Battle for Ukraine

Nice to hear the former German officer on the documentary got it right.

Viva France.

 

It is still unknown the degree to which the guerrilla movements in the conquered areas influenced the outcome of the war-for certain the NAZIs had a real talent for inspiring people to take to the forests with their rifles! I recall reading somewhere that Der Fuhrer regarded the guerrilla movement as a positive development as it would give him a good excuse to kill more untermenschen. I don't think his initial enthusiasm lasted.
JeffinMNUSA

 

You are correct. In the Ukraine, particularly the western Ukraine, Stalin was despised. If the Einsatzgruppen had not murdered so many civilians, vast numbers of Ukranians would have fought against Stalin.

 

I remember reading that the Guerrilla movement cost the Wehrmacht around 600,000 casualties... Quite a significant figure.


I will try to locate my source....

 

The numbers remain unknown. There is the fact that the Axis used mostly Allied and Quisling troops to fight the guerrillas so perhaps German casualties were not so high? Rich Cohen states that 250,000 Axis Allied troops and 20,000 German regulars were fighting the guerrillas but this-as all-remains an estimate. Then there was the desertion factor with whole units of ostensibly Axis troops going over to the guerrillas-were these counted as "Axis casualties"? There are more questions than answers on this "Mystery within an enigma."

 

Hello everyone!I've been absent from the forum for 6 months,cause I didn't have much time and it's so time consuming and easy to get hooked on..How do U manage??

About the question at hand..If I was C in C of Wermacht at that time in late July 1941.,without the hind sight I believe I would have done the same thing as Hitler.
First and obvious reason is economical; wealthy Ukrainian wheat fields that attracted conquers for centuries,raw materials and heavy industry primarly of Donbas region.Also it opens the way to other major economical goal of nazi Germany:the oil fields of cis and trans Caucaus region.These economical arguments that influenced Hitler so much should've been secondary in campaign designed to destroy enemy armies before winter.Because once the army is defeated all the prize goes to the winner anyway.
Second issue was of military-operational nature.These reasons would affect me the most.There are several moments that are relevant here..To start with there is a matter of ever widening gap between racing panzers and the infantry that reached critical extent in mid July,with infantry legging hundreds of miles behind.If nothing else,it's never been tried before and top military experts(mostly of the old guard) started to feel very nervous and unsettled.The logistic was also on breaking point and essentially the right flank of army group center was non existent with neighboring army group south far behind.This problem would only expand if they pressed forward.
Last of military reasons has to do with ferocious defensive/offensive battles Soviets waged around Smolensk from mid July deep into August.Von Bock wrote at that time:' I'm compelled to engage all my divisions from army reserve..I'm in need of every single man at the front line.. If no strong blow delivered against the Russians on some sector in near future,it will be hard to destroy their army before winter. 'In light of all these information turning south would achieve economic goals,provide time for supplies,railroad construction and infantry to catch up,eliminate danger of exposed right flank, opportunisticly avoid and bypass obviously numerous and prepared forces of western front grouping east of Smolensk and easily net some 660 000 Soviet troops,the entire Southwestern front.
If I grant myself the luxury of hind sight things are some what different..It is known now that most important enemy of nazi army was time.Time they had to destroy Soviet prewar army and to size mobilization centers which were producing new units at incredible pace.Soviet mobilization system between 22.June and 31.December added to order of battle 373 rifle,58 tank and 88 cavalry divisions for a galactical grand total of 518 new divisions!!Quality of these divisions is another matter but these numbers alone have tremendous power.Back in '41 nazi intelligence estimated total Soviet mobilization capacity at 200 divisions.A fatal mistake.Germans knew that Moscow was major transport,population,industry and political center,but they just couldn't comprehend that this was (only) center capable of raising 15! brand new armies in 6 months(10 out of 28 raised in western USSR from 31.July to 31. December).Seizing center of such mobilization potential was essential for Germans to win before winter,perhaps to win at all..Furthermore now is known that '41 Red army lacked any significant mobility and resupply capacity imperative for any offensive.Again back then German intelligence on the matter was flawed as they were so concerned about non existent danger to AGC right flank,especially after carnage at Uman.
So drive straight for Moscow would be my decision today.Alternative route would be to take Ukraine,than to use blitzkrieg once again in Typhoon and stop after Vyazma,just as supply lines are cracking,mobile war becoming impossible because of rasputica(Russian term for impassable roads due to thick mud every fall and spring),troops needed rest and refit and winter dangerously close.In the spring offensive would continue,with preserved forces,finally capturing Moscow and dealing a death blow to Soviet army.The Russians on the other hand were betting all on this one card,that exhausted German armies on the end of over stretched supply lines would come into the trap they set for them at Moscow..Most of the reserves were there as well as fresh regular,fully equipped units from far east.The Russian bear was just waiting for this pack of superiorly mobile hungry nazi wolfs to come close,lose it's evading and manoeuvring abilities and get messy.That's just what the wolfs did, coming out with bloody noses,as AGC almost disintegrated.

 

Not to contradict you ,but the importance of the units of the Far East in the Russian Winter offensive is much exagerated :they were only a smalll minority of the troops engaged .Most of them had been engaged prior december 1941 .Strength of the Russian army in decemberperational forces :4000000 ;Stavka reserve :500000 ;tanks:2000 of which 200 heavy . Cheers

 

Hi LJad! You love to write to me..

when I said 'Most of the reserves were there as well as fresh regular,fully equipped units from far east.', I was aware that easterners were relatively few in numbers,but in contrast to hastly raised and ill equipped reservists,they were trained regulars,with full support of tanks and heavy weapons.This made them the ones Soviet commanders could rely on the most..

 

I love discussing with intelligent people

 

It was in a conference circa August. I paraphrase him closely: "This partisan warfare is not without its advantages. We shall have cause to shoot anyone who so much as look at us askance."* His generals said that he looked excited.

John Keegan assessed that the influence of the guerillas on the war was not at all decisive as the partisans were never powerful enough to to pull first-rate German combat divisions from the front to the rear. The Wehrmacht was able to contain the partisan threat by using quislings, specialist anti-partisan units composed of criminals and security divisions that minimally guarded their LOC. I think he is only partiy right. The partisans' contribution was area denial and therefore denial of vital resources that the Germans needed to win the war.

*Edit: Hitler made that declaration after Stalin's total war speech. Does not remember the exact date, though.