What if...the Japanese had landed troops in Hawai'i immediately after bombing Pearl?

I think the CA's did actually fire some rounds at Midway. See Shattered Sword but that emphasizes the fact that it wasn't done by BBs. Indeed until the need to take out Henderson became paramount the use of BBs in this roles seems to have been anathema to the Japanese.

Not quite. In the historical case asside from the radar of which they were unaware being ignored little the assumptions were pretty reasonable and the risk controlable. In this case if the BBs for instance are detected on their run in Japan risk not just a couple of CVs but her battle fleet as well. Furthermore the probability of detection is much higher.

My understanding is the Japanese had some problems in recovering their aircraft during the historical raid in particular the 2nd wave becasue of weather conditions. If similar weather conditions occur on the morning of the 7th the battle fleet and troops are left sitting ducks. If it had occured during the historical raid the CVs could have returned to Japan or run out and back in again the next day. No one was counting on them.

No it's not the same. With a third wave there is a much greater chance that the planes are followed back or bomber are sent back down their approach vector. Furthermore CAP isn't going to be very effective after dark even if it's up which it won't be.

They weren't verry effective hitting maneuvering targets that could see them and the bombs they dropped. Given the fact that the CVs wouldn't neccessarily be even aware of the bombers, the fact that they would be traveling at a consistent speed in a strait line into the wind, and would be lit up the P(H) goes up considerably.

What do you look for if you are looking for sabatours? People sneaking around under cover of darkness.

Note also you have to be a very good shot to count on a quick kill with a silenced pistol. Oh by the way what did the Japanese have available in that regard (I'm not the first to ask this but haven't seen an answer yet).

 

See: Aircraft at Pearl Harbor
for army planes. Not exactly what you asked for as some of the damaged planes would be up and flying within 48 hours. And of course if the raid was given away more US planes would probably be available. Then there's the planes on Enterprise which could probably have launched a strike vs any Japanese ships near Oahu on the 7th.

They did but they were convinced the Japanese CVs were South West of Oahu and so that's where they searched.

 

Let me get this straight. You have 6 converted destroyers beaching themselves on Oahu during the night, transports anchoring offshore and unloading ninjas on shore, covered by 8 BB's providing inaccurate shore bombardments, AND you STILL think a 0800 air strike will catch the US off guard, decimating the US fleet at anchor? Whatever drugs you are on, it sounds like fun, maybe you should share?

Can I ask why you think that preventing sabotage of beach defenses would not be occurring? Sabotage was not being watched for on airfields only.

It simply is not as easy as that. Wake wasn't taken until December 23. Where were those transports earlier? You stated what went where earlier with this

Why should we believe any of your assumptions on this when you can't pull out a calculator and double check the numbers on your ATL allocations. Where is Japan purchasing German shipping from? Are these ships stuck in Japanese controlled ports? Please explain to me why you are canceling other operations, and then not allocating 200,000 tons of shipping to anything?

Yes, but not battleships. They were the principle piece in the decisive battle. Far to precious for use as shore bombardment.

No, light cruisers were used in Wake 1. Even then it was mainly to provoke a reaction out of the marine defenders. Note that this shelling accomplished nothing. Latter in the day the Japanese would lose two destroyers, and suffer sever damage to three cruisers and at least two destroyers IIRC. Wake 2 had no pre-bombardment of defenses and a night time attack that was pretty much not going anywhere by morning.

So you admit Japan can't hit much with what you propose.

Yes, Japan excepted the risks that they might lose two-three carriers. So why, If Japan thinks the US will spot the KB before launching it's attack, should you assume that an invasion will make it onshore before anyone notices?

This entire argument of yours is nothing more than a wet dream. Japan simply didn't have the possibility to do this at any time.

Let's just say for a minute that Japan does take Hawaii. What about the Philippines that are still held by the US, straddling the supply route back to Japan. What about the natural resources Japan needs that they now can't get, because instead of moving south toward the resources Japan is fighting east to maintain what it has conquered to no advantage to themselves. Your entire argument reminds me of the movie Hot Shots Part Duex. Thats the beauty of my plan. We will bring them here and kick there ass so we don't have to cross the world to get to them.

 

I'd suggest http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/7Dec41/7Dec41-B.html which has some slightly differing surviving aircraft totals.

Please consider than in my ATL scenario, IJN battleships working over Ameriacn airfields with aircraft adjusted main gunfire would be highly likely to reduce these numbers even further. In addition to taking out more storage buildings for warplane spare parts which would slow overnight repairs.

All of http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/7Dec41/7Dec41-7.html makes for a good read as it describes the OTL search for the Japanese carriers that you asked about.

Pages #12/13 of http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/7Dec41/7Dec41-1.html describe how Oahu tests had recorded that USAAF fighters alerted by radar COULD be airbourne within 6 minutes and could intercept a simulated air strike some 30 miles offshore.

Unfortunately for the American defenders of Oahu pages #15/16 of http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/7Dec41/7Dec41-1.html report:

"Tyler was there to observe how the system worked and assist the controller with the pursuit aircraft after they had launched. In no way was he responsible for, or for that matter expected to know how to activate, the air warning system. The most he could have done was call Bergquist (now a major) and let him know what was going on. It is unlikely that such a call would have helped the Hawaiian air defense that fateful morning, because the third and final part of the air warning system, aircraft ready to launch, was not set up at all.[SIZE=-1]18[/SIZE]

The whole purpose of the air warning system was to launch interceptor aircraft against would-be aggressors; yet, no aircraft were ready to launch and attack the enemy that morning. If the Hawaiian Air Force was expected to defend the islands, why were no aircraft on alert?

Within the answer to this question is the basic reason the Japanese attack on Oahu was so successful. Few, if anyone, in the Hawaiian Department felt the Japanese would attack Hawaii despite many indications that an attack on Hawaii was possible. Rather, most people considered the Hawaiian Islands a staging area from which the US Navy would sortie against predetermined targets. It was also commonly believed the Imperial Japanese fleet would attack Singapore or Malaysia, or possibly even the Philippines.

Although some Hawaiian Air Force units held exercise and full alerts on Oahu, and others deployed under field conditions, there was an air of make-believe to the deployments. When they were over, people would carefully clean and put away the equipment and ammunition for the next exercise. During the week preceding 7 December, the entire Hawaiian Department, by order of General Short, engaged in a full scale exercise for seven consecutive days. Army units from Schofield Barracks deployed, antiaircraft units drew ammunition and set up stations all over the island, and the Hawaiian Air Force armed aircraft and dispersed them to protective revetments. The warning center was fully operational and launched aircraft against simulated attacking targets.

General Short considered this exercise a great success. After its cancellation on 6 December, personnel returned to the barracks, carefully cleaned and repaired the guns and equipment, removed the ammunition and repacked it in storage containers, and returned the aircraft to their main bases to be reparked close together because Alert One was still in effect. After doing this, each command gave the troops the rest of the day off and told them to report to work Monday. When and if war began, General Short and the other senior commanders in Hawaii felt they would be given plenty of warning to begin long-range reconnaissance, set up communications between the Army and Navy, staff the aircraft warning center, and arm and disperse available aircraft ready for deployment against the enemy. The fleet would sortie, and the Japanese would find a sky full of American aircraft, piloted by well-trained personnel eager to defend the island.[SIZE=-1]19[/SIZE]"

I think it an eye-opening information, don't you ? Even with warning there would be no serious US fighter response other than for the few that were stashed at Haleiwa Field for training flights.

 

So all these troops and Naval Assets in the Phillipines, Guam, Wake and Singapore are just going to twiddle their thumbs?

Also, if Japan forgoes their other operations in the Pacific and diverts all of it resources to the invasion of the Hawaiian Islands wouldn't it be prudent for them to preserve as much of the petroleum stores as possible? and not go shelling willie nillie from the very edge of their naval gunfire range.

So now you are using the reactions of the Historical Timeline to judge responses for your "ATL". Outstanding non biased research there.

So you are saying that the Japanes fleet can resupply over a distance 3,840 miles in two weeks and the US Navy can't cover 2,390 miles in 10 days?........when they are being invaded!

You seem to forget that the US was already tooling up and supplying Brittain so there were available stores on the west coast.

Again you have interjected the Historical Response to your "ATL" it is safe to assume the Alternative Reaction of the US to Your "ATL" would be to devote the majority of the US effort on the defeat of Japan, instead of the defeat of Germany, wich would free up the majority of the Atlantic Fleet to deal with your "ATL"

IN order for those guns to produce the results of first round on target total destruction accuracy the ships they are fired from would have to be within 8NM of Schoefield Barracks and have spotter planes adjusting their fire. It is important to note that Schoefield Barracks is located in a saddle of two mountain ranges 10 miles inland from the nearest water. It is safe to assume that as soon as the spoter plane was spotted or the first 16" volley missed everyone would be awake. Thats assuming of course that the Japanese CAs and BBs could get within a mile of the coast.

Again you have based the success of your "ATL" with the US response and preparations from the Historical time line.

Your thinking is flawed

 

I concur

If they were Ninjas wouldn't they use throwing stars and poisoned darts, or would that be too foolish to imagine?

A bus full of Japanese staff officers riding around in a bus through Thailand with bar girls would raise considerably less eye brows than a similar bus loaded with english speaking Super Ninjas in American uniforms flicking throwing stars out of the windows.:ninja:

I think someone spent too much time playing "Dungeons and Dragons" and "World of Warcraft".

:feedtrolls-sign:

 

That would be me but I still don't buy this one....

 

The drydocks themselves, made from very thick steel reinforced poured concrete would be extremely difficult to damage at all. The floating hollow steel caisson gates that closed their harbor ends however would be a much easier target.

A single torpedo could flood and thus shift shift each so as to allow the drydock to quickly fill with water. A bomb hit on such a thin caisson target would be difficult to achieve though.

Any ships being worked on inside the drydock at the time would of course be flooded also if their hulls were open for repairs. Even a warship being knocked off of it's wooden support blocks could do much damage.

Rather than being targeted by a 3rd wave the few caisson drydock gates would best be targeted by the 1st wave since USN AA fire would be at it's least for that strike wave.

IIRC the USS Pennsylvania had three propeller shafts removed for repairs at the time of the OTL air attacks so an ATL torpedo hit on her drydock gate would have seen her flooded and on the bottom of Pearl Harbor also.

The fact that the drydocks themselves would not be greatly damaged by an anti-caisson attack is a bonus for my ATL invading Japanese. The Americans would be denied the immediate use of yet another battleship or the repair of minor flotation damage. Yet once Oahu was captured, simple warship repair welding techniques could be used to quickly get the caissson gates operational again for IJN use instead.

In the OTL the USN's tankers and fuel storage tankfarms weren't on Nagumo's target list at all. With Yamamoto in charge of my ATL Oahu invasion and Yamaguchi running the KB's carriers, rather than too timid Nagumo, the oilers USS Neosho and the USS Ramapo would certainly be.

Not the fuel storage tankfarms though.

While unlikely that the Americans would not destroy them if the ATL Japanese invasion was succeeding, I think that Yamamoto would continue to hope that some might be captured intact. Besids which, thick black smoke from massive tankfarm fires might block the lines of sight for the CF's orbiting spotter floatplanes.

A risk to be balanced against the additional shock of a surprise invasion actually being launched against Hawaii, America's (only) Pacific Fortress.

Please keep in mind that a 3rd air wave would have been able to cause much other Oahu damage if not targeting Oahu's fuel storage tankfarms. More combat air patrol fighter sweeps on still burning USAAF airfields would further reduce American warplane numbers and thus reduce the risk to the Japanese ships just off shore. More IJN fighters on CAP over Oahu would ensure the safety of CF spotter planes while keeping the USN's BB spotter planes grounded.

Any US Army troop concentrations finally getting moving on Oahu's very limited roadgrid could be easily interdicted at road and railway bridge locations..

American ammunition retreival from the Aliamanu Crater Ammunition Depot could be greatly harassed/ bombed/straffed so as to practically close the only (two lane) road leading in and out.

Any CAC atillery batterys proving to be troublesome to the Japanese invaders could be bombed/straffed.

Indeed such a 3rd wave would greatly aid the Japanese invaders in a multitude of ways..

Not on the west and ESE Oahu coasts.

I do not believe that the OTL Japanese felt that they needed 3:1 odds to beat western troops. IIRC they took Hong Kong, all of Malaya, then Singapore at 1: 1 or less than 1:1 odds. Luzon was taken at leass than 1:1 although I will grant that most Allied troops there were untrained Philippino recruits. After a long seige, fortified Corregidor was taken by the first landing wave ashore at something like 3,000 Japanese and a few tanks vs. 15,000 Americans.

If my ATL initial surprise landings are achieved, I don't expect that 6+ Japanese divisions would have been required. if surprise was not achieved it would be best for my ATL Japanese invaders to turm for home anyway.


Last but not least, please see:

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/7Dec41/maps/7Dec41-2.jpg for a stylized Oahu map that may help to make things more clear for readers here.

OTOH you might prefer MAP II - OAHU ISLAND instead ?

 

I have already mentioned these three PBYs in my "counterclockwise around Oahu" posting. It is my understanding that the USN PBYs based at Kaneohe NAS were a mixture of PBY-3s and PBY-5s but that neither sported wheels for dryland operations. That means water takeoffs, an EXTREMELY dangerous operation in ther darkness. As I have previously typed my information is that these 3 daily PBYs took off at 0630 every day for a counterclockwise flight around Oahu. Once they reached the Pearl Harbor entrance channel at 0700, one would orbit to aid the gateguard destroyer there (the USS Ward on Dec.7'41) in ASW sweeps while the other two flew further south to check the USN's usual operating/training areas south of Honolulu for possible submarines.

This is one of the reasons that my ATL attacks are scheduled to start at 0615 (or 15 minutes earlier in a few special cases) on Dec.7'41. ATL Japanese landing barges from the Chichibu Maru (Asama Maru class), anchored just offshore in Kaneohe Bay, would be inbound towards the north and west shores of Kaneohe NAS just as the 3 PBYs would be very noisily warming up their engines there for their normal 0630 takeoffs.

Additional IJA troops would have landed south of Kaneohe NAS during the hours of darkness, from the Asama Maru, and would be waiting in cover to begin their 0615 attacks on that American airfield from the south side.

Also to be mentioned are the 4 PBYs that departed from Ford Island NAS for an unusually scheduled ASW training mission with 2 inbond US submarines some 200 miles east of Oahu. There was no way that the OTL or ATL Japanese could have known about this one since it was NOT a regularly scheduled air mission. The 4 flyingboats made their own water takeoffs just after sunrise and flew south out over Mamala Bay to also sweep the USN's fleet operating/training areas (two 25mile x 25 mile boxes) which began some 25 miles south of Oahu. Before turning dead east towards their scheduled ASW training rendezvous.

Only by pure luck, they would have missed my ATL Japanese invaders by flying past some 50 miles to the south.

 

My mistake. Capt Trimble would have been using a Navy SCR radio mounted in his jeep. The Navy and Marine Corps had been using them since 1939.

Let's see. Ships don't just appear magically out of the darkness and start disgorging armed troops into landing boats without telling someone in the military hierarchy about it. In this case, a completely unknown, "blacked-out" ocean liner anchors in a restricted military area, without giving any notification whatsoever of their presence, business, or even a flashed call-sign, on a calm night, at a time when a War Warning from Washington DC had recently been issued to all Pacific Commands. This would probably stir up some interest, especially once the bullets started flying.

Trimble was not firing at the Japanese invaders. His three round burst of pistol fire was a "stand-to" alert signal that would bring all the troops under his command to full battle readiness. Any Marine Officer worth his salt would actively seek to ready his men for war, considering that since the massive expansion of the Marine Corps, the year before, his Second Lieutenants were mostly "green, 90 day wonders" and the majority of his enlisted men had been in uniform for less than a year. Luckily, his NCO's were all hardened, long service members of the "Old Breed", a combination of ex-China Marines, Bananna Wars veterans and some veterans from the Great War. Trimble, seeking to prepare his men for a war that everyone knew was coming, volunteered his men of the defense battalion for night time beach defense duty, complete with live ammunition, foxholes and interlocking fields of fire for his automatic weapons. Trimble gave the order and his NCO's made it happen.

Strangely enough, Outerbridge's incident with the USS Ward was not the first time that depth charges had been dropped on submarines operating in the restricted zone. The week before, the USS Arizona avoided a periscope sighting from an unknown submarine by zig-zagging away. Had that Japanese midget submarine fired a torpedo into the Ward or Antares, that surely would have gotten the USN's attention.

 

Since they tried very hard to land their troops on beaches "where the enemy wasn't" they didn't often neeed BB gunfire support.

Not at all true.

There was a Feb.25'42 incedence of two IJN BBs (Haruna & Kongo)bombarding Christmas Island (the one down near Timor, not the one near Palmyra) so they could indeed do it if they needed to.

No pain, no gain. If the Japanese want to win their long sought "Decisive Battle" against the American Fleet, then they DO actually have to fight it, don't they.

Everyone here seems to keep typing that yet no one details how such would happen. Yoshikawa's last 1801 Dec.6'41 coded telegram telling Tokyo that the Americans were flying NO long range recon patrols out of Oahu can be seen at ttp://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/411206cx2.html . Nagumo got a Tokyo radio rebroadcast of that message at 0200 on Dec.7'41 so he KNEW going in that there was very little chance of the Americans spotting his force. My ATL Japanese would have AT LEAST that same info if not more.

Indeed they did have several planes damaged during 2nd air wave landings but such was a risk that they accepted in order to hammer America's Pacific Fleet.

You assume, with no proof that you have presented, that the OTL Japanese had no idea of weather conditions expected just 12 hours later. I'd think the daily Honolulu newspapers and radio stations to be accurately forcasting at least one or two days ahead, not less than 12 hours ahead.

Not after my 9 ATL CF battleships have been aiding the OTL Kido Butai's warplanes in pounding Oahu's airfields for half of the day.

And neither will American bombers be able to hit anything in the dark.

BTW, how did any of them survive my ATL IJN BB pounding ?

How are they going to navigate back home after dark (when they flew in from San Francisco to Oahu they had used radio homing but now the Americans had turned off their radio startions since they feared that the Japanee would indeed home in on their signals) ?

How are they going to LAND in the dark when turning on runway light in the dark could draw IJN cruiser or battleship gunfire a' la Henderson Field several months later?

You obviously know nothing at all about the OTL Japanese carrier installed night light landing system. It does NOT at all give away the carrier's position by lighting up the carier's deck for all to see from miles away.
Please see http://www.ussessexcv9.org/pdfs/Japanese%20Carrier%20Operations.pdf for the night landing system .

Go to http://www.j-aircraft.com/research/gregspringer/radios/radio_systems.htm for the KB's warplane radio homing compass.

Hardly. Or you'd end up shooting all kinds of teenaged boys and girls. You look for people trying to attack the important/valuable installations that you have been ordered to defend.

I find it most amuzing that we two seem to look at nearly everything from the opposite Points of View.

I'd think the beauty of a silenced pistol to be that you could easily take as many fast repeated shots as you needed to get the job done, without alerting the neighbours. I'd think them to be a great aid to the bad shots of the world. Of course, I also picture the IJA and the JSNLF to be bright enough to train the good shots in their organizations in the use of the silenced pistols.

Geez, do i have to do EVERYTHING for you guys ?

I can't say as I've ever looked it up save for reading (in Prange's "ADWS") that the skipper of the repatriation cargo-liner Tatuta Maru handed out a box of them to his ship's officers on the night of Dec.6'41, just before that deception ship turned around in mid-Pacific to return to Japan. His military masters were afraid that some of the American passengers on board might panic and rush the crew so as to send radio messages detailing that ship's course reversal, to Honolulu. Possibly alerting the Americans there that something unusual was happening out to sea north and west of Oahu.

 

RE: the USS Pennsylvania in drydock. The drydock was partially flooded during the attack to keep what you described from happening.

Re: a needed 3-1 advantage. You really should read more about the Japanese landing attempts against Wake Island and Corregidor and see how they fared. In both cases, the Americans stacked the Japanese up like cordwood and in both cases, it was a failure of communications that brought about both island's surrender, not a disparity in numbers, or the fighting superiority of the Japanese superman.

In Wake's case, the Marines had already killed every Japanese invader on one island and were in the process of doing the very same on another, when the surrender order came to them by the island commander himself. In Corregidor's case, there were fewer than 500 effective Japanese troops left on the island after an all night battle that saw the destruction of not only the vast majority of the Japanese invaders, but also their irrreplaceable landing craft as well. The Americans were acting on the knowledge that Japanese tanks had been landed on the island and there was no information about how badly the Japanese had already been beaten, when the communications failed. General Wainright, acting on incomplete communications knowledge, threw in the towel and surrendered Corregidor.

You are forgetting too that Oahu's US Army Divisions and Marine Defense Battalions had all of their allotted TOE of light and medium artillery, plus their prime movers, something the Japanse could never match. You would need at least a 3 to 1 advantage in numbers of invading troops to overcome that sort of numbers and arms disparity.

 

RE: The effectiveness of US 12" mortars on Japanese infantry on Bataan:

"Since the morning of the 25th the crew of Corregidor's Battery Geary (eight 12-inch mortars) had been waiting eagerly for permission to open fire on the Japanese. At 1000 this permission had been denied and Col. Paul D. Bunker, commander of the Seaward Defenses on Corregidor, had gone back to his quarters "inwardly raving with disappointment."[33] Finally, late that evening word had come from Maj. Gen. Edward P. King, Jr., USAFFE artillery officer, that the battery could fire in support of the naval battalion. At about midnight the men began their "first real shoot of the war."[34] Using 670-pound land-attack projectiles with superquick fuzes, "which worked beautifully," Battery Geary fired sixteen rounds at a range of 12,000 yards, only 2,000 short of extreme range. The results were most gratifying. After the fourth shot the forward observer on Mt. Pucot reported that such large fires had been started on Longoskawayan point that he could no longer see the target.[35]

This bombardment, the first hostile heavy caliber American coast artillery fire since the Civil War, made a strong impression on the Japanese. One of them later declared: "We were terrified. We could not see where the big shells or bombs were coming from; they seemed to be falling from the sky. Before I was wounded, my head was going round and round, and I did not know what to do. Some of my companions jumped off the cliff to escape the terrible fire."[36]

Even with the aid of the heavy guns from Corregidor, Bridget's battalion was unable to make any headway against the Japanese on the point. Unless reinforcements were received, not only was there little likelihood of an early end to the fight but there was a possibility that the enemy might even launch a counterattack. Fortunately, the reinforcements sent by Wainwright began to arrive." Taken from Morton's book "The Fall of the Philippines."

 

Are you seriously criticizing someone else's deviation from your "ATL" ?
A Marine skylarking on a deserted beach is considerably less fantastic than a bus load of ESSNDAUw/SR&SP's and prostitutes flicking throwing stars and nunchucks at drunk sailors and barking dogs.

"Pot Pot..this is Kettle, be advised you are Black ........over"
"Roger that Pot.....out"

I read through the jibberish and I still don't see how the Japanese are going to get close enough to accurately shell Schoefield Barracks. I think even if they beached their CAs or BBs they wouldn't have the trajectory to get over the mountains.

Mountains is another good point. Any route from the invasion beaches, which have yet to be named, require the crossing of mountains.

Another thing to consider is the reef surrounding Oahu, except for the north shore, would prevent a ship of any usable size getting more than 2 miles from any beach. Does that mean that the english speaking super ninjas dressed in American uniforms with sniper rifles and silenced pistols (ESSNDAUw/SR&SP's) are going to row life boats from their converted merchant cruise ships to the beach?

The only entertainment factor left in this thread is to point out the pure obsurdity of the thesis since the thread jack.

Hopefully it will stay active untill tommorrow evening when I start drinking.

 

You're quite welcome.

The point of aircraft attacking an assault landing is that landings, by their nature, are extremely vulnerable to any attack, be it from land-based artillery, naval units or aircraft; Aircraft are especially effective against landings because even being strafed by fighters can quickly sink or disable large numbers of landing craft. The initial Japanese landings on Malaya were nearly defeated by just six Australian-piloted Hudson bombers attacking at first light. Seventy-seven bombers and fighters could do immense damage to the landing forces and certainly would have gone a long way to defeating the landings.

That is why it is a military axiom that no landings can proceed until air supremacy is absolutely assured.

The US defenders on Oahu realized that the strength of the air attacks on December 7th. meant multiple carriers; I have read of the estimates varying between four and six carriers. But despite the numbers various commanders might have believed the Japanese had, the US carriers and surviving Army and Navy aircraft definitely had orders to attack the Japanese carriers wherever and whenever they were found. Nagumo's rapid retreat, and in my opinion, very prudent retreat, meant that there was little chance of finding them.

 

Could but it is unlikely the Japanese could ever hit the dry dock gates with a torpedo which weren't exactly precision weapons. You obviously have neglected to study the map of Pearl Harbor. Dry Dock Number One, the dock that contained the Pennsylvania (which had her propellers removed not her propeller shafts) had gates about 130 feet across, which is a rather small target for an aerial torpedo. But the dry dock was adjacent to 1010 Dock which extended out some distance from the shoreline where Dry Dock Number one was located and paralleled the water approach to Dry Dock Number One and partially masked the approach. Moreover, ships were moored to !)!) Dock which further obscured the dry dock gates, leaving only about 40-50 feet of gate available as a target area for a torpedo. A torpedo plane making it's attack on the dry dock would have to make it's run parallel to the ships moored at 1010 Dock, under fire all the way, and aim the minuscule 40 or 50 feet of dry dock gate that was not masked by the bulk of 1010 Dock and the ships moored there. An almost impossible feat of airmanship.

Yes, except that the Japanese chose to target what they viewed as the primary objective of the raid; the battleships moored off Ford Island. Furthermore, the Japanese were acutely aware that the number of modified torpedoes for use in shallow water was very limited, they were not assured of having enough of these torpedoes to even carry out their limited plans against the US battleships.

As indicated earlier, I have read the Pennsylvania's propellers were removed, not her propeller shafts. She would not flood at all with just her screws removed.

Probably not.

A third wave attack from Nagumo's carriers would be very weak indeed compared to the first two, and would be flown by either pilots already tired out or by the third string pilots aboard the carriers. Moreover, it would be opposed by fully manned and alert AA batteries and by the surviving fighters of the US Army and Navy defenses. It would be very unlikely that it would cause much damage at all and would almost certainly incur heavier losses.

Yet you think this much weakened force could disperse all over Oahu effectively attacking a variety of targets and completely disrupting the defensive efforts? The whole idea is absurd, but that never seems to give you pause. In all likelihood a third attack on Oahu on December 7th. would simply mean that Nagumo's carriers would not be able to render any effective assistance at all on the following days, leaving the landing forces to their own devices in the face of increasing American attacks with air and naval forces.

 

It's your concept and you're asserting that everything you ascribe to the Japanese was either available or possible within the historical period; the burden of proof is on you, not us.

BTW, these numbers have been questioned by at least two posters. You have not answered the questions raised nor provided any kind of citation as to where these numbers came from.

I trust this is a simple oversight.

Please advise the source of these numbers and explain the methodology which was used in compiling them, so that we may judge for ourselves whether they are reasonably accurate and represent something other than random numbers.

 

No.

I have 6 ex-DD JSNLF "patrol boats" stern ramp launching their 10 fully loaded daihatsu landing barges at 6 different beach locations on Oahu's west, east and southeast shorelines. They don't beach themselves in this ATL scenario although two of the type did do so during the OTL Wake Island #2 landings.

No.

Two 17,000 ton fast cargo-liners, each carrying shohatsu, daihatsu and a few bigger toko-hatsu landing barges in place of their regulr lifeboats will anchor, at night, in the shallow protected waters of Kaneohe Bay and off of Bellow's Field beach. There each to unload their 3,400 IJA light infantry regiment passengers into the darkness as quickly and quietly as possible.

Only if discovered and heavily attacked will each vessel drive itself onto the sand in order to save it's passengers/regimental cargo.

The 9 IJN BBs of my ATL CF will prowl the darkness about 4-5 miles off shore from both unloading vessels in order to protect them should any USN warships unexpectedly arrive. That BB group will NOT be providing beach supression naval gunfire at all, although in an emergency an escorting DD or CL might be ordered inshore to help out.

Nearer to dawn the CF battleline will move to its bombardment track position slightly north and west so as to circle off the northern end of Kaneohe Bay behind the cover of light smoke screens.From there, beginning at 0615 it's battleships will conduct spotter aircraft adjusted area bombardments, over the Koolau Mountains, of several large inland US military targets like Schofield Barracks, Fort Shafter, Wheeler Field, Hickam Field and Aliamanu Crater Ammunition Depot.

You have somehow missed my advancement of the 1st wave of the Kido Butai's air strike to 0615 also. Yes this means carrier takeoffs in darkness and a radio homing flight thru the night to a dawn arrival at Oahu as per Minoru Genda's original air strike plan. My ATL Japanese will still drop their bombs and torpedos in DAYLIGHT as he insisted, for the greater attack accuracy.

Although I will point out that Prange's "ADWS" records that the KB's torpedo bombers did practise attack runs by flarelight while back home in Japan prior to Dec.7'41.

Rather than doing drugs perhaps you should try to keep up with the ogoing discussion here. You've not done well at that so far.

Because there were no beach defenses on any significant magnatude constructed on the OTL Oahu prior to the late afternoon of Dec.7'41. Certainly there were some harbor defense structures built at the PH and HH entrances as well as at several of the US Army Forts that fronted on the ocean but my ATL Japanese, who wish to land "where the enemy isn't", will be avoiding those locations anyway.

It took the OTL Japanese two attempts to take Wake Island so the transports stayed in the Marshall Islands between attempts. There wasn't time for them to go anywhere else and then get back again.

I've never said that I couldn't.

Consider that I am but one working person trying to keep up with responses to about 10 critics and that there are only so many hours in any one day.

Otherwise, suit yourself.

Exactly, they were unable to go back to Germany safely, for several different reasons, when the war with the British began.

But I did. I allocated it to the "Unallocated Cargo Pool".

Simply because my ATL scenario is still a work in progress, I thought it pruden t to maintain a reserve just in case you lot pointed out that I had overlooked somethng important.

At the VERY least there will be transport losses to the Allies that must be replaced and the occassional mechanical breakdown. Hence, I called it a pool.

If the USN's battleline gets a warning and comes out of Pearl Harbor looking for a "Decisive Battle", then my Combined Fleet battleships will be there to give them one, after suitable attrition is inflicted by IJN submaines and the Kido Butai's carrier warplanes. If they stay in that harbor and are "messed up" by the KB's air attacks as in the OTL, then my battleships have little to do save for large "area target" bombardment.

Why would I waste such an opportunity ?

I have typed several times that the IJN battleship will NOT be used for beachfront assault shoots because my ATL Japanese will not likely be making any. Some of the CF's escorting cruisers and destroyers may be used in that capacity however, should an emergency arise.

Say what ? Quite to the contrary, I believe that my ATL Japanese battleships will devastate their assigned inland bombardment targets. As per page #260 of the Peattie & Evans book "Kaigun", my long ranged bombardments will be made in DAYLIGHT under spotting aircraft control. And those pairs of spotter aircraft will have Zero fighter protection

Since the OTL Japanese were not idiots, I assume that my ATL Japanese would not be either. Nagumo's OTL orders included instruction on the choises available to him should his attack force be discovered while still on it's way to Oahu, because it might have been spotted.

Similarly, my ATL Japanese would have contingency orders just in case they were spotted while inbound. I think that likelyhood to be of low probbility but the Japanese were bright enough to realize that bad luck could indeed happen and to plan for it, as well.

Sorry that you feel that way but I don't agree with your stated PoV. Perhaps now that you have read this posting and finally understand what I actually intend, you might change your opinion.

'Thas already been covered before.

Japan won't be ready to pump any NEI oil for many months yet so there is more than adequite time available for the ATL Japanese to destroy or drive off offensive American weaponry based on the PIs such as submarines, surface warships and warplanes, via landbased air blockade from Formosa and Mindanao.

Why am I not surprised.

I've never seen the movie but that sounds like a good summary of the Japanese Empire's OTL "Decisive Battle" plan, "Surely the USN's Pacific Fleet will sail across the wide Pacific Ocean to us here in Japan so that we may utterly destroy them without having to journey over to Hawaii".

 

Not to mention that there was a lot of smoke in the harbor at that point in time. Were there any of the shallow run torpedoes left in any case?