What if MacArthur goes on the offensive in the PI?

Let's see. Marrying tanks with mobile infantry, along with artillery support in the PI could have paid off in big divedends, with a whole different end result to a number of those rear-guard action battles than the historically recorded ones, had those tactics been attempted. Guderian's words of wisdom could have reaped big rewards had they been learned and heeded.

It also seems to me that the Ardennes Region isn't terribly well known for its four lane highways and good communications network, yet somehow. the Germans managed to persevere and win on one occasion, while scaring the hell out of the Allies on another. Mind you, on both occasions this was during a time of Zero or questionable friendly air support.

RE: "good intel" It seems to me that history teaches us that Robert E. Lee held off the much superior in numbers and equipment laden, Army of the Potomac for the better part of three years, before General Grant came in and finally settled his hash. Lee did it all with bluff, innovation, change and adaptation in a constantly changing and fluid battle environment, along with a little help from Jeb Stewart. When in doubt, Lee was no piker and always made it a point to ride towards the sound of the guns.

Lastly, the fact that light tank-infantry teams did so well against dug-in, fortified Japanese positions on islands in the South Pacific means that it could have worked equally well in the PI.

 

Yeah, but only if they had well-trained, well-equipped infantry, and if they had had experienced artillery units with all the prime movers they needed and all the artillery shells they needed, and confidence that they could get resupplied when ammo stocks ran low. And only if the tankers and infantry had been trained inn Blitzkrieg style tactics. Air cover would have been nice, too. And some good intel on where the Japanese were and how many of them were there, not to mention some passable staff work from MacArthur's staff. Only they didn't have any of that.

But the most important thing they needed to make a German style blitzkrieg work that they didn't have was the initiative. No way in hell they were going to get that.

If I recall correctly, The Germans didn't do so well in the Ardennes with tanks when they came up against a determined opponent. Something about the road network, which was far more highly developed than that on Luzon, being unable to support a wide enough advance or to keep the spearhead properly supplied. Gives one some idea of just how poorly Weaver would have fared had he been foolish enough to try to use German tactics.

Lee didn't report to MacArthur.

My, you certainly are taking an awful long leap of faith with that conclusion.

You do realize that conditions later in the war were completely different from those at the end of 1941 on Luzon? I suppose you're going to tell us that the Marines were disciples of Guderian's book?

 

John, D.A., that's quite an interesting discussion. You both shared good points and I'd like to add to that.
DA, you're right when you said that the Japanese had the initiative and were dictating the terms of the battle. However, if I understand John's view correctly, I think he does have a point when he said that Weaver's tanks should have been used more aggressively ("riding to the sound of the guns"). I believe that if those tanks had been committed at the appropriate point, then Weaver could have been in a position to seize the "local" initiative in the area, thus giving time for the US garrison some breathing space and probably a chance to do more.
However, one question remains: Were Weaver and his tanks capable of doing this?
Okay, Weaver might have been a little gun-shy (to put things mildly) but we have to understand the context of the situation he was operating in.
What he had for fuel, spare parts and ammo were what he had. He had no assurance of getting more. Logically, he had to conserve what assets he did have.
On the other hand, the tanks with dedicated infantry support could have a better chance of blunting an infantry attack. The enemy infantry who are advancing wouldn't have fixed positions to fight off the tanks and would thus be put at a disadvantage. The only threat Weaver would have faced was from the air, I think.

Historically, it looked (at least to me) like Weaver erred on the side of caution too often, thus losing opportunities for his unit to influence a battle positively in favor of the US garrison. I've read Guderian's book too and I understand (and even share some of) John's point of view but DA has a point that sometimes, conditions on the ground make it unlikely for such tactics to be practical.
Now a few questions: If Weaver had intervened in Layac, what assets did the Japanese had at that moment to oppose the US light tanks? I don't think the Japanese had at that time a good close air support system, do they?

 

I'm only familar with one tanks action very early in this campaign. From the two version I read a platoon comander took off ahead of a counter attack force, got his five tanks ambushed on a narrow road crossing muddy rice fields, and lost all five to Japanese guns. This sugests a complete lack of understanding of combined arms techniques at the Lts level.

Question: Was Wever a Regualr Army or National Guard officer? I know one of the tank battalions was made up of California NG mobilized the previous winter.

 

Well, my point is that it takes more than a commander just reading a book to create a successful battle doctrine.

First, the conditions have to be right. Luzon, in late 1941, was nothing like Europe with it's network of roads and highways. There was simply no way for an armored force to maneuver or advance in a blitzkrieg style attack. Secondly, the Japanese held air superiority. They never had any kind of coordinated air support system, but they certainly had the ability to turn what few roads existed into death traps for armored forces. They demonstrated this against British motorized columns in Malaya time and again. In addition, the Japanese did have effective anti-tank guns and used them on more than one occasion to stop US armored attacks.

Another necessity is training; The US tank forces in the Philippines had not trained extensively with their supporting arms, so going into battle with a combined arms doctrine which had never been tried out even in exercises was extremely dicey, even if the trained infantry and experienced artillery units had been available.

Finally, a commander about to engage in a blitzkrieg-style campaign can't be hobbled by worrying about his supply, replacements, and losses. Weaver had to worry about conserving his force because it was the only edge the US forces had on the Japanese. He had no idea what he might be called upon to do later, nor even any good idea of what forces he was up against. He had to be cautious because his intel was so sketchy.

It's easy to sit in judgment on Weaver some sixty later and make facile comments of his abilities, but it's only fair to consider some of his concerns, as well.

See my comments above.

I would only add that Weaver was struggling against poor staff work on the part of MacArthur's staff, as if everything else weren't enough of a disadvantage.

 

I have been going over this dormant thread and I found something that I think should be pointed out.
According to what I found as I was reviewing the Hyperwar site, the bren gun carriers that was incorporated into Weaver's unit didn't have any weapons. "Unfortunately, the guns for the carriers were not included in the cargo, and they had to be armed by the Manila Ordnance Depot" the Hyperwar Link narrated.
Does anyone have anymore info on what weapons were used to replace the missing Bren guns? Did the the Manila Ordnance Depot have Bren guns in quantity?
I ask these questions because the information above could significantly alter the effectiveness of Weaver's unit and perhaps explain his apparent hesitancy to have his unit to engaged with the enemy on more than one occasion.
As for Carl's question to whether Weaver was regular Army or National Guard, he's regular Army. It took me time to find the answer. Additionally, according to the "Annual Report of the General Service Schools 1926", Weaver was originally Infantry.

 

I read that the retreating Bren carriers used salvaged machineguns taken from damaged, unflyable US aircraft at various abandoned airfields as they passed; Nichols, Del Carmen and Clark Field to name but a few.

 

Thanks, John. I'm also checking.
If they did salvage their guns, then that indicates that his force would have ammo problems because of the different calibers of the guns they would have recovered. Now that's just conjecture on my part. Another question that comes to mind is this: machine guns are machine guns and a part of me think that machine guns for aircraft might have some special modification that would limit or impair its efficiency when used on another platform or vehicle.
So from this point, Weaver's force, at least in my view, is more of a paper tiger, more of a rag tag force instead of a coherent unit that packs the punch that could have given Mac a chance, however slim, of conducting a counter offensive.

 

Bren gun carriers were generally considered more useful as recon and logistics support vehicles than anything else. They certainly weren't substitutes for real armored vehicles and had no overhead protection for the crews which were exposed to grenades, sniper fire, and especially airbursts, and air attack. Japanese 13 MM heavy machine guns could easily penetrate their armor. Reading about their use in Malaya, it's clear the British limited their use to the road net and that they weren't very effective against the Japanese there. Since the Philippine road net was about as limited as that in Malaya, I seriously doubt that Bren gun carriers would have conferred much additional capability on Weaver's command, with, or without their proper armament.

The Bren gun carrier was a useful adjunct to mobile warfare, the British using them much like the Americans used jeeps, the only real differences being, of course, the tracks and 10 MM side armor. The Bren carrier was fast, about 30 mph on favorable ground, but that meant it was hard on it's tracks, and it was common to carry two complete sets of tracks per vehicle. Being tracked, the Bren carrier required significantly more maintenance than the jeep. There were a huge number of variants, including one with an extra road wheel manufactured in the US as the T-16 cargo carrier. They were used by almost all of the Allied countries, and captured carriers were used by both Germany and Japan.

 

I can't imagine why US Army Air Corps machine guns would have any different calibers than their Army counterparts. IIRC, they only came in two "flavors," .30 and .50 caliber. The guns themselves were all Browning air-cooled models.

I also wouldn't call Weaver's force a "paper tiger" by any means. He had 108 M-3 Stuart tanks, several dozen M-2 half tracks with 75mm anti-tank guns mounted on them, jeeps and all of those bren gun carriers that were meant for the Canadian Garrison of Hong Kong. That's a sizeable force in anyone's book

 

I concede that a hundred Stuart tanks, several dozen M-2 halftracks mounted with 75mm anti-tank guns, plus attached jeeps and bren gun carriers is a sizable force, John. However, the more I look at the subject of Weaver's force and the question of if his unit could've been used as a spearhead for a hypothetical Mac offensive in the PI, the more questions are raised on the quality of his unit. Sure, Weaver had good numbers on paper but it seems to me now after reading more about the subject in the past several weeks, his unit was "raw."
As you rightly pointed out earlier, similar units made a good account of themselves in other areas of the Pacific. However, those units had the advantage of learning the lessons from past mistakes in the use of such units against the Japanese. Weaver and his unit didn't have this benefit.
And as pointed out earlier by DA, Weaver's unit was operating under a hamstrung logistical chain.
I used to think differently but now a part of me have to describe Weaver's force now as a "paper tiger" because of the difficult circumstances he had to face through no fault of his own.

 

I'm not saying that the end results of the campaign would have been any different, but the Americans did stand their ground at a number of places during the long retreat into Bataan. Had large numbers of armor and supporting vehicles been committed to these operations even to the extent of making local counterattacks, it may have badly upset the Japanese timetable for conquest even further, putting them temporarily on the defensive, buying badly needed time for the USAFFE Forces and allowing them to pour more supplies and foodstuffs into Bataan.

 

MacArthur's and his staff had, at least, from July, 1941 until January 6, 1942 to prepare the Bataan peninsula for a protracted defense. Five months was more than enough time, had MacArthur obeyed his orders. MacArthur's orders were to conduct a defense of the Bataan peninsula according to the Rainbow War Plan. Bataan was to have been fortified and supplied with everything needed for an extended period of time prior to the Japanese attack.

MacArthur ignored those orders until December 23, 1941, less than two weeks before the last American and Filipino troops entered Bataan. Even then more could have been done, but MacArthur's staff failed to issue timely orders to move food and other supplies into Bataan. The failure to properly defend Bataan was entirely MacArthur's and his staff's responsibility. Even the most brilliant and courageous of fighting retreats could not have overcome the ill-judgment and tardiness of the Commanding General and his bumbling staff. That Weaver, or any other junior officers, should be held accountable for these failures when they themselves were the victims of deplorable leadership at the highest levels is, at best, ironic.

 

The only reason that any foodstuffs and supplies made it into Bataan in the levels that existed during the siege is because General Beebe took it upon himself, against orders to begin secretly shipping supplies there from the Manila warehouses and Quartermaster depots as early as the second week of December. There was a decided lack of Army deuce and a half trucks to accomplish this task, so local ships and barges were pressed into service. So much ammunition of every type and caliber was sent into Bataan that they never ran out for the duration of the siege.

 

News which, of course, was greeted with great enthusiasm by the starving American and Filipino troops on Bataan.

 

You are forgetting about President Quezon. Had MacArthur abandoned Luzon and fled immediately into Bataan at the start of war, Quezon would have declared Philippine neutrality and tried to cut a deal with the Japanese. He would have stood down the Filippino troops already in uniform and MacArthur would have been left with a few understrength US regiments to fight the Japanese. That's one of the reasons that MacArthur initially went on the offensive against the Japanese, seeking to counter their landings with largely green, untrained Filippino troops.

 

No, I'm not forgetting Quezon. He suggested to Roosevelt that the Philippine Commonwealth be declared neutral, and General MacArthur appended his lukewarm support for the suggestion. Roosevelt said "no" in no uncertain terms, and that was the end of the idea. Quezon did not have the authority to order Philippine troops to "stand down"; they were under Federal control and MacArthur was their commander. MacArthur never went "on the offensive" against the Japanese, but he did try to defend against the landings with poorly trained, ill-equipped, Filipino troops because he had informed General Marshall, in the fall of 1941, that he would soon have nearly 200,000 trained, well-equipped Filipino troops, and to do otherwise would expose his lie.

MacArthur refused to accept WPO-3, and deceived Marshall and Roosevelt as to his ability to successfully defend the entire Philippine archipelago. That deception led to the ill-advised American attempt reinforce the Philippines. MacArthur simply misjudged the entire situation, lied to his superiors, and subsequently allowe the Japanese to destroy his air force on the ground. Had he faithfully followed his original orders Bataan would have held out far longer, although it probably wouldn't haven materially changed the course of the war.

 

I'm still not convinced about Quezon. The two of them were at loggerheads before Pearl Harbor over the defense of the PI and Quezon seriously considered invoking neutrality with or without Washington's blessing. In fact, he lamented America's "Europe First"
war plans while still on Corregidor, saying to the effect that "a distant relative is being threatened far away while a younger sister is being raped here."

Pardon my use of the word "offensive." What I meant to say was that MacArthur's troops sought to counter the Japanese landings at Lingayen Gulf and Lamon Bay. They were unsucessful in their attempts.

I don't agree that MacArthur allowed the Japanese to "destroy his air force on the ground." He ordered Brereton to send the B-17's back to Del Monte on Mindanao until a mission could be flown against Formosa. Brereton instead, allowed the bomber crews to remain at Clark Field to attend a big party in his honor that evening. The bomber crews were already angry at having to extend their tours in the PI. Their actions were bordering on insubordination and Brereton sought to smooth things over. He was much more the cause of the bomber force's destruction than MacArthur was. For the good of the service, it would have been far better had he been courtmartialed and cashiered rather than to go on and be the person responsible for not ordering a second paratroop drop during Market Garden in 1944.

 

John, DA, here's something about Quezon's situation during the Japanese invasion and the matter of declaring neutrality.
In the years before the war, there was a strong debate on how to deal with the Americans in the Philippines, even after the last organized resistance group had been crushed. One side pushed for working within the US system to gain independence. Another group was the Federalists, who maintained that the Philippines should remain under the US. This group died a natural death in the 1960s.
Anyway back to 1941-42, Quezon was with the first group and this group defeated the Federalists. With the Federalists in decline, though still retaining a strong voice, Quezon would have a hard time even within his government to declare neutrality. Though Quezon's group was for independence, both groups have one thing in common: they were both pro-American. This would have discredited Quezon's declaration of neutrality in the eyes of the Japanese.
And if Quezon had actually declared the country neutral, I don't doubt that the US government would have found a way, even on paper, to have someone on the Federalist side take over. Still, such an attempt would just be saving face for the US because with the Japanese already on a rampage in the PI, the US wouldn't be in a position to enforce its decision.
Now a question under John's scenario:
Were there enough airfields in Bataan to base US aircraft in the Peninsula if more had survived the attack on Clark? And if there were, the next question would be what about aviation fuel and spare parts?
Given the historical situation, ammunition was plentiful in Bataan but the rest of the stuff were limited.
Another thing comes to mind: If Macarthur had went on the offensive in the PI and broke through, what then? The PI was already isolated and there was little chance for additional supplies to be sent given the situation in the Pacific.
The only thing that Mac could've achieved with that offensive is to reopen his local supply lines to bring in more food into Bataan. On the debit side, that offensive would've reduced the US garrison's store of irreplaceable fuel and ammo. I don't doubt that the Japanese would've concentrated to crush Mac if he had went on a successful offensive. Such a thing would've been a loss of face for the Japanese and they would move to redeem their honor. Another thing, with the PI still in US hands after that hypothetical Mac offensive, the Japanese (of course, they wouldn't know what we know now) would have a potentially devastating threat to their sea lines of supply and communications.
Given these, a successful Mac offensive would have brought on only partial relief for the US garrison while the Japanese, at least at that stage of the Pacific war, still had the capability to reinforce at will.

 

Well, whether you think Quezon could have unilaterally declared "neutrality" or not, it was a dead issue by the time the Japanese hit the beaches at Lingayan Gulf. If Quezon lamented the "Europe First" policy that was about all he could do about it. The fact is Quezon was a minor player in the big picture and dependent on the US's good will. Had quezon made it difficult for US strategy, Roosevelt would have seen to it that he was replaced in some way.

As for who was responsible for the loss of MacArthur's Air Force, it doesn't matter whether it was Brereton or MacArthur; the planes were destroyed and MacArthur was ultimately responsible. It's a facile argument to say that Mac ordered Brereton to send the planes to Del Monte, when Brereton spent hours on the morning of the 8th., trying to get permission to launch a raid on Formosa. What did Mac and his staff think, that Brereton was going to magically transport them all up from Del Monte? Hell, given the cricumstances, Mac should have at least ASKED where his heavy bombers were? He didn't even do that.