effectiveness of WW2 air bombing of Germany

Kai, all your last posts were very interesting and they talk very well about the Luftwaffe being banned from the airs in East and West after 1943. But we have come to different conclusions about that, so let's stop.

Good post, Vermillion. Just want to point out that luckily when the Allies bombarded Ploiesti oilfields they were working only at 60% of their total capacity.

And I do agree that Harris' bombing policy was to raise British morale and have revenge for Great Britain. However, I do not think that 120.000 casulaties (more less) of the RAF bombing command was a TOO HIGH price for that. Totally worthless in my opinion.

 

Fried, I will now have you bookmark my new web-site addy if you wish. Follow along over the next months to 2 years and you will find out that the Defence of the Reich fighter force was far from being banned from the skies in summer and ealry fall of 1944. Only in the winter did the toll really take effect as there were only 9 Jagdgeschschwader and not to full capacity left in the areas of Germany......

 

OK, I'd wish to see that.

And maybe I'll have to change the word banned for another one... since I do not mean that the Luftwaffe was banned from the air like the Red Air Force was banned in June and July 1941. Of course they were still a very capable fighting force, but the numerical inferiority cost them dearly. My whole point has always been and will always be that the Luftwaffe just couldn't bear those loss rates, could it?

 

No the Luftwaffe could not bear the losses by late winter 1943 through spring of 1944 in the heated battles over Germany and Holland. Too many good pilots killed. Some of the fiercest and I mean fiercest air battles took place in the winter and spring. Stevin our friend here can testify to this with his knowledge on the January 11, 1944 air battle. The real crunch or the "thinning" out of the Luftwaffe was certainly by November of 1944. As an example when my cousin flew his total of 2/3 missions with the revised JG 301. Almost all new pilots full of honour taking to the skies in machines they had only received in late September 44 and taking on vastly superior numbers of P-51's to help protect those like my cousin to attack B-24's and B-17's and yet being pounced on by the overwhelming amount of US fighters, trying oh as they might to attack close-in to the US heavies, and yet to be shot down many, many times before they could even get a Gefechstverband organized.
A very slim chance for a Luftwaffe fighter pilot to make it through to winter of 44/45 without being wounded or worse, killed and 6 feet under.

Though the Luftwaffe still put up brave pilots and a/c it was at a much lower rate in 1945, due to fuels, ammo and the always run and move your Geschwader to another airfield being hemmed in by the Soviets in the Ost and the Allies in the West.
The only effective Day-fighter Geschwader in 1945 in my opinion was Me 262 JG 7. JG 300 tried as they could and were smashed.

Getting back to Günther Rall, I asked him about his service career as Kommodore of JG 300 and all he could do was tell me how chaotic it was. He asked himself over and over "what am I doing here ?" "I'm going to get killed !" "What was the use as we are defeated but I must do my duty and send boys to meet their deaths"......sounds pretty depressing, and it was. And to be honest I never did ask him how many missions he flew while with the Stab./JG 300

So the word banned not be used but maybe a slowing or reduced force would be better ?

Fried although our site has and will continue to cover the three German Luftwaffe Sturmgruppen you and others should get a real feel of deadly air combat in all forms, text and pics and I will include more materials on my cousins mission in November of 44 while with JG 301 as it fits right in with the type of sturm taktics used then in the fall of that year....

~E

 

Hamburg, Dresden....AND Darmstadt!

11/12 September 1944

Darmstadt: 226 Lancasters and 14 Mosquitos of No 5 Group. 12 Lancasters lost, 5.3 per cent of the Lancaster force. A previous No 5 Group attack in August had failed to harm Darmstadt but, in clear weather conditions, the group's marking methods produced an outstandingly accurate and concentrated raid on this almost intact city of 120,000 people. A fierce fire area was created in the centre and in the districts immediately south and east of the centre. Property damage in this area was almost complete. Casualties were very heavy.

http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/diary/sep44.html

1944: - heavy allied air war attacks: 12.300 dead, 70.000 homeless, 78% of inner city area destroyed, only 50.000 inhabitants left in Darmstadt

http://www.tu-darmstadt.de/city/hist.html

 

I completely agree with your post, Erich. Thanks for the response.

And of course in 1944 there were so many US fighters that the heavy-armed FW-190s designed to shoot heavy bombers down were being shot down by Mustangs since they were out-manoeuvred because of the weight and then the Luftwaffe had to bring light fighters to escort the heavy ones. Fighters escorting fighters... That doesn't sound nice. Is that true?

 

u are very correct fried. please excuse my terrible typing as my ct is in bad shape today so the post maybe grammatically challenged

yes during the september/october 44 battles the heavy fw 190a-8's almost felt like they flew alone with no high cover or hohenschutz. the high cover 109g-6's were overwhelmed and if they were not shot down by p-51's and the other p-47's the 109 pilots would try to escape or attack some crippled b-17 pr b-24. i have accounts of at least 5 times the whole combined unit of 109's/fw 190's could not even form up for a rear attack on the bombers as the allied p-51's selected a perfect time for a bounce and slaughtered many german a/c.
in most cases the fw 190a-8's could make one pass through the back of the bomber's and then they would try and reform up and to the right or left 1000 feet higher for another rear attack, and at this time of form up the fw 190's were at their weakest and the p-51's were right there to cause major destruction. only if the staffeln or gruppenkommanduer would call off the attack with the approach of allied fighters and the fw 190's could dive down and hug the ground to escape to their airfields.

hoping this makes sense.

to go along with Kai's September 11 44 mission, here is one hot site that coverse the 1ooth bomb group and jg 4 fighters en masse

www.lf.czu.cz/museum119

good friend Jan Zdiarsky from czech republic....

~E

 

Data on the methods and success rates on both sides:

Q: How accurate was daylight bombing?

A: In good to fair visibility 40% of the bombs fell within 1,000ft (300 m) of the MPI (Mean Point of Impact). This value increased to 60% within 2,000 ft (600 m) with the rest of the bombs falling further away. This is typical for missions flown by the 8th Air Force in 1944 using visual bombing. Overcast and poor weather often prevailed in Europe and radar bombing was utilized.


Q: How accurate was radar bombing?

A: A report from the 8th Air Force Operations Analysis Section show radar bombing achieved the following accuracy in various conditions of overcast: The following percentages indicate bombs landing within 1,000 ft ( 300 m ) of the MPI (Mean Point of Impact)
100% overcast 0.2%
80 - 90% overcast 1%
60 - 70% overcast 2%
40 - 50% overcast 4.4%

Q: Which was more effective against bombers, anti-aircraft fire (flak) or fighters?

A: This varied from theater to theater and even from mission to mission but overall flak brought down more Allied aircraft than any other single cause. In 1944, German flak destroyed 3,501 American aircraft - nearly 600 more than Luftwaffe fighters. Conversely, anti-aircraft fire over Japan was very ineffective. While more than 2,000 B-29s suffered various degrees of damage to flak, antiaircraft fire was credited with downing just 29 of the giant bombers.

Q: How many bombs fell on countries outside of Germany and Italy in the European theater?

A: 41% of the tonnage of bombs dropped by the USAF fell on countries outside Germany and Italy. 339,651 tons on France (22%), 76,026 tons on Austria (5%), 26,415 tons on Rumania (2%), 24,040 tons on Yugoslavia (2%); the percentages for the remaining countries are 1% or lower: Hungary 22,228 tons, 15,519 tons on the Low Countries, Albania 371 tons, Czechoslovakia 14,799 tons, Denmark 60 tons, Bulgaria 2,600 tons, Greece 3,225 tons, Norway 1,497 tons, Poland 1,460 tons. In addition North Africa was struck with 49,251 tons of bombs (3% of the total) while 59,808 tons (4%) landed on 'other' targets (not identified with any country).

Q: What percentage of bombs failed to detonate properly, becoming unexploded bombs?

A: Faulty fuses, poor assembly or bad angle of impact led to bombs failing to detonate properly. These 'duds' or unexploded bombs (UXB)s were and are a special threat as they continue to be uncovered due to construction and other activities 50+ yrs later. Most sources quote a 5% figure for 'duds' and I think this is fairly representative. During the war 440,000 bombs fell in the Berlin area, using a 5% failure rate means that some 22,000 bombs failed to explode. On occasion bombs were deliberately set not to go off thereby creating additional hazards for bomb disposal personnel most notably during the Blitz.

http://www.ww2guide.com/ww2faq.shtml