A few things... If the H6K does detect a convoy at it's extreme range of 1,500 miles, the most it can do is send a contact report and head for home - because it is low on gas and must head home now, or else, it will not make it home since it has run out of gas. The H6K will be unable to shadow the convoy, and continue to send those valuable contact reports, simply because it lacks the fuel to do so and return home. Now, if the I-Boat is dockside, it is going to take a good 5 days of cruising at an economical speed to reach the contact point. 5 Days...That is a really long time in war. Not to mention, where will the convoy be in 5 days time...Since contact with the convoy will almost certainly be lost since the convoy cannot be kept continuously under surveillance. Now, let's consider the "short range" E14Y1 (Glen). Despite it's disadvantages of range and flight duration, it possesses many advantages that the H6K does not have: First, it's information is immediately actionable by the I-Boat - any contacts can be immediately pursued, as opposed to what might be a 2,000-3,000 mile wild goose chase given the information of the H6K. Second, by being "based" on the I-Boat, the E14Y1 Glen can have a much longer range than the H6K or H8K - For instance, the only Japanese aircraft to bomb the continental United States was the E14Y1 Glen...Despite their "longer range" and "longer flight duration" neither the H6K, nor the H8K achieved such a feat(although the Japanese were planning continental raids using the H8K). Third, by using the E14Y1 as submarine reconnaissance, it will require far less coordination, and thus less chances of things going wrong, than by using the H6K. Sure they can Gomer... The midget submarine raid on Sydney Harbor proves that they can. An E14Y1 Glen provided the necessary information, by radio transmission, to the four midget-carrying Japanese submarines. Proof positive that the E14Y1 is capable of directing and/or redirecting Japanese submarine to the attack. Fine...lays down a plugged nickle...I call. What do you have? And what are your sources? Ok Gomer, keep doing that if it make you happy...Or, would you prefer I referred to you by the title "Heir to the Throne of the Kingdom of Idiots" Bonus points to anyone who gets the reference. I will, however, make you this counteroffer...Stop acting like you just fell off the turnip truck, do some serious research - I don't mean watching the Hysterical Channel & the Mythical Channel, or perusing through Wonkypedia - for your information, and bring to this thread some intelligent discussion...and I will stop calling you "Gomer". Failure to meet any of these three conditions will result in my continuation of calling you "Gomer." Now Gomer, do you agree to these terms...Please indicate with a "yes" or "no" response. Those in the Pacific did...or was it a pond? Same ball parks with regards to shipping traffic and city lights. Both had plenty of coastal traffic and both shown their city lights brightly. The Japanese I-Boats are designed for long-range patrols, just like the American Fleet submarines, and did not have problems with resupply, nor did they have less combat time. Both Japan and the US had warships called submarine tenders, and both Japan and the US made use of advance submarine bases for refueling and resupply - Germany was mostly lacking in these areas. Look...Gomer...Do some research. You continually open your mouth, and insert foot, followed by the shoe store...Brick by brick...And to top it all off, the shopping center in which the shoe store is located. Battleships are useless against submarines, exception is noted for the HMS Dreadnought. Further, the American convoys were traveling through waters where surface warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy could intercept them - the protection offered these convoys was geared towards surface combat(hence the battleships). But not on the East Coast...Given that US coastal convoys did not begin until roughly May, 1942, how and why would battleships, etc. be assigned to non-existent convoys? Further on the East Coast...Odd then that the Eastern Sea Frontier's War Diary lists 23 destroyers spending what amounted to 140 days on patrol for the month of April, 1942...Don't you think? Hmmm...Let's see...In the Doolittle Raid 8 destroyers were provided for escorts...In the Eastern Sea Frontier, there were 23 destroyers spending some 140 days on patrol...And Gomer thinks the "priority" is with the carriers Enterprise & Hornet which had only 8 destroyers. You really shoud read the Eastern Sea Frontier's war diary for 1942. You see...The Eastern Sea Frontier had not been assigned any destroyers permanently, but destroyers would be assigned on a temporary basis. I never said that the Americans didn't use wolfpack tactics...Only that the Americans never really took to the idea of wolfpacks. The Americans never relied heavily on wolfpacks the way the Germans did, nor were the American wolfpacks as successful as the Germans were. American aircraft laying mines to force Japanese shipping into American submarine hunting grounds did not begin in earnest until March 27th, 1945, with the initiation of Operation Starvation. The vast majority of mining missions flown earlier in the war was against rivers in China and Indo-China - the object being to sink and stop Japanese riverine traffic from using said rivers to bring supplies to Japanese troops stationed further upriver...Not do drive Japanese riverine shipping traffic out into the seas. Why won't you continue to respond to my posts? Lack of facts...Lack of sources...Lack of knowledge on the Pacific War...Lack of knowledge on Japanese aircraft...Lack of knowledge on Japanese submarines...Lack of knowledge on American submarines...Lack of knowledge on American mining operations????? You can continue doing what ever you want to do...For if I continue to see idiocy on your part, I shall continue to call it idiocy on your part.