Would the loss of both Enterprise and Hornet at Santa Cruz doom the Guadalcanal campaign?

Going back to post #36 above. Opinions solicited.

Now if Enterprise had been sunk by the Japanes strikes around noon, Hornet was still afloat. This would make her the sole US carrier in the Pacific. She had just about restored power when the 15:20 strikes doomed her. Based upon Nimitz and Halsey's statements with regards to the damaged Enterprise, if she were gone, would they have gone to greater lengths to save Hornet? South Dakota went with Enterprise when she withdrew at 11:35. Would they have had SoDak remain to help defend Hornet? She had been credited with downing 26 Japanese aircraft during the battle, over 1/4 of all Japanese aircraft losses (26%). She had also been damaged, if she had stayed, what would have happened if the Japanese surface forces intercepted them? Does anyone thing the damage she took at Santa Cruz, may have been an underlying cause of her mechanical/electrical issues 19 days later during the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal?

Nimitz and Halsey's actions in light of damaged Enterpris:

But on Navy Day—27 October—1942, SOPAC was in the direst of circumstances. From Pearl Harbor Nimitz directed Halsey to complete arrangements for the defense of rear bases in the South Pacific. Both admirals asked authorities in Washington to request the loan of a British aircraft carrier for service in SOPAC. Meanwhile, Halsey set all hands to work in a race against time to repair the Enterprise, the only U.S. aircraft carrier left in the Pacific.

Enterprise Damage, source US Naval Institute article:

Two near misses had sprung rivets or deflected plates—in places as much as 2½ feet inward—opening fuel tanks to the sea along almost 100 feet of hull. In one area, all the frames, floors, and bulkheads had buckled. Leaks threatened. The Enterprise ’s stem was laced with fragment holes, a few up to a foot wide, and she was taking water, down four feet by the bow. On the hangar deck, the floor of a 50-foot section near the No. 1 elevator was heavily damaged, the decks below blown out. Crewmen in one compartment were actually trapped by flooded spaces above them. Two bomb hoists were questionable. The bridge gyroscope had failed. Several radios and a direction-finding loop were out.
Some repairs could only be made in port. Although the Big E could launch and recover aircraft, she was not truly combat-ready and in a renewed engagement would have been gravely disadvantaged. Battle speeds and even stormy seas might have threatened her seaworthiness. Captain Hardison’s damage-control parties—plus every spare hand—bent superhuman efforts to enable the ship to make speed despite her damage.
For 11 days after the carrier arrived at Nouméa she was completely incapacitated, as Admiral Halsey added every engineer and repairman to those already working over the ship. Hull breaches were repaired, but the aircraft elevator jam awaited drydocking in the United States. When the Enterprise went to sea again, Pearl Harbor privately estimated that the carrier was operating at 70 percent of her combat efficiency.

South Dakota damage:

The ship received a direct hit from a 500-pound bomb on top of Main Battery Turret # 1. It did not penetrate but deformed two of the three 16-Inch barrels of #2 turret. Flying shrapnel damaged a 40mm quad and hit Captain Gatch standing on the catwalk of the bridge, wrote Donovan D. Graham, assigned to the Deck Division aboard South Dakota.

The strike also jammed the #1 turret in train, later on the 27th she collided with a US DD and was further damaged.

 

Intriguing hypothesis. We seem to be assuming that Enterprise - unlike Hornet or Yorktown - sinks almost immediately, so except for ships involved in rescuing survivors, her escorts would have little else to do other than join up with Hornet, only about ten miles away. SoDak's damage would not interfere with steaming or AA action. "Antiaircraft" cruiser San Juan was also with Enterprise. Incidentally her sister Juneau was originally with Hornet but misinterpreted a signal as direction to move over to Enterprise's formation, which would presumably not happen in our current scenario. So Hornet would have plenty of AA support if she appeared salvageable. IIRC the cruiser Northampton which was towing Hornet had to cast off the tow when the final torpedo attack came in; I wonder if her captain would have been willing to chance sticking with it if there were more ships putting up flak?

There was also Task Force 64 - battleship Washington, three cruisers, six destroyers - somewhere in the area, not clear exactly where or for that matter why they weren't included with the carrier force.

If Hornet survived, she'd be in for a long period of repairs, probably not rejoin the fleet until the Central Pacific offensive got under way in mid-1943.

The bomb damage to SoDak suggests that she had only four 16" operational at Guadalcanal, is that right?

 

I think they got the turret unjammed before that action.

 

All you've stated is in line with my understanding of the battle. I too am not sure where Washington was at the time, or why she wasn't attached to the carrier task forces. As for SoDak, I'm not knowledgeable enough on what would be required to repair the two 16" tubes that were damaged to give an informed opinion. Don't really know where to look for the answer either. I, like LWD was pretty sure her number one turret was "unstuck" by the time of the surface action, but she may have been down to 7 tubes vs her total of nine. My supposition as to if it effected her during her fight alongside Washington was more along the lines of, if the concussion or fragmentation, might have damaged some of her other internal systems, which might have led to the recurring short and the decision to "tie down" the breakers.

 

Was the rescue of Hornet more concerned with Japanese sub attack- rather than any AA threat.

 

I suspect further air attack was the main concern.

 

WRT USS Washington and Task Force 64.

Task Force 64 was some 500 miles away in the vicinity of San Cristobal & Rennell Islands. TF 64 had been assigned the task of patrolling "The Slot" for any runs of the Tokyo Express, defending Guadalcanal should the Japanese send a naval force down, and escorting any US reinforcement convoys to Guadalcanal. Task Force 64 had just spent the past 24 hours before Santa Cruz patrolling up and down "The Slot".

 

http://www.conservapedia.com/South_Dakota-class_battleship
states that SoDak's bomb damage was repaired prior to the engagement with Kirishima but I'm pretty sure I've read that at least one gun tube was not operational. Not seeing a whole lot about this one. She did have a tendency to run into things though. Definitely took her a while to "work up".

I did find a source that indicates the capatain of SoDak considered turret 2 risky to use during the battle. See:
https://books.google.com/books?id=vb_QAwAAQBAJ&pg=PT18&lpg=PT18&dq=uss+south+dakota+bomb+damage+%22santa+cruz%22&source=bl&ots=YDKZHWUu98&sig=pH6BfuEjeI3JW6NVRbvPJjMmreM&hl=en&sa=X&ei=k_FuVeeNEIeigwSm6oGYCA&ved=0CC0Q6AEwAjgK#v=onepage&q=uss%20south%20dakota%20bomb%20damage%20%22santa%20cruz%22&f=false

 

''and all day on the 12th planes had rushed across to Guadalcanal from Espiritu. Maj. Dale D. Brannon brought in eight P-38's of the new 339th Fighter Squadron (TE), while COMSOPAC sent in Marine and Navy air reinforcements to raise the island's total strength to forty-one F4F's, thirty SBD-3's, nineteen TBF-1's, and two P-4OO's, in addition to the P-38's.89 General MacArthur had been called upon to send eight P-38's and these planes of the 39th Fighter Squadron arrived on the 13th, flying direct from Milne Bay across to Henderson where they remained until 22 November.90 Further to support Henderson, both the 69th and 70th medium squadrons moved their B-26's to Espiritu, the 69th coming up under command of Maj. James F. Collins, pilot of one of the two surviving B-26's which had attacked the enemy carrier force at Midway.91'''

I see VMSB 132 AND VMF 112 coming in to Cactus at the end of October...

''Thus ended the most critical of the battles for Guadalcanal to date. By 27 October, Harmon believed that the immediate crisis had passed and that the situation did not necessitate emergency dispatch of any additional heavy bombardment units from the mainland. He now had forty-seven B-17's available, of which thirty-five were ready for combat; eight B-24's of the fresh 90th Group were en route from Hawaii to Australia, and seven B-17's of the worn 19th Group* were being held in Fiji in conformance with instructions to COMSOPAC to make use of these transient units if needed to meet the current emergency''

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/IV/AAF-IV-2.html

correct me if I'm wrong...the JA/IJN has to 1. gain control of the air
2. maintain that control for some time
3. bring in supplies and reinforcements
4. move those to attack position.
3 and 4 taking much time to accomplish
5. take over the airfield
even with the loss of the Big E and all her aircraft, is this a good possibility with the forces the US has? Remember, Roosevelt wants 'every' possible weapon sent to the Canal....and the US air and land are on defense...they don't have to fly as long to get to the battle....they don't have an airfield to take out

 

Unless the Enterprise is lost very early in the battle which would take a more serious revision of the history the IJN still has to deal with this:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Santa_Cruz_Islands

Note also the claims

I wouldn't expect to see much difference in thier actions in the next month or so.

 

It would have had to have been lost during the 11:21 strike to have the greatest effect. They thought Hornet was sinking and made no further attacks on her during this strike. If the strike reported that the last US carrier had been sunk or was in the process of sinking, they may not have launched the 13:06 strike from Junyo and Zuikaku or the 15:35 strike by Junyo. I think they would have relied strictly on the surface forces already underway to finish Hornet.
As it was Zuikaku was not forced to return to Japan to rebuild her crew as the Wikipedia article suggests, "the undamaged Zuikaku and Hiyō were also forced to return to Japan..." The Navy chose to do so in anticipation of renewing the campaign. "Meanwhile, the IJN decision to return the Zuikaku to Japanese Empire waters was entirely voluntary, based on a plan to regenerate for another Guadalcanal offensive timed for January 1943." (USNI article) She just as easily could have been retained in the South Pacific. Had Japan realized the true enormity of their win, by seeing Enterprise go down they quite possibly would have made a number of different decisions. The Japanese were not devoid on intelligence of US Naval forces available, on 31 October, a Japanese submarine floatplane saw and reported Enterprise at Noumea;
"Fujii began the mission by reconnoitering Nouméa on October 31, the day after the Enterprise anchored there. An outside I-boat, I-8, did likewise at Espíritu two days later. At dawn on November 4, Fujii sent his floatplane over Nouméa. The pilot reported one carrier, several cruisers, and other ships."

So Japan's actions after this sighting were based upon knowledge that at one US carrier was in the operational area.

Just as important though is how it would have effected US decision making. Actions by both sides were as much a reaction to the moves by the otherside and the changing tactical situation, as to adherence to their overall planned actions. In the historical case, by expending enormous effort, Halsey hoped to have Enterprise available in time to counter Japanese offensive moves that might have threatened Guadalcanal's supply line. In our discussion she will never be available.
The aircraft from her own and Hornet's airgroups would be gone, going down with the ship and not available to be used as land based assets. Strategically, Halsey would have had to give priority in resources to protection of US bases in New Caledonia and in the New Hebrides. A couple of Japanese carriers roaming the area attacking the supply line with no US carriers to counter them, in addition to surface units potentially in the slot and submarines in "torpedo junction".

USNI article on Santa Cruz by John Prados:
http://www.usni.org/...ries-santa-cruz

Another article on Japanese submarine operations in the campaign.
http://www.historynet.com/torpedo-junction.htm

 

Wonder if there would have been a surface action as the conclusion to Santa Cruz? If the only US carrier left is damaged but afloat or there are two heavily damaged but afloat would the USN have hung around to try and salvage them? Would the IJN have conduct ed further strikes to go after what was left of the US fleet? Given the IJN losses in aircraft and the fact that with that many shot down there would likely be a fair number of damaged craft as well I wonder what Zuikaku's air group looked like.

As an aside I should know better than to rely on wiki but it did bring some good info to light thanks to Price checking up on me.

 

did you not read my 49?? they were bringing many other air units in right after the battle, and had other assets standing by to reinforce...the president and Halsey were committed to reinforcing...they did not need the Big E's air ....and they are on defense with not that far to fly....they are reinforcing Cactus no matter what...

and as stated many times, IJN air has taken a good beating....the Cactus air battles are like the land battles...winning and winning, and then, in a short time, the lose, everything?

 

That's one of the things I was wondering. I would think, based upon Nimitz and Halsey's later actions that they would possibly feel compelled to try and save one of them. The historical action makes sense along those lines, abandon Hornet and withdraw Enterprise so as not to risk losing both. Halsey was a fighter though and might risk heavy surface units to try and salvage what he could. South Dakota had/would have a history of being kinda' "snake bit", so how she would have fared is really open to speculation. I don't think they would have sent a strike solely against surface vessels, preferring the surface action, in fact doctrinally they stressed the decisive surface fleet engagement.

According to Combined Fleet's TROM for Zuikaku, she had - After landing the returning third wave, ZUIKAKU had aboard 38 fighters, 10 dive-bombers, and 19 attack planes. this included ZUIKAKU lands 5 fighters, 7 dive-bombers, and a recon torpedo plane from SHOKAKU. I really don't know how many aircraft she lost, if any, during the late afternoon strikes. Additionally, 5 torpedo planes and 1 fighter of Shokaku's airgroup had to ditch near the Japanese TF but were picked up.

While reading Shokaku's TROM, I also picked up a little piece of information, and while it is not pertinent to our current topic, it is interesting and the kind of information that I think you'd like.
- 0640 SHOKAKU's radar detects inbound enemy strike, 78 miles away. A CAP of twenty-three fighters is readied over the carriers. (This early example of IJN carrier using radar had detected USS HORNET's first strike wave of 15 dive-bombers with 8 fighters and 6 torpedo planes launched at 0530).
I normally don't think of the Japanese having this capability, this early in the war.

I don't know, Wiki has improved over the years, in fact, the very article you quoted, Wiki's "Battle of Santa Cruz Islands" is one of the better online accounts of the battle, IMHO. I do double check most critical information I get from Wiki, and very seldom do I find it inaccurate, I think they're a good source.

 

I wonder what the condition of these planes was though. I would expect at least some were damaged with damage running from minor to possibly not worth repairing. With only 29 bombers left she got a pretty limited number of strikes left. The wiki article also mentioned heavy losses among the comand personel as well.

 

and this from the conclusions paragraph of my previous post....I've posted many facts stating the IJN air force is not in shape to overcome US forces, even with the loss of the Big E



for the Japanese to complete even number 1 of my post 49 , ''gain control of the air'', it would take a complete turnaround...''fleet carriers impotent''

 

How is any of this even relevant to the question at hand? The OP's original question was "Would the loss of both Enterprise and Hornet at Santa Cruz doom the Guadalcanal campaign?" Enterprise was potent (though at about 70% of her capability) when she sortied on November 11th, had she been sunk at Santa Cruz she would be a non-factor so ZERO percent effective. In this case, unless the US knew that the Japanese air groups were decimated, the simple presence of a Japanese carrier or carriers would pose a potential threat that had to be accounted for. If a catalina spotted a carrier task force with Junyo, Hiyo and Shokaku sailing in the direction of New Caledonia, the New Hebrides or the Santa Cruz Island group, Halsey would be forced to hold additional aircraft and pilots at the rear bases for CAP and naval airstrikes. He would have to keep additional surface units in position to protect the supply lines and bases. He would have hard choices to make as to if or how many resupply missions he ran up to Guadalcanal. They do not have to actually attack, they just have to have the perceived capability to do so.

I know this conclusion comes from the USS Enterprise CV-6 web site, I read it a while back. There are other opinions though, the USNI article I've linked to has this to say; "By many reasonable measures the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands marked a Japanese victory—and a strategic one. The Imperial Japanese Navy had pursued Kinkaid’s retiring fleet, indeed forced it away from the battle zone. The day after the action, the Japanese possessed the only operational carrier force in the Pacific. In addition to having sunk more ships­­­­­—of greater combat tonnage—the Japanese had more aircraft remaining and were in physical possession of the seas."

The Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy publication on the battle has this to say;

"CONCLUSIONS
It is unlikely that the damage suffered by the Japanese in the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands was immediately instrumental in saving Guadalcanal, or indeed that it was the principal reason for the enemy's abandonment of the pursuit of Task Force KING. Even if the action had never been fought, the Japanese retirement was logical. This is easily comprehensible if we remember that the planned advance southward of the hostile armada was predicated on the capture of Henderson Field. Beginning with their original "zero day" on the 23d, the Japanese had retreated at sea each time their land attacks had failed to take the field. When they learned on the 26th that the Marines had stood fast once more, and that our land-based planes were still operating from Guadalcanal, it was reasonable for them to retire again, whether or not they had been in contact with Task Force KING.
In this light, the costly Battle of Santa Cruz, with the resultant reduction of our South Pacific carrier strength to one damaged vessel, was of dubious value to our cause. Perhaps the most that can be said is that the aircraft losses and carrier damage inflicted on the enemy kept him from providing a more effective air umbrella for his invasion fleet in the decisive Battle of Guadalcanal, three weeks later."

How would they have evaluated it if it read, carrier strength of Zero?

 

this is the critical factor<> Halsey and the President were determined to hold the Canal....Halsey was a fighter.....they had enough air assets at Cactus to, in the very least, defend Cactus for some time, as seen in the above posts..and more in the pipeline if needed, without Es air groups....

why would the IJN be going after Caledonia, or Hebrides, when their main focus is the Canal? ????? the US would just bring in more supplies, if the IJN took 'some' out...the IJN would attack the rear bases without interference???

the US had B17s doing 700m search missions from Espiritu, and other assets at these islands.....and then, by attacking these rear bases, would they significantly help to do a total turnaround at the Canal, even if they were able to get a devastating strike in?... the US had more than one rear area supply base

at the Canal, I think we are seeing the US's power, superior pilot training, logistic capability, technology, etc, starting to show it's strength...the land and air battles, the supply situation, etc....as LWD stated on landing supplies, etc....as we see in the lopsided land battle casualties...and air battles....much thanks all replies

 

I think any interruption would be short-lived. Certainly if aircraft or transport ships were about to be dispatched to Guadalcanal when the Japanese were sighted, they would be held back, but as soon as the threat passed, Halsey would get back to the main business at hand. Halsey was not easily deterred; he had been given the South Pacific command precisely to do away with that sort of indecisive command.

Although it might have been beneficial to them, the Japanese were unlikely to use their carriers against logistic targets. I don't recall them even using carriers against Henderson Field or the Marines on Guadalcanal except for the small strike by Ryujo during the Eastern Solomons battle (later in the Solomons campaign they did use carrier planes from land bases). They seem to have felt that their battle force should be reserved for combat with its American counterparts and the actual reduction of Guadalcanal left to land-based air, surface forces, and ground troops.

 

Side note. Neither Rabaul nor Truk had been built up to be effective bases. At the start of the war, Truk actually had an oiler in port to take the place of shore fueling stations. Japan waited till after the war started to begin building up Truk as a port and thus it lacked effective repair facilities as well as the fueling.