What if Soviet vs. Germany 1939

The Soviet army of 1939 was largely incapable of conducting any serious military operations due to its various deficiencies. And this was not related to opponent's strength.

The Red Army encountered serious problems even while conducting "relatively blodless" campaigns such as Poland 1939 or completely blodless such as Besarabia.

The fact that they had more numerous and superior (some of them - but not most) tanks would not help them if most of their tanks would be immobilized due to mechanical breakdowns or lack of fuel (as it happened yet after the first several days of the Soviet Invasion of Poland). Just to mention that only on the first day of the Soviet Invasion of Poland some of the Red Army units managed to reach their ordered daily objectives, and the primary cause of that was not the Polish resistance...

The German army of 1939 outclassed the Soviet army of 1939 in almost everything (except for "paper statistics / paper numbers"). Just like two years later on 22 June 1941.

Just to mention examples of Polish-Soviet fights from September 1939 where Poles actually put some determined resistance.

In battles such as Grodno or Szack the Red Army proved totally incapable of quickly defeating a much, much weaker Polish opponent and suffered serious casualties...

Ironically - during initial months of Barbarossa in 1941, most of Red Army's tank casualties were also tanks abandoned due to breakdowns or lack of fuel.

So I am repeating: the Soviet Army had no chance against the German army in 1939; despite numerical superiority.

Khalkhin Gol was a very small-scale operation conducted by forces which were among the best units of the Red Army and under good command.

Conducting large-scale campaigns with massive armies (of much lower average quality) involved was something completely different.

Plus you are underestimating the value and capabilities of Germany's armoured forces in 1939.

I can prove that the value of Germany's armoured forces between 1939 and 1941 improved less than the value of Soviet armoured forces in the same timeframe.

First of all - why you think that Blitzkrieg tactics was underdeveloped in 1939? (not mentioning that tactics of armoured units such as company / battalion and regiment did not change significantly between 1939 and 1941). Secondly - Blitzkrieg is a purely offensive (and very agressive) tactics. In defense you do not use Blitzkrieg.

The Soviets did not have any KV tanks in September 1939.

 

The best of Red Army units were not in the East but in the West guarding Russias gates to Europe, Zhukov too was sent over from the West at the last minute.

It must also be mentioned that khalkin Ghol might be small in comparison to German-Russian aggression but similar in size to conflicts in the West and Pacific....

 

If you look at the Soviet advance into Poland aganist only light opposition you find that the Red Army was disasterously unprepared for offensive action. Columns became confused, the roads were littered with broken down vehicles. Many columns just struggled to move forward and retain some simblance of order. Even with the tanks and equipment they had in 1939 the Germans would have smashed most or all Soviet offensive moves.
I would think that fighting in Poland would also have given the Germans a huge edge in the air. Soviet pilots of 1939 were almost uniformly patheticly trained as evidenced by their performance in China where the Japanese scored on the order of 10 to 1 in kills. This would have drained the Soviet VVS of its "trained" pilots very quickly and likely would have kept them putting very poorly and hastily trained replacements into aircraft that were somewhere between obsolesent and obsolete even by 1939 European standards.

 

And in places where the Red Army actually encountered heavy opposition, they performed rather poorly.

Examples of this are the Polish-Soviet battles of Grodno, Szack, Borowicze-Nawoz, Sarny Fortified Region, Milanow-Parczew and some more ones.

Grodno was defended by ca. 2,000 - 2,500 poorly equipped soldiers, policemen, gendarmes and civilian volunteers without heavy weapons (except for 2 AA guns which were used to fight against tanks). On 21 September the defence was reinforced by further 2 improvised reserve cavalry regiments (each of them numbered few hundred soldiers).

The defence of Grodno lasted from 20 IX to 22 IX (but vast majority of defenders abandonded the city in the night from 21 to 22 IX and retreated to Lithuania).

Soviet forces attacking Grodno were:

27th Tank Brigade - elements:
- command and HQ
- recon battalion
- I. tank battalion
- II. tank battalion
- mot. infantry battalion (?)

20th Motorized Brigade - elements:
- command (?)
- mot. infantry battalion
- recon company
- some artillery

Mechanized Group of 16th Rifle Corps:
- command
- recon battalion
- 364 tank battalion
- 365 tank battalion

Mechanized Group of 6th Cavalry Corps:
- command
- 28 tank regiment
- 31 tank regiment
- two platoons of AA MGs
- mot. infantry battalion (?)

Elements of 5th Rifle Corps ("ad hoc" motorized):
- 119 rifle regiment (from 13 Rifle Division)
- 101 rifle regiment (from 4 Rifle Division)

====================================

Casualties of mechanized units alone amounted to:

27th Tank Brigade - 20 KIA, 18 MIA, 26 WIA (64)
20th Motorized Brigade - 7 KIA, 22 WIA (29)
Mechanized Group of 6th Cavalry Corps - 25 KIA, 110 WIA (135)
Mechanized Group of 16th Rifle Corps - 6 KIA, 5 WIA (11)

In total 239 soldiers in mechanized units alone, without losses of both infantry regiments.

Also infantry units from 5th Rifle Corps suffered heavy loses, which probably amounted to at least:

119th and 101st infantry regiments - ca. 160 KIA, 376 WIA (536)

In total Soviet men losses in Grodno were: ca. 218 KIA + 18 MIA + 539 WIA (775).

AFVs losses were equally heavy and amounted to (tanks + armoured cars).

27th Tank Brigade - 4 destroyed, 26 + 1 damaged (31)
20th Motorized Brigade - 2 + 1 destroyed (3)
Mechanized Group of 6th Cavalry Corps - 1 destroyed, 12 + 1 damaged (14)*
Mechanized Group of 16th Rifle Corps - 1 destroyed, 2 damaged (3)

*Commander - komdiv Jeromienko - lost 3 tanks during the battle and all members of his crew were wounded.
Komdiv Jeromienko himself was WIA during the battle for Grodno too (when his third tank was knocked out).

In total 51 Soviet AFVs were knocked out (mostly by improvised means such as bottles with gasoline, as well as by AA guns).

==================================================

Komdiv Andriej Jeriomienko (commander of 6th Cavalry Corps) about the battle of Grodno in 1939:

"Poles put up strong but completely purposeless resistance (...) For the first time I had an occasion to participate in a tank attack and to get to know about their combat value, to understand the sense of some tactical operations during an attack on big open spaces and in the developed area. This experience rather didn't belong to the category of pleasant experiences: during combats at the outskirts of Grodno the entire crew of [my] tank, which served as a mobile command post, were WIA, and all 3 tanks, from which I was in turn directing combats, were knocked out."

Source: Vladimir Beshanov, "Krasnyj Blickrig", page 91.

Ppor. Rafał Czyżewski - officer serving in surplus unit of 86 pp from the Spare Unit of 19 DP (Spare Unit - OZ - of 19 DP numbered some 1000 men under command of Ppłk. Izydor Blumski) about his combats at the outskirts of Grodno and later (when units of Ppłk. Blumski were pushed from their initial positions into Grodno):

"The enemy struck towards the gardens of Grodno, but was defeated between the fences and is now withdrawing towards Stanislawowo. Simultaneously from the direction of Skidel enemy armour is attacking. Tanks ran over us, but enemy infantry was defeated and after loosing several KIA and captured wounded it retreated towards Skidel. At 11:00 I received an order to withdraw, covered by machine guns, to the Sekret forest. [...] at 12:30 I was encircled by enemy armour and called by Soviet forces to surrender. With heavy casualties I broke through behind the marshland towards Grandicze. Soldiers were fighting excellently, despite the fact that 50% of my company were Belarusians. Our casualties were 2 officers and 57 men. On 21 September in the afternoon we decided to leave the city, this decision was forced by lack of ammunition and enemy superiority. Our units broke away from the Soviets and across Stanislawowo marched towards the Lithuanian border, which was crossed by the Spare Unit of 19 Inf.Div. on 23 September in Kodzie. Soldiers were disarmed and interned, but most of them soon escaped and broke through to the West, to France."

And here I posted something about the mentioned battle of Szack, where also Soviet forces messed up, despite their numerical superiority over the Poles:

http://www.ww2f.com/prelude-war-poland-1939/46961-polish-campaign-question.html#post570336

Broken down - also.

But first of all with vehicles which were left behind due to huge problems with fuel supplies (logistics in the Red Army was disastrous).

Just to mention that by the time of attacking Grodno on 20 September 1939, tank units of 27th Tank Brigade mentioned above:

Had only the following number of operational AFVs:

- recon battalion - 12 tanks and 1 armoured car operational
- I. tank battalion - 17+ tanks operational
- II. tank battalion - 20 tanks operational

In total only 50 or slightly more AFVs still operational on 20 September in the morning (after 3 days of the campaign).

Their initial strength was much bigger and certainly most of casualties suffered so far (until 20 IX) were tanks left behind due to shortage of fuel supplies.

And in the battle of Grodno this brigade lost 30 tanks and 1 armoured car knocked out in combats - 60% of strength at the start of the battle.

27th Tank Brigade was equipped mainly with BT tanks: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BT_tank

Also Polish fighter pilots managed to score 3 confirmed kills on Soviet planes (not sure if fighters though) during the first hours of 17 September before the evacuation of entire Polish Air Force to Romania. Other sources say that even 7 Soviet planes were claimed by Polish pilots in their - even more obsolete than Soviet - fighters.

This was achieved without own losses (however, some recon, observation and liaison Polish planes were shot down by Soviet Air Force in 1939).

 

In 1939 Russia was not ready for military confrontation. In 1941, Russia too was not ready and the war took 4 years, how long would this war take? Considering that a dragged out affair would benifit Russia as it historically had I fail to see Germany' long term capabilities.

Also, from 1939-41 Germany was receiving countless of "goodies" from the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. A conflict in 39' would negate any such luxury..... And how would Germany overcome the alliance between GB, France and Poland?

 

This is a good point indeed.

Well if we assume that there is a coalition of GB, France, Poland (not yet defeated) and the USSR against Germany, then I guess the outcome is obvious.

When it comes to ammunition:

By the end of August Germany had considerable ammunition stockpiles. These would be enough for around 5 - 8 months of very intensive war (with average monthly ammo expenditure similar to that on the Eastern Front in period June 1941 - October 1944, which was ca. 130,000 tons monthly for ground forces).

Ammo usage in Poland (ground forces) in September 1939 was ca. 100,000 tons (by a smaller army than that on the Eastern Front between 1941 and 1944).

Probably the average German monthly usage of ammo in the alternative Soviet-German conflict in 1939 would also be closer to 100,000 tons (or lower) than to 130,000 tons considering that sizes of both armies were smaller than on the Eastern Front in 1941 - 1944.

However if Germany was forced to fight a two-front war they would expend much more ammunition monthly. And their ammunition production was not yet high enough to cover current expenditure even in case of one-front war.

There would be also considerable problems with supplies of air bombs after the first several months.

Total German pre-war reserve was 69,015 tons of bombs, including:

1,502,600 bombs 10 kg
700,000 bombs 50 kg
47,300 bombs 250 kg
9,500 bombs 500 kg

And German expenditure of bombs in September of 1939 was ca. 22,000 tons, including:

100,300 bombs 10 kg (% expended = 6,7%)
295,350 bombs 50 kg (% expended = 42,2%)
16,540 bombs 250 kg (% expended = 35,0%)
1,709 bombs 500 kg (% expended = 18,0%)

This was an exceptionally high monthly expenditure of bombs (for example Soviet monthly expenditure of air bombs on the Eastern Front was much smaller in 1941, 1942, 1943 and 1944 - and only in 1945 it was higher: ca. 24,000 tons monthly).

But even with smaller expenditure rates, current production would most probably be insufficient.

 

One critical factor is that the Soviets supplied Germany with enough resources to last the war. With out the oil, grain, and other raw materials the Soviets supplied the German economy would have collapsed quickly. The Germans probably would have done okay in the first battles, but considering the lack of infrastructure the Germans would have had difficulty advancing beyond SMolensk.