The War Journal of Baron Tekisasu Belasar, Prime Minister of Imperial Japan

Skipper, the plans we are making will all happen over a period of time and implementation based upon the strategic situation. The China operations that we initially forecast are in areas we currently control, just clearing and securing them. We have plans for a TOE change that will increase the firepower of the basic squad, which will make them more capable. We are not intending to initially invade the Philippines, Guam, Wake and other locations, this frees up a large number of troops for employment elsewhere. Burma we're just moving forward by a month, the historical invasion started in January 1942. If our plans go well we should be able to free up additional forces in China for employment elsewhere by mid-1942. If we are successful in keeping America out of the war, forces dispatched to New Guinea and the Solomons can be utilized elsewhere, plus the Philippine occupation forces. We are going to attempt a seperate peace with the Philippines. But, as Belasar says, much depends upon how the situation develops, we just should have a long range strategic operational plan so we forego a situation as occurred at Midway. The Japanese had out conquered their pre-war plans and were looking for new options.

 

....The IJA 14th Army was originally intended to be used to invade and occupy the Philippine Islands, but with the change in our plans concerning America, it is now available for other duties. This force, two Infantry Divisions, an Independent Mixed Brigade, two Tank Regiments, 5 Artillery Battalions and other assorted support formations is a formidable collection of troops.

I would like to see one Division, the Brigade, one Tank Regiment and 2 or 3 of the Artillery Bttn's given to Gen. Terauchi to speed his offensive. The balance to be held as a strategic reserve.

Early on I told the military that I had no intention on giving them specific deployment orders for their respective commands as I accept I am no expert in their chosen fields, but restrain myself to higher strategy and the political direction of this conflict. The challenge for me is to get across my desires without being to direct or obvious about it.

Terauchi needs more troops to strike deeply into Burma, but we must have a reserve if things begin to unravel.....

 

....Admiral Takao's warning is still in my head. We are taking a big risk not attacking US interest's and forces at the outset and redeploying assets intended for the Philippine's is on the face of things, counter to his advice to keep enough forces ready for an early American entry.

There has been a change in out intent re-guarding the Philippines. If a break from America comes we no longer intend to fully invade and occupy the Island chain, but rather to secure a small number of smaller islands that will allow us to control the area. This will greatly reduce what we need to use and if we keep our Strategic reserve it should be enough, I hope.

What American-Phillipino forces are there are too limited to be a threat in the short term. We should be able to neutralize their airpower quickly and control of the air will make large scale supply of this position impossible unless escorted by major units of the USN's Pacific Fleet. Which is what we want.

We need an opportunity to strike and destroy the US Battlefleet early, before they overwhelm us with their production. The Philippines become in effect, a massive bait for a trap. The key is if they act with their heart to aid their colony, or with their head....

 

....Bobimoto has brought up our Pilot training program and the alterations he feels we must undertake to support a probable long conflict. It takes about a year of various stages of training to produce a combat ready pilot, with those capable of working off a Carrier's deck the longest to produce.

At present both services induct a little less than 350 new pilots each month for training. While this seems a lot, between washouts and attrition, we still are not producing much of a surplus each month. Worse if his intelligence on America's admitted pilot program is accurate, they are creating 5 times the number of pilots each month!

Bobimoto is proposing we increase our induction of new pilots to 1,400 per month, 1,100 from the Home Islands and another 300 from Korea and China.

I questioned him closely on this as to feasibility, could we make such a leap all at once, or would it not be wiser to gradually increase our intake say 150 per month until we reached the 1,400 pilot goal. I was deeply concerned that we lacked training aircraft, instructor pilots and facilities necessary to support such an effort.

He stated that our facilities are easily able to accept the increase in trainee's. We would need to pull some pilots out of active squadrons to add to our pool of instructors. I am not completely happy about this, especially on the eve of war, but I recognize we must invest in our future. As for training aircraft, he admits we must expand production, but that these craft are of simple design and construction and so, quickly produced. Any shortfall can be supplied by obsolete craft withdrawn from frontline service.

Then again I though we were going to give these to our newly raised Chinese/Korean allied pilot's? Is the Colonel being too clever by half?......

 

....With the issue of pilot training on the table I ask just how we will give them enough training time on actual carrier decks since all our existing Carriers will now be on a war footing. I am told that the newly commissioned Taiyo, and her as yet unfinished sisters, Unyo and Chuyo will fill this role. Each ship would carry about 27 aircraft.

I am also promised the diminutive Hosho with the ability to carry 15 aircraft. Unfortunately she will have to survive as an actual warship for the near term as the Navy feels they cannot do without her for the initial SRA operations.

I try to lay claim on Junyo and Hiyo scheduled to join the fleet next summer for training duties, but Karonada wishes them to stay with the main fleet as second line Fleet Carriers. A mixed bag here, they have a good sized airwing (50 aircraft each), but are slow and have a poor aircraft turn around time to compete with a true enemy Fleet Carrier.

I can see his point somewhat as our Quick Reaction Landing Force (QRLF) will need to provide air cover and support to its counter landing troops and the Kido Butai could be otherwise engaged dealing with an enemy battlefleet. My concern is that these two ships will not be enough and the good Admiral will dip into our 4 "training" carriers to make the up the shortfall.

It seems to me that more ships are needed for Training Command and I say so. I am told that there are at least 3 other Liners, Sharnhorst, Argentina Maru and Brazil Maru available for conversion. Each could carry about 25 aircraft once converted, but I can get only vague promises as to when this will occur.

I try to suggest that perhaps we should select a type of production Tanker to afford us a standard design CVE that we can easily and cheaply produce. I believe we will need more training carriers, Convoy escort carriers and more ships to provide QRLF air support. Everyone agrees this seems prudent, but there is no great enthusiasm to begin this now....

 

....One good thing to come from my concern to have air cover for our Merchant Convoy's is a novel, yet quite practical solution. A proposal for a Merchant Aircraft Carrier, or MAC is offered for consideration. In effect one of our larger merchant ships, probably a Tanker, would have a simple flat deck raised above the main deck. Spotted on deck would be 4 to 6 older aircraft, likely Bi-planes, that could be launched and recovered.

These aircraft would provide aerial coverage for the convoy of which these ships would be a part. There would be no hanger or elevator, and would be little but basic service done on these aircraft. The "AirGroup" would be swapped out at each end of the convoy's route.

Aircraft that are lost due inability to land would be of an older, obsolete type, and therefore expendable to some degree. The convoy's escorts would be able to recover ditched pilots in many if not most cases. In any event this billet for Naval Aviators would provide a valuable training stage before they transitioned to actual Fleet Carriers.

Building of a simple deck structure should be both inexpensive and quickly effected. Best of all, these merchant ships would still be able to transport cargo, though it might be somewhat reduced and take a little longer to unload. All in all, an acceptable trade off....

 

....Two other concepts for Aerial coverage are presented, but these seem more marginal at best.

The first proposal was to provide a lighter than air craft such as as a Blimp or Airship. This is a good idea in principle, but I fear unworkable due to our limited experience in such craft. Can we make up the technology quickly enough to field these in the numbers we need? Do we have the materials needed like lifting gasses?

The other concept is to use something like a Barrage Balloon with an observer tethered to a merchant ship. This would be more as a deterrent to scare off submarines or to direct Escorts to a sighting. I must admit to two questions, how will this platform act being pulled along at 9 to 15 knots? Will this make a convoy easier to spot by Submarines?

We will look into both further, but I am not holding too much faith in either....

 

....I am pushing for a early start to our creation of convoy routes. Its seems prudent to me to gain the expierence now (at the time we move south) before the enemy has a chance to put forward an effective submarine offensive. It seems espscially wise to do so before America enters the war.

Unfortunately there is resistance from some members of the council as they feel that doing so would actually reduce the amount shipped, over that we can if we have if no restriction on shipping times and routes are in effect. They feel that in the near term there is minimal threat posed by Dutch and English submarines. They may be correct, but I hate to lose ships or crews we don't need to.....

 

.....My second suggestion to the Council on our merchant fleet is even less well received.

I had asked Col. Bobimoto's aid Lt. Wiki to provide me with a quick briefing paper on the state of our merchant fleet. Admiral Noka is working on a detailed version at the moment, and no doubt it will be full of exacting detail, but I wanted an early overview.

On the face of it we have a fairly large fleet, and it will likely expand from those ships we seize early in the conflict and of course our own new production. Noka estimates that we will have the capacity to build perhaps a million tonnes of new shipping per year, although some of this will be in auxiliary type ships.

The troubling aspect is that our merchant fleet is a varied lot. Some excellent ships, good speed and carry capacity. Many, if not most, reasonable speed and capacity, but it is the last group that gives me pause. These are ships that either have a limited capacity, slow speed (under 10 knots cruising), tend to be unreliable mechanically or have poorly trained crews.

Some of these suffer from more than one of these flaws.

My proposal was to systematically cull out these least desirable vessels, those unable to reach speeds of 10 knots or better and those which seem to require undue levels of repair to keep operational. Then scrap these ships and reuse the steel to construct new ships of our agreed upon designs that are both faster and able to carry more cargo per trip, thus saving fuel.

I had envisioned perhaps taking 2 to 4 ships per month out of service to be recycled into new shipping. This would be likely no more than 10,000 to 12,000 tonnes maximum per month, a figure equal to what I suspect we are able to produce in any event and once we get well underway, say 6 months down the line, we will be launching a net increase in tonnage.

The advantages seem so obvious. A convoy must travel at the speed of its slowest member and it seems clear that a 12 knot convoy is at less risk than a 9 knot group. Fewer ships to guard is easier than large convoy's which require more escorts to do a adequate job. It is also wasteful, in both fuel and crew, to have 4 ships carry a 1,000 tons each when one hull could do the job as well.

Sadly I can find no support on the Council.They claim more hulls ensure that some of the cargo will make it though and that in some areas we must have "expendable" merchant ships.

For people who constantly preach we must have superior designed warships to counter an enemy numerical advantage, they seem short sighted to me on this....

 

.....With the broad stroke of our intended actions in place, though a great many details remain unresolved, it is possible to comprehend our over all strategic intent. We used different terms in the Council Room, but on reflection a more poetic phrase comes to mind, Isolation and Exhaustion.

It lacks the martial tones that so appeal to our military, and the ommision of the word victory is positively scandalous to them, but it is an accurate summation of our intent. How could it be otherwise, the concepts of absolute victory and total domination of our enemies are a fantasy in our case. Yet it can not be a fantasy to our common Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen as they would never understand what we must do. I am not entirely sure our senior military men, including those on the Council fully understand what may be neccasary for us to survive.....

 

.....In 1905 we fought the decrepit and elderly Bear. Many glorious deeds were recorded, but in retrospect our success was not as much of a surpize as it seemed at the time. In the Great War we gained much for little effort on our part while the etablished empires bled themselves white. In Korea and repeatedly in China we have fought a foe that, though we can not bring to their knees, is no match for us upon the batttlefield.

We have infused ouselves with the Hubris that we are invincable in battle and that no foe can stand before our implacable will. But we have never faced a foe such as those before us now.

In a few weeks we will be at war with the English, and while there are similarities with 1905, there are also grave differences. They are much stronger than the Czar's were. tHe sea is a natural battlefield to them, and they posses one great advantage, a powerful ally.

America....

 

.....Eventually we will have to fight America also, but I intend to see that we do not fire the first shot. What remains to be seen is if the military will co-operate with me on this, as they have been known to "play Cowboy" as the American's say.

This would give us three troublesome foes to have to contend with, China, the English and America. I discount the Dutch as they are too weak to matter. As for the Commonwealth forces, without the English they can do nothing on their own. Of course hovering at the sidelines is the Soviets.

Only with China can we dictate terms favorable to us. London, Washington and Moscow are all far too distant to force their surrender, and with China, so long as they receive support we will find subduing them most difficult. Hence, only a strategy of Isolation and Exhaustion offers us a reasonable chance....

 

....In the weeks that remain to us before Imperial forces move south, we will engage in a deliberate and intense propaganda effort to change our perception worldwide generally, and in America specifically. This will take multiple forms. An induction of significant numbers of Chinese and Korean officer candidates into our various Military Academy's , while simultaneously raising large numbers of local recruits to form new Allied combat units. This will include Ground, Air and Sea assets.

We will offer a greater level of local autonomy within area's under Imperial control. Promote greater industrialization within China and Korea to offer employment to the local populations. A scattering of Imperial officials, civilian and military, will be publicly called to account for previous excesses committed during our occupation.

To insure we get maximum exposure for our efforts we will invite the western press, especially American, to come and observe.

Had we done this 3 years ago we might not now be going to war, but there is little profit to contemplate might have been's. We can only play the pieces before us.

While this looks like we are acting altruistically, in truth we gain as much or more than our subject people's. The industry will provide us with the tools of war and building locally, with local resources we save greatly in fuel transportation costs. Employing local populations deprives the Chinese Bandits, Chaing and Mao, of valuable recruits to oppose us. Thus separating them from their population base.

Greater autonomy will make the local's an active part of our efforts. The officials and military officers offered up for our previous sins will come from those we recently stopped in the attempted coup. They will provide one final service to the Empire, explained as such, many might even willingly accept their fate. It will also demonstrate to those who lurk in the shadows with ill will towards the new Imperial Council that we can be ruthless when we must.

Privately we will contact the American government and offer a sanitized account of our recent political upheaval while stressing we are committed to change Imperial policies, but that we are on the fine edge and need their patience in the near term. We will offer the actions listed as "proof'' of our sincerity.

All this, public and private, to make it harder politically for America to continue funding Chaing, thus Isolating him. We will complete the isolation militarily by closing both ends of the western supply line in China and India. Once accomplished, we will Exhaust the Bandits without having to occupy the entire country...

Thus, the first element of Isolation and Exhaustion is enacted......

 

....Next we must Isolate the English and their Dutch allies.

This is accomplished by the simple expedient of not attacking American interests directly the Pacific. For every month that America stays neutral, the English will wonder and worry if their eventual entry (if any) will be in time to preserve their Asiatic empire. They know that many of their subject peoples are straining to have their yokes lifted by any means possible.

We will take this a step further by trying to find an accommodation with the Australian's and New Zeelander's. In the end they will remain loyal to the Commonwealth, but every obstacle we place before them is a new worry. India will get a different approach as we will do all in our power to encourage them to rise up and look to their own interests rather than those of the English.

This will act to promote the Exhaustion of the English, but to be honest Herr Hitler will do more to sap their energy than what we are able to do directly. Still I will push to have us harm the English in any manner we can before an American entry into the Pacific war. I will have some opposition from the Navy I fear, but I will push to have them hunt down and destroy the Royal Navy in the Indian Ocean. Every ship we sink now will not be available to them for a counter offensive against us later. More to the point, it is their navy that truly binds their empire, without it those colonial possessions that wish to will shed their masters.

If our will is greater than theirs, we will prevail......

 

.....This leaves America.

Her Isolation is the easiest to achieve, the simple expedient of not attacking her directly takes from them the pretext to go to war with us without a real provocation. We can further this by diplomatic moves aimed at her primary colony in our area of operations, the Philippines. They claim that they will grant them full independence in a few years, so we publicly applaud them for their forward thinking position and proclaim that we too have a similar agenda within our sphere of influence.

We will protest that the limitations of our resources, much of it coming from their cruel embargo, compels us to take a slower and more deliberate pace in our efforts to place local populations on a strong footing secure enough to stand on their own. Still we hold the US example as an admirable role model for both us but also those other western empires who will never willingly see their colonies freed.

This will play to their pride, while engendering in the Filipino people some degree good relations to us as we tout them as the new wave of Asian independence. There may still be time for a quick state visit by me to Manilla as a gesture of good will, and of course an opportunity for my wife to go shopping in the west one last time would bring some domestic bliss.

Of more import to the Empire, the suggestion of us importing food from the Philippines ought to find favor with the Filipino quasi government. The actual amount is of little consequence as its mere fact will discourage their interest in a war between their overlords and us. The American's can not totally ignore the opinion of a people who shortly will have their independence, or so they claim.

This of course will be a bitter meal for the Americans, but one they cannot publicly acknowledge without boldly showing their hand with re-guard to their own interests at the expense of the Filipino people.....

 

.....How long we can "isolate" America is the imponderable. Admiral Takao fears it can be for a matter of weeks only, Colonel Bobimoto, on the other hand is confident we could prolong this for as much as a year and a half. At first I tended to favor the Admiral's view but I now side with the majority who expect we can achieve 9 months to a year free of direct US involvement.

Americas Isolation will be far from complete as their will be two large gaps we cannot fully close. As in the Great War they will make and send the tools of war to the English and her allies. While we can sink ships under the flags of enemy countries with impunity, and those of neutrals with nearly as much latitude, sinking US flag ships will only give them the pretext they need to declare war upon us. Even so we cannot sink all the ships no matter what state of war we are in.

I must speak with Ambassador Kourei and the Foreign Ministry about setting up corridors where US flag vessels can travel unmolested to their intended destinations. The Navy will balk and I have little affection for the idea, but we cannot throw away a complacent America for some submarine commanders folly......

 

.....The other loop hole will be America's ability to continue their build up in the western Pacific. The islands of Wake, Guam and Midway do not greatly trouble me as they are small and there is a limit to what America can do there. The Philippines are a different matter. Given enough time they could become too strong to completely overcome.

In truth we do not contemplate a total occupation of these islands when war breaks out between us, still reducing them enough to ensure they cannot interfere with the movement of our convoy's could become problematic given enough time.

I remain committed to making the US fire the first shot, but there may come a point when I will no longer have this option.....

 

....The Isolation of America early in the conflict will be the easy task, exhaustion of this giant, the most difficult to achieve. On paper an impossible task considering her great wealth, industry, natureal resources, population and location. Still I perceive a glimmer of hope.

In America's long wars there has been occasions where it population has become weary of the struggle and this wearyness has impacted both political and military decision making. Sadly I can not point to an example where they have actually given up per se, but they have come terribly close on occasion.

WE MUST stimulate their desire to seek an accomodation with us, rather than our destruction.....

 

....To exhaust America's will we must do the following,

Secure the resources denied us with a minimum of disruption.

Ensure their timely and safe arrival to our industry with a minimum of loss to our enemies.

Optimise and expand our industry to ensure large scale supply and support of Imperial Forces.

Delay American interference long enough to erect substantial defenses of both our resources and their transportation to the Home Islands and their return to the frontlines as finished tools of war.

Husband our military forces for as long as possible to delay the point in time where we no longer possess the initative to dictate or even influence events.

None of these in themselves are a insurmountable problem. The catch is that we must accomplish all to have a chance to wear down American resolve enough to reach an accomodation.....

 

....Colonel Bobimoto raises a troubling last minute proposal, at least it is to me.

He offers that we use Vichy French troops to seize Noumea from Pro Free French control ahead of SRA objectives. His plan is that we employ elements of the Kido Butai to transport a mixed force of French Colonial and Imperial troops from Indochina to take control of the Islands, then quietly construct a defensive position there.

He is confident that little or no resistance can be offered by the local garrison and that no interference will be undertaken by Western forces. He points out that this location offers a good position to stage air and submarine forces that can interdict US aid to Australia and act as an outer defence post against the eventual Western counter offensive.

I do not doubt him on this, up to a point, but my concerns remain.

First I worry that attempting to squeeze this operation into our time table could disrupt our more important SRA operations. Secondly I can not see how this could not further strain our relations with America. The Colonel counters that officially America supports the Vichy regime as the legitimate French Government and so could not object to our "helping" it restore its former colony to its "control".

While this may be true "officially", I know full well that what a government says "officially" can often differ from what it truly feels, and no government likes having its own words thrown into their face.

I am also concerned that this act will signal a "need" on our part to constantly expand our defensive perimeter in the fool's errand of providing security. This argument has haunted us in China for years now, without providing either the security or victory promised.

I had the support of General Terauchi, but while not ecstatic about it, the majority of the Council does not oppose the operation. So we go forward and I hope for the best.