What was the view of the US military regarding "friendly fire" incidents in WW2?

I am interested in the actual stated procedure and/or practice with respect to "friendly fire" incidents.

I have read a few AAR's and S-2/S-3 journals. Occasionally, I have come across mention of "friendly fire" incidents in rather matter-of-fact terms. I don't want to read too much into that because it may just be the nature of those type of reports. However, I got the impression that it was considered part of war. Obviously, no one wants them to occur, but war is a messy business and they do happen.

Thoughtful and informative thoughts would be appreciated.

 

Anyone?

 

I am thinking that "Friendly Fire" was treated about like washing your hands after you go to the bathroom.

 

I always got the impression that there was an inquiry, maybe a slap on the wrist and a "bad boy, don't do it again" Post-It note placed in a service record, then the fighting man in question was put back on the line to continue fighting. I may be wrong, though (heh...the chances of me being 'right' are somewhat slimmer than those of successfully navigating an asteroid field in a beat-up Correllian freighter), since most books don't go much into detail about "friendly-fire" incidents. Seems like the prevailing attitude is "well, war sucks, just don't make a habit of it". If it turned out to be on purpose ("oops, LT Douchebag just got hit. In the back. By three clips of Thompson .45s. And a BAR. Darn the bad luck!"), my guess is the offending parties, if found guilty, were quietly shoved into a deep dark hole.

 

There is a scene in "The Dirty Dozen" between Lee Marvin and Charles Bronson where they discuss Charles Bronson's charecter shooting one of his own troops, during battle, for desertion. The final comment was: "There is only one problem with what you did; You let them see you do it."

 

Friendly fire incidents in WWII were quite common. If serious casualties were caused it would be investigated if it could be determined who was responsible. If it was determined that the incident was a result of negligence or incompetence, it would be forwarded up the chain and taken care of administratively (relieving the officer, letter of reprimand, etc.) or judicially, depending upon the severity of the incident. More often than not it was impossible to determine who was responsible so nothing could be done. So, most of the time it is just the cost of doing business.

Todays military goes to great lengths to avoid these types of incidents but they still occur. They are thoroughly investigated and normally punished harshly (unless they're interservice related, then they're usually swept under the rug). It is an interesting fact that during the first Gulf War (Desert Storm) virtually all USMC casualties were due to friendly fire (USAF A-10's) and during the Invasion of Iraq in 2003 most USMC casualties were due to friendly fire (USAF A-10's). My personal opinion is that it's due to the USAF not working regularly with USMC forces and the pilots not being familiar with USMC armored vehicles. I do know that quite a few marines get nervous when the CAS over heard isn't Marine intrinsic air.

 

There is also the dog that did not bark. The press of WWII pretty much reported what they were told to. In these days every incident makes the news.

 

Thanks, Lou. Though primarily from a Naval perspective, very much on point. Like USMCPrice and Belasar, the author makes the comparison between past and present attitudes with respect to friendly fire incidents:

 

Great comments from everyone. Thank you!

One point of clarity, I meant to make at distinction between intentional FF (i.e. murder, fragging, shooting deserters, etc.) and unintentional FF incidents (i.e. accidental, incompetence, fog of war, etc.). For this discussion, I am interested in the latter -- the unintentional incidents.

 

I would not put the entire press as anti-war. Just that there is greater freedom for the press to report in general. Also the serviceman has greater freedom to communicate uncensored then before (cell/sat phones ).

 

It is a bit of a broad brush by the author and I hesitated using that part of the quote because I wanted to keep things focused on WW2. However, I try not to take quotes out of context and usually err on the side of leaving too much in. I do think it is helpful to be aware of current attitudes in order to avoid projecting those attitudes on the past when it might not be the case. In saying that, I am not referring to any of the comments made here. I'm just explaining the approach I try to take.

In doing some additional Google searches, I came across this article on CARL:

Amicicide: the problem of friendly fire in modern war by Charles R. Shrader

I have only scanned through it, but it does seem to be very much on point.

It's interesting how one can do an online search one day and a week later find something you didn't find the first time.

 

HOW CAN YOU HAVE A ''POLICY'' for something as unpredictable as ''friendly fire'' incidents which occur in most wars -witness ''Stonewall'' Jackson being killed by one of his own pickets during the American civil war?.
In World War Two Americcan bombers accidentally killed U.S. General Leslie McNair in Normandy because he got too close the enemy lines hch were being carpet bombed-the Norden bomsight may have been precise but it couldn't make out a General's stars at 15,000 feet up in the sky.
During the Batlle of Britain in 1940 some Hawker Hurricanes fought exch other in a dogfiight that is known as the ''Battle ofBarking Creek'' mistaking each other for enemy aircaraft.
During the hunt for the German battleship ''Bismarck'' in the Atlantic in 1941 Royal Navy Fairey ''Swordfish'' torpedo planes attacked and tried to sink-by mistake the British cruiser ''HMS Sheffield'' who fortunately they missed-you can't legislate for such things in war so talk of a ''policy'' striks me as ludicrous.!

 

Thank you for your comments. I agree that "policy" was a poorly chosen word and have edited my OP to use the word "procedure" which does not have the political connotations of the former.

In re-reading my OP, I did notice that I had assumed that it was understood that individual FF incidents are unpredictable. What is predictable, as your own post indicates, is that FF incidents occur in virtually every war. Since we do know that they occur, just as automobile accidents occur, it seem reasonable to me that the military would want to (a) find ways to reduce FF incidents, if possible and (b) investigate FF incidents when they do occur. Apparently, I am not the only one with that "ludicrous" idea:

~~ LtC Charles R. Shrader, US Army, from the Introduction to Americide: The Problem of
Friendly Fire in Modern War (see link in my previous post to this study on CARL).​

 

I found these interesting

L R H Orloff: "Analysis of Fratricide in United States Naval Surface and Submarine Forces in the Second World War"
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA374561
Abstract: Friendly fire in naval warfare is a virtually unstudied phenomenon. In order to prepare future U.S. naval forces for the inevitable losses that will occur as a result of fratricide, we must look to the past to discover the role it has played in this century's wars at sea. This study examines the significance of friendly fire in U.S. naval surface and submarine operations during World War II and argues that the occurrence of self-inflicted casualties is a function primarily of the frequency and intensity of naval combat. Additionally, the causes of and factors contributing to naval fratricide are identified and discussed in detail using historical cases. The crucial result of this thesis is that even the most technologically advanced and highly trained force is subject to surprisingly high rates of friendly fire. Only when the vulnerability of every navy to fratricide is officially acknowledged can technology and doctrine be developed to reduce the risk of accidentally engaging one's own forces.

Also

E D Gauker & C G Blood: "Amicicide at Sea: Friendly Fire Incidents During World War II Naval Operations"
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA278291
Abstract: When U.S. ships become victims of 'friendly fire,' or amicicide, the cost is high both in human and operational terms. Incidents in which U.S. Ships were damaged or sunk by Allied gunfire during World War II were identified and classified by scenario and ship type. Frequencies of wounded-in-action (WIA) and killed-in-action (KIA) were compiled. Fifty-three incidents of amicicide at sea resulted in 438 WIA and 186 KIA. Forty of the incidents occurred in 1945. Amphibious operations accounted for 25 incidents, while only three occurred during naval battles. Destroyers were hit most often, accounting for 32 percent of the incidents.


Rich

 

Excellent finds, Rich. Thanks for tracking those down. Nice addition to the thread.

 

The Shrader study covers four areas of "friendly fire" or amicicide from the US Army perspective: Artillery, Air, Antiaircraft and Ground. As for the rest, I haven't a clue.