Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

I believe that cordoning off the Philippines would be very tough..to many navigable waters ways to deal with. It may be possible to have submarines observe the approaches to Manila and Subic, but the shallow waters there would likely make any submerged submarine fairly visible from the air(depending on water conditions, it was possible to spot submarines that were submerged down to a depth of 120-160 feet).

Wake we can easily keep tabs on from the air, and probably is not worth investing a submarine in, unless our air reconnaissance detects a build-up of American forces there, or detects that the Americans or fortifying their position and enlarging their facilities there.

Midway is much to small to serve as a major naval base, although, it might be worth having a submarine check it out occasionally, just to keep tabs on the Americans. However, it might also be with in range of our H6K Mavis flying boats, and certainly will be within range of our new H8K Emily flying boats.

Pearl Harbor really is not worth the effort, since our embassy provides us with current intelligence of American warship movements. However, when(not if), American enters the war, this source of valuable intelligence will dry up. Then, it might be worth having a submarine poke around Pearl/Oahu. Until then, it most assuredly is not worth the risk of having one of our submarine nearby.

 

I believe there's a thread over on the axis history forum that discusses ship yard capacities of the axis powers. As I recall they included some information on capacity. Might be worth looking up. One thing to keep in mind is several sources mention that work on Shinano was temporarily halted at one point or another (no details on any of them) in at least one case it was so that the workers could be used elsewhere. The implication is that ship workers may be a major constraint.

 

Well, the state of the respective economies did play it's part. Since, in the 1930 London Naval Treaty, the three major High Contracting Powers(US, Britain, and Japan) agreed not to lay down any of their replacement battleships until 1936. Under the replacement tables of the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty, for the years 1931-35, the US would have been allowed to lay down 8 battleships, Great Britain 8 battleships, and Japan 5 battleships. This, given the ongoing construction of other warship types, would have placed a great strain on the naval budgets if those countries.

 

Yes, I remember reading the thread/posts(don't think I participated in it though), but could not remember if the thread was specifically on Japanese shipyards, or if the thread was about another topic, in which the shipyards were brought up . I had tried searching for it, but was unable to find it. IIRC, it found one on German harbors, but that would be of no help to us.

Given the mostly agrarian nature of Japan's economy, trained industrial workers would be at a premium, and given the rapid increase of Japanese warship construction/re-construction/modernization in the years leading up to the war, experienced shipfitters & construction workers likely would have
have been a bottleneck, especially in the later months of 1941, when the Japanese hurried to complete several warships. Without more details on the halting of Shinano, it is impossible to draw any concrete conclusions. Since, in 1941, Shinano(battleship) was not expected to be completed for sometime, were the workers drawn off to complete other construction that was further along before the war begins. Or, were the Japanese changing their construction priorities then, shifting workers to more "necessary" construction for the upcoming war?

 

I may have misread Carronades post Mike but I thought he was speaking of going no further than Truk with a Repair Shipyard facility.

That was my meaning, sorry if I caused any confusion.

I had suggested earlier using the carrier force to support invasion of the eastern East Indies immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities. I envision amphibious groups proceeding simultaneously from Palau to the following points:
Halmahera/Morotai
Manado
Ambon
Kendari
Tarakan
Balikpapen
Most of these should be able to be secured by one Special Naval Landing Force; we may want two for Ambon or Balikpapen. We will want to establish base facilities promptly, especially air bases, and secure the oil and other facilities. We should have sufficient shipping if we are not initially invading the Philippines.

As we have no land bases in this area, the operation will have to be supported by the carriers; they will also cover our invasion forces against the possibility of American intervention. The distances do not allow one carrier force to cover all objectives, so I suggested operating as two task groups. They will be close enough to be mutually supporting, although each group will have more combat power than our opponents have in the area.

Group1 - Celebes Sea, Tarakan, Balikpapen
Akagi, Kaga, Ryujo, Zuiho
Hiei, Kirishima
Destroyer squadron

Group 2 - Molucca Sea, Kendari, Ambon
Hiryu, Soryu, Shokaku, Zuikaku
Tone, Chikuma
Destroyer squadron

I assume we will simultaneously secure key points in N/NW Borneo (Miri, Seri, Sandakan, Kuching) using land-based air support from Indochina. We can then stage aircraft to our new bases to support ongoing operations. As soon as possible I would regroup all six fleet carriers into Kido Butai.

The cordoning of the Philippines will be accomplished by our control of surrounding islands and waters rather than by ships or submarines immediately offshore. Too close an approach to any American territory also adds to the possibility of an incident. I see the main initial mission of our long-range submarines as detecting and intercepting the American fleet should it intervene; we might base most of them in the Marshalls.

 

Having the aircraft "in theater" is quite different from having them in action against the Japanese on the front lines.

Burma and Indian aircraft are essentially isolated from supporting Malaya with the Japanese invasion of the Thailand/Kra Peninsula. The Japanese invasion of British North Borneo & Sarawak would hold the attention of the Dutch & likely Australia & New Zealand RAF forces, since a Japanese success in Borneo would threaten to drive a wedge between Australia/New Zealand and the rest of the British Far East territories. And Fiji, IIRC had pitifully few aircraft that would essentially be a "drop in the bucket".

Then there would be the logistical factors to take into consideration. Suddenly dumping several hundred aircraft into Malaya would completely overwhelm the airfields needed to support the aircraft. Fuel, ammunition, spare parts, trained technicians, and proper maintenance & repair facilities would all be lacking. So, it would not be long before most of the aircraft would be out of action due to lack of fuel, ammo, and necessary maintenance.

Another consideration to take into consideration would be the conditions at the airfields. Most Malayan air fields were simple grass strips and lacked any permanent facilities. So, it does not sound encouraging that most of the some 17 air fields would be able to support more than a handful of aircraft at any given time.

 

Carronade's Post:

I like these ideas. Maybe an extra few companies of SNLF (surgical mission teams) to round up the key petrochemical engineers/employees and to interdict sabotage operations of oil installations, port infrastructure and loading facilities.

Definitely agree with the mutually supporting carrier groups to cover these landings. We should also be able to perform well in Malaya, Signora and Rangoon with all of the assets slated for the Philippine invasion, if we call it off or delay, which I still believe we should do.

 

One I would suggest using the full Kido plus Zuiho and Ryujo to attack Singapore first and then we can split it off to support the Java invasion. In WITP Ambon requires a regiment since it has good defences. I use a brigade for Tarakan and Balikppan each since they have some troops and I like over kill. There are only recon and some fighters in the SE corner of Borneo so we do not need to worry about air cover. I do have a couple of CA groups to cover since the area is close to Soerbaja. Since Soerbaja is the main Dutch base that is my recommended second target. With Kido we can risk a landing at the south tip of Malaya to really cut off the forces. Two should do the job. We can land at the north end of Java with one division to seize Batavia as a base. One division plus special landing troops to help seize critical spots and a para landing for Palembang. This division can then help in the Java attack.

 

I think this is the one I was thinking of but no idea how much use it will be:
Axis History Forum • View topic - Shipyards of the Major Powers
This one talks to the wooden ship construction and may be of some use as well:
Axis History Forum • View topic - Wooden merchantmen during WWII
This one discusses river gunboats in China:
Axis History Forum • View topic - Manchuko navy - the mysterious Hai Chen
And if pictures help there's always this massive thread:
Axis History Forum • View topic - Something different...

 

You are correct, however what I'm looking at is the potential British aircraft which could be brought into action against Japan, which would have to form the basis for Japanese plans. This is the old military axiom, "Plan for the worst case, hope for the best case"
When Japan began it's plans in the summer of 1941, they had no way to anticipate how many British/Commonwealth/Dutch aircraft could be brought into play, so they have to assume that it could be 1,200 - 1,500 range. As noted earlier by USMC, the Japanese didn't have a good estimate of RAF/RAAF aircraft in Malaya and over-estimated it by several hundred.
The British did in fact have plans to base close to 600 aircraft in Malaya, and the airfields were constructed/improved to handle this increased number, howver the aircraft hadn't arrived (or were diverted) before war broke out. The Dutch had also had many airfields available, these were later used by USAAF B-17s to operate from DEI, Celebes, Java & Sumatra.
The potential for long range bombers operating from Australia & DEI is certainly a threat to extended Japanese supply lines, and Japan has absolutely no way to determine how many there are as the aircraft can be based 1,000s of miles away and staged through these airbases

 

Potential is not the same as practical. Britain for instance would not strip India because of potential Japanese operations against her, she could not strip Australia because of the same concern plus the fact that Australia already felt under defended. It was not politically possible.

They did not need to plan for that number, because they actually had pretty good intell.

I believe you have drawn a conclusion from the information I provided that is different from what I intended to convey. Yes, the British only had between 150 and 160 aircraft in Singapore, Malaya, Hong Kong and Borneo and another 88 in reserve (I take that to mean flyable but lacking aircrew). The number of aircraft the war ministry had agreed to supply, and the Far East command had agreed to, was 336, that is the exact number that Japan estimated them to have so I interpreted it to mean they had some well placed sources. How else would they arrive at that exact number? If this be the case they would also be aware of plans to supplement the number.

No, it is my understanding that the 600 figure is based upon the original requirement submitted to the War Office, by the area commanders as the minimum number necessary to successfully defend British positions. The actual number requested was 582 1st line aircraft, exclusive of all the obselete types they were stuck with. This request was turned down and the War Office decided that 336 was all that would be provided. (and that number was not even reached)

Actually, the Japanese Navy took advantage of the situation and basically took it upon themselves to seize the Carolines, Marshalls, Palaus and Marianas. The League of Nations allowed them to retain these former German possessions after WWI as mandates. Its not as your statement makes it appear.

 

It seems likely that we can use our embassy in Manila much as in Honolulu. Further, perhaps we can develop local operatives to monitor the situation. For present, that may be more than sufficient. But once we begin our war it will behoove us to monitor passage in and out of the islands more closely.

I think we can observe and control the Philippines from four key points, one of which we already control, and the second of which is on our initial target list.

While there are many small passes through the islands, only two are suitable for fleet actions: the Suriago and San Bernadino Straits. We could monitor these with a cordon of submarines on station in nearby deep water. Resupply could be affected either by rotation or clandestinely with a tender camouflaged as a merchant vessel.

Passage north of Cap Engaño can be monitored by air from Formosa. We will be able to patrol the Celebes Sea from Manado.

Beyond these four, other routes become less practical. The San Juanico Strait is little more than a mile wide for much of its length, and less at the narrowest spots. It is probably unsuitable for fleet passage, and our units stationed off Leyte to watch the Suriago strait would most probably sight major units attemtping such a transit anyway. U.S. approach from the west would be circuitous and lengthy and will be exposed to our patrols once we control the Malay barrier. I don't believe we need to be concerned about this immediately.

 

Consider where Japan was 6 months after Pearl Harbor. 5 of 11 commissioned carriers sunk , along with much of her expert aircrews lost, and the loss of the strategic initative. The time gives Japan the CVL Shoho available, more trained aircrews from the acadamy, a chance to put convoy's in place, 6 months closer to full oil output in DEI, 6 months closer to Radar in our capital ships, 6 months to fortify our conquests and of course 6 months of war production.

Nor can the ability to concentrate all our forces to more limited objectives be discounted. A faster, more comprehensive attack may yeild more un damaged spoils or at least make thier capture quicker, and less costly.

When war comes with the US Japan can concentrate her assets on taking the American Western Pacific Islands.

Fuel consumption could actually be less as there will be no jaunt to PH and no fruitless chases of the US PacFleet.

 

OK Council members, I have been busy entering data into the game editor. I have come to the pilot training rate section.

1) Are we going to increase pilot training?

The historical averages for pilots entering training per month are as follows:
(shown as year:average number of pilots entering training each month)

IJA-'41:195 '42:185 '43:615 '44:615 '45:615
IJN-'41:150 '42:150 '43:480 '44:480 '45:480
MosTot-'41:345 '42:335 '43:1095 '44:1095 '45:1095

Historical average Japanese aircraft production is 1475 per month, with a total of 64,900 produced during 1942 to early August 1945.

'41-5100
'42-8900
'43-16,700
'44-28,200
'45-11,100 (War ended 15 August)

Our historical predecessors were planning on a short war. I believe the council's concensus is we're planning for a long war and hoping it will be shorter. If so, I think we need to front load our aircraft and pilot production, instead of reacting to events as occurred historically. I believe we can surpass the historical aircraft production rates, they are given here as a guideline for planning our pilot production. Also, realize that because of the training time there is approximately a 12 month lag in pilot availability, unless we want to field poorly trained airmen. This is one area we must have long term planning, we can always cut back later on if our situation develops more favorably.

US pilot training figures, historical averages:
(shown as year:average number of pilots entering training each month)

USN-'41:600 '42:1145 '43:1160 '44:735 '45:735
USAAF-'41:435 '42:1115 '43:1475 '44:345 '45:1035 (not total pilots but those allocated to PTO)
USMC-'41:115 '42:385 '43:105 '44:105 '45:105
MosTot-'41:1150 '42:2645 '43:2740 '44:1185 '45:1875

If you look at the US spike in '42 once war is declared, if we start immediately we can probably enjoy a period of numerical parity in addition to our initial quality advantage. Also, consider the IJ Army and Navy numbers in relation to our overall strategy. (see next post)

I await your thoughts.
Bobimoto out.

 

I second our honorable Prime Minister's thoughts. We gain many advantages, particularly if we're not looking to a decisive engagement to knock the US out of the war quickly. Pearl Harbor and the Phillipines galvanized US public opinion against us in such a way as to make anything but unconditional surrender unacceptable. Even so, by 1945 the US public was beginning to tire of the costs both financial and in lives. We just need to make it more costly for them and to slow their counter-offensive and if we are not the ones to initiate war with the US, the revenge motive will not prevent a negotiated settlement from being a possibility. If we can actually defeat one of the US's early offensives the morale effect could seriously undermine US efforts to prosecute the war, especially if the war was one of choice and not one forced upon the US.

 

Well said, Col. Bobimoto!

 

Honorable colleagues, the following report of recent shipbuilding activities , split by yard, should give us a better appreciation of our capabilities.
(I concentrated on post 1935 builds/rebuilds of large warships except for carriers)

Mitsubushi (Nagasaki): Musashi (BB), Junyo (CV), Chikuma (CA), Tone (CA), Mikuma (CA)
Kure naval yard : Yamato (BB), 111 (BB), Akagi (CV), Soryu (CV), Oyodo (CL), Ibiki (CA/CV), Mogami (CA), Chitose (AV), Chiyoda (AV)
Kawasaki (Kobe): - Kaga (CV hull), Zuikaku (CV), Hiyo (CV), Tahio (CV), Kumano (CA)
Yokosuka naval yard: - Kaga (CV fitting out), Ryujo (CV fitting out), Hyryu (CV), Shokaku (CV), Shoho (CV), Zuiho (CV), Shinano (BB/CV), Ryuho (CV), Noshiro (CL), Suzuya (CA), Chiyoda (Conversion to CV)
Sasebo Naval Yard- Kaga (CV rebuild), Agano (CL), Sakawa (CL), Yahagi (CL), Chitose (Conversion to CV)
Yokohama dock: Ryujo (CV build)

So we have really 5 yards capable of building large warships with most having multiple slips.

As to what we should build carriers and Akitsuki class DDs are my priorities, with ASW ships and merchant tonnage close behind (hopefully we will not get involved in an attrition war immediately).

 

I can't see us affecting the totals for the last qtr of 1941 by much, but we ought to be able to double the number of naval pilots (300 p/m) in 1942 and shoot for 600 a month in each of the following years. As for Army pilots, again double to 350/375 p/m in 1942 and perhaps 750/800 p/m in 1943 and after. I acknowledge this is much lower than US historical rates, but realisticly how many can we train considering fuel/airframes and the number of qualified people?


As for aircraft, again the last qtr of 1941 won't yeild us much of an increase, if we reach say 5,250 for 1941 i'd be very happy. For 1942 i would say shoot for 11,000, 1943 21,000 and 1944-45 30-32,000. These probably seem modest, especially compared to historical US production, but we hope to field not just more aircraft, but better ones. Heavier MG's, self sealing tanks, folding wings on ALL carrier planes, etc.. Also we plan to augment production in other areas of our war machine so we have to even the pie out a bit.

 

In reguard to the Philipines, I find myself both partialy agreeing with and disagreeing with what has been proposed. I suspect that the US for political reasons will be forced to send much equipment and men to the P.I. due to the influence of Quezon and MacArther as well as national pride. This can work in our favor as it presents us a avenue to use our Submarine Fleet in its best possible application, comerce interdiction. It also gives a chance to force the US Pacific Fleet to come to us in a early showdown before they have a chance to add much new construction.

I agree turn the Philipines into a white elephant, just do not let it grow much past a baby elephant. Once the US has deployed say two divisions worth of American troops plus what ever stocks to the Philipine Army, then crush the combined force. The loss of this much men and material will hurt greatly and delay any attack upon our perimiter, by perhaps 6 months or more. It will take several years to turn the Philipine Army into an effective offensive combat force, and at least 2-3 years to turn it into a force capable defensively of stopping us in a determined assault.

 

Ulrich,

A quick look at wiki states that Japan formed some 40 Independent Mixed Brigades (IMB's)for various duties. They had no set OOB, but generally consisted of 4 Inf. Battalions, an Artillery Battalion and a Command group. Some had more Infantry, others more guns and some even had a small tank Battalion.

An Idea for consideration,

For more or less static Areas of the lines in China a Corps unit consisting of:

1 Japanese IMB (4 Inf. Bttns, 1 Med Arty Bttn, 1 Lt Arty Bttn. 1 Eng. Bttn [Chinese], Signals/QM)

3-5 Korean/Chinese/Other IMB's (4 Inf Bttns., 1 Lt Arty. Bttn, Signal/QM)

Each IMB should be roughly equal to a Chinese "Division" and we could free some-many IJA Divisions to go after important Chinese positions we wish to take like the new capitol or some other position that will interrupt the flow of Western aid. This 'Corps unit' ought to be able to hold a quiet sector of front that formerly took 2+ IJA Divisions.