Air Power.

The Heeres died in the East but the Luftwaffe was destroyed in the West. Germany's loss of aerial supremacy over Russia, which was one of the reasons of its defeat, was the direct result of the strategic bombing camaign--almost all machines were moved to defend the Reich.

It is ture that the bulk of Germany's military losses occurred in Russia, from 1944-1945, but one should be careful about dismissing the contribution of the Common Wealth/US armies. They fought as many as 40% of Germany's soldiery and 60% of its armor; their defeat in the west however was aided immensely by the superiority of the allied air arm.

Both Bagration and Vistula-Oder Offensives benefited immensely from the absence of German mobile forces as well as sufficient stocks of oil. The problem with equating the quantity of weapons production with industrial output is that it ignores the impact of the fuel crisis to Germany's armed forces. The Luftwaffe had no fuel on which to train its replacement pilots, tank training was minimal, and Germany's motorized forces had lost much of its bite simply because it could not lift itself without gasoline.

None of Speer's weapons could solve the fuel crisis and it had been demonstrated that the rise in German military production was more an indicator of how poorly German economy was organized rather than the inefficacy of strategic bombing.

That's probably fair to say that the full effect was not felt because the war was ended already on the ground.

 

Indeed, the C-47 along with the jeep, the bazooka and two and half ton trucks were one of about a dozen types of equipment that Eisenhower thought won the war for the allies.

 

yes,i read these things in the eminent historian steven ambroses book too,cheers.

 

but imo EL-HAMMA was the first allied victory in which the full use of tactical air power was used,cheers.

 

We covered the strategic and operational stuff. But the tactical impact of airpower is both over- and underrated and the same time.

True, fighter bombers destroyed a tiny number of tanks in comparison to tanks, antitank guns and infantry portable AT weapons. Even heavy caliber machine guns couldn't do much to a panzer and the bombs and rockets are inaccurate, the armament of the fighter bombers were more than enough to shred infantry, trucks and horse wagons. The panzers were going nowhere without these to back them up.

Another overlooked fact is that he who controls the air literally has a bird-eye view of the battle; I cannot count the times the Americans narrowly escaped defeat but for the pilots of the liason planes. The Germans were often spotted before their forces could make contact with the enemy, and the Americans would go quickly to work on setting a trap for the attackers. The most famous example might be Arracourt, when the CCA, 4 AD took up advantageous positions and waited for the 113 Pz Bde.

In spite of the low accuracy of tank-busting weapons on a fighter bomber, a large panzer column at regimental strength on a road or open field makes a big, target-rich environment and would attract swarms of Typhoons and T-Bolts like flies to carcass. The result is often devastating; kill probably is high in those situations and certainly would ruin the scheduled attack of the day, at least. To avoid this, panzers must travel in small packs and at night, greatly dissipating their strength.

There is also the factor of irrational, uncontrollable terror of being attacked by a strange, novel weapon that cannot be retaliated or stopped effectively by any weapons at your dispossal. Many German panzer commanders commented that inexperienced crews or otherwise veteran tankers who had not been straffed before often abandoned their vehicles in sheer terror of the moment. Tank-fear in the Ostfront was a similiar phenomana; it can be and was alleviated by experience, but the short life expectancy of German soldiers at the western allied invasion phase of the war meant they were more often then not could not wisen up.

Another situation in which air power came in handy was encirclement battles. If the attackers could constrict the enemy's route of escape, even if the pocket was not properly sealed, the enemy would have to try to force his way through a small number of roads. This leads to static, colossal traffic jams that a fighter bomber pilot could not miss. The 2 SS Pz Div met this fate near Avranche, when a thin screen of armored infantry, egineers and some tanks of the 2 AD trapped their Pz Rgt. Almost 300 vehicles were engulfed by aerial attack made by six squadrons of fighter bombers the whole day. The GIs who witnessed the aftermath of the carnage thought the Germans were out of gasoline, or they would not have stopped their vehicles bumper to bumper while it happened. In fact, it was the case that some drivers abandoned their vehicle and blocked the escape of the column.

With the Western Allies' inexperience at fighting a real Kessel Battle, their air arm as well as the artillery claimed a lion's share of destroying routed German troops.

 

I am not going to bore you with quoting "Triple C's" previous post; but, I have to disagree, in part, that air power had little affect on tanks, artillery and infantry. The allied bombing camapign targeted the industrial heart of Germany. You can not produce tanks, atillery and equip infantry if you do not have the industrial means to produce those items. The German Army was highly mechanized and everything mechanized requires two things: fuel and ball bearings, take those items out of the equation and everything stops.

The allied bombing campaign targeted: fuel, production and transportation. Air power was the most significant weapon in the defeat of the Axis.

Brad

 

:v4victory:

Ah, now we're on to something . . . The King of Battle! Even today, especially when the weather chooses not to cooperate.

 

Your observations are i guess, correct. British resistance in the Battle of Britain made Hitler drop the idea of invading England, since his heart was never really in it (he admired the British and considered them a "good germanic race"). Moreover Germany lacked the warships and landing craft necessary to make it work. Hitler thought the British were full of fight but too weak to hurt him much, and could eventually be neutralized by the U-boats and sporadic air attack - since his real goal was to destroy Russia (he was certain they would invade Germany first).

Whats more, Hitler went out of his way to avoid provoking the USA, since he knew our industrial capacity (however he thought the US could never field a good army since we were "Too mongrelized") and thought if he trod the line the US would stay out of "European entanglements".

By the time the P-51 went to war, it was already all over for the third reich. Even Herman Goerring said, "When i saw the American fighters over Berlin, i knew it was all over for us."

 

so what did the R.A.F use the early models of mustang for?.cheers.

 

I love the US Army Official Historian's favorite expression about airpower being "up to the weather gods"

 

The early models of the P-51, with the "undernourished" Allison engine were fast and agile at low level, but worthless at altitudes above about 10/15,000 feet. Consequently they were used as attack bombers by both the RAF and the USAAF. We even renamed (designated) it as an A-36 for attack instead of P for pursuit.

The A-36 was an early version of the P-51 provided with dive brakes and underwing racks, to operate in a close-support role.
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The USAF Museum website has a page on the A-36 which states the following: The A-36A dive bomber was the first AAF version of the "Mustang" developed for Britain in 1940. The A-36 fist flew in Oct. 1942; production of 500 A-36As was completed by March 1943. Unofficially named "Invaders," A-36As were assigned to the 27th and 86th Bombardment Groups (Dive), later redesignated as Fighter-Bomber Groups. In June 1943, the plane went into action from North Africa. During the Italian campaign, A-36A pilots flew bomber escort and strafing missions as well as ground support bombing attacks. A-36As also served with the 311th Fighter Bomber Group in India. Dive brakes in the wings gave greater stability in a dive, but they were sometimes wired closed due to malfunctions. In 1944, AAF A-36As were replaced by P-51s and P-47s when experience showed that these high-altitude fighters, equipped with bomb racks, were more suitable for low-level missions than the A-36As.

From:

American Aircraft of WWII

I like that site alot, great sublinks to other places including the fine Joe Baugher texts on all kinds of aircraft. Here is an example:

The relatively poor high altitude performance of the Mustang was more than just a minor deficiency, since most aerial combat over Europe at that time was taking place at medium to high altitudes. Consequently, it was decided that the Mustang I could be best used for low-level tactical reconnaissance and ground attack, where full advantage could be taken of its exceptional low-altitude performance.

See:

Service of Mustang I/IA With RAF
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I couldn't get the Wright Patterson link to work here is one from Dave's pages: http://www.daveswarbirds.com/usplanes/aircraft/a-36.ht