Equipment wasn't nearly the problem leadership, training, and organization were for Italy. First, the Italian infantry division was, in a word, organized like crap. The binary organization was far too weak for anything but occupation duty. The organization at battalion and company level remained much as it had in WW 1 making these units clumsy and inefficient. The same goes for artillery. Italy was still practicing WW 1 techniques for fire direction for the most part. Without more flexible artillery fire direction and technique they were really, again, only useful on the defensive. The Italian armored divisions were tank heavy, infantry light formations without adequate artillery and engineering support. Giving them better tanks won't change the organizational failure of their units. In 1940 the M13/40 was a adequate tank. It performed miserably much of the time because the crews and commanding officers didn't know how to utilize it properly and lacked the combined arms support the Germans had. In terms of leadership, there was a massive gulf between officers and men in the Italian army. In many units the men had little confidence in their officers and were often poorly trained as well. There were some Italian units that performed brilliantly and with incredible bravery, but were let down more by poor doctrine and organization than poor equipment.