Alternative British strategy in Malaysia

I wonder too, if it wouldn't have been better for the Commonwealth Forces to clear away the jungle and dig a major defense line across the penninsula well in front of the resevoir that provided Singapore with its water. Singapore depended on that resevoir as its sole source of drinking water. Clear away the jungle and there's no way that the Japanese troops could execute unseen flanking manuevers and get behind the British Forces. The British could also use the strong suit of their artillery to turn back the Japanese attacks.

 

Theres really a dozen things the Brits could and should have done. Rereading Swinson makes it clear the problems was not just Percival. Heath a key corps commander was too quick to order retreats, Popenham was completely unprepared mentally for the onset of war. Too many of the Brit leaders had a weak grasp of the situation.

 

From what I've seen posted here, it does seem that Singapore could've been held longer. This leads me to ask a question: if the improvements and suggestions posted here were actually done historically to strengthen Singapore's defenses, what would the Japanese need to crack open the Lion City's defensive shell?
My first thought was to send more Japanese warships to strengthen its blockade and probably more heavier ships with the necessary guns to bombard the city from the sea. Unfortunately, this would leave these ships vulnerable to air attack from planes based in Singapore.
Probably to counter such an air threat, the IJN might consider sending its carriers to help reduce the Singapore defenses. If that's so, some of the naval battles that turned the tide against the Japanese might not occur.
More Japanese troops, equipment and supplies would also have to be sent.
For me, it's becoming feasible that Singapore could've functioned much more like Guadalcanal instead of doing a Malta.

 

Interesting thread TA. (sorry if I'm a couple of years late to the party.)

Probably not the best strategy, and unworkable for several reasons.

No, I think that the campaign could be won with the forces at hand or available, provided that the british are committed to winning.

Here is a map of the situation on Dec 7 1941.

2 regiments of the Japanese 18th division (23rd & 56th regiments) attack at the Malaysian airfield/port of Kota Baharu.
3 regiments of the Japanese 5th division land at Singora & Patani, Thailand. Two columns attack down the Singora-Jitra and the Patani-Kroh roads.

The British in Malaya have 2 Indian divisions (9th & 11th), 2 brigades of Australian 8th division and about 2 mixed brigades in Singapore itself.

The Indian 11th division has the 6th brigade defending the road leading to Jitra, while the 15th defends the road through Kroh. the 28th brigade is in reserve at Ipoh. The Indian 9th division has the 8th brigade + a battalion of the 22nd defending Kota Baharu, while the remaining 2 battlaions of 22 brigade defend Kuantan. The Indian 12th Brigade is in army reserve.

The Australian 22nd & 27th brigades are defending Johore.

 

It prevents the Japanese from invading DEI, and from threatening Australia. The Japanese needed to use the troops from Malaya to attack DEI, and they can't really leave a functional British base at Singapore, as a constant threat to their supply lines to DEI.

Yes that is a major concern, something to be dealt with

TA, I'm not sure if you are quoting historical here? Also, I'm assuming that your "what if" starts on Dec 7, obviously if it's earlier things become much easier.
Not quite correct about the building of fortifications, they were unfortunately built on the seaward side. (MG pillboxes & minefields.)

There were several huge problems at Singapore.
Some of those being:
1.) lack of strong leadership
2.) Disagreement about strategy, and lack of clear authority over civilian matters.
3.) Unwillingness on the part of the civilian authority to make defensive preparations. (supposedly so as not to damage morale)

This was something that's hard to judge, after the war not too many of those in power were candid about other political & military leaders. (Although Brooke's book was fairly candid, Eiesenhower seemed incapable of critisizing anyone directly - maybe because he had Presidential ambitions )
So it's not clear that they knew that Percival was not the man they needed at the top.
However, it's clear from Brooke's writings about his conversation with CIGS Dill in Nov 1941 (just before Brooke took over the post) that they were aware that Singapore's defences were badly unprepared. There was also a report by Churchill's representative (Duff-cooper) one week into the campaign on the comlete lack of defensive preparations, and a suggestion for a military apointee to oversee it.

It was abundantly clear in the spring on 1940 that Britain needed a strong, experienced man at the helm, that's why Churchill was selected by an all-party War government. On Dec 7 1941 it should have been clear that Singapore needed the same thing.

Also, unfortunately for TA's suggestion of having the Indian troops defend northern Malaya while the Aussies stay in singapore, a large part of the problem was the inexperience, lack of toughness & poor training & equipment of the green Indian troops.

So what could have been done?
1.) I would have straight away sent Lt. Gen Willam Dobbie to replace the governor there. In Dec 1941 he is the Governor of Malta, he had previously commanded the Singapore garrison in the 30's, had an engineering background, and was completely familiar with the plans & preparations needed to defend Singapore from the north. (he had written them)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Dobbie

2.) I would have put the Aussies in charge of holding back the Japanese in northern Malaya, which would buy more time for defensive preparations. I would have put an Aussie corps defending NW Malaya (replacing Heath's Indian corps), and add perhaps 2 - 3 Aussie regiments from the 6th or 7th or 9th divisions.

3.) I would send Lt. Gen Morshead to command the Aussie corps, he certainly had enough experience with defensive operations in Tobruk, and had a reputation for "holding the line"

More to follow....

 

I dont see that as a given. The Japanese begain operations against Dutch territory in early to mid January, weeks before the Maylay penennsula was cleared and long before nuetralization of Singapore as a British air and naval base was assured. If Yamashita fails to close up to Singapore or capture it the Japanese are unlikely to reverse course and withdraw from the just captured territories because a potiential threat continues on on flank.

 

As others have already posted, British defeat due to poor leadership but I wonder if the situation could have been changed i.e. holding out longer, inflicting more casualties on Japanese, if the Allied forces were better equipped.
What if captured Italian armour and anti-tank guns were sent to Malaya or if an Arctic convoy was diverted to warmed climes. PQ1 in Sept 1941 carried 20 tanks and 193 Hurricanes to the USSR. In the hands of the more experienced Dutch pilots Hurricanes, rather than Buffaloes, might have inflicted heavier losses on the Japanese.

 

freebird, I look forward to your contribution to this discussion.