Battle of the Bulge

They were well beyond that by late afternoon on the 18th. The platoons under Lt. Murray were firing rifle grenades and bazookas at the top of Rue Haut Rivage, well beyond the Place marche'. Those platoons may have withdrawn after dark to Place Marche', but they were skirmishing south of there during daylight hours. Captain Kent (whose overlay is above) isn't clear on that point, but after dark they did withdraw to defensive positions on the north side of town. The following morning they advanced and cut off the bridge and blocked the west side of town at the road to La Gleize.

 

Here´s what Kent had to say about this. Note that it matches my description of the events of December 18 like a glove:

"The 1st Battalion detrucked at dawn, of 18. The orders were: Company "A" to protect bridge approaches to Malmedy from the South-East direction. Company "C" to hill on left flank (South of Company "A"). Orders quickly changed, 1st Battalion mission changed, now to go to Stavelot to relieve Company "A" 526th Armored Infantry Battalion which had not seen much action prior to this time. They told us that the road from Malmedy to Stavelot had been cut by the Germans.

The 1st Battalion moved by convoy to Francorchamps, then south toward Stavelot. We detrucked at 2 miles of town. We found Armored Infantry personnel eating K-rations and the men said simply: "Germans ran us out of town. Mission abruptly changed from relief to Assault. Units jockeyed into tactical formation and advanced. Company "A" at right of the road and Company "B" at left of road leading into Stavelot.Along the road on right side was a large number of gasoline drums, some had been set on fire to prevent the Germans from using this as a supply. I met some civilians who were very helpful, and knowledgeable about the whereabouts of the German troops. These men may have given their names, but I have forgotten, but they did mention "Belgique Resistance" and thusly I have remembered them. Also I felt that they were the ones that set the drums afire rather than the men of Company "A" 526th Armored infantry Battalion. This act took tactical foresight, which did not come through to me in my contact with the young soldiers.

As our leading echelons moved through the fields and woods toward the town, our leading men were now infiltrating into the town square, the 1st Platoon of Company "A" and 1st Platoon Company "B" moved in on their share. The 1st Platoons of Company "A" and Company "B", took the town square in Stavelot, but due to the fire power of the German tanks, could do no more. The tanks were kept at bay by the actions of the two platoons under the direction of Lieutenant Murray. Firing grenades and bazookas, they kept the tanks from being too aggressive. One tank even backed into a building.

We were ordered to hold our position. Under Lieutenant Murray's direction and organization, with the cooperation of Lieutenant Foster, Company "B", the area was tactically snug, also helped by mortar observers, light machinegun, heavy machinegun, Tank support, and Tank Destroyer.Again the Jerries tried to again breakthrough our lines. The GI's were not to be fooled, we killed or captured most of them."

http://www.criba.be/fr/stories/detail/stavelot-belgium-17-to-22-december-44-211-1

Ostuf. Wessel testified that he drove all the way up the Rue Haute Rivage to what he described as a "rectangular square" where he got two AT hits on the bow, urging him to back up the tank causing it to crash into the building. The rectangular square would be the crossing of the Rue Haute Rivage, the Rue Henry Massange and the Rue du Vinave. Murrays bazooka team only had to move 50 meters from the square to the corner of the Rue de Vinave and the Rue d´Eglise to enable them to fire at the bow of 105. Another possibility is that they moved 60 meters up the Rue Generale Jacques and fired at the rectangular square from there, accounting for the bazooka hits visible on the right hand side of 105 visible in the picture you posted. None of these scenarios involves a penetration by the 117th "well beyond" the market square. For sure the bazooka teams backed off after dark, probably because the Shermans of Lt. Hansen had entered the market square from the north and taken up defensive positions there.

 

In addition, again in his own words, Kent about the early morning of the 19th:

"Midnight to dawn: the orders were: shoot anything and everything that moves. Not much action. Morning, orders to push forward to the river, specific objectives were to push forward to the Ambleve River and set up defenses along the river, and to blow the bridge. The river bank objective was reached by 10.00 hrs. The Germans had withdrawn during the night. Over the single bridge across the Ambleve River, the Germans tried to trick us again. "B" Company was to the north of the bridge; "A" Company was to the south of the Bridge and very stretched out to Parfondruy. Company "C" was in reserve, the 1st Battalion H.Q., Company "D" H.Q. and its 81mm Mortar Platoon all back on the hill overlooking Stavelot from the east (Erlinchamps)."

Note that he specifically describes that he held on to his positions on the market square and that the push south of the market place down to the entrance of the bridge and the train station, the positions on the "afternoon op the 18th" map you posted, took place in the morning of the 19th. This matches all German accounts (Knittel would not have been able to pour his Kampfgruppe across the bridge up the Rue Haute Rivage and on to La Gleize all evening and night if Kent had made those moves in the afternoon of the 18th).

 

Ruimteaapje - Thank you for sharing this information.

It's a pitty that the Stavelot actions get so few attention in literature. IMO the fate of KG Peiper was decided at his town. It looks as if only a relatively small band of Americans, only two infantry companies of the 1st Bn, one of which also was responsible for covering the right flank, retook the important town and bridge.

What is known about the American efforts to blow the bridge.

 

The blowing of the bridge in Stavelot is described in great detail on the CRIBA website:

"Some time about noon on the 19th of December, I received orders to go to Stavelot and destroy the bridge. Reconnaissance was the first thing to be done. I took off with my driver, T-5 Tony Barone, in a jeep and drove as close to the river as I dared, then proceeded on foot to near the bridge. This was the front line of the 117th Infantry who were "holed up" in houses and basements along this line. Jerry held all the ground south of the river and had at least one tank and infantry with other weapons, covering the bridge. The bridge was in "no man's land".
In the daytime it would have been instant suicide to approach the bridge in the open. It was completely exposed to German fire. It was necessary that I got a good look at the bridge so we could decide how to destroy it and how much explosive would be needed.
By carefully moving through each house to the next I arrived at an upper story window which gave me an oblique view of the bridge. By standing back from the window to remain unseen, I sketched a rough drawing of the bridge and estimated the length of the spans and thickness of the deck. There was a wrecked US jeep on the bridge and the body of an American soldier wearing an armored unit uniform lying near our end.
While at my position overlooking the bridge, I was witness to a duel between one of our TD's [Tank Destroyer] and the Kraut tank on the south side of the river. After some maneuvering by both combatants, the TD got a couple of rounds into the side of the enemy tank. A few seconds later a smoke grenade was tossed out of the tank hatch and followed one by one, the surviving members of the crew who ran into a nearby building. [This tank is the one pictured on the 31st page of the picture section of the 30th Division history. Picture was taken from a position very close to where I observed the bridge].
After returning to my jeep, we drove back up the hill to our Company CP to plan and to organize a demolition crew. We estimated an excessive amount of TNT to be certain, because the charge would be just sitting on the top of the deck, nothing like an Engineer School solution. We decided on 1000 lbs., which was 20 fifty pound boxes of TNT. We placed caps at random in various boxes to insure it would all explode. TNT is super stable and it needs a good shock to set it off. We also built three igniters, with slow burning fuses, long enough to burn about one minute with detonators and fuse lighters. This was two more than necessary but insurance to guarantee detonation.
We planned to approach after dark, but didn't want to delay too long because the Germans might be planning an assault to recapture the bridge that night. We arranged through the 117th Regimental Headquarters for HE [High Explosive] artillery fire at a constant rate mixed with smoke shells into the enemy positions close to the south end of the bridge. This fire was to begin at the hour we planned to move to the bridge. [The time has long been forgotten but was probably 1900 or 2000 hrs]. The artillery fire was necessary to cover the noise we would make. The smoke, to make it more difficult to be observed while we were approaching the bridge and setting the charge. The town had been shelled the previous days and there was much glass from shattered windows and doors laying in the cobblestone streets, making it impossible to walk quietly, especially while carrying a 50 lb box of TNT.
The TNT and men were loaded into two 6x6 trucks and with the jeep leading we drove down the hill. When the artillery fire started we moved to within 3 or 4 blocks of the bridge. The trucks were unloaded, passing out the TNT, one box per man and everybody headed for the bridge on foot. On our way, a French speaking soldier was assigned to check the houses and basements near the bridge and advise anyone in them to leave. I do not recall whether we found anyone, they had probably already left due to the fighting earlier. Our infantry had already been ordered to move back from the bridge site. Staff Sgt. James McKeon, [who was killed about a month later] and Sgt. Lowell Richardson, accompanied me with the rest of the men following, to set all the TNT in one stack directly over the thinnest part of the deck in the first span. The men delivered their boxes and quickly returned to the trucks. This was done in about 3 or 4 minutes and we three, McKeon, Richardson and myself, on a signal, pulled all three fuse lighters simultaneously.
explosion. Stone masonry houses close to the ends of the bridge collapsed and any remaining windows near the bridge were blown out . It must have been some shock to any Krauts, exposed or not, on the south side.
We took off running, disregarding any noise we might make, then a couple of short blocks away, "KA-BOOM!!!". It was a terrific
Our artillery fire stopped and we were all standing along a sidewalk just north of the bridge when at least one Jerry machine gun began firing up the street from the south side. We fell and jumped through doors and windows into houses until after a few minutes, the firing stopped. Luckily, no one was hurt.
It was then necessary to get a look at the bridge to see if the job had been accomplished. Sgt. Richardson and I stole back to the river as quietly as possible and looked over the edge of the hole in the bridge. The first span had disappeared, it was a good gap. As our company commander, Captain James Rice, told Hal Boyle, an AP reporter "No German tank can broad jump that"."

Captain Leland E. COFER, A Company Commander, 105th Engineer Battalion, 30th Infantry Division

http://www.criba.be/fr/stories/detail/the-bridge-at-stavelot-45-1

Note that the described duel between a TD and a German tank involved the M10 Tank Destroyer of [SIZE=small]Sgt. Ray Dudley, C Comp, 823rd TD, and the Tiger "222" of SS-Oscha Kurt Sowa, 2nd Comp, schw. SS-PzAbt 501[/SIZE]:

http://www.battleofthebulgememories.be/stories26/32-battle-of-the-bulge-us-army/740-the-end-of-the-trail-for-tiger-222.html

 

Leland Cofer (as a Captain, in the Spring of 45).

View attachment 21336

 

I agree. The head of the snake was cut off at Stavelot and the fate not only of Peiper, but the fate of the entire 6th panzer army was decided there. The 6th Panzer army was the main thrust of the attack and with that penetration stopped, all efforts had to shift south to the the 5th panzer army which was in a much more difficult position. From the German strategic perspective, all hope of the "big solution" (cutting the allied armies in half) ended at Stavelot.

 

Ruimteaapje - thanks again for the information.

Apart from the book of Hubert Laby "Ardennes 44, Stavelot", which was published in 1996, I do not know of any other monography focussing on the fight for this town.

I have a (signed :sunglasses-peek: ) copy of it, got it many years ago when I was an active member of CRIBA .

I assume that the Belgian resistance fighters in Kent's account were the members of the 5th Fusilier Battalion, who were charged with guarding the fuel depots around Spa.

 

No doubt one of the upcoming volumes of Duel in the Mist will deal with Stavelot in great detail (there´s already quite a lot of info about KG Knittel in Stavelot on December 20 to 22 in vol. 3). Laby did a great job but isn´t without errors, Mathieu Longue wrote a book about KG Knittel which combines info from Laby with his own research, info from one of the researchers of DitM and some info from me, and there´s my own manuscript about Knittel, if I ever manage to complete it and find a publisher. I think I can promise that it will be extremely detailed from the German, American and civilian side.

some examples...

 

Ruimteaapje - I sincerely hope you will succeed in bringing out your book. Judging from the information you provided it must be excellent.

 

I prefer facts over fantasy, unfortunately the film script seems to be focused on the latter.

 

I totally agree. I have the Laby and Longue books in addition to all three 'Duel In The Mists' and would be very keen to see a published work from our contributor, who I know has been researching this area for many years.

 

I'd like Ruimteaapje's book also! I'd love to get my hands on translated versions of Mr. Laby's books, but they aren't available. It's sad how little information is available (in English) on the civilian experiences in these battles.

 

I think that Schrijvers' 'The Unknown Dead' is almost all that we have in English translation......

 

"KodiakBeer", could you ask Jean-Marie how he identified Leidreiter as the officer who's men entered the home in the Rue Rivage? I'm asking because I try to establish who the officer or nco in question actually was.

The name "Walter Leidreiter" is an error in the well known After the Battle book by Jean-Paul Pallud. Not only did the author got the first name wrong (it was Hans-Martin Leidreiter, usually refered to as Martin), he also applied the name to the wrong person: the photo in Palluds book of an officer in a Schwimmwagen actually shows Obersturmführer Goltz, CO of the staff company. And, to complete the mix up, the photos captioned as Knittel with Goltz actually show Knittel with the real Leidreiter.

Last month we've established that indeed a platoon from Leidreiter's company was present at the bridge in Stavelot and took shelter in the houses near the bridge when allied fighterbombers attacked. We've also established that Leidreiter himself wasn't present as he was with Knittel in Peiper's CP near Cheneux, keeping their heads down for the allied planes.

Goltz and his men from the staff company crossed the bridge after the air attack and were responible for the failed attempt that evening to push the Americans off the Place de Marché. But if it was actually Goltz and his men who entered the house, I guess his name and face would be known to Jean-Marie and his family because in 1948 he was tried in Liège for warcrimes in the Stavelot area and visited Stavelot under guard from Rijkswachters as part of the investigations. An event witnessed by most villagers and broadly reported in the local papers.

Greetings from Amsterdam

 

I'm rather busy right now. I just bought an old ranch house and am in the process of re-building. I'm actually living in a motel at the moment.. But, you can get in contact with Jean-Marie Degbomont and many other people with memories of those days at: https://www.facebook.com/groups/136129013260252/ TU SAIS QUE TU AS VECU A STAVELOT QUAND.....(Lachez vos commentaires)

Mr. Degbomont was quite clear that some of this was memory and some of this info he picked up later from family and other people in the town. Remember, he was only 5 years old at the time. In his correspondence (which is run through an online translator and rather jumbled) he is very good about preceding actual memories with words that clarify that he saw this or heard this - his mother whispering the Neuman will die, climbing over the dead cow, playing "Tarzan" with the GI and so on. Other events were obviously picked up later as the family discussed those harrowing days.

 

Well, I requested membership of the FB page but there's no reply and it now seems the FB page is offline?

 

It's still quite active. The moderator (?) of the page is Martine Martin https://www.facebook.com/Martine.Martin.Hutsemekers?fref=grp_mmbr_list You should probably just contact him directly with an IM from Facebook.

Another Belgian Facebook page is devoted entirely to the battle of the Ardennes. It's more military oriented than civilian. https://www.facebook.com/groups/393409870805887/

 

Well, it seems pretty clear that following my request for membership I was blocked from viewing the Stavelot page, hence the "content unavailable remark".. Not the kind of people I want to follow around facebook to get allowed in.