The Japanese take Madagascar

Ummm, mjölnir,

Ceylon supplied the US with only 6% of it's rubber needs in 1941...Malaya & the DEI supplied 90%. Now given the definite loss of 90% of her rubber supply, what makes you think that the loss of Ceylon's 6% will prove crippling?

Not to mention the fact that the US had a strategic reserve of rubber to last her a year and a half. Further, the opening of the Pacific War brought the need to acquire rubber from other sources into sharp focus, and prompted the US to embark on rapid drive to construct synthetic rubber plants. So rapid was this growth, that by 1943, the new US synthetic rubber industry was producing three times what the US had imported from Ceylon rubber plantations.

Thus, your idle speculation about the necessity of Ceylon's rubber production is simply a non-starter.

 

Never a truer word was posted on these forums.

They could recycle rubber and did; further, they both developed and produced new ways of manufacturing synthetic rubber.

 

Since you're so sure and knowledgeable, please tell me the name of the precess for reversing vulcanization in 1942, the amount recycled.

 

I'll do that right after you post answers to every other question ever posed to you on the plethora of threads you have started.

Or, and here is a radical idea; use your own google-fu.

And here is a little tip; the recycling of a product does not necessarily mean that you need (in the case of rubber products) to reverse the vulcanization process... All you need to do, is stretch out the current stocks of natural rubber, until the chemists and industry have built sufficient plants manufacturing artificial rubber, which they did. It's not like American industry was wanting for money or ideas.

Face it, in spite of Japanese holding 90% of the natural rubber, the allies were still not wanting for rubber in their military vehicles. Which side was it, that built the vast majority of vehicles of all types in WW2 again? As the Germans showed, you can make do with very little. But the Allies didn't really even need to "make do" beyond a few simple measures in civilian life.

 

And what if the British destroyed those tanks before loosing them as doctrine would suggest? Kind of leaves the invasion high and dry doesn't it?

 

Like they didn't in Benghazi, Tobruk, Malaya, Hong Kong, Singapore, etc,? British forces often were captured or they surrendered, withdrew or evacuated so fast that they could not destroy much of the equipment and stores. Rommel and Yamashita could not have fought so well without British supplies. Were it not for a US intelligence operative in Burma, who distributed and destroyed much of the abundant materiel in warehouses and on the docks in Rangoon (destined for China), the Japanese would have captured even more than they did.

Anyway, I already mentioned that by this time British Borneo was about to start producing and that transporting fuel in the E IO is much easier than in the Pacific, with US and Dutch subs in Perth and PH. There was even a little oil in Burma, which had little use other than in Ceylon, with so much oil in the DEI.

It is much easier for attacking Japanese forces to supply an invasion with complete naval and air superiority than it is for the meager forces in Ceylon to oppose it, after losing planes and ships in the first hours of the invasion and without any expectation of reinforcements and supplies. Compare the ridiculously weak force defending large Ceylon (65,000 km2), with the stronger forces defending unsuccessfully wee Tobruk or Singapore or small Crete (8,300 km2).

 

So you would be willing to risk the entire invasion force based on the questionable assumption that the British wouldn't destroy their fuel reserves before they fell into Japanese hands? If they even try to seriously defend the stockpiles there's a chance that they will be destroyed. Even if they do fall into Japanese hands they are at risk of being hit by RAF bombers and any ship trying to refuel is also at risk. In the mean time a major portion of the IJN is a long way away from not only the Home Islands but the islands facing the Americans.

 

The Australian batallion and the African division are not very likely to be even close to the fuel or naval bases and will be very busy hiding from the naval shells and bombs.
This is how prepared the British really were:
OTL on the day of the raid (which ATL is an invasion), Radar was not operating because it was a sunday. Although civilians called by phone to report Japanese planes on their way to the bases, no action was taken. In any case, the few Hurricanes wer not much of a challenge. The Japanese bombed what little there was, wasting a very strong fleet and then hunted down an old carrier without planes and sank it and a cruiser and then raided the E IO for days.

ATL an invasion force lands in 4 beacheads with heavy naval gun and air support (no bombs wasted on valuable installations and fuel tanks farms). The Ceylanese (who hate the British) assist the Japanese. When the shell and bomb shocked African division loses its few British officers, it promptly surrenders (in Malaya an Indian batallion even killed its unpopular officers in order to withdraw). The Japanese capture a dock and an airfield on the first day and begin unloading tanks and troops and landing G3M from Thailand, which drop paratroopers or bombs before landing. The brave Australian batallion fights to the end, but it is not match for 6" and 8" shells, bombs, strafing and a much larger IJA force with 100 tanks, so it is wiped out within 3 days.
Somehow, you missed the fact that the British Empire was a paper tiger with incongruent, poorly traned troops for jungle warfare and outdated naval planes and that even a large infantry force cannot hold an island against planes and warships, much less an Australian batallion and an African division.
The British army lost every single land and sea battle against the Japanese in 1941 and early 42 (HK, British Borneo, Malaya, Singapore, Burma, etc,). Rather remarkable, given the fact that the RN had centuries of experience and a huge budget and L-L and the IJN had only decades of experience and a small budget.

The only area where the British did sabotage oil wells and a refinery was in British Borneo and only because the Japanese made the blunder of not attacking and capturing it on the first day (it was defended by a few hundred policemen), so the British had a full week unmolested to sabotage 150 wells and the refinery. They did such a poor job that within months the Japanese (no brilliant or well equipped oil experts) were producing oil in B. Borneo (long before they produced in sabotaged areas in the DEI).

Again, even if the British manage to destroy all the fuel in Ceylon, fuel is not a problem with oil in B. Borneo and Burma. Planes, subs, etc, operating between Ceylon and Burma and W of Ceylon to disrupt allied shipping use less fuel than escorted carriers roaming the area as OTL. It is much more difficult to transport oil to Japan than to Ceylon.

In contrast, Chiang receives no oil, weapons, medications, etc, by plane from India, with Ceylon in Japanese hands. India is cut off and it has to become a Japanese ally (like Thailand) if it wants oil, rice, etc, and to avoid an invasion.

 

I suspect your assumptions are incorrect. Care to show us just what how the British forces were deployed on Ceylon?

 

I certainly don't, I know that even Houdini or Heinrici cannot defend a 65,600 km2 island with an Australian Batallion and an African division and without planes, armor and warships. If you concentrate the troops around the fuel tanks and bases instead of defending civilian ports, airports, blocking roads, RR, etc, the invasion is a walk in the park. If you spread them out, the invasion is also a walk in the park.

A huge, well equipped army in wee Singapore (with some huge guns and a lot of smaller guns) could not even defend the water supplies. Imagine how a poorly equipped African division will stop the invasion of a huge island under continuous bombing, shelling and attack by land forces. I stated repeatedly that if the Japanese capture intact facilities and fuel farms great, but even if the Africans blow everything up while they fight for their lives, Japan will acquire invaluable bases and resources and displace the allies from the E IO.

 

The 6 brigades on the island don't have to defend 65,600 km2...All they have to defend are the few airbases on the island. If the Japanese cannot capture those, their invasion is doomed. Kido Butai cannot hang around Ceylon forever.

And given the Doolittle Raid and Coral Sea, Kido Butai's stay around Ceylon is going to be very brief indeed.

 

Do you really think that the carriers and seaplane tenders give a damn about an airfield? Moreover, the Japanese need only capture the racetrack in Colombo or the airport or any paved road or any long beach to start landing empty G3M and G4M (they dropped their bombs and paratroopers). H6K can deliver troops, armament and supplies in the massive reservoir and along the coast.
Do you know how long it took the Japanese to capture airfields (with fuel, etc, even an intact armored car in an airfiedl in Malaya, with a map of all British troop concentrations) in Thailand, Malaya, Point Victoria-Burma, Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Luzon, HK, etc, against better and better equipped troops than Africans?

How do you expect a few African and Australian troops to defend airfields, fuel tanks, etc,against planes, naval shells, tanks and troops trained to outflank the enemy even through dense jungle or with repeated landings (as in W Malaya)?

For comparison's sake:
Luzon is 105,000 km2 and Ceylon is 65.600 km2, yet a much larger and better equipped Filipino-American force (including a very powerful air force and field artillery and even some armor) was rapildy cornered in Bataan, etc, the strong air force destroyed within a couple of days and most of the island (including the new Manila airport and all the airfields) rapidly fell in Japanese hands. Ceylon is much easier to invade and much more difficult to defend for a few battalions, mostly poorly equipped and African troops with a few dozen Hurricanes.

The invasion is starting on Easter sunday (April 5) and Doolittle struck on April 18, by which time airfields and docks are definitely operating and the defenders have been decimated and isolated in small areas. The British have a few Hurricane, Fulmar, Blenheims, Catalina, Sunderland, etc, which are promptly wiped out with the first 2 waves of carrier planes. The invasion will cause the RN in the Maldives to either counter attack in Ceylon with nealry total loss or to withdraw to S Africa.

Ironically, the loss of Ceylon will induce Churchill to invade Madagascar even earlier in order to secure the supply lanes, but with Japanese subs and planes operating from Mauritius )which is invaded when Ceylon is secured on April 14), an RN carrier, a cruiser, a monitor and a destroyer are sunk at the beginning of the invasion of Madagascar, forcing Churchill to call off the invasion.

 

One doesn't have to defend the entire island though does one? So you assume the troops are where you want them to be based on what? It fit's your preconceptions?

 

As in Crete, Malaya, Luzon, Sicily, Sumatra, Java, Guadalcanal, Leyte, Luzon again, Saipan, IWO, Okinawa, etc, one definitely has to defend the whole territory. Once the enemy captures landing strips and/or a port the gig is up for the small, completely isolated defense force in Ceylon.

 

Or not. It very much depends on the invading force and how it is supported. What size force are you imagining the Japanese would commit to this? What beaches were suitable for landings?

 

Just look at Malaya. The Japanese did not need pretty beaches, hundreds of LC, etc, to land and kick butt, they did so, outflanking repeatedly the enemy along the W Malayan coast and w/o warships in the Indian Ocean (using a ridiculous fleet)! and those landing areas were between large enemy forces in the narrow Malayan peninsula, whereas British forces in Ceylon are thinly spread along the long coast. The Japanese did not have any problem whatsover landing in over 30 islands (many of them much better defended than Ceylon) in a couple of months either [Penang, Luzon, Sumatra, Java, New Britain, New Ireland, Guam (much more difficult and much smaller coast than Ceylon), Hong Kong, Borneo, etc,]

3 experienced and well equipped divisions are used (and 2 kept in reserve). The best divisions from Burma, Thailand, Malaya, DEI and PI are chosen to attack on Easter sunday. Yamashita, all airborne units, 4 fleet carriers and Ryujo, 2 plane tenders, 3 battleships, 9 cruisers, 24 destroyers, 20 subs, 20 minesweepers, 500 G3M- G4M, 40 H6K, 80 crated Ki-43, 80 Ki-21, 100 tanks and 800 field guns also take part.

BTW, the 4 fleet carrier TF wasted OTL raiding weak Darwin is split into 2 TF ATL and used to invade New Caledonia and Port Moresby in Feb 1942, which are very weak at the time and prove invaluable for Japan (nickel and invaluable bases) and preclude the battle fo the Coral Sea. The capture of New Caledonia and Port Moresby isolate Rabaul, the N and NW Australian coast (Darwin, Brisbane, Cairns, etc,) and the N Island of NZ, secure New Guinea and the Solomons and extend the defense perimeter cosiderably.

 

I beg to differ. The Japanese did need pretty beaches...uncluttered by bunkers, gun pits, enemy troops, etc. Because when they Japanese did not have pretty beaches to land at, and had to make an amphibious assault, rather than an amphibious landing...They got slaughtered.

Most of these that you list are actually not near as well defended as Ceylon, and a few were hardly defended at all.

Guam??? Now that is funny...Oh, I am sorry...In this "What If" Guam must have been a very heavily defended American outpost. Unfortunately for you, in the OTL it wasn't.

There is no "kill" like "overkill."

I love how your go on and on about how poorly defended Ceylon is, and then proceed to assemble a massive combined arms operation to obliterate it. That is not being very efficient is it?

500 G3M/G4M...That's what...25% of Japan's entire wartime production of these aircraft. Do you have any idea how many G4M1 Model 11s were produced prior to March, 1942...Less than 250...And your going to be using all of them.

Where are these invasion forces coming from? Looks like you will be forgoing the invasion of Java, Timor, New Guinea, etc.

Brisbane is hardly isolated, and the same goes for Darwin(since you neglected to capture Timor and Java).

I believe that you fail to grasp the fact that the Japanese defensive perimeter was already grossly over extended without capturing Port Moresby and New Caledonia. Which is why several unopposed American carrier task groups were raiding Japanese island outposts at this time.

 

I also don't see the IJA giving up its best divisions for this effort. Would they have had the landing craft to support an effort like this? Would they have had the oil? What happens when the fleet has to leave?

 

Again, this operation is happening when Malaya, Burma, the DEI, HK, and PI are secured (dozens of divs have little to do), so there are plenty of divs, LC, ships, tanks, planes, etc, and the Japanese did not need fancy beaches or LC for repeated landing in W Malaya. As for oil, there is still plenty and much less is required to invade Ceylon from Sumatra, Malaya, Thailand and Burma than to send large forces to useless Rabaul, Wewak, Guadalcanal, Alaska, Milne Bay, Port Moresby, Midway, etc, especially since a raid in Ceylon and subsequent ship hunting in the Bay of Bengal would require a lot of fuel anyway (might as well invest it into an invasion), Moreover, B. Borneo started producing oil a few months after it was captured, before the DEI. There are also large numbers of tankers heading from Abadan to Britain, Egypt, S Africa, etc, and large oil reserves in Ceylon, some of which can be captured or at least denied to the allies.

In Malaya Singapore (which was happening simultaneously with many other operations, like the PI, HK, B. Borneo, DEI, Guam, etc,) Yamashita was offered a large force to start the campaign, yet he settled for 2 divs to start the campaign (he turned down divs, that is how many there were).
In tiny HK, which had much less stratetic and economic importance than Ceylon, the IJA deployed a larger force than the one suggested for Ceylon.
In China the IJA engaged huge forces for years to acquire a huge territory of little value and had to deal with hundreds of millions of people.
In Luzon, which had very little economic value, the IJA deployed an enormous force for several months.
In contrast, a few divs for days to secure the main producer of rubber and cinnamon, invaluable bases, control of the E IO, etc, in Ceylon is an infinitely better investment.

The IJA had run a profitable opium operation in Machuria for years. Capturing Ceylon would also secure the opium of India and Afghanistan for Japan, another asset won by Japan and lost to the allies.

 

The IJA never had "dozens of divs" with "little to do". Note as mentioned the Japanese doctrine involved landing at unopposed beaches. A reasonable beach or even better a port is pretty much required to land any significant amount of material. The Midway op which was a smaller force than you are proposing burned a huge amount of oil (something like 1/4-1/2 the pre war reserve).