What if Japan Joined in operation Barbarossa

Actually, it's not difficult at all to understand why Japan might be interested in the Siberia, AKA the Russian Far East.

First, the Russians were expanding into that area and the Japanese perceived that as a danger to their ambitions in the territories of Korea and Manchuria. They wanted, at the very least, to establish buffer territories which would be useful in protecting Japanese colonies in North Asia. They were also interested in areas like Sakhalin Island for colonization to exploit it's coal and fishing grounds.

Secondly, it's not true that Japan knew nothing of Siberia's wealth of raw materials. Japanese troops occupied Vladivostok, the Russian Maritime Provinces, and large areas of Siberia, particularly the Ussuri region, from August, 1918, to October, 1922, and actively gathered as much information on the Russian Far East as was possible. In addition, they had access to thousands of White Russians who had fled to Siberia, North Asia, and China, during the Russian Civil War. These Russians were familiar with Siberia and it's welath, and were only too happy to cooperate with the fiercely anti-communist Japanese.

The Japanese eventual decision to "Go South" had nothing to do with with an alleged comparison between the riches of the Southern Resources Area and the "barren" reaches of Siberia (a statement which is false, BTW), but with an assessment of the difficulties of the military measures against the Soviet Union which had demonstrated in 1939, that it was more than capable of holding it's own against the Japanese Army.

In addition, the "Go South" iniative was championed by the Japanese Navy, which coincidentally, would have the majority of the responsibilty for making the campaign successful, and was only peripherally involved in the Chinese war, while the "Go North" option was favored by the Japanese Army which was already seriously mired in the war with China, and had few spare resources to commit to any new military adventures. Thus, the decision to attack to the south had more to do with Japan's international political circumstances, and the internal political dynamics of the Japanese Army and Navy factions, than any assessment of the comparative wealth of the areas in question, or a lack of knowledge of Siberia.

 

Any more egg to spread on my face? :lol:

Sources for that, DA, please, I'd be interested to read more







Damn, if this is not staying power then I don't know what it is. Contrary to some cry-babies I know )

 

As a matter of fact I have often seen threads with awful beginnings turning into pieces of art due to the efforts of honest people contradicting the intelligence-challenged who started them. "Neither cast ye your pearls before swine", but in many cases the pearls cast certainly outweigh the swine who started it all

So keep casting pearls!


Oink!

 

I think you'll have to admit that the egg was pretty much self-applied. You made assertions relative to the state of Japanese knowledge of Siberia and conditions of which you could not possibly have first-hand knowledge. Then you failed to cite your own sources, if any, and apparently arrived at your conclusions using an incomplete knowledge of the relevant facts.

As for my sources they are as follows:

http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9503EEDA1439EF3ABC4C53DFB0668389639EDE

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siberian_Intervention

http://books.google.com/books?id=M2...=X&oi=book_result&resnum=4&ct=result#PPA11,M1

http://www.answers.com/topic/siberian-expedition

http://ibiblio.org/pha/monos/146/index.html

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/magic/index.html

 

Thanks for the gruffly applied history lesson, I'll read these carefully

 

Za,

I'm sorry if I came across as gruff. Actually, all the time I was writing it, I was smiling and thinking about the numerous posts I have made on various forums where I thought I knew what I was talking about, and ended up being summarily corrected by those more knowledgable than myself.

I find it's well, when making positive statements of historical fact, to ask myself, can I support these assertions with solid references if someone calls me on them?

 

No offence taken, by any means! I think it has already become clear to everyone here that you are a demanding, low tolerance for fools kind of person Maybe we need more like you

 

1. The american oil embargo was enacted because of Japanese aggression in China and the rest of Asia, which had started in the early 1930's. So that answers that question.

2. If Japan had tied down significant Russian forces in the far east, the Russians would have had a tougher time of it and Hitler might have eventually captured Moscow. Might. Japanese forces were nearly always victorious against primitive, non-mechanized armies such as China's. But against a modern army like Russia's which was well equipped with tanks, trucks and artillery, things may have been very different. Japan's forces were always short of fuel, ammo, and everything else and in a long Asian land campaign, would have completely outrun their supply lines in a matter of weeks.

3. This is an interesting scenario, so lets assume the battle worked just as described...how would the Germans get the oil to the Japanese, past a gauntlet of American and british subs and ships? Oil was, and is, shipped by sea (in tankers), by rail, or by a pipeline. Probably not feasible to lay railroad lines, let alone a pipeline, southeast from Russian territory through all of Asia, although it could have been done (until the allies got around to bombing it). So the only other conceivable way was a pipeline through Iran (a neutral country, occupied by the British at the time). But since the British held Gibralter and the Suez canal in Egypt, any pipeline or railway to the Mediterranean was no good either. Transporting large quantities of oil by sub or air is not practical. So what good would German victories in Russia have done for the Japanese? Anybody want to give their opinion on this?

 

both Blau Himmel and marc780's posts should be addressed in the "transfer" of Siberian troops. There was a substancial force left in the far east when those were moved to the Soviet's western front. And NONE of the 80,000 independent Mongolian Army troops were transferred.

When General Yeremenko arrived in early 1941, the 1st Red Banner Army was responsible for all the frontier between Vladivostok, and Khabarovsk.

The official Soviet archives list the composition of the Army on 22 of June 1941 as the 26th Rifle Corps (21, 22, 26th Rifle Divisions), 59th Rifle Corps (39th, 59th Rifle Divisions), 1st, 4th and 5th Rifle Brigades, 8th Cavalry Division, 105th Fortified Region (YP), and 30th Mechanized Corps. (June 22, 1941 and Orbat.com/Niehorster, Administrative Order of Battle, 1st Army, 22 June, 1941)

From (even though I dislike Wiki):

1st Red Banner Army - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

There were about 31 Divisions of various branches in the Far East Red Banner Army when Barbarossa began, and only slightly over half, or 17 of them were transferred to the Moscow area between June and December of 1941; leaving nearly 14 full divisions to guard the border against the Japanese, "just in case", and they were supported by the Soviet trained and equipped 80,000 Mongolians.

So in total 17 divisions were transferred from the east. 6 divisions were transferred before the start of "Typhoon" operation, 11 after. Of the total number, 2 divisions were committed to actions in the Battle of Smolensk, 1 – on the North-West Front, 2 were placed on the Svir River against Finns, 3 went to the Tikhvin area, and only the remaining 9 were in the Battle of Moscow.

While the Red Army transferred over half of their Far East divisions to the Moscow front in 1941, here is the distribution of the "Siberian" forces in the course of the Battle of Moscow. Being merged into the OoB of the Soviet’s West Front Dec. 1, 1941. It was 5 days before the start of the Soviet counteroffensive (large units only), the changes the Order of Battle underwent during these days were not substantial. Fully Siberian units are highlighted with bold.

The rest were NOT really "Siberian" units, as some were simply members of the Far East Command, transferred to the area near the capital.

OoB West Front 1st December 1941

1st Shock Army: 133rd Rifle Division, 29th, 44th, 47th, 50th, 55th, 56th, 71st, 84th Rifle Brigade, 17th Cavalry Brigade


5th Army: 32nd, 50th, 108th, 144th Rifle, 82nd Motorized Rifle Divisions, 1310th Rifle Regiment of the 18th RD

10th Army 322nd, 323rd, 324th, 325th, 326th, 328th, 330th Rifle Divisions, 57th, 75th Cavalry Divisions

16th Army: 7th, 8th, 9th Guards, 18th, 126th, 354th Rifle Divisions, 36th, 37th, 40th, 49th Rifle Brigades, 282nd Rifle Regiment (19th Rifle Division), 2md Guards Cavalry Corps (3rd, 4th Guards, 20th Cavalry Divisions), 44th Mountain Cavalry Division


20th Army: 331st, 352nd Rifle Divisions, 28th, 35th, 64th Rifle Brigades


30th Army: 185th, 251st, 348th, 365th, 371st, 379th Rifle Divisions, 18th, 24th, 46th, 82nd Cavalry Divisions, 58th Tank Division, 107th Motorized Rifle Division

33rd Army: 110th, 113th, 222nd Rifle Divisions, 1st Guards Motorized Division


43rd Army: 17th, 19th, 53rd, 93rd Rifle Divisions, 5th Airborne Corps


49th Army: 5th Guards, 60th, 194th, 238th, 340th, 415th Rifle, 112th Tank Division.


50th Army: 154th, 217th, 258th, 290th, 299th, 413th Rifle Divisions, 31st, 41st Cavalry Divisions, 108th Tank Divisions.

Front’s reserve:160, 173rd, 239th Rifle Divisions, 18th Rifle Brigade, 1st Guards Cavalry Corps (1st, 2nd Guards Cavalry Divisions)

Source:

a) For the Rifle and Motorized Divisions:
Appendix No. 3 to General Staff Directive No. D-043 of 18 July 1970 (List No. 5: Rifle, Mountain Rifle, Motorized Rifle and Motorized Divisions, that entered the composition of the Active Army in the Years of the Great Patriotic War 1941 – 1945)

b) For the Tank Divisions:
Appendix to General Staff Directive No. 168780 of 18 June 1956 (List No. 6: Cavalry, Tank, Airborne and Headquarters, Artillery, Anti-Aircraft Artillery, Mortar, Aviation and Destroyer Divisions, that entered the composition of the Active Army in the Years of the Great Patriotic War 1941 – 1945.


I picked most of the above up from:

Axis History Forum • View topic - How many divisions were transferred from Far East in 1941?

And don't forget that throughout WW2, Mongolia was an independent nation, they followed Moscow's directives and used Soviet equipment, and Mongolia supported the Soviet Union with livestock, raw materials (tungsten), gold and silver, food, and fabrics for military clothing. The 80,000 man Mongolian army was maintained intact throughout the war; it served as an important "neutral" buffer force in the Soviet Far East defense system against the Japanese, but it did not actually join the Red Army until the last months of the war.

Mongolia's wartime "neutrality" ended in the closing days of the war. On August 10, 1945, two days after the Soviet Union had declared war on Japan, Mongolia also declared war on Japan. The Mongolian army, better trained and equipped than in the early days was still about 80,000 strong.

They joined Soviet troops in invading Inner Mongolia and Manchuria during Operation August Storm.

 

I think if Germany and Japan were to cooperate, Germany would better help Japan on diplomatic and politcal terms.

During the ceasefire talk after the battle of France, Germany could force Vichy France yield

1) French Somaliland (today Djibouti) (not Madagascar) and the port to Japan. Italy and Japan could then cooperate more, especially on naval assets where both nations were strong.

2) Split French Indochina: Vietnam self governing, east part of Cambodia self governing, Dutch East Indies except Java, Sumatra and Borneo under Japan protection. Laos and west part of Cambodia to Thailand.

In this case, British empire would have to deal with Thailand and Japan together by strokes of the German pen while Japan would be reaping resources from Vietnam and Dutch East Indies. French and Dutch Colonial forces were not that strong. Japan confiscated French colonial naval vessals and aircrafts and donated some of them to Thailand. Armors from the Dutch and French colonial forces would be Japanese. Would the French and Dutch colonial forces stand up and fight ?

3) Corsica to Italy to reverse the Genoan selling.

 

Trying to force that on France might be enough to keep France fighting, at the very least there's a good chance a lot more of the French Navy goes Free French that might apply to the colonies as well. I'm not sure Japan has much use for a port in Africa in any case as holding it and supplying it would be a pain with the British in India.

 

I agree but these statements hinge on the French and Dutch colonial forces were not strong enough comparing to combined Thai and Japanese forces. Outsides of Sumatra, Java and Borneo, were many other islands of the Dutch East Indies effectively controlled by the Dutch ? For example the Sulawesi island held oil and rubber resources which Japan could take advantage of.

 

Historically Japan took French IndoChina so not much of an advantage there. If French African colonies go Free French and possibly Syria as well I'm not sure the Germans and Italians are looking at a favoreable change. Especially if the majority of the French Fleet also sails for Britain or at best the US.

 

My idea was to divide the French colony to Axis and non-allies powers that would increase their geopolitical advantage. French Somaliland, that was in the middle between Italian East Africa in the west and British Somaliland in the East, could be a choke point like Malta or Midway to British navy from the Indian Ocean voyaging on the Red Sea to Egypt. British could launch a Pearl Harbor on the port of Djibouti but with Italy were going to take British Somaliland, such effort would be a waste of British assets because that land was, "a dusty and strategically useless corner of Africa" (Knox 2000, p.78)

http://www.ww2f.com/topic/40519-hitlers-italian-allies-a-book-review/

 

Before you can do much of anything with the French colonies you need a treaty between the French and the Germans (or it needs to be part of such a treatay). Historically that didn't happen. Even with a treaty the French colonies are independent enough that they may well go Free French if the treaty gives them to other powers. In most cases there is little or nothing the Axis could do about it. Especially if the African colonies do so Italy is in a lot worse position than they were historically and none of the Axis powers are really in a position to take control of those colonies.

 

So letting the viewers go back to the topic header, Japanese forces especially naval would have to be strong enough to forces French colonial forces in Indochina and French Somaliland not elsewhere to bow to Japanese influence; with Japanese historically successful attempt on Pearl Harbor against American navy I would think so. Also colonies in Africa that are mentioned in this scenario were only French and British Somaliland, while adjacent to each other by land, both are "dusty and strategically useless corner of Africa" (Knox 2000, p.78). Why would French or British did something very serious about it, like British for Malta.

After all, this is a "what if" scenario.

What I would like to ask though is that were the ceasefire talk and agreement after the Battle of France effectively a treaty ?

 

While Japan can force the issue in Indochina Somaliland is a bit different. Also remember it was thier move into Indochina that resulted in the complete embargo and siezure of Japanese assets. They had been trying to build up an oil reserve in the late 30's and 40. Pushing this a year forward is likely to push the embargos forward a year as well. The IJN also made some huge jumps forward in 40 and 41. Starting or potentially starting a conflict with GB a year or two earlier is going to short circuit those. The Kido Butai for instance didn't form until the Spring of 41 from what I recall.

The problem is you can't just focus on one or two French colonies you choose to. The French colonial administrations were fairly independent and if they see the Germans pressuring France to turn one over to an axis power they are likly to react poorly to this even if they don't think it's likely to happen to them. Morrocco and Syria are two others that historically stayed Vichy that might switch. Morrocco for instance could easily apply for US support and might well get it which would put the Axis position in North Africa in a very shaky way. Also consider that historically the British felt they needed to launch operation Ironclad in 42 if Madagscar goes Free French in 40 not only is Ironclad not required but the British now have another base with whch to intradict any movement between Japan and Africa.

The cesefire talk and agreement was most defintily not a treaty as several huge issues remained. These were basically put off until Germany sized the rest of France after Torch.

 

In the bigger picture, I think Japan should concentrate on neighboring territories of the Japanese Archipalego, that includes west coast of the Sea of Japan. Regardless of Japan's joining in OB, her particaption was limited.

http://sputniknews.com/columnists/20150904/1026576872.html

 

Let me combine ideas from different threads on similar topics:

Killkoy Posted 26 December 2000 - 05:42 PM on http://www.ww2f.com/topic/2405-japan-invaded-russia/
Japan DID invade Russia... and was it ever a disaster for them!
When the Russians unleashed their armor on the Japanese forces, it convinced them that a war with Russia was - to say the least - an unprofitable alternative. The Japanese forces lacked even a single credible tank. Their best was probably equivalent to the Stuart M3/M5, nor did they have anti-tank weapons sufficient to the task of combating armored formations.

Kai-Petri Posted 21 October 2006 - 12:13 AM in http://www.ww2f.com/topic/2794-what-if-japan-invaded-russia/
The Soviet forces were quite strong all through the WW2 in the Asian part so any attack by Japan would not really change much. The quality of troops did fall when the Siberian ski troops were sent to protect Moscow but otherwise the number of troops did not change much.

Kai-Petri Posted 05 July 2005 - 08:37 AM in http://www.ww2f.com/topic/2679-if-japan-invaded-the-soviet-union/
The first time the troops from east were used in late Ocotber, but it seems that the troops were not needed to stop the Germans, the weather did it as well as getting no supplies of men and food, but the troops were needed for the counter attack that might have destroyed the whole of Army Group Center.


Kai-Petri Posted 08 March 2003 - 10:10 AM
I am sure as well that the Germans knew [result of Nomohan], how could they not with all their connections to Japan? Hitler probably thought that Blitzkrieg was the best of all tactics, anyway.
Here was a part on T-34´s being used by then...That was not possible. The first versions were tested in March 1940 even though some earlier versions might have been around but none used in August 1939 against the Japs...
Anyway, here´s something I found:

http://zhukov.mitsi.com/Russo.htm

Japan decided that it was not yet ready for an all-out war with the Soviet Union and on 13 April 1941 the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact was signed, with Japan unaware that Hitler would reverse his arrangement with the USSR and launch the Wehrmacht on Operation Barbarossa in June 1941.

The Nomonhan incident and the preceding borderland fights on the contested Mongolian-Manchurian borders, confirmed that in 1938 and 1939 the "Go North" strategy was highly favoured by elements of the Japanese army. Why then, with Germany invaded by the USSR in June 1941, did Japan not then seize the day and mount an invasion of the Soviet eastern republics? On 28 March 1941 the German foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, persuaded Count Oshima, the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, of the merit of joint action to deliver "a crushing blow" on the USSR. Germany sought a Japanese attack on Vladivostok, and into the USSR's central Asiatic republic. Tokyo was not interested.

While the Japanese foreign minister, Matsuoka Yosuke favoured a "Go North" thrust, most civil and military leaders in Tokyo advocated caution. With the Soviet Union now within the Anglo-American camp, albeit with the United States in non-belligerent status, Japan risked attack by the Russians in Manchuria and by the United States at sea. A two front war was undesirable, and likely to be calamitous. The Soviets were well deployed on Manchuria's border, and had shown their determination to fight. In mid-1941 the "Go South" strategy won preference with Japan to secure its needed resources in the south, diplomatically if possible. The Kwantung Army's pride was salved by a reminder that once Japan had secured its goal in the south the contest with the USSR could then be resumed. In any case, it was better to wait until Germany had broken the Red Army and taken Moscow.



Friedrich Posted 16 March 2003 - 09:09 AM

In this matter I do agree with many of you but have to make some important points:
-The Germans obviously knew about the Japanese defeat in Nomonhan.
-The Japanese Army was indeed not equipped to fight the professional Siberian Red Army (you should remember that these forces WERE NOT purged as the rest of the Red Army was), an élite force. And by the huge extention of territory involved it was needed that the Japanese would have bombed with ships and aeroplanes the important ports and cities in Russia's far East. Maybe puting them under siege. And advance inland would have been idiotic! There are 6.000 kilometres of snow and nothing before you reach the Urals and ANY Army was capable of achieving that even if they were adequately equipped... The important matter in here is that if the Japanese, exploiting their naval, aerial and numerical superiority would have attacked Vladivostok and other cities, the Siberian Red Army would have stayed there to fight them and even if the Japanese didn't achieve anything important the Siberian divisions would have remained there. Then who would have counterattacked in Leningrad, Moscow and Rostov? The war would have ended by spring 1942! This didn't require much of the Japanese military power and it could have been done at the very same time than all the other Japanese campaigns in the Pacific in December 1941 and early 1942. We say often that "Japan could not fight a two front war". They DID! In a month they invaded the whole Pacific! From Burma, Thailand and Indochina, Hong-Kong, New Guinea, Guadalcanal, Indonesia, etc., etc. That seems to me like a 10 fronts war...

T. A.. Gardner Posted on 19 October 2006 - 09:16 AM in http://www.ww2f.com/topic/2794-what-if-japan-invaded-russia/
The Soviets did win but not through superior ability as is often credited to them. Zhukov's reputation far exceeds what actually was accomplished against the Japanese.
The Japanese initially put just a single infantry division (the 28th) into the Nomohan area. As the battle progressed a second infantry division was injected (the 7th). The Soviets countered the Japanese with over a corps of primarily mechanized troops (several tank brigades, a mechanized division, several armored car brigades and several cavalry brigades) amounting to something between 5 and 7 times the manpower the Japanese had.
In the air the Japanese had about 100 aircraft committed against what eventually was between 500 and 700 Soviet machines.
The Japanese 28th division was largely destroyed and they suffered several thousand dead. The Soviets lost about 300 AFV and as much as 10,000 dead in return. In the air the Japanese were defeated purely through attrition shooting down at least 5 to 1. Polikarpov, the premier Soviet fighter designer of the period was personally sacked by Stalin due to the pathetic performance of his designs (admittedly in the hands of barely competent pilots up against pros with thousands of flying hours). On the whole though, the Japanese simply lacked the necessary manpower and material to successfully invade or even fight a major war against the Soviets.

T. A.. Gardner In http://www.ww2f.com/topic/2679-if-japan-invaded-the-soviet-union/ Posted 02 July 2005 - 06:00 PM
There are several reasons that a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union, even at the height of the German invasion, would have failed.
First, the Soviets raised a new division for each one sent West from Siberia or Mongolia. The Soviets typically for most of the war maintained about 50 divisions in the Far East facing Japan. They also maintained parity or superiority in artillery and armor to Japan.
Second, the Japanese would have been literally hundreds of miles from the nearest rail head for supply. This means with every mile they advance their supply situation becomes more tenious. At Kalakin Gol the Japanese were 350 miles from their railhead and able to maintain just one infantry division at that position. The Soviets threw the equivalent of a reinforced corps against them and wiped out that divison,albeit at the cost of heavy casualities. But, then again, when have the Soviets ever been overly concerned with casualities?
Third, the Japanese army was in no way fit or capable of sustained large scale continential warfare against a major industrial power.
And, lastly, the Japanese get very little by invading. They don't aquire any major industrial sites, no major resources they really need and, no useful population for labor. If their invasion is for economic gain they get none from this course of action.

T. A.. Gardner Posted 06 July 2005 - 12:07 AM
Why? As I pointed out, the Soviets typically kept about 50 divisions in the Far East throughout the war. The Japanese at their height had about 75 there and for much of the war, far less. Of these, only about 10 or 15 could have been used in an offensive in any case as the rest are engaged in internal garrison of China or in fighting the Chinese Nationalists or Communists. The Soviets began the war with equal or better equipment to the Japanese and far more armor.
They kept a substancial advantage in armor and artillery right through the war (yes, most of the armor were older models like the BT-7 and such but these were substancially better than anything the Japanese had). The Soviets also built much heavier fortifications and made very liberal use of mines; two things the Japanese eschewed form much of the war as defensive and defeatist...not the Bushido way so to speak.
About the only useful thing Japan might have managed out of an attack on the Soviets was conquest of Sakalin Island and its substancial oil reserves.

T. A.. Gardner Posted 07 July 2005 - 11:33 PM
Because while Sakalin's oil was substancial it was far from enough to keep Japan's economy afloat on its own. Taking on a power that had recently thumped you twice is usually not a smart thing to do.


T. A.. Gardner Posted 12 July 2005 - 01:53 AM
Sakalin: It represents about 20% of Soviet oil production. This increased during the war to about 25%.
Forces: Japanese
The Japanese Kwantung Army (the overall command in Manchuria) had about 10 divisions in 1939, 9 infantry and one cavalry. The biggest armored unit was a single tank brigade with about 90 light tanks and tankettes. Additionally, there were 8 brigade sized border guard units occupying various fortified regions of the border. The 2nd Air army with about 100 aircraft total supported the ground troops.
By 1945 the size of the Japanese army in Manchuria had about doubled, at least on paper. However, many of the units were of poor quality and their armament was often inadequite.
In 1941 the Kwantung Army is still, more or less, the size of it was in 1939. The Japanese at this point have a total of 41 divisions in existance, so the Kwantung Army represents about 25% of the entire Japanese Army strength when Germany invades the Soviet Union.
Soviet: On June 22 1941 the Soviets had in the Far East, Siberian, Central Asian and, Trans-Bakal military districts a total of 5 Armies, 16 Rifle corps, and 1 cavalry corps. There were a total of 28 Rifle divisions, 4 Cavalry divisions, 14 Border guard regiments, 3 Rifle Brigades and, 1 Airborne Brigade.
In mechanized units the Soviets had in the same districts:
2 Mechanized corps with 4 Tank Divisions and 2 Mechanized divisions in them. Additionally, there was 1 additional mechanized division, 1 mechanized brigade and , 3 motorcycle regiments in these districts.
The Soviets had about a 5 to 1 advantage in aircraft and about a 7 or 8 to 1 advantage in artillery.
On 1 July 42 the composition was:
7 Rifle corps, 4 cavalry corps, with 52 Rifle divisions, 30 Rifle Brigades and, 23 Cavalry divisions. Mechanized units included: 2 Tank divisions, 19 tank brigades, 2 motorized rifle brigades and, 1 mechanized brigade.
The Soviets still had about the same preponderance of artillery and aircraft they had a year before.
There is little doubt that had Japan attacked the Soviets they would have found themselves in very dire straights within a month or two of opening hostilities. If the US placed an embargo on Japan for increasing hostilites, a very likely proposition, Japan would have been badly hurt economically and in no position to open a war against the US or South East Asia.
chocapic Posted 23 October 2006 - 06:39 AM in http://www.ww2f.com/topic/2794-what-if-japan-invaded-russia/
[Zhukov is] responsible for some heavy blunders (like many other commanders -> this doesn't mean he was a dunce and he was overall one of the best generals/marshals of WWII in my opinion), and so many military errors were blamed on Stalin after he died, just like so many German generals hid behind Hitler's mistakes after the war. When you look at the Soviet total inability to organise any protracted large scale combined arms operation until late 42 begining 43, you can understand the Khalkin Gol victory owes more to numbers and Japan inconsistencies, than genius.

Dasreich Posted 20 October 2005 - 02:15 PM in http://www.ww2f.com/topic/2679-if-japan-invaded-the-soviet-union/page-2
If they had ended the war in China and threw the whole weight of the Kwantung Army into the East, Stalin would have had a problem. Of course even then, I don't think Japan could have made serious gains, as TA Garnder has already pointed out there was little to gain in the Soviet Far East.
Much more substantial is the delay of US entry into the war, as it would have positively impacted Germany's effort in Russia. Add to that with the full weight of the Japanese Army involved against Russia, they would have to withdraw some forces from the West.
This all supposes, though, Japan ended the war in China. There would be no other way to carry out an assault against the Soviets and hope for it not to have drastic and terrible consequences within a year.

from other posters
The Eastern Russian forces were pretty strong and would resist successfully and even repel Germans at the western front without the Siberian transfer, but who knows? Maybe that was all that was needed to tip the balance and if not allow the Germans to beat the Russians outright or at least take out the resources of the Caucasus, it would perhaps create political problems for the USSR that would cause it to collapse and prove Hitler right. I'm not saying it's likely, but this is a what-if after all.
And about whether Japan would get any economic benefits or not it doesn't really see the big picture. What if the Japan invasion allowed Germany to beat USSR and let USA out of the war for far too long. Japan could take care of South Asia later. And then the USA. Now the question is would Japan's contribution help the Germans in the East, not whether they gain eco benefits alone. Sometimes, grand strategy can bring better rewards than short-term planning. You did make a good case about how the Eastern Russian forces were pretty strong and would resist successfully and even repel Germans at the western front without the Siberian transfer, but who knows? Maybe that was all that was needed to tip the balance and if not allow the Germans to beat the Russians outright or at least take out the resources of the Caucasus, it would perhaps create political problems for the USSR that would cause it to collapse and prove Hitler right. I'm not saying it's likely, but this is a what-if after all.

------
I think the above is quite informative on how Japan and the Soviet Union would have or have not acted. Also, the moved industries in the Urals were far from both Japan and Germany so on the map alone, double envelopment on the SU having a impact of the German-SU war is a wishful thinking.

However, if looking at Japan expanding into Outer Manchuria and Sakhalin alone -- that was the Far Eastern Republic's territory in 1920s -- the perspective may be different but the topic was that Japan supposed to help Germany, right ?

 

However, bringing in two points:

1) Japan invasion of Russia would actually help not Germany but Finland

So in fighting the Siberians in Red Army troops -- Japanese troops would have faced if they invaded Russian Far East -- the only recorded worthy opponent were the Finns . Also checking on the numerous Russian leadership during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905, Mannerheim from Askainen, Kolchak from Saint Petersburg, von Rennenkampf from Rapla County in Estonia also served for Russians. All three leaders had different roles afterwards. Samsonov from Kherson Governorate later killed himself during Tanneberg. On geographical perspectives, the three leaders were Baltic origins.

So if Japan invaded the SU, troops would inevitably face Siberians -- officers may have served against the Finns in the Winter and Continuation Wars. However, the impact is small.

2) If Japan halted at occupying Manchuria than attacked only Outer Manchuria and Sakhalin, T. A.. Gardner showed the numbers. What if Japan stay friendly with the SU and helped clandestinely Germany on intelligence ? I think this was indeed part of history -- Richard Sorge was a ww1 German officer and then a Soviet spy. and would have informed the Stavka a fundamental change in Japanese northward policy.