Anyone interested in some intellectual exercise?

Doing a little research ( I hate homework! ) Britian began deploying CAM Ships in may-june 1941 as a stop-gap until CVE's could be delivered in number. Eventually some 35 such ships ( 8 privately owned, 27 Ministry owned ) were produced, and while they were intended to stymie Long range German aircraft, they were still offering protection to merchant convoys. The FW Condor was seen as a dual threat, both direct attack and vectoring U-boats to make attacks. Our MAC concept is not so different from the CAM but better suites our resources.

I would make the arguement that converting ALL fleet oilers to MAC's could have benefits. We will need to provide a steady stream of replacement aircraft to our fleet carrier's as well as fuel, why not do both at the same time? It could mean keeping a marginal carrier in the training role (much expanded as we planned), while offering some airial protection to and from destinations without tasking a carrier for the duty.

I can see the point about delaying convoys for the sake of delivered tonnage, yet we need to gain expierence un the process also. Traffic to and from Korea and China can do without in the near term, those operating either in the SRA or some other 'front line area' probably should be moved in convoy as much as possible.

 

most honourable sirs, i have a question, which at this late date probably is moot but will ask it anyway,do we really need to take Malaysia? we can get most of the raw minerals and other products from areas we already control. if we do not take Malaysia, we do not need to take Singapore, or Hong Kong, and if we do not take the british held areas, they have no legitimate reason to go to war with us.

 

Considering that the two are active allies it would be risky to leave Singapore alone in case Britain does fight. A solution for the tanker loading would be to have the main centers, Palembang, Soerbaja, Miri, Medan Tarakan and Balikpappan meet together for a mega convoy. The ships could gather at Singapore or Cam Rahn Bay and then sail for Japan. They can combine with resource convoys.

 

WRT not invading British territory,

The way I see it.

While the British and Dutch have had several talks over the years about a military alliance in the Pacific, none have been formally ratified. HOWEVER, recent events in the European war have moved matters along quickly, and the British and Dutch have been cooperating closely to forming an alliance against us. Recent American diplomatic and military moves further suggest that such an alliance is very close to being announced, and that America will, very likely, also be a partner in this agreement. It is very possible that this alliance will be announced before the start of the new year(1942). Given these new strengthened ties between the three nations, it is probable that if we attack one, then the other two will join in, even if there has been no formal treaty announced. Also, given the rather tenuous positions of British and Dutch and their fairly close geographic proximity, as well as heavy British investment in the DEI economy, it is ver probable that the two will fight as one if we invade the DEI.

 

in Table 3 on page 19, lists the Taiyo as having a Type 3 Model 10 and Type 3 Model 11 arresting gear, with 4 wires per unit, for a total of 8 wires. However, going on the basis of one Japanese naming convention, the Type 3 arresting gear would have been introduced in the Japanese year 2603 or, for Westerners, 1943.

True about "Type 3", but the table shows the same arrangements in Junyo and Hosho which we know were capable of arrested landings before 1943. I suppose they could have had their arresting gear updated in mid-war, although that seems an odd thing to expend resources on, especially in Junyo, barely a year old.

I would guess the listings for Unryu, Taiyo, and Junyo refer to those classes.

Arresting gear would not be needed for aircraft transport, but Taiyo et. al. are recorded as also be used for training. Obviously landing is one of the most crucial elements of carrier training; their value in that role would be very limited if pilots could not make the same arrested landings that they would on fleet carriers.

 

So long as I hold the privledge of being Prime Minister it will never be too late to ast the question "Are we making a Mistake?"
I have full confedense in our command staff, yet it is far better for us to acknowledge an error in strategy or planning at the earliest moment and to seek a correct path. I will not long support any effort that throws good assets after bad to continue a course that serves no other purpose than to stroke the ego of a commander who has lost perspective.

What we hope to do with Singapore beyond deny it to the British remains unclear to me so far, but we have not disscussed this in great lemgth yet. I can see a value in targeting only Dutch islands initially, but suspect Admiral Takao is correct that Britain will throw her lot in with the Dutch. In any event I do not feel strongly enough to press the matter.

 

I would make the arguement that converting ALL fleet oilers to MAC's could have benefits. We will need to provide a steady stream of replacement aircraft to our fleet carrier's as well as fuel, why not do both at the same time?

IIRC the IJN did (will?) equip a couple of oilers to carry replacement aircraft and also return "flyable duds" for repair; I'll look them up in Jentschura when I have a chance.

Again this is distinctly different from the merchant aircraft carrier concept. A ship to carry and launch a useful number of front-line carrier planes will need a longer flight deck than a MAC, especially if it stows then on deck; otherwise we have to add a hangar and elevator. Landing or maintenance capabilities if desired would further complicate the design. It might also be easier to manage the replacement pool with a few ships carrying say 20 spare planes each than having some on every oiler.

While commercial tankers were pressed into the underway replenishment role, ideally a fleet oiler is a faster and more sophisticated ship than a tanker which simply carries liquid cargo between ports. The latter is what I and I think others were thinking of as a MAC, carrying 3-4 aircraft on a flight deck extending from the stern to a little forward of the bridge. It would need no more gun armament than any other merchant ship in our rear areas, whereas the fleet oiler is more likely to come under air attack and needs some AA firepower.

p.s. ran across this in wikipedia - the oiler Hayasui, completed in 1944, was equipped with a catapult and six E13A floatplanes to augment fleet scouting capabilities. She was present at the Philippine Sea and was damaged, no indication if she conducted air operations, and she was sunk by a sub shortly after.

 

In a sense, outfitting the Junyo with the newer catapults does not seem odd at all. If the USNTMJ is correct, the older Kure Type catapults(max A/C landing weight of 3,000kg) would likely have a hard time handling the newer aircraft that would be(B6N Tenzan), or were intended to be entering service(A7M Reppu & B7A Ryusei). Approximate empty weights for these aircraft were;B6N - 3,000kg, A7M - 3,200kg, and the B7A - 3,800kg. So, upgrading the Junyo, which would likely be operating the newer aircraft, is easily understandable, even though the carrier is still fairly "new".

This also applies to any carriers that were to be used for training. Since they would need the better arresting gear to handle the new aircraft that were expected to be entering service shortly. While the could do intermediate training in older aircraft(A6M, D3A, B5N), they would still have to be trained in type(A7M, B6N, B7A) which had vastly different handling characteristics than their older brethren. That training, you would not want to perform on a combat carrier, where accidents were almost certain to happen.

 

I must confess that I liked earlier suggestions re. New Caledonia and one or two other things.

As to Britain and the DEI I wonder if we might proceed like this:

1. Issue statements simultaneously to the Netherlands government in exile and the British government that a new government is in control in Japan, that we are reforming our operations in China, and that we need oil for those continued operations. Denial of that oil to Japan is, as Britain and the Netherlands must surely understand, a threat to security and will be regarded as causus belli. Require response to demands for oil sales at reasonable prices in 1 week.

2. If oil is not forthcoming issue a warning to London that Japan will go to war with the Netherlands and seek assurances of British neutrality. Give Britain 48 hours to declare her neutrality in the conflict with the Netherlands.

3. If no assurances are given, invade as before.

4. Offer return of all colonial possessions under certain conditions. (Guaranteed oil sales, equal treatment of Asian citizens, etc. To be further considered.)

 

Again, we're talking about merchant ships in say the South China Sea, hundreds of miles from anything we need Kates, Vals, or Zeros to engage.

I would be cautious about assuming that you will face no threats, this could be as dangerous as Japan assuming that it didn't need to worry much about ASW.

So what do you conclude? We have a convoy steaming home through the Luzon Straits (the Philippines either neutral or Japanese-occupied), a few B4Ys operating from a tanker that's already in the convoy could significantly enhance its anti-submarine defense, but we shouldn't bother unless we can provide a fully capable carrier with a complement of front-line attack aircraft?

better not to paint yourself in a corner.

How much of a corner are we painting ourselves into? A few retired planes operating from a few ships as they go about their normal business. We're not making any major investment of resources or foreclosing any other options. Depending how events develop, we can convert more MACs, or fewer, or stop, or pull the airmen off the ones we have if we need them more somewhere else. In fact one suggestion was to use a MAC ship round trip as part of the training program, so they wouldn't be cutting into the pilot pool at all.

In areas or situations where our shipping faces multi-dimensional threats, we'll respond accordingly; but most likely there will be large areas in which the only danger is submarines, and we'll act accordingly there also.

 

Food for thought.

 

A nice one! That should change some thoughts.

 

Do you have an online source for that? In particular it would be nice to know the date. I seem to recall the numbers being revised several times by pretty significant amounts and it would be nice to know which set this is.

Here's one that I haven't seen discussed yet but which could be quite important.

If Japan is successful in keeping the US out of the war initially what is to be done if Germany and the US go to war?
1) If Germany declares war on the US the Japanese are not treaty bound to commit themselves to it.
2) If the US declares war first they are but it has not been unknown for national interest to overcome treaty obligations.

Given the planning changes when will the campaign begin against the Dutch? What happens if the US and Germany go to war before this event?

 

Although the specific numbers are hindsight, the distribution of causes is about what we might anticipate, especially for merchant ships, with submarines by far the greatest threat. Most of our shipping should have minimal exposure to air attack, whether carrier- or land-based, unless the war situation truly goes to pot.

The mine category leads to the question of how the mines were planted - air, submarine, or surface - mines are more an extension of those categories than a source of loss in themselves. Mines can only inflict losses on our merchant shipping if hostile aircraft, subs, or (least likely) ships can operate in our shipping lanes. Warships may also suffer losses from mines when entering hostile or contested waters, but merchants are unlikely to operate as aggressively.

 

That will depend upon the council's wishes. Historically, Germany invaded the Soviet Union after Japan had signed a non-aggression pact with them. Japan was angered with Germany because she was not warned or consulted before the invasion was undertaken.

Japan would be unlikey to do so IMO, but again it would be up to the council.

It is very unlikely that the US would declare war on Germany anytime soon, due to US public opinion, political opposition. Historically, even after the Pearl Harbor attacks, Roosevelt feared asking for a DOW against Germany for political reasons and losing public support for the actions the US was already taking. Hitler in his immense wisdom solved the problem for FDR by declaring war himself. It would take a really egregious act on Germany's part to make a DOW by the US a probability.

That is to be determined by the council. Historically, the plan was adopted (as was Pearl Harbor) in the spring of 1941 (IIRC April) and later in the year the Emperor ordered a review of the war plans to be completed by IIRC, November 15th. Troops and assets have been being moved in preparation for sometime now. I'd say that if we decide to go with theplan it will just take as long as it takes to get the logistics done. I haven't looked at the sailing times etc. to get a firm earliest date, most of that will be handled by the game. If we're give the go, we'll start issuing orders to move units around and how long it takes will be how long it take the units to complete the movements in the game.

 

From what I've read/remember B-29 mineing efforts contributed the most submarine mines were second.
This page which contains the graph below indicates that USAAF delivered mines were the majority:
Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses During World War II by All Causes
Here's part of the table but formating is likely to be messed up:
[TABLE]
[TR]
[TD="colspan: 2"]Mines:[/TD]
[TD="align: right"]19[/TD]
[TD="align: right"]17,995[/TD]
[TD] [/TD]
[TD="align: right"]247[/TD]
[TD="align: right"]591,660[/TD]
[TD] [/TD]
[TD="align: right"]266[/TD]
[TD="align: right"]609,655[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD] [/TD]
[TD]Laid by Army Air Forces[/TD]
[TD="align: right"]16[/TD]
[TD="align: right"]13,670[/TD]
[TD] [/TD]
[TD="align: right"]241[/TD]
[TD="align: right"]566,690[/TD]
[TD] [/TD]
[TD="align: right"]257[/TD]
[TD="align: right"]580,360[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD] [/TD]
[TD]Laid by Surface Craft[/TD]
[TD="align: right"]2[/TD]
[TD="align: right"]3,800[/TD]
[TD] [/TD]
[TD="align: right"]-[/TD]
[TD="align: right"]-[/TD]
[TD] [/TD]
[TD="align: right"]2[/TD]
[TD="align: right"]3,800[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD] [/TD]
[TD]Laid by Navy Land-Based Aircraft[/TD]
[TD="align: right"]1[/TD]
[TD="align: right"]525[/TD]
[TD] [/TD]
[TD="align: right"]1[/TD]
[TD="align: right"]6,417[/TD]
[TD] [/TD]
[TD="align: right"]2[/TD]
[TD="align: right"]6,942[/TD]
[/TR]
[TR]
[TD] [/TD]
[TD]Laid by Submarines[/TD]
[TD="align: right"]-[/TD]
[TD="align: right"]-[/TD]
[TD] [/TD]
[TD="align: right"]5[/TD]
[TD="align: right"]18,553[/TD]
[TD] [/TD]
[TD="align: right"]5[/TD]
[TD="align: right"]18,553[/TD]
[/TR]
[/TABLE]
Colums are number of naval ships, tonnage of naval ships, number of merchat ships, tonnage of merchant ships, and totals

 

The reason I brought it up was not to get an answer but it seems to me that it is something the council will want to consider before hand. I can see it depending a great deal on the circumstances of the time but if it does happen being able to react quickly (but rationally) to it might prove advantageous.

 

Sorry for this question Bob, but when will you write the next part of the story at the ICT? I´m very curios!

 

However in practice the two are already in an undeclared war. I think the above is probably accurate in the absence of a major provocative event. That is becomeing increasingly likely however. The "shoot on sight" order for instance had wide public approval. What happens if the US say starts escorting the Artic convoys?

 

Perhaps prior to 1942 they only used the slower, older biplanes for training on Taiyo, and as the front line forces upgraded the "cast offs" were relegated to training, but now required faster landing speeds (hence arresting gear was installed)

Perhaps they had a two tier training, first step with the biplanes on Taiyo etc, then move up to the higher performance craft on the Hosho or other carriers with arresting gear.

No, what I'm saying is that if you are going to take the time to cut off the superstructure and build a deck, it would be better to to make a CVE that has a hanger and 20 - 25 aircraft rather than just 4 or 5 aircraft. It would also be better to use the faster (20 - 28 knt) hulls rather than slow freighters.

What I'm doing is asking some questions here, hopefully you or lwd or Takao can answer.
1.) What is the cost (in time) to make a MAC vs a CVE? For example, if a freighter takes 12 months to construct, to convert a MAC takes 4 - 6 months and a CVE takes 8 to 10?
2.) Can a CVE flight deck be constructed during the construction process to save time?
3.) Would it be possible to use a CAM ship instead of a MAC?

The thing is, for every 2 (3?) MACs that you make, you use up the shipyard resources to make 1 more freighter, which Japan is already short on.
For convoys to the DEI (for example) it might be better to have shore based aircraft cover the convoy, with perhaps 1 CAM ship, with the CAM aircraft landing on a nearby airfield.


Basically, my point is this: If the construction bureau cam to me and said, "We have the resources to make you 3 Shoho CVE's, or 5 MACs" I would definately want the 3 CVE's rather than the 5 MACS. In the event that there is a minor operation (against an airfield on Wake, Tarawa, Howland, Johnson for example) you could send a CVE to do it, but a MAC couldn't. If there is the threat of an Allied carrier raid vs South Pacific or SRA assets you could have a squadron or so Zeros on a CVE, but a MAC couldn't handle it.


There are some other points to consider.

1.) The period from Nov - March is both the Typhoon season and Monsoon season in the South Pacific and the South China Sea. With at least a small hanger you can keep your aircraft protected, wheras on a MAC you will have some major problems doing maintainance in a Monsoon, and there is a decent chance that you can have your aircraft all damaged (biplane canvas torn by high winds) or even all swept off the decks in heavy winds.

2.) What are your available service assets? To equip a dozen MACs you will need a full complement of mechanics, deck personnel etc, does Japan have lots of spare assets in early 1942? If there is a situation where there are aircraft that are idle for a week or two (because they need engine overhauls etc and there aren't enough parts or mechanics) I'd much rather be in the position having them sitting in the hanger for a few weeks rather than have to push them overboard (because they are jamming up the flight deck and we need the room)