If hitler began operation Barbarossa at his initial proposed date

I'm not at all sure this is the case. The by the end of September the front line German units were facing quite a few logistical problems. Not just supplies but the condition of their vehciles and quantity of replacements were also suffering.

Or not. While you may believe this it is far from clear to me.

If the Germans get an extra 5 weeks so do the Soviets. They may reach Moscow earlier indeed in some sense of the word they may have the time to surround Moscow but do they have the forces and do they have the time in the face of Soviet resistance?

 

Two points:
1) Were more trucks used there than were produced/procured during the time before the invasion started?
2) Trucks are not the critical item in regards to the logistics problems the Germans experianced. It's the train system and I see nothing here that improves that.

 

The real disadvantages from the Balkan campaign were the wear and tear on the tanks, resulting in high rate of mechanical failure in Operation Barbarossa. Secondly, the Balkan campaign deprived the Army Group South of about a third of its armoured strength for its initial attack and their loss was sorely felt. Finally, the failed airborne invasion of Crete discouraged Hitler to attempt any further large airborne operations, which could have been invaluable in the Russian campaign.

 

The real disadvantages from the Balkan campaign were the wear and tear on the tanks, resulting in high rate of mechanical failure in Operation Barbarossa. Secondly, the Balkan campaign deprived the Army Group South of about a third of its armoured strength for its initial attack and their loss was sorely felt. Finally, the failed airborne invasion of Crete discouraged Hitler to attempt any further large airborne operations, which could have been invaluable in the Russian campaign.
Of course much the same wear and tear was recieved to the transports.
Production did not match the loses.

 

Do you have any documentation on this? How much did the experiance gained off set this?

The airborne invasion of Crete didn't fail. Large airborne ops could also have proved a disaster in the Russian campaign. I don't see strong evidence either way.

One of the flaws one sees in many what if's is a tendency for the proponent to assume all the brakes go one way and not allow for reactions of the opponent to the changes. I see both playing a part here.

 

Im sure they will be some info online by my material tends to come from my bookshelf.
Ill get my books out and ref them for you.

It captured Crete however with heavy loses.
This may not have been the case had they been used in Russia.

 

In Adolf Hitler by John Toland Hitler specifically blames Mussolini's invasion of Greece and the subsequent Balkan campaign for the delay and the loss of army group South’s armour and much transport.

 

I doubt that very much. With every new invention there are always going to be teething issues, bugs to work out. The heavy casualties at Crete were mainly due to the fact that the Germans were inexperienced with airborne assaults, and they paid for there inadequacy much like the Allies at Dieppe, and there first real Amphibious landing.

So had the Germans started there landings in Russia there is a good chance, that there troops would come off far worse, against a far numerically superior force as well as being in an area without water surrounding your targets such as Crete, the landings would have been nothing short of a slaughter for the Germans.

The object after all for paratroopers of any kind is pretty simple, stop the enemy advancing towards the front and hold key points of interest further up the line, well with Russia holding key points would achieve nothing. Russia being as large as she is, even if you hold one river bridge, there will surely be another hundred to go before the end.

 

No the main reason for loses was because they landed on heavly defended possitions and troop formations.
Being a cramped island this is far more likely.
Russia would allow much greater scope for the use of such troops away from defended strong points.

It was the delaying of the Soviet retreat which would be the main purpose here not to mention bride seizure.
Even if only one bridge is seized before it should have been then time will have been saved.

 

May not have indeed but probably would have. I know of three major airborne ops the Germans conducted. Crete, Holland, and Norway. All of them involed substantial losses of transport aircraft.

Certainly Mussolini was responsible for attacking Greece. However Hitler had a number of alternatives in response to the Italian failures. One can hardly put sole blame on Mussolini for Hitler's decisions. Then there's the question of just what impact these losses to army group South would have on the assault on Moscow.

 

Hitler had no choice but to invade the Balkans.
If he did not the British could have opened a South East European front.
The loses meant Army Group South struggled to achieve it's objectives which then called for the diversion of Army Group Centres Panzers to the South.
Thus hindering the advance on Moscow.
The Italian forces could have had more than double the transports with the Balkan campaign not to mention greater man power and air power.

 

I was just going to point out that it is true that the invasion of the Soviet was late getting started because Hitler diverted troops to Africa and the Balkans in order to prop up failed Italian operations there. But that ignores the fact that the spring rains in April and early May of 1941 were heavier than usual, and the areas didn’t dry up until late June. Those five weeks between the original planned date of invasion (May 15th) were still heavily mud covered and slow in drying out, and remember there were only 40,000 miles of paved all-weather roads in the entire Soviet Union, and few of them where the Wehrmacht needed them.


Add to that the rather sound reason for the Balkan operation; it wasn’t just to save Mussolini’s bacon (he had been humiliated in both areas), it was also prudent for the German right flank to be secure from British air-intervention through Greece, which could easily threaten the vital oil fields at Ploesti in Rumania. It was these fields that provided much of the fuel necessary for the German army, if the Soviet oil is removed from the equation. The Soviets were supplying 34% of German oil at the time. So it would be prudent to protect the Ploesti Fields if you are about to loose 1/3 of your POL (Petroleum-Oil-Lubricants).

Hitler’s attacking the Soviet Union was without doubt "going to be done", but he risked loosing much if he couldn’t occupy and exploit the natural resources of the SU, and he never could nor did. In 1940, and the first half of 1941, the Soviet Union supplied Germany with 74% of its phosphate needs, 67% of its asbestos imports, 65% of its chrome ore supplies, 55% of its manganese, 40% of its nickel imports and 34% of its oil.

The Germans had 134 Divisions at full fighting strength and 73 more reserve divisions for deployment behind the front when they invaded in June. And a single German panzer division could consume somewhere between 400-550 tons of supplies of all types daily. With the relative paucity of all-weather, roads and limited rail capacity there were several times during the campaign that the armored divisions were forced to stop due to lack of supplies. (The tonnage figures are for a division of 1944, of which the establishment was slightly smaller than in 1941, but it can be accepted as reasonably accurate when combat and mechanical losses are taken into account.)

Much of this is from:

Military History Online - Operation Barbarossa: The Ultimate Strategic Miscalculation

 

Of course he did. Quite a few of them. The one he chose might or might not have been the best but that's another matter.

Did they? What was their strength at the time Barbarosa would have started if there hadn't been a Balkan campaign vs historical? Was it enough to make a difference?

Why would the Italians even be involved at least intially in a campaign vs the Soviet Union? What's in it for them?

 

The Wehrmacht deemed conditions fine by June 1st.

Several senior German figures mainly economic spoke against the invasion.
One said referring to the USSR useless bureaucratic state said to Hitler "let the USSR stew in its own bureaucratic Bolshevism.
However that has to be weighed up whether the Soviets would move against Germany which played heavy on Hitler’s mind.

 

The Italians were involved this isnt counter factual but a fact.

 

You are srarting from a false assumption :that the Germans were winning,but were prevented of taking Moscow by a shortage of time (btw:there is no proof that taking Moscow would mean the end of the war ).
The fact is that from the beginning the Russians became stronger and the Germans were weakening ,thus why should that change if the Germans attacked earlier ?

 

But your POD is prior to their involvement. Lacking the Balkan campaign what interest do they have in a campaign in the East?

 

You can not simply change what the German war machine would do and not follow suit for the Russian side. Had Germany reached Moscow sooner as you claim the Soviet Counter offensive would have come sooner as well. Or do you suppose the Soviet counter offensive would come on the same date and place as they historically had regardless of German presence there?

As pointed out by numerous Historians an extra month and 20 German divisions would not have changed a thing.

but lets say that these extra factors allowed the Germans to surround and even take Moscow. What then?

How many casualties do you suppose the German war machine might have sustained in this ambitious undertaking?

How would these men be reinforced?

Whats to happen to the supply lines?

 

Do you know that more Italian troops were killed in the Soviet Union(82,000) than in the African campaigns (50,000)

 

I have no doubt that taking Moscow would not have ended the war.
As for strength the extra 8 divisions of occupation in the Balkans including 2 Panzer divisions would help.
As would some of the 150,000 casualties and mass equipment loss the Italians suffered in Greece.
As I mentioned early Army group South lost a third of its armoured strength because of the Balkan campaign.
The Axis powers lost around 100 planes in the Balkans too plus wear and tear on even more.
Not to mention the planes that had to be stationed there for occupation support and defence.