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US on the left and Brits on the right

Discussion in 'What If - European Theater - Western Front & Atlan' started by Slipdigit, Sep 28, 2007.

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  1. tikilal

    tikilal Ace

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    Sorry, I know that Monty was in command of the entire landing, I was refering to the British vs the Americans.

    On several occasions the German Armor did disengage at one point even moving 3 armored divisions to try and cut off the American break out to the south. Yes there was constant pressure by all involved all did excellent things, but in the end it was the Germans that chose where to field their units. Holding the initiative and deployment of units are two different things. The Germans could have moved their armor further south had they wanted to, they would have had to move infantry around but it was still possible, this is what I was getting at.
     
  2. redcoat

    redcoat Ace

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    Holding the intiative is making the enemy react to your moves. The deployment of the German forces was in reaction to Allied actions
    They could have, but it would have weakened the forces facing the British, and while the British kept attacking they were fearful that this would enable a British breakthrough.
    The fact that the Germans later moved armoured divisions south in response to the US breakthrough shows that they were still responding to Allied actions
     
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  3. tikilal

    tikilal Ace

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    No the German deployment was the German decision to the allied action. No where no how does your enemies movement require you to do anything. The Choice was made how to deploy, yes the situation on the battlefield affects (or should) your deployment, but it doesn't have too.

    Reaction yes, forgone conclusion no. Would you also like to say then that the Battle of the Bulge was a response to allied actions? So did the Allies loose the initiative?
     
  4. Jaeger

    Jaeger Ace

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    tikilal

    'Would you also like to say then that the Battle of the Bulge was a response to allied actions? So did the Allies loose the initiative?'

    What is this?

    Overlord happened during the Summer of '44
    Wacht am Rhein happened in the winter of 44-45

    Wacht am Rhein was a german offensive. During the early stages the germans held the initiative. But in typical german fashion the lack of a proper logistical system made the offensive run out of steam. To make matters worse the weather cleared up and the Allied tactical airforce pounded the germans.

    Operation Market Garden was an Allied (or would you prefer just Monty) operation that saw the allies grab the initiative but loose it.

    Initiative is one of the most difficult aspects to master in warfare. It is also one of the hardest things to instill in soldiers.

    Look at the french campaign in 1940. Looking at the forces before the battle it would suggest that the germans would fail. But doctrinal advantages ensured that the germans held the initiative all through the campaign. There was plenty of opportunity for the allies to retain it, but the manouvre doctrine of the germans also sapped the communications and higher command. Yes there was local actions that showed that the allies did regain initiative, and let us not forget that Herr Hitler himself stopped his armour.
     
  5. redcoat

    redcoat Ace

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    Yes. The Allies did lose the initiative at the start of the Battle of the Bulge.
     
  6. Joe

    Joe Ace

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    But regained it later.
     
  7. Slipdigit

    Slipdigit Good Ol' Boy Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    Initiative.
    I propose that what little initiative the Germans had on Dec 16 was mostly gone by the the 19th or 20th, when Allied ground commanders met in Verdun and decided to fight the Germans on the ground of their own choosing.

    The German 6th Panzer Army (PA) had been stopped cold in the North, the German 7th Army was making little progress in the south, mostly on the heels of the 5th PA's tail. Only in the center (German 5th PA) were Germans making any headway, essentially against no forces, since the US 106th Infantry Division (ID) had lost two of it's regiments and most of it's artillery.

    The US 422nd and 423rd Infantry Regiments of the 106th ID were unable to manuever as the result of being on the wrong side of a river with insufficient bridging to connect them to the rear. They simply ran out of supplies and unlike locations to the rear, they were so far forward that significant supply depots did not exist where they were. The other divisions in the center (US28th ID, US 7th Armored Division) and the various cavalry groups were able to retire in good order because they were not positioned so that their ability to maneuver was handicapped like the US 106th ID.

    The decisions to fight at Elsenborn Ridge, St Vith and Bastogne, certainly born of desperation, served their purpose of denying the Germans the initiative, slowing their advance and allow other Allied forces to prepare to fight in other locations. The forces in these area were helped by a better supply situation than was the 106th. The Allied decision not to go on the offensive along the length of the bulge until all forces were in place was a sound one. There were no large scale counter-attacks early on by the Allies. This allowed the Allies to fight using their strengths and capitalize on German weaknesses, when the weather cleared and the German attack was weakening.

    From the 19th on, the Allies held the initiative, even though they were falling back in the center. It was an action akin to allowing a cow to through a chute at a slaughterhouse. The cow thinks is going somewhere safe, but we know better. Eisenhower's early efforts were to hold the shoulders of the bulge strongly and allow the Germans movement in the center, until forces could be marshalled to slow the entire German offensive.

    That is pretty much what happened. Look at maps of the battle. The shoulders held and Germans went blithely toward their defeat at Celles on the 24th. It was there that Allies fought German armor on the ground of their own choosing and defeated them.
     
  8. Kai-Petri

    Kai-Petri Kenraali

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    For the Germans it seems the attack went wrong from the beginning. The tanks were meant to be used ONLY once the breakthrough was created by the attack of their infantry. This did not manage to make it and the tanks were used for getting through the front and the Germans lost tanks and time which both they could not afford to lose.
     
  9. tikilal

    tikilal Ace

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    I did not mean to change the subject to the Battle of the Bulge.

    What I was trying to show was the difference between Reaction and Initiative. Now we can talk about local initative all the way up to the stratigic level (where I thought we were at) but we need to make sure that we are not mixing them up.
     
  10. Slipdigit

    Slipdigit Good Ol' Boy Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    Fine with me. When I posed the initial question, I wasn't really wanting to talk about the Lodgement phase of the campaign anyway. I was more interested in how the drive across France would differ.
     
  11. Carl W Schwamberger

    Carl W Schwamberger Ace

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    My only thought is if the US Leaders would have priority on taking Antwerp as they rush across Belgium in late August/early Spetember. Or, would they have also become enamoured with the idea of breaching the Rhine instead.
     
  12. Slipdigit

    Slipdigit Good Ol' Boy Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    Carl,
    What precedents in the actual timeline do you base this on? In your opinion, would the US 12th Army Group have been more aggressive taking Walcheren Island and the Antwerp approaches and what you base this on? I'm not trying to be cantankerous or difficult, just wanting to explore this further.

    As far as Patton's drive across Brittany and from Avranches to the Seine and on to just beyond the Meuse, this was more a pursuit of an almost non-existant enemy. This is not to detract from the accomplishment, the 3rd Army stayed in the saddle and drove hard nipping at German heels when some armies would very well have stopped. And this was in territory mostly not as conducisive to mobile warfare as existed on the North German Plain. It also didn't help the German cause that Herr Schinkelgruber insisted that the 5th Panzer Army put it's own head in the noose trying to pinch off the US 3rd Army and showed Bradley's faith in the US 30thID holding at Mortain.

    So I guess the questions (for all of you) are, would US doctrine and practice, coupled with more wheeled vehicles, and resulted in a quicker run to the Lower Rhine for the 12th AG than did the 21st AG ? Would US Engineering assets be adequate to bridge the Lower Rhine branches before Oct 1944? Would the US 82nd, 101st and British 6th Airborne Division been utilized in a similar manner or would the 12th AG gotten close enough Arnhem to have resulted in more drops across the river?

    I know, I know, I hate what ifs. Just bear with me.

    edit I just noticed that this post 888 for me. If 666 is the Sign of the Beast, what is 888, the Sign of the Breasts?
     
  13. Jaeger

    Jaeger Ace

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    No...
     
  14. redcoat

    redcoat Ace

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    "From 1 Aug, when Patton's Third Army was activated at Avranches, to 26 Aug, when it's lead elements reached the Seine near Troyes, the army had advanced approximately 260 miles an average of 10 miles a day. Meanwhile, 21st Army Group was still facing the bulk of the German panzer divisions and facing an enemy fighting for it's life while attempting to escape the Falaise pocket. Patton was advancing against negligible opposition. But from 26 August on, when the bulk of the Allied forces had closed to and crossed the Seine, 21st Army Group reached Antwerp on 4 Sep, a distance of approx 200 miles in nine days an average of 22 miles a day, and Maastricht on 14 Sept, a distance of 250 miles from the Seine. Meanwhile, in that same period, Patton advanced 100-150 miles"

    As you can see, when Montys 21st Army broke out, it travelled at a faster rate than Pattons 3rd Army ;)
     
  15. Jaeger

    Jaeger Ace

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    The operation that Redcoat referrs to is called 'the great swan'
    (mentioned in my earlier posts)
     
  16. Kai-Petri

    Kai-Petri Kenraali

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    I read that Patton had alot of rivers to cross. Was Monty also facing the problem of rivers with no bridges? ( just asking...)
     
  17. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    Sirs, I know this thread is basically about the breakout phase of D-Day but after reading all your very informative posts, I just can't help but wonder how a British division would've handled Omaha's defenses. The British had Hobart's Funnies, which the US refused to use when the British offered the equipment to them.
    Since you guys really know about this stuff, how would a British division fare against Omaha's defenses.

    P.S. I checked the what if's to find out if this was asked before. I found none. I thought about starting a new thread but the title would've been very similar to the title of this thread. I hope I didn't go off topic. If I did, I apologize in advance. I am just really curious how the British would've handled Omaha.
     
  18. redcoat

    redcoat Ace

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    The British and Canadian beaches all had a longer bombardment from naval units on D-day, (IIRC 1.5 hours against 45 minutes) and did use a greater variety of specialised armour, but I've no doubt the outcome would have been the same, a successful landing. Casualties may have been a little lower, but that's the only difference I can see.
     
  19. redcoat

    redcoat Ace

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    Get a map.
     
  20. Kai-Petri

    Kai-Petri Kenraali

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    Perhaps you can direct me to the direction of a map with intact bridges then....
     
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