What if the German armies in Stalingrad attempted to break out?

Ok, i will go with your figures, now take this senario, Hitler on the 25th November 1942 just a day after the encirclement orders Stalingrad evacuated as it is a lost cause and that at all cost orders Army Group B's commander General von Weichs to do everything he can to force a breakout of Stalingrad, are you saying that with those forces working together could not force at least a complete or partial breakout.

 

One problem that the germans had in breaking out of difficult situations during the war, was the ever present lack of transport and fuel.

To get any out of Stalingrad the Germans would have to do what Rommel did to the Itallians. A motorised force break out, and the rest are trapped.

 

Yes, a breakout would take place but where to stop is the next question? There are no defence lines where to retreat to really (?), and the only closer reserves are probably in the army group A which is fighting in the Caucasus. In fact if you retreat too fast you actually end up with the AG A being in trap in the Caucasus which would mean some 400,000 more men in trouble.

 

I would amass all the panzers and armoured fighting vehicle i could muster drain as much fuel from damaged vehicles (then set them on fire, as to deprive the Soviets of war material) then withdraw those vehicles to the where to weakest point of the encirclement and have General von Weichs attack with what he can muster. And rely on Luftwaffe support to send in as many aircraft as possible to attack Soviet troops and then launch fierce counter attacks on the rear of the Soviets (Facing the 6th Army) forcing the breakout.

Then after a breakout is achieved i would then make a stand on the western bank of the River Don (on the proviso that the Soviets had yet to cross it), With Army Group A i would withdraw it and send it into Rostov and dig in along the northern bank of the River Don.

 

The problem here is that the Soviets are already on the west side of the Don, and in strength. That was what 14th, 16th, and 24th Panzer from 4th Panzer Army were fighing starting on about the 19th. These units were struggling to hold open bridgeheads across the Don to 6th Army.....without success. By the 22nd the bridgeheads were gone and 6th Army encircled.
The problem for the Germans relieving 6th Army are really two-fold:

First, there is a lack of available units to break the encirclement. Units like 29th PzGr tried and failed. The problem here was that the counterattacking units were badly weakened from months of fighting. Panzer divisions had less than a battalion of tanks typically. Infantry battalions were down to just a few hundred effectives on the line in most cases. Compounding this were political stupidities like Luftwaffe Field Divisions that were thrown into the attack and ground up for nothing.
On top of all this, AGC was also having to fight for its life as the Soviets were attacking their sector too. Rezev and Velieki-Luki were two salients under assault and holding on by a thread. So, the rest of the German army in the East could not send much help to AGS for a counteroffensive.
As for the Luftwaffe, it was virtually ineffective. Its bomber units could either supplement the air lift into 6th Army or conduct offensive operations. Either way, it lacked the resources to do this on a sustained level. Many of its forward air bases were either vulnerable to Soviet attack or were so bad in terms of maintenance that they posed severe operational limitations on flying.

The second problem was one of logistics. The Germans were at the end of a very tenious supply line and simply were not getting what they needed to really fight an offensive war in the East at this point.

In the final analysis, AGS's problems began before their offensive and were only multiplied as they advanced. The solution is not found when 6th Army is threatened with annhilation but before the offensive begins several months earlier.

 

I can't agree more. As Manstein would put it: "Yet the fact that Sixth Army could ever land in such a situation at all was due to the operational errors committed BEFOREHAND by the Supreme Command in the planning and execution of the 1942 offensive, most of all with regard to its final stages."

Manstein on the Supreme Command: "While Hitler may have had an eye for tactical opportunity and could quickly seize a chance when it was offered to him, he still lacked the ability to assess the prerequisites and practicability of a plan of operations. He failed to understand that the objectives and ultimate scope of an operation must be in direct proportion to the time and forces needed to carry it out-to say nothing of the possibilities of supply. He did not - or would not - realize that any long-range offensive operation calls for a steady build - up of troops over and above those committed in the original assault. All this was brought out with striking clarity in the planning and execution of the 1942 summer offensive. Another example was the fantastic idea he disclosed to me in autumn 1942 of driving through the Caucasus to the Near East and India with a motorized army group"

Like I said before, the command chain of the Wehrmacht was the most serious problem for Germany. That is why Operation Barbarossa, Operation Blue, and the Ardennes offensive failed.

 

Hitler´main mistake, in my opinion, seems to be his ultimate belief that the Red Army reserves are close to zero in late 1942, especially after the big wins in Kharkov spring 1942 and Crimea later on with huge losses for the Soviets, he did not believe the poor defending towards Stalingrad was due to new strategy but to having no men anymore.

However I never have seen that the August 1942 battles in Rzhev area in any way affected Hitler´s views for the campaign as Zhukov sent tanks after tanks to crush the AGC ( See the david Glanz book Zhukov´s biggest defeat ). One of the problems may be that Hitler was informed of everything but when he negotiated with Generals they only knew what Hitler told them. His way to keep the Generals quite/happy...

 

Many idiots believed that, and Hitler was one of them. But it was the command chain of the Wehrmacht that made it possible for such a believe to dictate the operational plannings.

 

Im not sure that "idiots" would be the word of my choosing. As Kai correctly pointed out the German high command only established that the Soviet Union would be able to mobilize no more then 300 divisions. However in 1938 the Soviet Union passed a law raising the age of recruitment to 50 ( I believe ) this opened up an additional pool of 14million men which by the time of the invasion had at least some sort of basic training.

There was no way that the German Intelligence could know this, as you can imagine they were quite suprised and shocked when the Soviet Union was able to raise double the amount of divisions which the Germans predicted.

As for the operational planning, it worked quite well until the 7th month of Barbarrosa

 

Here is an open challenge to Sloniksp and T.A Gardner, you are now Generaloberst Friedrich Paulas and in command of German and Axis units in Stalingrad and Operation Uranus has taken place and after consideration Adolf Hitler on the 25th November issues a Fuhrerdirektive and orders the evacuation of Stalingrad.

You have under your command anywhere between 250,000 to 330,000 men and you have to get them out of Stalingrad Cauldron, Surrendering is not an option. How would achieve this task and as i said surrendering is not an option.

 

Im sure that T.A. would do a better job then me on the subject.

Frankly I have no idea.

Those 250,000 men are far from good shape. A large number are wounded and freezing. There is no motorized transport available for such an operation. Their only real hope perhaps might be the horses but a large number were either lost to gun fire or were eaten by the starving men, 39,000 alone just in December ( the following month. ) The 100 tanks they had would have been easily cut down by artillery and Soviet tanks along with aircraft as Russia had air supperiority. The weather would have played a huge role and NOT in the favor of the Germans as they ( while fleeing on foot ) would probably be close to a knee deep in snow. I would imagine that perhaps the wounded ones might be left behind as to not slow them down?


Banzai charge

 

So if you have no idea then at least give credit to those who do at least give it a shot no matter how preposterious it is.

Regards.

 

Ok I'll bite and give an answer. First off, I doubt it would work and probably would lead to near original results but it is a shot at saving 6th Army.

1. Army Group A (in the Caucasus) is ordered to immediately cease offensive operations to the south and east and redeploy as follows:
17th Army will withdraw and form a new defensive line based on the Kerch River and secure the area around Rostov. This will form the basis for a future new offensive operation into the Caucasus.
1st Panzer Army in its entirety will begin a withdrawal with the intent of counterattacking into the southern arm of the Soviet salient to take pressure off 6th Army.

6th Army, with those reminants of 4th Pz Army that are now being encircled, is to do the following:

The various infantry divisions will immediately regroup under designated division HQ reforming in place under a single division number per three divisions. The excess division HQ personnel will be reassigned to other duties necessary for the breakout as outlined below. The commander's intent here is to try and re-orgainze by combination the infantry divisions into a few actually near-full-strength units under a unified command. It is better that a single battalion of near full strength be holding a sector than three weak battalions.
All non-divisional motorized transport will immediately be pooled under the command of a division staff designated for this purpose.
All non-divisional artillery of non-standard calibers and those not having ammunition will immediately be disbanded. All other non-divisional batteries will be reassigned to a division to supplement their artillery.
All engineering assets, divisional and non-divisional are to be grouped under a division staff designated for the purpose. These units will immediately be assigned duties to maintain roads, rail lines, and airfields along with providing these basic security. These units are to have first use on all horse transport.
The units of 4th Panzer Army are to immediately move to secure at least one, and preferably two crossing points on the Don River for 6th Army movement West. The available flak regiment (which is motorized) will move to secure these crossing sites and then relinquish their vehicles for evacuation (when time comes this unit will be withdrawn without equipment).
The Luftwaffe is requested to make a maximum effort to attack Soviet combat units and columns with particular emphsis on armor and artillery units. Normal transport units should continue to air lift in supplies and evacuate troops as possible.
6th Army will form a "roving pocket" and attempt to move West as quickly as possible with the intent of getting a good portion of the pocket across the Don. This will greatly increase the likelyhood of relief or escape.
The non-trapped portion of 4th Panzer Army will immediately attack to the South to put pressure on the Soviet units encircling 6th Army.
The main thrust of relieving units should follow rail lines East from Stalino towards Stalingrad. AGC and AGN will sent 50% of their railway engineers to Stalino immedately to begin work with those of AGS to open and maintain a rail line forward from that point to allow supply of the relief force and an eventual means of moving 6th Army out of the pocket.

With some luck and alot of reinforcements from the West, such as units now in France, it might be possible to open a hole for 6th Army to withdraw through with a loss of say 30 to 40% of its forces and the majority of its equipment. However, saving say 150,000 men would be useful even if they were largely equipped with little more than small arms.

 

Thank you T.A.Gardner, a most insightful post, i had already postulated using a Walther Model style "rolling offensive" but was critised for it.

Now the most important question and that is the date of your attempted breakout, what is the expected date of your breakout, leaving it for more that several days after the completion of the encirclement is doomed as by this stage as Soviet defenses have been dug in, traditionally the best time to breakout of an encirclement is within 24 hours of it being made, due to that it is difficult to fortify the entire perimeter, their are expected gaps in the encirclement.

Regards.

 

The breakout would have to start by 18 November at the latest and preferably by the 15th. Otherwise, the Soviets are already closing the noose and doubling or tripling the difficulty of moving West.

 

Which would mean before Uranus would actually take place, as the offensive started on the19th.?

 

Ouch, hit the mark, i would have launched my breakout on the 25th November a day after the encirclement had been completed but not yet fortified.

 

What do you want? I had to do that stuff off the cuff at work. The retreat needs to start several days before the encirclement is even halfway complete. It would have been best to start the day the Soviets attack, at least towards making preparations in case they actually succeed.
It was the height of arogance that the Germans, and Palaus in particular, did nothing other than note that the Soviets had launched a counter offensive. Instead, Palaus (in our scenario) should have immediately made plans and taken actions to counter the Soviet attack(s) particularly given the weakness of his flanks being held by the Romanians and Italians. Palaus knew these units were weak. He had bolstered them some with a few German units. The Italian 8th Army was put into position specifically to shore up 6th Army's northern flank.
Yet, Palaus did little or nothing but instead continued offensive operations against Stalingrad. Ok, start on the 19th with the full withdrawal and redirection of forces by the 22nd at the latest.

 

My point exactly, once the encirclement was complete, so was the fate of the mighty 6th army.

 

Here is the original question.

I have addressed that question with an attempt on the 25th November 1942 a day after the encirclement, with a Walther Model rolling breakout from the east and a sustained counter-attack from Heers Gruppen B from the west, into this i would effectively send in every available luftwaffe aircraft i could to area bomb the Soviets within the two German forces.

It sounds impossible, and maybe it is doomed from the outset, but then again it may have worked.