented by the Hungarian SS Regiment Ney, retook the key city of Székesfehérvár on the 23rd, unhinging the entire Soviet sector. This was the last serious Soviet military crisis of the war. Within five days the German attack had split Tolbukhin's front, pinning it against the Danube. Advancing German spearheads were just miles from the Soviets' main supply routes crossing the river and were just one bound from Budapest. Marshal Tolbukhin perceived the threat to be grave enough that he requested to withdraw his forces back across the Danube, which would have meant success for the German southern option and temporary relief of the garrison. For a moment Stalin almost relented, but then ordered the Soviet marshal to hold his ground. Soviet countermeasures were swift once the magnitude of the crisis revealed itself. Two rifle corps slated for the final reduction of Buda were hurriedly redirected south. The Fifth Guard Cavalry Corps rode sixty-five miles in twenty-four hours, arriving with the other redeployed corps in the nick of time to blunt the increasingly attenuated German advance. On the 24th, the Germans conducted a last-gasp attack that approached to within thirteen or fourteen miles of Buda's southern suburbs. The garrison managed to make radio contact with the fading German spearhead, greeting it with the words, "Warm wishes towards your success and our liberation, ten thousand of our wounded await you." Once again Pfeffer-Wildenbruch requested to break out, and once again Hitler ordered the wavering garrison to remain in place. Faced with fresh Soviet forces to their front and the erosion of their dangerously extended southern flank, the German relief force was forced to postpone the offensive on January 28, thereby sealing Budapest's fate. On February 6, the Soviets, attacking from three sides, finally took Eagle Hill after six weeks of continuous fighting. The defense of Budapest was fatally compromised with the Soviet seizure of this key tactical height. From Eagle Hill's summit, Soviet artillery spotters were able to call in accurate fire on the garrison's positions below them on Castle and Gellert Hills. The improvised landing strip on the Vérmezö became untenable. German counterbattery fire was negligible and was unable to answer the torrent of Soviet shellfire. The doomed garrison was relentlessly pressed against the Danube into an area of approximately one and a half miles by seven hundred yards. Critical shortages in artillery, ammunition, and gasoline limited the garrison's ability to respond to any crisis. Pfeffer-Wildenbruch, against Hitler's orders, directed a breakout to commence at dark on February 11. At eight o'clock that night, while President Franklin D. Roosevelt was dining with Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Stalin at Yalta, the garrison began its breakout attempt. Three German division commanders lay among the fallen. Hauptsturmführer (Captain) Joachim Boosfeld was in the initial Eighth SS attack. Hit in the leg by mortar shrapnel in mid-January, he credited his survival to his servant, Ricard, who had never left his side and had found him a special pair of Hungarian boots for his damaged leg. Boosfeld related: "All around us people were falling--bodies lay everywhere. Ricard was hit in the head. I pulled him in and treated his face as best I could, my hands shook so much I had difficulty binding the wound." They then joined the attack that overran the Soviet positions opposite Szell Kalman Square, rushed through a factory, and hobbled their way into the Buda hills. Boosfeld evaded the subsequent Soviet manhunt, reaching German lines on February 14; Ricard was captured. Within a day the Soviets managed to seal off most escape routes and set up an extensive manhunt. Trucks patrolled the edge of the Buda hills, offering safe conduct to those who surrendered. Many did, and hundreds of them, mostly Germans, were summarily executed and dumped later into mass graves. Arpad Goncz, the current president of Hungary and a Cold War-era dissident and poet, composed "The Mass Grave," capturing his memories of this frightful slaughter's aftermath: "They dug two graves: In one they threw the Hungarians, in the other the Germans and the dead horses. The Germans and Hungarians were usually barefooted: in those days they paid due reverence to soled footwear." One Hungarian lieutenant led a group of eleven Hungarian and four Waffen SS soldiers out of the cauldron along a railway up and over Schwabian Hill. This was the same general route used by the largest group of German survivors, several hundred Feldherrnhalle troopers led by Oberstleutnant (Lt. Col.) Helmut Wolff, who managed to reach German lines on the 14th. The lieutenant's group, however, was not as lucky. Concealed Soviet infantry ambushed and captured the small group. The four SS soldiers were immediately stripped naked and shot, while the Hungarians barely escaped with their lives by promising to help the Soviets with the roundup. By February 14, the siege and breakout was over. Of the approximately thirty thousand souls participating in the breakout only 785 German and Hungarian soldiers managed to evade the relentless Soviet pursuit and reach German lines. Pfeffer-Wildenbruch and his command group never made it; they were surrounded and captured in a Buda villa after emerging from a sewer main a kilometer behind Soviet lines. Malinovsky reportedly told the German commander, "If I didn't have a direct order from Stalin himself, I'd hang you in the main square of Buda castle for all the trouble you caused us." There is an epilogue to Budapest's fall. Hitler committed significant reserves to Hungary, including the battered Sixth SS Panzer Army fresh from the Ardennes counteroffensive. Consisting of four of the most battle-hardened Waffen SS Panzer units, including the dreaded Leibstandarte and Das Reich divisions, this formidable force was squandered in early March during an ill-conceived panzer "death ride" into waiting and well-prepared Soviet anti-tank defenses near Lake Balaton. Handily defeated by the now highly proficient Soviets, this reverse of Hitler's best divisions finally broke German resistance in Hungary. Within a month Vienna had fallen. The war in Europe ended three weeks later.
Thanks, Kai. As further clarification, the above article provides yet more detail on Operation Konrad... Kai does hit on another area we could look into- the actual siege and reduction of Budapest. This could be examined in more depth in addition to the german operations atempting to relieve the city.
Thanx CrazyD, Looking for info on that time period as the fighting is well connected together. As a matter of fact I guess the fighting in Budapest and the operations that followed weakened the front and allowed the Russians to reach Berlin faster. What if these troops were protecting Berlin? Of course the oil situation was catastrophic but trying to get Ploesti back and protecting the last oil fields was not going to work in 1945! http://www.hungary.com/hungq/no151/137.html Krisztián Ungváry: Budapest ostroma (The Siege of Budapest). Corvina, 1998 "During the 1960s, I had the chance to talk to or to exchange letters with a number of senior officers of the German 6th Army, including Generals Balck and Gaedcke. I was in a position to talk to Gille and Harteneck, the corps commanders in the 1945 January German offensives. I also contacted a number of senior Hungarian officers who had served in Transdanubia. Most importantly from the point of view of the present subject, in the early 1970s I met General Walther Wenck, in 1945 deputy to Colonel-General Guderian, Chief of Staff of the OKH. (He was a personal friend of both Generals Balck and Grollman, the latter chief of staff of Army Group South). From conversations with these German commanders I was able to establish that the ultimate objective of the three German offensives in January 1945 was not to rescue the Fortress Budapest garrison. Hitler wanted to hold Budapest at all costs, as a forward bastion. The objective of the German offensives was to establish a corridor between the German forces in Transdanubia and Budapest. In other words, had the German counter-offensive been successful, Budapest would have remained a battlefield for further weeks, perhaps even months. " The campaign medals—no fewer than 35,000—distributed to the Soviet soldiers taking part in the Budapest siege had inscriptions to the same effect. This would mean that during the whole period of the siege—in three and a half months of constant fighting—the Soviet Army had employed about 500,000 men in and around Budapest.
Nice find, Kai. On the idea of the troops being used instead to defend Berlin- dosne't this really hold true for all the german operations around this time?! I'd even say that the Ardennes offensive was a wasted effort. By this point in the war, I think you have got it exactly- the only real practical use for all these troops would have been to defend the dwindling Reich. But we know how Hitler felt about defensive strategies... Now this would be in relation to the oil fields Hitler hoped to re-acquire, correct? This author is suggesting that Hitler wanted to use Budapest as a forward garrison from which to re-take the oil fields Germany needed, correct? On this note, I've got a simple "clarification question"... (Kai, if you could find some kind of online map or something for this... I know you've got the online searching skills!) What oil fields are we referring to? Specifically, where were the Ploesti oil fields, how big were they, etc., and what other oil fields were in contention other than Ploesti (if any)? Figured a map of Spring Awakening would be good too... http://www.onwar.com/maps/wwii/eastfront2/1balaton-vienna45.htm
C : There were oil fields in the Ukraine. Ploesti is in Rumania and the US 15th Air Force bombed it into uselessness by late 44 early 45. E
Actually never did get too deep about the Ploesti oil fields-so let´s see what comes up. Anyway, there were some oil fields or at least some oil in the ground somewhere around lake Balaton ( I got the name of the place somewhere in my papers ) and Hitler tried to save those. As well his plan again went quite huge as he thought his "Spring awakening " would squash the Russians in the south and his troops would conquer Ploesti back..or something like that. As well he thought in early 1945 that the info on Russian massive attack was just a rumour and thus he was able to release troops from defending Warsaw to the South. As the Russians attacked and took Warsaw and moved some hundreds of kilometers Hitler again blamed the generals...not himself... Suddenly the Russians were right in front of Berlin... ---------- Though Operation Tidal Wave in April 1943 devastated Ploesti, the Germans kept rebuilding their vital refineries in the Balkans. It was the fatal late summer attack in 1944 that sent black clouds rolling into the heavens that would close the Ploesti oil fields for a decade. Without fuel, the huge Nazi juggernaut that had ruthlessly blitzed across Europe suddenly groaned to a stop. http://www.montrosepress.com/display/inn_courage/18.txt ---------- Ploesti was the center of the great Rumanian oil fields, which were capable of producing seven million tons of oil a year. ------ The German commander in charge of Ploesti, General Alfred Gerstenberg, had provisioned Ploesti with 2,000 smoke generators, placed in patterns to take advantage of the prevailing winds, to help conceal the refineries. Gerstenberg's anti-aircraft battery concentration became the heaviest in the world. The first large-scale (five B-24 groups) Army Air Force attack on Ploesti was on Aug. 1, 1943. An estimated 40 percent of refining capacity was put out of service, but Ploesti was soon back on line. Although 42% of Ploesti's refineries destroyed, there was enough capacity remaining to keep oil production at 400,000 tons per month until the refineries were again bombed in April 1944 In the spring and summer of 1944, the 15th Air Force opened a sustained campaign against oil targets, including Ploesti, Before the refineries around that city were shut down by bombing (and the city captured by the Soviets), nearly 60,000 airmen had flown against those pinpoint targets, dropped some 13,000 tons of bombs, lost 350 heavy bombers, and left more than 3,000 airmen killed or captured. Fifteenth Air Force raids were considerably larger than the first attack of August, 1943. For example, on June 23, 1944, in one of its major strikes, the Fifteenth sent 761 bombers to Romanian oil targets. http://www.50missions.com/Ploesti.html http://history.acusd.edu/gen/WW2Timeline/Europe06.html -------- http://www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/history/wwii/ce10.htm ---------- So it seems it was already bombed to pieces when the Russians got the Ploesti August 30, 1944.So getting it back in 1945 would not have changed anything-except in Hitler´s mind...??
Well said. Even further- if the germans HAD been able to re-take the Ploesti oil fields- what then? ALL of the german war machine would have been required just to HOLD the oil fields. So by this point in the war, even if the oil fields were still usable, they would have done the germans very little good. More from Ripley... and now it's actually on Spring Awakening, not the preceeding ops! Spring Awakening begins officially at 04:30 hours on 6 March 1945. 6 March I SS Panzer Corps Panzergrenadiers of LAH ordered to move forward and clear lanes through minefields for the panzers to use. This mine-clearing takes all morning, holding up the rest of the tanks and infantry. The armor and infantry was finally able to get moving around midday- and after only a couple miles, the LAH armor and infantry ran into the first Russian pakfront. As the kampfgruppe's vehicles tried to move off of the road to engage the enemy AT guns, vehicles begin to sink in "axle-deep mud." "The panzergrenadiers had to press home their attacks without armored support. Not suprisingly, the rate of the advance was unimpressive. On the left of the LAH, the HitlerJugend division had an equally hard time getting moving. LIke the LAH, the tanks of the HJ also had major trouble with the soft ground. HJ was only able to advance 1.6km (1 mile!) on the first day. II SS Panzer Corps- "II SS Panzer Corp's attack did not even reach it's assembly area until well after dark." So they got noweher on 6 march. Russian- Because of the slow german advance, the russians were able to deploy an extra infantry Corps, with limited tank support, in path of I SS Pz. Corps. Interestingly, the russians did NOT move up their armored reserves to meet the german attack. Apparently the russians were confident at this point that they could halt the attack with the forces already deployed. 7 March- the German attack begins to gain some momentum. I SS Panzer Corps- LAH and HJ able to use armor to exploit the breaches made the day before by the grenadiers. II SS Panzer Corps- "attack did not get very far before it ground to a halt in waterlogged ground. One tank even sank up to its turret ring in the mud!". Reason the german attack enjoyed more success on March 7- the Russians late in the day and night of March 7 began withdrawing their forces back to a new defensive line on the Sio canal. (I'll update more tonight- need to clarify what (if anything) IV SS Pz. Corps accomplished in the first 2 days. Also include more info on the attack as it progressed. Also found some more info on armor strengths.)
Continuing from Ripley... 8 March The Offensive looked a bit better for the Germans on the 8th. Hitlerjugend managed to advance 16km (10 miles) during the day. Another line of Russian defences were overrun at the end of the day in a night attack. Ripley notes "a dozen Jagdpanthers and Jagdpanzer IVs" participated in the attack. The German forces then ran ito the Russian XXX Corps and XVIII Tank Corps, who "battled furiously to hold them [the Germans] back from the Danube. "The next day the Hohenstaufen and Wiking Divisions joined the attack, driving a wedge 24km (15 miles) into the Soviet line." (This is somewhat odd- I get the idea that Wiking was more of a reserve force in this operation. Wiking had been one fo the primary divisions fighting in Operation Konrad a couple months earlier, and was still recuperating. Hence, Wiking was holding the line, as opposed to attacking. Not sure how accurate Ripley is here... have to check other sources. Wiking was part of IV SS Panzer Corps...) I SS Panzer Coprs pursued the Russian forces to the Sio Canal. I SS Pz Crps spent the next two days fighting to cross the Sio. Some of the heavy armor had to be used during these atacks... "Heavy rain and sleet made this miserable work, and scores of vehicles got stuck in the mud as they tried to manoeuvre through the fields along the canal bank ." Ripley notes that Russian air forces were able to pick off quite a few of the immobilized vehicles. II SS Panzer Corps attack also continued, also moving slowly and running into very stiff Russian resistance. (Odd... Ripley only makes passing mention of II SS Pz. Crps progress at this time. Far less detail than his accounts of I SS Pz. Corps. Odd.) Fighting along the Sio canal reached a climax on 12 March, when the Germans launched a major effort to cross the Sio. Hitlerjugend forces were apparently slaughtered during their attempt. Not enough support fire and bad sarting points left the panzergrenadiers open to massive amounts fo Soviet fire. Although a few soldiers did make it to the other side of the river, they were not able to establish a bridgehead. Leibstandarte had more luck in their sector (more armor fire support) and were able to establish a bridgehead. During the night, German engineers built a precarious bridge over the canal. One Jagdpanzer IV was able to cross, but a second tank broke the bridge (and was liekly lost). Constant repairs were needed ot keep the bridge up. I SS Panzer Coprs was able to hold on to the bridgehead for three days, but the russians simply kept feeding in more and more forces, piinning the Germans down. With this route south being blocked by the russians, Dietrich decided to switch the main effort of his attack to II SS Panzer Corps (Bittrich). But the next day, the Russians launched their own attack... and basically ended Spring Awakening. Wiking was nearly surrounded, and Hohenstaufen was forced to come to their rescue. Wiking had been orders by Hitler to hold fast- an impossible and hopeless order. Thus, as Wiking was pulling back with Hohenstaufen's help, both were defying orders from Hitler (Hohenstaufen had not been ordered to halt the attack yet). "Bittrich and Gille now joined forces ot hold open an escape route for I SS Panzer Corps, which was pulling back north as fast as it could to avoid encirclement. It managed to get out of the trap, but had to leave most of its damaged and bogged-in vehicles behind. By 20 March 1945, I SS Panzer Corps could only muster 80 tanks, assault guns, and self-propelled guns fit for service." . . "All the Waffen SS divisions had suffered massively during Spring Awakening, and most were below 50 percent strength and there was little prospect of any reinforcements to replace losses." The retreat of the Waffen SS divisions from Spring Awakening also prompted the famous "CUff Order", in which Hitler ordered the Waffen SS men to remove their cuffbands in dishonor. In disgust with Hitler, many did, and began to address how they would surrender to the Americans. That's about all Ripley has on Spring Awakening. not sure about his accuracy... and although Ripley does address S.A. more than many authors, it still does get something of a cursory treatment. However... aiding in my interest in these last onths of the war, I picked up Michale Reynolds two volumes on the I and II SS Panzer Corps (Men of Steel and Sons of the Reich respectively). These should provide more depth on these late war operations, and I understand that Reynolds is well recognised and relatively accurate. more to come... [ 13. May 2003, 12:03 AM: Message edited by: CrazyD ]
Beginning to plow through Reynolds' info on Spring Awakening and late war stuff... but came across a side point Reynolds raises that is rather interesting... Connection between operation Spring Awakening and the western Allies' willingness to let the Russians take Berlin. Reynolds cites a SHAEF Intel summary dated 11 March 45 that talks about the "National Redoubt" idea that was held by Eisenhower and some of the other allied commanders. They believed that the Germans were planning to escape to the Alpine Zone in Austria- the Bavarian (?) Alps. This area represented nearly impenetrable terrain which the allies believed the Germans would attempt to use to make a last stand, holdig out as long as they could. And- this idea was greatly strengthened in early March 1945 by the deployment of 6 out of the 7 Waffen-SS Panzer Divisions to Austria and the southern areas of German-controlled territory - deployment which was in reality for operation Spring Awakening. "Although the idea of a National Redoubt turned out in the end to be mythical, it was realistic enough at the time to lead Eisenhower to conclude that the southern part of the European theatre was of greater significance than Berlin;" (Reynolds, Men of Steel, 177) An interesting idea... although I was under the impression that plans had been made in advance of this to let the Russians take Berlin? I think I rememeber, among others, Ryan in The Last Battle talking about the Eclipse (?) plan- plans for the division of Germany completed in late 44, which already included the Russians taking Berlin. [15 minutes later...] Briefly re-reading Ryan, it does seem as if (partly due to US diplomatic blunders) the division of Germany was already decided on, with the Russians taking Berlin. So it would seem that Reynolds missed this? Interesting food for thought nonetheless...
