A-10 Thunderbolt II and the USAF

Here's an interesting article on the A-10's. I wonder if the C model changed how the infantry viewed it?
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairfo/articles/20150225.aspx
Would be interesting to see how the friendly fire casualties compare on a per sortie basis for the C compared to the older models.

 

Not sure all that many spots would be taken up, One definitely, Perhaps a second one but all depends on the ramp design and if it is built atop the flat deck or hanging out further in front of the ship such as the Juan Carlos and Canberra classes.

Agreed that the landings would be the biggest issue, They knowing that the minimum stall speed for the A-10 is 120 knots (Stories around of them able to maintain 80 knots) what is the stall speed for other aircraft? (F-18's etc), Id imagine coming in faster would play a big role in the amount of stress put on the frame and landing gear, So is it plausible that a lower approach speed could mean less stress on the aircraft in landing?

On subject of Ski-jumps, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a237265.pdf, USAF report on putting them on airfields in Europe, Has mentions of USN test's and plans at one time to build a fleet of smaller ski-jump fitted carriers, Will see if I can find the USN report.

 

Here's a rather intersting article on an emergency landing by an AV-8:
http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/story/military/2015/02/22/harrier-pilot-awarded-medal-emergency-landing/23744077/
Even includes a video for those that like such things.

 

In the 1970s there was a proposal for a Sea Control Ship, intended to carry about 17 helos and Harriers. The original design did not include a ski jump, but the Spanish built two ships based on it which did (one for themselves, one for Thailand).

The idea for the SCS was to maintain 2-3 helos continuously airborne for both ASW and AEW, and be able to launch VSTOL fighters when necessary for self-defense or to counter threats like the Soviet Bear patrol aircraft (the Essex-class ASW carriers had about four Skyhawks for the same reasons). The British Invincible class, which pioneered the ski jump, were intended to operate in a similar role and manner.

We might contrast this sort of continual low-intensity operation with the heliborne assault requirement of the USN/USMC, which puts a premium on helo spots in order to launch the maximum number of aircraft and troops simultaneously. LPHs or LHAs carried around 20 troop-carrying helos plus Hueys and Cobras, so even with a complete flat deck it would take 2-3 shifts to get them all airborne. They would have to make multiple trips to offload all the airmobile troops and equipment the ships carried and also accommodate tasks like casualty reception and rearming attack helos. And of course we have the option that most other navies don't of using a regular aircraft carrier to provide fixed-wing support so our helo carriers can focus on helo operations.

 

Impressive! Thanks for the link.

 

Here I thought you would be a regular reader on that site ....

Not something you could have done with many other planes though was it.

 

Cool indeed! We had a somewhat similar incident on Saipan (LHA-2, not the island) when a CH-53 had a defective starboard landing gear. The flight deck gang stacked plain wooden pallets to the height of the side sponson, and an LSE (Landing Signalman Enlisted) guided the helo to a precise landing. This was another case where the pilot could not see the object he needed to "land" on.

 

Here is a summary:
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=10&ved=0CFAQFjAJ&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.f-16.net%2Fforum%2Fdownload%2Ffile.php%3Fid%3D16902&ei=B0vuVL3_KYyWgwTpx4CgDg&usg=AFQjCNF9VIHWU4FKs3_mRvn_PZntMPKfBA&bvm=bv.86956481,d.eXY&cad=rja

 

No offense, but if the US Navy had wanted an optimum CAS platform, they would have kept the A-6 Intruder, and gone with the improved A-6F. However, they wanted all the bells and whistles with a bag of chips, and ditched the A-6, and continued development of the ill-fated A-12 Avenger II.

 

Apparently there is talk about putting the A-10's into 'Storage 1000' or something along those lines, Basically store the entire fleet or most of it, with an initial cost of about $40k + with another $10 - $12k + in annual costs to maintain them. Makes it difficult to bring the fleet back into use if they have no active dedicated A-10 crew's but still leaves them their if needed, $12m set up and $3 - $4m in annual costs, Better option then scrapping entirely and the costs would be chicken feed to the USAF budget.

 

That "talk" has been around since at least 2012. But, lately seems to be gathering steam, as Congress and the USAF are at loggerheads on the A-10 issue.

 

Wonder who supports which system.

 

Aside from giving CAS training a higher priority for A-10 pilots, what else can be done to help reduce friendly-fire incidents by the A-10?

 

The myth of the A-10 being the highest cause of friendly fire incidents was already disproved earlier with the A-10 actually having the second lowest friendly fire casualty rates after the AC-130. http://www.allgov.com/news/controversies/air-force-doctored-statistics-about-friendly-fire-and-civilian-deaths-to-get-rid-of-a-10-attack-jet-150213?news=855657

All that aside we should never stop striving to reduce casualties of allied forces and non combatants. We should ideally be looking a a unified strategy and procedure for calling in CAS, Wont be a massively difficult thing to implement as for the most part it would mainly be NATO with a few outlying allied nations. Wouldn't go amiss to have in the US a single school to combine CAS training and development from all the different branches just as they have done with all the Special forces from various branches put under command of SOCOM.

 

I don't know, that article doesn't really detail on how they attained those casualty figures, perhaps USMCPrice can provide some info.

I fully agree with you on that.

 

The consolidation of the different Special Operations entities from the various branches into SOCOM has not, and was not intended to consolidate training and development. It is/was a centralized command element to employ the various Special Operations Forces, insure inter-operability and theoretically to employ them in a manner to maximize their particular areas of expertise and skill sets. There is no one SpecOps unit that is the best at all mission types. SEALS specialize in certain types of missions, Special Forces (Army Green Berets in others), Marine MARSOC/Force Reconaissance in others, DELTA in others, they do have some capability overlap, but their training and doctrine are focused on certain skill sets and mission types. Each branch has their own requirements, selection and training. Certain specialty schools are attended by multiple branches, but this isn't the majority. Even within the SEALS and Special Forces the different Teams/Groups specialize in different mission profiles. For instance DEVGRU (formerly and still commonly referred to as SEAL Team 6) and Delta (officially 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta) are the premier anti-terrorism direct action units within the US military, they have similar capabilities, are sometimes utilized together, but have totally different training development pipelines and draw personnel from their wider parent units DEVGRU from SEAL Teams, Delta from the Special Forces Groups.
As for close air support, the various branches do have more interoperability than they used to have, but whose system do you go with, and who is put in charge? The Air Force doesn't emphasize CAS and views it as an ancillary mission, but provides the Army with Tactical Air Control teams. The Marine Corps emphasizes CAS as the reason for it to have aviation assets, and actually assigns pilots with ground training, to ground combat units as their controllers. Their reasoning is that the controller understands the unique needs and problems associated with both the air and the ground sides. Even here though you have MARSOC/Force Recon, Battalion Recon and ANGLICO personnel that are trained at calling in air strikes but are non-aviation personnel. The Navy practices CAS as an ancillary skill and is often the only airfield in the area, but it is far from an area of expertise, and to be fair, they already have an extensive number of mission profiles and normally have a Marine Corps F/A squadron that does have adequate CAS training embarked with it's Carrier Air Group. The Army has it's own CAS in it's attack helicopters, has to rely on them heavily and have their own proceedures. The US Army produces, as a whole, probably the best rotary wing pilots of the all the services. One of the reasons is experience, unlike the other services where a commissioned officer spends time as a pilot and as promoted moves out of the pilots seat into the command structure of the aviation element, the Army has a lot of Warrant officer fliers and they stay in the seats longer, possibly their entire career. The Marine Corps has probably the best CAS system having been in use and evolved since they pioneered it in the 20's, but they have neither the manpower or desire to be the trainer, implementor, across the services.

An excerpt from an article on CAS in the 21st Century:
"The problem, as he explained it, is that the Air Force refuses to drop precision-guided munitions unless the strike has been called in by an Air Force ground forward air controller or an Air Force enlisted terminal attack controller. But there are not enough of these personnel for one to be placed in every Army unit that might require close air support. This particularly was the case in Anaconda, Hagenbeck told Field Artillery.....The solution, according to Hagenbeck and Bentley, is to train and certify the Army's forward observers - who call in artillery and mortar fire - as 'universal observers,' able to call in any Army or Air Force munitions. 'Our FOs must be certified as ground forward air controllers,' Bentley said in the article. 'This may be a sore spot with the Air Force, but I believe it to be nonnegotiable.'"

So in order to implement your suggestion, the Air Force would have to place a priority on the CAS mission, something they institutionally have refused to do. They would need to be the service to provide the standardization, but have historically refused to focus on the needs their primary CAS end user the US Army. The Marine Corps has historically taken the short end of the stick when their aviation assets have been placed under Air Force control and will probably fight tooth and nail to avoid losing control of them, since they consider them an integral part of their combines arms warfighting doctrine. Integrating NATO and other foreign militaries is a minor thing.

 

Awesome post Price, your knowledge on military matters is a great benefit to this Forum.

 

Thanks but don't give me too much credit. I learn something new here everyday. We have a great group of members with a huge and diverse knowledge base and the information gets passed around and around. The circle of life???

 

Agreed, the members here are what makes this site great.

 

IMO it's not just the knowledge but the willingness to ask and accept as valid most questions. I've also learned a lot from the responses of the members here but I've probably learned as much from the questions.