Let's see. Marrying tanks with mobile infantry, along with artillery support in the PI could have paid off in big divedends, with a whole different end result to a number of those rear-guard action battles than the historically recorded ones, had those tactics been attempted. Guderian's words of wisdom could have reaped big rewards had they been learned and heeded. It also seems to me that the Ardennes Region isn't terribly well known for its four lane highways and good communications network, yet somehow. the Germans managed to persevere and win on one occasion, while scaring the hell out of the Allies on another. Mind you, on both occasions this was during a time of Zero or questionable friendly air support. RE: "good intel" It seems to me that history teaches us that Robert E. Lee held off the much superior in numbers and equipment laden, Army of the Potomac for the better part of three years, before General Grant came in and finally settled his hash. Lee did it all with bluff, innovation, change and adaptation in a constantly changing and fluid battle environment, along with a little help from Jeb Stewart. When in doubt, Lee was no piker and always made it a point to ride towards the sound of the guns. Lastly, the fact that light tank-infantry teams did so well against dug-in, fortified Japanese positions on islands in the South Pacific means that it could have worked equally well in the PI.