What if........Hitler never invaded the Soviet Union?

It sounds to myself like this opinion if based on that discredited book Icebreaker. Concerning that book, I would say the bulk of the real evidence actually shows the opposite of that book’s premise. Stalin was certain that Hitler wasn't such a "fool" as to open a second front without making peace or defeating the British before attacking the Soviets on his eastern border, especially as the USSR was shipping grains, POL, and alloys to the Nazis. Stalin was almost in denial when the reports first started coming in, so he was far from launching or preparing his own invasion, he was in fact doing the opposite.

While there are some neo-Nazi sites (ihr.org for example) which dearly love the book Icebreaker by Suvorov, the bulk of the more academic historians reject it, and its supposition. The neo-Nazis embrace the idea since it makes Hitler appear to be "only defending Germany from the god-less Communist hoards"! These next statements aren’t all my own, I read them elsewhere and copied them down; that said it (Icebreaker) flies in the fact of numerous historial truths, i.e.:

Marxist Theory:

In traditional Marxist theory, militarism is normally seen as a form of social control and a component of imperialism, delaying the emergence of a class-conscious international working class or proletariat. The activities of the Communist International in the period preceding the First World War show clearly that Communist parties and the political Left in general were opponents of militarism. Once the first communist regime took political power in the Russian Revolution and survived the Russian Civil War, a major line of debate in the USSR during the 1920s was how the world's first socialist state should relate to other nations.

The view of Trotsky was that a communist revolution could succeed only by continuous revolutionary activity in other nation-states. The notion of socialism surviving in a single nation-state was considered ridiculous and self-contradictory. The remaining capitalist powers would swiftly move to crush the USSR (the experience of western intervention on behalf of the Whites in the civil war was not forgotten). Since the bourgeois nations would be more powerful, they would probably succeed in destroying socialism. However, if the working classes of these countries could understand that a war of conquest in support of capitalism was not in their class interests, they would not support such a war and socialism would survive through the process of revolution abroad.

Stalin, on the other hand, argued that 'socialism in one country' was feasible if properly managed. His subsequent program of militarizing the whole Soviet economy was simultaneously a means of maintaining his totalitarian power and ensuring the survival of the Soviet state without regard to the internal politics of other nations.

It is important to note that Stalin's approach flew in the face of most Marxist thought up till that point, but that neither the Trotskyist view nor the Stalinist view can be reconciled with Suvorov's Icebreaker thesis. Neither approach envisioned the use of conventional armed forces to wage an aggressive "first strike" or premptive strike war.

Soviet Diplomacy Under Stalin:

Under Stalin, Soviet foreign policy in the late 1920s through at least 1939 was essentially defensive and very cautious. The USSR sought alliances with western powers, in particular seeking to re-establish the traditional anti-German alliance with France. For a multitude of reasons, these efforts failed. One of the main reasons was that the USSR was considered a pariah state prior to June 22, 1941, and the other European powers were reluctant to enter into any serious negotiation with the Stalin regime. Also, one effect of the Great Purge was that western militaries came to regard the Red Army as a worthless ally. They were thus not eager to reinstate the traditional east-west coalition against Germany which had existed during the "Great War", WW1.

Prior to the rise of the Nazis, joint military training facilities existed in the USSR, in which German and Soviet soldiers developed nascent versions of the tactics and weapons that would come to prominence in WW2. However, these joint endevors occurred during a period when Germany was weak, under the Weimar Republic, and were largely shut down once the Nazis came to power.

The Soviet view was that as efforts to 'surround' Hitler failed, and as the western powers seemed to allow Nazi expansion in Central Europe (as long as it was not aimed westward), some accommodation had to be reached with Germany in order to buy time. Stalin knew the USSR was not ready to fight Germany, but the massive rearmament and reorganization programs begun in 1939 might begin to bear fruit by 1942. The goal of the Nazi-Soviet nonagression pact was primarily to buy time and space which the USSR could use to prepare for the German invasion they feared was inevitable. The rights of the populations of Central Europe were trampled as a result. This was not, of course, fundamentally different from the Franco-British approach up until Munich. Consequently there is little in the basically opportunistic diplomatic record to support Suvorov's thesis, and much to contradict it.

The Historical Record:

The author’s (Suvorov’s) view that a Soviet invasion of Germany was imminent in 1941/42 is not shared by the vast majority of the historian community. A noteworthy refutation of his thesis is contained in Col. David Glantz's work Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War. Glantz views Suvorov's argument as "incredible" on a variety of fronts:

1) Suvorov rejects without examination classified ex-Soviet archival material, and makes highly selective picks from memoirs. There are thus basic methodological problems.

2) Suvorov's thesis is strongly contradicted both by ex-Soviet and German archival material.

The facts simply do not bear out any argument that the Red Army was prepared or preparing to invade Germany; on the contrary, the appalling lack of readiness, poor training level, and abysmal state of deployments show that the Red Army was unprepared for even static defense, much less large-scale offensive operations. A proof for un-preparedness is naturally the combat experience of Red Army throughout 1941. Glantz's conclusion is that; "Stalin may well have been an unscrupulous tyrant, but he was not a lunatic".

On the other hand, one may point at certain methodological problems concerning Glantz' study, too; it depicted only Red Army's lack of readiness, not comparing it to its enemy's. One can hardly say Germany was ready for war in 1939 (the conscription was re-established 1935 and real tank production began only after the seizure of the Czech Skoda factories), but it didn't prevent Hitler from unleashing major military conflict.

Although Suvorov claims that an attack date of July 8, 1941 had been selected, this is contradicted by the overwhelming mass of evidence. There were no stockpiles of the fuel, ammunition, and other stores held in forward areas as would have been needed if an invasion was about to be mounted. Major ground units were dispersed into small garrisons rather than being concentrated at railheads, as they would have been had they been preparing an invasion. Units were not co-located with their own transportation assets, leaving, for example, major artillery units immobile. Air Force aircraft were parked in neat, tightly-packed rows along their airfields rather than dispersed. Over 50% of all Soviet tanks required major maintenance on June 22, 1941. If an invasion were being planned, these maintenance tasks would have been completed. Most Soviet armor units were in the process of re-organizing into new Tank Corps; the German invasion caught these units in the midst of this reorganization. Such a large-scale reorganization is inconsistent with an impending invasion.

And in order to get a better idea of who this fellow is, remember that is his nom d’plume. Victor Suvorov’s real name is Vladimir Rezun. If you look up Rezun, you will find out who we are dealing with here.

 

Almost as if i'd said it!

 

To my mind this scenario is not such an impossible. For example, Hitler decide that “Juidish-bolshevistic regime” and “Lebensraum auf Osten” could wait and it`s better first to finish with “London plutocracy” (which he also disliked).
Stalin from his side decided not interfere to “between-imperialistic war” and according to communistic ideology to wait for communistic revolutions all over the Europe, including Germany and GB, maybe in America also. (What disappointment that this would never occurred) Till this time (communistic revolutions) he decided to be as friendly to Germany as possible, excluding direct military alliance.
Ideological explanations for “friendship” between Nazi and Commy: hostility toward “rotten liberalism”, “plutocracy” (= capitalism) and Anglo-Saxons in general.
If SU for some reasons would staid out of war, more possible scenario would be a both-exhausted war for some years. Germany would conquer Mediterranean and North Africa. In 1947 “peacemakers” go to power in GB Britain and make a “compromise” (in reality – defeat) treaty with Germany: Germans preserve their conquests in Europe and return to Bitts some African colonies. Reasons for British: they lost their empire anyway, war costs more and more and GB became more and more indebted to US, there are few chances to overthrown Nazi fanatics, even nuking was found not an argument for them. (Possibly till those time German would have their own nuclear weapon.)

 

One thing that must not be ignored here is that the US would still be working like mad on the atomics, since the Germans getting them first was the driving force. Consequently the Nazis would have to figure out how to end the war well before mid-1945, or they (the original targets) would be irradiated.

There is no way for Hitler and his group to keep the US out of the war, and we had started working on the bomb before we were at war. Not by much understand, but the S1 Committee had been formed and funded moderately. Ironically I believe it was on Dec. 6th that S1 got the go ahead, and the Japanese attacked Pearl the next day.

Hitler would not only have to NOT attack the SU, his reason d'etre for coming to power (soil in the east), he would have to convince his luke-warm allies the Japanese to NOT attack the US. Something they also couldn't avoid doing if they had any hope of estabishing the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere with the "white" race out of Asia, with Asia for the Asians with them as Lords and every other Asian serving them.

Just my opinion of course, but I don't see how Hitler could avoid attacking the Soviets, he needed their resources and couldn't pay for nor barter for them any more. He had to try to take by force what he couldn't afford to aquire by legitimate methods. The Japanese were in the same, or similar boat as he was, they needed nearly everything to support their home islands, and couldn't afford to buy nor barter for anything. Their own aggressions on the Asian mainland had "closed the door" for them as well.

 

Agree with you. I only try to indulge fantasy how it could be according to proposed topic. I don`t exclude Perl Harbor and US from my scenario.
But I want to make some remarks.
First, Germany REALLY FOUGHT for four years with us, you and British WITHOUT many Soviet fuel and raw materials, which they failed to achieve during the Barbarossa. (Oil, aluminum, for a example).
Second, my assumption is based on the fact that Hitler wasn`t completely rational person. He could imagine that Germany could overthrow GB, and only after this invade SU. This assumption is made only in order to make this scenario possible.
Without Eastern Germans would fought against Western Allies more vigorously and wouldn`t refuse from conquered countries. Don`t forget, that the battle of Stalingrad had also psychological effect: that became clear that Germans are not invincible. So Allies would have two choices: to invade the continent with great risk and causalities or try to exhaust Germany. The second variant would cost much for Allies also, that`s why to my mind either GB or America in sometime would go to separate piece. After which other part should stop the struggle also: without Britain Americans wouldn`t have a base, without America British wouldn`t have recourses for struggle. My assumption that British would be first who would ask for piece because their situation would be more hard, than for Americans and harder than in reality (more Luftwaffe`s raids at least). Maybe this would be America; for example, in 1945 after Roosevelt death.

 

The war in the east lasted from June of 1941 to May of 1945, but the Brits had been fighting the Nazis alone from Sept of 1939 until the middle of 1941. America had been supplying them with material, but while we were supplying the British, the Soviets were supplying the Germans. That has to be taken into account.

Hitler’s attacking the Soviet Union was without doubt "going to be done", but he risked loosing much if he couldn’t occupy and exploit the natural resources of the SU, and he never could nor did.

In 1940, and the first half of 1941, the Soviet Union supplied Germany with 74% of its phosphate needs, 67% of its asbestos imports, 65% of its chrome ore supplies, 55% of its manganese, 50% of its Tungsten (Wolfram), 40% of its nickel imports and 34% of its oil.

This site is quite interesting as to the strategic blunder which Barbarossa was. It also exposes why it simply must be done (in Hitler’s mind), and why the US and British would never be "out of the picture" so as to allow Hitler a free hand in the east.

See:

Military History Online - Operation Barbarossa: The Ultimate Strategic Miscalculation

 

Look at the topic of thread please!

 

Thank you for information.
I just want to say that AFTER June 22 1941 Germany fought WITHOUT all of this.

 

And how often did they had all these resources stockpiled ready to use in plentiful supply, after June 22 1941? How often did they run into shortage of these supplies, how often did the Germans end up accepting lower quality tools of war due to these shortages?

 

This was one of the factors (if not crucial) why they lost the war in REAL history. In PROPOSED IN THIS THREAD alternative their situation would be a little better. (At least in air forces)

 

Let me go from start. If Hitler wouldn't invade SU, he would probably go right head on with Yugoslavia, later on also with Greece (at which, england would enter the war for sure). The Invasion of England would be delayed anyway, since germany did had superior airpower, but nothing of seapower.
Later on, with the development of jet fighters and rocket bombs, the England would fall. At that point, he would pupetize the spain, and attacked Italy. With overtakin of Italy, i dont see a problem of Invading of Soviet Union under one condition: Not sharing and spying on russians by germany or spying on germany and supplying a Yugoslavia by Soviets.

Hardly tooked one. But it seems almost a fear deal. Again, Russia win with overwhelming of germany's main city, Berlin, and assasinating Hitler in Moskov by an more fanatic person than he would be.

 

Yes, germans would come to Moskov, Stalin, would retreat behind Ural.

 

I didn't see this response until today, been busy doing other stuff and that said they didn't fight without it completely. Some was stockpiled (as mentioned), some was replaced with lower quality material like synthetic oils. And not to sound too gruesome, but many of their phosphate needs were filled by the ash of their KZ victims.

As to the "stuff" they did without, some of it simply made their new "jets" untenable. The steel alloy manganese especially. They did get more chromite and nickel ore from Turkey than they had pre-Barbarossa, and they more than doubled their Wolfram (tungsten) imports from Spain.

Hope that helps clear it up a bit.

 

Now Just as much as Churchill bitterly despised Germany, Germany despised the USSR. It's no Secret that Germany Always wanted war with Russia, especially for It's Mineral and mining resources. NO What IF'SSSsssssssssssssssss.

 

Franco would be eliminated by german high comand orders. And thank you. I do not need screaming, since i have it enough. If you realy need to go on this too realistic look, than thank you. I used some imagination, since you don't HAVE IT!!!!

 

That assumes that the Germans would be able to advance to the Ural,and that is assuming a lot,even to much

 

Why? Note that the Meteor saw squadron service before the Me-262 and the latter could be maintained in numbers far in excess of what the Me-262 could.

Does this reallly help him? The Spanish coast was already protected by Spains neutrality and the Italians were protecting their own. Now he has to fight two wars that gain him little in the way of resources and radically increase the amount of coast line he has to protect while decreasing the number of troops at his disposal.

 

If the Soviet transport machine would be crippled, this could happen. That's why, the russians were losing the territory at the beginning. When the delivery machine begun to run, the german forces were quickly outnumbered.

 

Well, since i did forgot about that, but let just see a fact, that a politician, that wants great country is also very greedy politician.

 

Operation Sea Lion was never, ever going to happen, because it required the aerial domination of the channel by the Germans. Not just to prevent RAF attacks on the beach head, but primarily to prevent the Royal Navy charging in and blasting every dinghy and barge the Germans needed (and they would have needed every vessel on the Atlantic coast) to get anything approaching a military force across the channel. For the English, the battle would be one of survival, and there is no question that the Royal Naval would have intercepted any German attempt to cross the channel. There isn't much point having a Navy if you no longer have a country. The Germans knew this, and this is why the LW was assigned to first destroy the RAF, as the preliminary round. The LW failed miserably in 1940, and wasn't eager to try again.

I believe, that if Hitler didn't invade the Soviet Union, that the Soviet Union would have invaded Nazi Germany, sooner or later. Probably much later, say 1946-1949. Each passing year would see Stalin grow in military strength, and cause Hitler nightmares. What would Hitler have done instead? Hitler probably realised the same, and with the poor performance of the Russians versus the Finns, thus Barbarossa was almost assured (the expectaction that kicking in the door will cause the whole house to crumble).

Nevertheless, this "What if scenario": Perhaps concentrated on building Naval power, and consolidating the hold on the mainland Europe. No need to Declare War on America; there is no hope that Japan will reciprocate and declare war on USSR. Without a US war against Germany, there is no "Europe First", and definitely no Manhattan Project (it was the threat of German scientists developing it, that caused the rush). A US war against Japan without the bomb goes all the way to Tokyo, causing more than 1 million more casualities on the Pacific front.

Without direct American intervention in the European theatre, life is grim for the Empire.