Was the Wehrmacht overrated?

From "Christos military and intelligence corner"
Strength of the German divisions in Normandy on 6 june 1944:
243 ID:11.529
709 ID:11.320
716 ID:7.771
352 ID:12.734 (with 10 STuG III)
91 ID :7.500
Total :50.864
There also was the 21 PzD (in the inland) with 16.297 and 112 PzIV and(also in the inland) a Flak regiment and small units :7000 men
Farther away were 2 PzD(12 SS and PL) with 400 Pz and and 35000 men,but they did not intervene on 6 june .
The allies..landed on 6 june :150000 men and 922 AFV.As the Allies had total naval and air supremacy,there was no way that the Germans could defeat the invasion .

 

Thank you LJAD I knew someone in here would have this info.

Glad I wasnt lossing my mind!

 

some of the US divisions weren't completely motorized with organic trucks

True, and deliberately so. If an infantry division was completely motorized, a lot of trucks would be sitting around idle most of the time was in combat. Basically a division had enough organic vehicles to move all of its equipment, including the heavier "man-portable" items like mortars - everything except the infantrymen themselves. When necessary, truck companies, six IIRC, would be attached to make the division completely mobile. The US Army was sufficiently mechanized that corps or army headquarters could say "send six truck companies to XX Division"; any more mechanization would have been wasted.

It could be argued that the Germans' and others' paucity of motor vehicles forced them to use the ones they had less efficiently. The only way a German division could count on having all the trucks it needed when it needed them was to own them.

It's a matter of opinion, but I wouldn't say that the American or British army using horses or mules when appropriate means that they were lacking in motorization; indeed the mules themselves were probably trucked to the front! It's not the same situation as the Germans and others who had to use horses when they would have preferred trucks, but simply didn't have them.

 

At VE Day there were approximately 80 US, British, and Empire divisions in the ETO (also 10 French) and 15 in Italy (plus 2 Polish, 1 Brazilian, and some Italians). The British also had troops in Greece and the Middle East maintaining security, so about 100 total US-GB.

 

Hitler was first for holding Stalingrad because of Göring´s promise to supply the 6th Army from Air. Next was for the try to break into Stalingrad by Guderian. And the last was his personal order given to Paulus to hold until the last man and the last round to fire. And that was the real idiotic order, more than to believe Görings promise!
Hope this was what you´ve asked for.

 

It was not Guderian but Manstein who convinced Hitler that a pull out wasnt necessary since he could break through. Also by the time Manstein failed, there was no way to break out. All that was left of the 6th were starving, freezing, wounded and shell shocked troops, most of whom died on the way to POW camps.

 

After the first reading I have rated the above post with "like", after second reading "salute" was obvious rating.

Paulus's destiny was neither in his hands nor in his Führer's hands. It was decided in Moscow on 12th September when Stalin has send Vasilevsky and Zhukov to the General Staff to »think over very carefully indeed what must be done in the Stalingrad area«. After a day spent at Stavka, Vasilevsky and Zhukov have foreseen creation of new armies and armoured corps over the next two months. Stalin has approved the plan with no interference.

At the very same day Paulus has visited Führer at Wolfschantze bunker in Vinitsa.

 

After being encircled Paulus could still have made a break through and withdraw. He was allowed to do so and when the Rusisans maanged to get enough reinforcments to make the grip permanent it progressively became too late for Paulus, first his men were exhausted. Cold and the lack of food, amno and permanent Russians attacks followed.

 

I agree. I'm a little off-topic, here and the whole Paulus/Stalingrad thing would make a thread in its own right which would probably roll on for years with no resolution.

But the more I read about Paulus, I have to feel a certain sympathy. I'll quote one line which seems to sum it up for me ; -

'..There can be no quibbling with the integrity of (Paulus') character. This is not contradicted by the fact that the Army Commander lacked those traits, abilities and experiences of a superior Commander that could have enabled him to master the outrageously unique military situation of Stalingrad. As his biography clearly shows, these gifts were just not given to Paulus'. cf Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel, 'Stalingrad - Memories And Reassessments' p 189/190.

It's worth keeping in mind that the Volga wasn't just another river - as the border between Europe and Asia it was one of the Third Reich's key war aims.

IMPO, Paulus is a tragic figure - absolutely the wrong man in the wrong job & the wrong place.

 

Don't worry, Paulus was in charge of a Wehrmacht army, so discussing about him being overeated or not is not off topic .

 

It's possibly a case of Paulus over-rating Hitler.....( 'Don't worry - the Fuhrer will get us out').... and also there's a question of his weakness of character compared to Arthur Schmidt who was undoubtedly a powerful influence.

 

Theoretically perhaps - with fresh soldiers and more importatly, with horses, oxes, camels and trucks which were relocated hunderd miles to west earlier during preparations for winter. With exhausted and demoralized units, witout transportation he was lost. Führer knew that and he has extracted the last drops of blood from the 6th Army to save the rest of AGS.

 

After (and maybe already during the war)Stalingrad become something mythological(I don't know why)and every one was looking at the reasons for Stalingrad (translation :at a responsible,scape-goat),and,all the generalswere saying :it's not me ,and,very quickly,the ideal scape-goat was found (he was dead,and,no one would defend him) :Hitler,and,this image(the corporal,the civilian,who refused to listen to the generals) has become an ineradicable myth of WWII and there are still people(with 2 books only in their library: Carell and the memoires of Manstein )on a lot of forums,who are spreading this story.
The truth...is totally different :in the spring of 1942,the Germans decided to go south(=capture the oil fields of the Caucasus),although AGN and AGS were stripped to give AGS all what was available,the Ostheer was already that weakened,that Fall Blau only could succeed if the decision was forced in some 10 weeks at most (the parallellism with Barbarossa is obvious):before september,the Soviet front had to be broken,and the Caucasus and Stalingrad captured .
At the end of august,it was obvious that Blau had failed (as had failed Barbarossa at the end of august 1941)and,as to be excepted ,the commanders of both AG's(List and Bock ) were fired .
The Germans now had 3 options:
1)to retreat (to what line?)
2)to remain where they were
3)to continue the offensive
For obvious reasons,they chosed the last one (rightfully IMHO)
It was of course impossible to continue both attacks(an advance in the Caucasus was impossible)and the Germans continued the fighting at the Stalingrad area,hoping,if they could not capture the oil,to prevent the oil of going to the Ural.
Very quickly,it became clear that Stalingrad also could not be captured,but,as a withdrawal was out of the question(to which line ? /a withdrawal from Stalingrad would result in a withdrawal from the Caucase)the only option was to remain at Stalingrad (there also was the point that no one,not even the overrated Gehlen was forecasting Uranus).When Uranus started,6th Army was already that weakened that an escape was impossible.After the second phase of Uranus(against the Romanians/Italians and Hungarians),the whole south front collapsed,and 6th Army was written of .
3 conclusions:
1)I see no idiotic order of Hitler ,unless some one could show me the alternatives for Hitler's decisions
2)The German Army was to weak to execute Blau (in the spring,Bock had written that the Ostheer was no longer capable for long-distance operations)
3)If there was some one responsible for Stalingrad ,it was the Red Army

 

With an advance on the Caucasus being impossible, and a withdrawal being out of the question, I'd say the Wehrmacht was definitely over-rated......

 

Lets no forget that after Manstein was stopped his attention was needed elswhere.... The sneaky Russians had launched another major offensive in the north. IMO, the Germans did all they could to no avail; the 6th was doomed from the moment the Soviet counter offensive began.

 

The fate of the 6th Army was done the longer the encirclement lasted. The high Command was in guess that the 6th Army would be encircled by the Russians ( to read at the OKW diary) and the 6th Army would have saved the most of their troops, propably without their heavy guns and most of the tanks, if the decision was made to withdrawal early enough. As the circle was closed once, there was only a weak chance to get out with higher numbers of soldiers. Capitulation isn´t a good option and it would have made a bigger difference for the soldiers. The withdraw of AGA has worked too with a 6th Army in a strength between 50 to 70% of their soldiers if they were out of Stalingrad. It hasn´t changed the history and the Wehrmacht had lost the war in this or a other way, but it had been the better solution to me.

 

I know it was von Manstein, but i wrote Guderian for the reason that he was the one who was responible for the operation. Nothing more nothing less.