Japanese Tanks

was looking up information on Japanese tanks in WWII and found this interesting little post on another discussion forum on the subject. Does anyone know what happened to the Stuarts that were captured in the Phillipines?


"Well, I need to kill time before I get on the plane back to the US, I thought I'll write up a article about Japanese tanks of WW2, based off a Korean magazine. So don't kill me if some of these sentences sound bad, it's kinda hard to translate. Enjoy.



I: At first, one of the finest.

Well, Japanese tanks weren't a failure from the start, they were actually pretty good. During the 1920's. Japan brought in British and French tanks(the old WWI tanks), for studying, and making their own tank. The Japanese rule was try to make the most parts of something by your self. Instead of making massive tank units, they decided to use a few British/french tank units at first, to get the hang of controlling tanks as a strategic piece. At first, this strategy worked well. In 1929, the first pure Japanese tank was revealed. The 89 type(the actual mass production began in 1931). The 89 type was good, compared to other WWI tanks. Of course, compared to WWII tanks, it was a tracked armoured car... The 89 type's armor barely stopped light MG bullets, the armor panels wire RIVETED. The main gun was useless also. A low speed 57mm cannon. So basically, this was a moving, troop support bunker. But that's compared to WWII tanks. Until atleast 1930, the most of the world didn't know how to use tanks. Japan thought the tank's role was to destory MG nests, and barbed wire. So the 89 type's armor and main gun was good enough, at the time. Plus the 89(I'll scratch off the type, to save my fingers.) had a diesel engine, a first in tanks. The 89 was a good tank for that time.


II: Victory at 89's first debut, but...

The 89 started to be placed in units in numbers, starting from 1932. Japan's invasion of China, so the newly made tank unit invaded Shanghai. So the 89 was a "fortress" in China. China had few tanks, and fewer AT weapons. The 89 was invincible, it helped lead the Japanese forces to victory in Shanghai and Nanjing. But the "invinciblity" was bad for the 89 command. They saw no need to change tactics in their "moving bunker"... After the 89, The Japanese developed the 94 type(1934), armed with only a LMG(-_-). Then came the 95 type(1935). The 95 carried a 37mm cannon(In 1935, a 37 mm was a very powerful cannon). The next tank was the start of the suffering of the Japanese tanks(Sorry, couldn't write up a better sentence...) The 97 type(1937), it had much better armor than the 89, but the main gun was same. The low power 57mm. They still had the idea that tanks were moving bunkers, supporting foot soldiers.


III: Defeat.

1939, Soviet and Japanese soldiers fighting for the Manchurian border met with tanks. The Japanese 89 and 97 types got slaughtered. Their low power 57mm s didn't do any damage on the Soviet BT tanks, while the BT's 47mm pierced the 89/97s. But the 95 type actually was better than the newer 97. It had a 37mm. The Soviet tank's armor was weak too, so the 37mm pierced them. Japanese forced faced the first tank defeat. If they shaped up from here, they might had some decent tanks in WWII. Problem is, they didn't.


IIII: Japan doesn't shape up, and they face a powerful enemy.

The Japanese forces wanted to forget the defeat, and keep the tanks the way they are. Although, they found out the 97's cannon didn't pierce anything. So they decided to upgrade to a 47mm, but the funds weren't steady enough, so the upgrade was postphoned. December 1941, the Pacific was began. The Allied forces didn't expect tanks in the jungle, so a lot of the first Allied defeats were helped by the Japanese tanks. The Allies had a few tanks, but those few tanks gave GREAT shock to the Japanese. The M3 Stuart tank. They weren't so suprised about the armor of the M3 deflecting the low power 57mm from the 89s and 97s(no upgrade yet), so they sent in 95s, with 37mm. Direct hit! But the 37mm just deflects off. The M3's 37mm pierces the weak Japanese tanks... The Japanese act like Germans who faced T-34s or KV-1s. But the M3s were overhwelmed, and captured/destroyed. To the Japanese, the M3 Light tank was a medium tank.


IIIII: The so called "solution".

The Japanese army tried to find a solution to penetrate the M3's 50mm front armot. The solution was the postphoned upgrade. They hurriedly upgraded the 97s with the 47mm cannons, and made their first debut in the Philippines. The result was good. The 47mm penetrated the M3's armor, and the Japanese army felt like invincible again. But the upgrades didn't get to that many 97's soon, there was a shortage of tanks. The masses of old tanks outnumbered the 47mm 97s. And the battlefield was about to turn into living hell for the Japanese tank crewmen.


IIIIII: The American Calvary is here!

1943, now the 47mm 97s are widely distributed, and the Japanese forces are feeling invincible. But, the next American tank they face, its not the M3... It's the M4 Sherman. The Japanese thought the M3 was a monster. They thought the M4 was a dinosaur. But, they trust their 47mm and fire at the Sherman. They think it will penetrate. It doesn't make a dent. They try using captured M3s. M4 >x9999 M3. Plus the 75mm cannon could penetrate everything. Now the Japanese tanks were on the run. American troops were now supplied with bazookas and M2HBs. The bazooka shattered them. The M2HB cut through the weak 97's armor and cut the crew up. And for the 95type and lower, a M1 rifle or a M1919 LMG could penetrate the armor at close range... And so the Japanese tanks' glory days in WWII were gone forever.


End! How'd you like this bit of info? "

http://www.totalbf2.com/forums/showthread.php?t=91491

 

Note in the PI in 44 the US also had several battalions of tank destroyers (in this case M 18s). These could shoot through any Japanese tank at any range they could spot them at.

But, the Japanese problem with armor initially stems from the nature of their nation itself. One thing limiting tank size and weight was the need to ship and then land tanks ashore. Available shipping, booms, whips, hoists, and even landing craft dictated weight. Weight dictated how much tank you could have. Since the armor is most of the weight and hatches and boats dictate size one can see the problems facing Japanese designers. A Tiger was out of the question even if they could have built it.

In tactics the Japanese never held large maneuvers or spent alot of time on the theory of mechanized warfare like the powers in Europe. They faced no one prior to the war that had the capacity for this sort of warfare in Asia so it was not a priority. Yes, the Soviets ran the Japanese down in a couple of border clashes but, the IJA assessment was that their infantry formations in the end gave as good or better than they got. Their proof was in the heavy losses Russia took to win those engagements.
What they did not take away from those engagements was that the Russians might be back at some future date with even more vicious mechanized forces. So, upgrades were slow in coming. The thinking was the equipment in service was adequite and there was no pressing need for replacements.

When the Pacific War broke out the largest mechanized formation in the Japanese army was a tank brigade. This was typically about 90 to 120 tanks strong organized into three battalions and might have had a battalion of motorized infantry attached but not usually. It was rarely used enmasse. Generally instead it was broken up and parcelled out to various other units acting more as a general headquarters pool of armor than a coherent fighting formation.
When fast pursuits were necessay, and these did occur with some frequency, flying columns of tanks, motorized infantry, cavalry, and even bicycle infantry were put togeather ad hoc from available components and used for that particular mission returning to their parent units when finished. These were seen in the opening days of the Pacific War in Malaysia, the Philippines, and elsewhere.
Against disorganized defenders or ones lacking anti tank weapons they were generally successful. Where the defenders had orgainzed rear guards and the proper weapons, more than one such column suffered heavily for their lack of cohesion and poor tactical handling.

 

How could you explain the British defeats in South East Asia then? they were certainly well organized and armed, and definitely had anti tank weapons capable of defeating Japanese armor.

 

The Germans had very capable anti tank guns in 1945 but it didn't stop the Allies!

 

Well the allies had unlimited airpower and maany more tanks and guns, so I don't think thats a good example.

 

IIRC that the 2/4 Australian Anti-Tank Regiment engaged some Japanese tanks in Singapore with 2 pounders. But it was really no use as the Japanese had about 200 light tanks there.

 

T.A. makes a good point here.

 

Tactical Problems and Solutions


Armor Quality

As has already been discussed, Japanese armored vehicles were very
lightly constructed, by Western standards. This was, primarily, a result of
Japanese experiences in Manchuria and tropical theatres of war, both of
which had shown heavy vehicles to be a severe liability. Indeed, the
deployment of heavier armored vehicles such as the Sherman and
Matilda II in the Pacific had shown that this experience was not unique to
the Japanese, and many of these heavier vehicles were simply useless
until properly adapted. A great many heavy vehicles were lost, even after
these adaptations, to the machinations of weather, terrain, and clever
infantrymen experienced in taking advantage of the weaknesses of such
vehicles in such circumstances.

The armor protection of Japan's heaviest vehicle to see combat during the
second world war, the Type 1 Chi-He, was approximately 8-50mm thick,
with a welded hull. This was superior to the protection of the M3/M5 Stuart
(the most commonly deployed Allied vehicle in the Pacific). The 50mm
front turret glacis, however, was nearly 49mm thinner than that of the M4
Sherman with which it had been designed to contend, with armor varying
from about 13 to 89mm thick. The most commonly encountered Japanese
medium tank, the Type 97 Chi-Ha, was by comparison only 8-25mm thick,
considerably less effective than the 10-44mm thick armor of the M3/M5
Stuart. The armor of the Type 95 Ha-Go light tank, Japan's most common
vehicle, was nowhere near either vehicle in terms of protection.

The myth that the armor of most Japanese vehicles could be penetrated by
the American .50 MG is just that, a myth, but the protection of Japanese
vehicles in the field was clearly inferior to that of their Allied opponents.

Doctrine

A major problem for Japanese armor in the field was the doctrine with
which it was employed. To the Japanese military establishment, tanks
were strictly supporting weapons, designed to assist the infantry but
generally insufficient in an independent role for anything beyond
reconnaissance. Further, because they were viewed as a subordinate
branch, Japanese tankers were frequently treated as support troops, and
as a result, their views and opinions gained from experience in the field
against Allied armor were generally taken for granted.

As a result of all these factors, Japanese tankers suffered terribly.
Frequently, they would be employed in penny packets with the infantry;
other times, they would be employed in static defense, effectively negating
their chief advantages over Allied vehicles - speed and mechanical
reliability in difficult terrain. Independent operations were generally
discouraged, and when they did take place such actions were executed
under extremely controlled conditions in which the tankers were frequently
thrown against insanely difficult objectives.

In at least one instance, a column of Japanese armor was ordered to
break-through an American position on Tarawa. The Japanese had
scouted the American position thoroughly, knew where the American weak
spots could be found, and had determined that a tank assault could break
the line in a critical place. They had also, however, discovered that the
Americans had two 57mm Anti-Tank guns, pre-sited in the position. The
commander of the Japanese armor formation believed that a frontal attack
against such a position would be unwise, and suggested a flanking
maneuver. The request was ignored, and the order was given for a frontal
assault. Of some thirteen vehicles, only two managed to break through the
American line, and these were quickly overwhelmed.

In another instance, a Japanese tank commander was censured and
recalled home for encouraging his men to make flanking attacks on
American armor positions, having discovered that his vehicles had a much
higher rate of success attacking the Allies from this position.

There were a few genuinely successful Japanese tank actions. Most of
these took place in small armor skirmishes which are frequently recorded
in only the most minimalist of ways - we know, for example, that of the
more than ninety-five American vehicles destroyed on Okinawa, at least
some were destroyed by Japanese tanks. But we do not know how, when,
or under what circumstances.

Japanese "Bushido" Mentality

Japanese infantry may have been successful in part because of the
samurai discipline enforced by their officers, but this was not the case for
Japanese armor. Generally speaking, such attitudes could be absolutely
disastrous for Japanese armored units in the field.

In New Guinea , we are told of a 'Banzai' charge attempted by a unit of IJA
infantry against a strong Australian position. The attack was supported by
Japanese armor, but not in the way that perhaps planners had hoped.
Instead, the Japanese tank crews screamed in triumph, threw open their
hatches, and dismounted to Banzai charge on foot

Improvised Solutions

We know very little about the improvised solutions employed by Japanese
tank crews in these circumstances. To be honest, Allied intelligence
reports are more concerned with killing Japanese armor than with the
ways it which can be better protected, and the memoirs of Japanese
tankers are extremely hard to come by.

At least one methodology to improve the survivability of Japanese armor in
the field was to dig a vehicle in to the earth and use it as a bunker or in a
more or less static hull down position. This did improve survivability
somewhat, but mobility was of course out of the question.

There is also some photographic evidence of Japanese vehicles
camouflaged heavily with foliage and palm trunks. But, this seems to be
an anti-air measure rather than an attempt (as some have alleged) at
cellulose armor. Certainly, because the Allies did not make use of
magnetic anti-tank mines to the same extent as their Japanese
opponents, the use of wood plating of any kind would not have been as
useful a solution for armor protection as it was for the allies.

I have read some claims that the Japanese used sandbags to improve
their survivability. This is certainly possible, but I have looked at hundreds
of photos of Japanese armor in the field, before, during, and after combat
and I have yet to see a single image of a Japanese fighting vehicle using
sandbagged armor in the field. I have, in fact, seen photographs of
Japanese tanks used as bunkers and protected with a layer of sandbags,
but I have never seen them equipped as such in a mobile role. In use
against the Chinese, who were quite fond of the use of Molotov cocktails
as anti-tank weapons, this seems to be an excellent solution, but there is
no evidence (to my knowledge) of such a thing ever being attempted. I
therefore find this probability somewhat unlikely.

We know of at least one tactic that worked for the Japanese, and that was
outmaneuvering the enemy for a flank shot, with the use of superior
speed and mobility of most Japanese vehicles to make this possible.
Certainly, the Australians lost a few Matildas this way, and the Americans
more than a few Shermans. Of course, such behavior was not normally
approved, and as has already been discussed, some Japanese tankers
were actually censured for doing so. By 1944 however, when Japan’s tank
doctrine began to be radically changed, such behaviors seem to have
been accepted practice.

Home

 

Considering that you said that the Type 97 Chi-Ha had 8-25mm of armor, and the .50 BMG could penetrate 20-16mm of armor at a 0 degrees, 200 meters, couldn't the .50 HMG penetrate the most common Japanese tank from the side or rear?

 

It is an excellent example if one looks at things outside the specific detail but within a much larger overall, strategic frame. The Germans may have had great anti-tank guns, but had very bad taste in choosing enemies, which is what makes you lose wars.

 

I believe that that may have actually been a lightly armored artillery tractor similar to a Bren Gun Carrier...

Japanese tanks were only feeble when compared to their Western counterparts...They were effectively used in situations where there were none opposing them (Singapore, China) and where the enemy anti-tank and armor capability withered (the Philippines). And the Imperial Japanese Army was adept at employing them in such circumstances.

There were some decent tanks designs that were roughly on par with a Sherman, and even one that would have even given the Pershing (which was deployed for the invasion of the Japanese home islands) a run for its money.

Towards the end of the Pacific campaign, tanks in island garrisons were largely a waste of resources as placing guns in the underground labyrinths and bunker fortresses were much more effective, and cheaper. And the terrain usually prevented US tanks from maneuver essentially forced them to adopt the role of direct infantry support as "mobile pillboxes". Though, there were tank to tank encounters between Marine and Army units and the IJA. The 75mm gun on the Sherman, considered inadequate against German armor by the end of 1942 was still too much for the typical Japanese tank, and often they used high explosive rounds to demolish them, because AP would just pass right through the thin Japanese armor often with little effect unless it was a direct head on hit.

Here are a couple of related threads:

Type 5 "Heavy Tank" - WW2inColor Talk
Type 3 medium tank Chi-Nu - WW2inColor Talk

 

LOL agreed *cough* picking a fight with the Russians! *cough*

 

I dont think the Japanese really had that greater need for Tanks. I dont think it would have changed the outcome at all if they had developed or produced more tanks. Their greatest need was for ships and aircraft. The Japanese would have simply wasted time and resources building tanks that would have been smashed by the US anyway.

 

Obviously the Japanese felt that they were as important either. The small amounts and use of tanks in the Island campaign proved that.Though they seem to have felt a need later in the war. They certainly could have used some more modern and better tanks in the Phillipines, Manchuria in 1945 and in case of the US invasion of the Home Islands for examples.

 

"The Japanese have made only limited use of tanks up to the present time. In their operations in China, however, they have had an opportunity to utilize tanks much more extensively than elsewhere because of the character of the terrain and the large areas over which the fighting has occurred. As a matter of fact, China has been the great proving ground for Japanese armored vehicles of all types. The Japanese also used light and medium tanks to some extent in the Malayan campaign and in the siege of Singapore, as well as in the Philippines, Burma, Guadalcanal, and Papua. More recently, on Guam and Tinian, comparatively large numbers of Japanese tanks have been in action; on Saipan more than 80 were destroyed, many by aerial and naval bombardment before they could be moved from assembly areas.


In suitable terrain the tank is an ideal weapon for the favorite envelopment tactics of the Japanese. Although it is likely that their armored units will continue to be considered primarily as infantry support weapons, the potentialities of tanks in wide encircling movements to cut enemy lines of communications and to disorganize his rear areas hardly will be overlooked. Equipment probably will remain inferior in comparison with armored vehicles used by the other modern armies, but the study of German and United Nations designs is likely to bring about important modification in the construction of Japanese armored vehicles. Japanese industry will be able to provide a volume of production, which, although small in comparison with United Nations standards, will make possible the commitment of tank units on a larger scale than hitherto has been encountered. All information in Japanese Tanks and Tank Tactics is believed accurate as of 1 November 1944. "

Introduction | Japanese Tanks and Tank Tactics, WWII Military Intelligence Service, Special Series No. 26, November 15, 1944 (LoneSentry.com)

 

Hmmmm. For a first posting here there doesn't seem to be alot of input or insight LOL. How about letting us know what your view is?

 

I think what is even more amusing is the suicidally primitive tactics/weapons the Japanese used to fight tanks..

 

Wolfy: I think what is even more amusing is the suicidally primitive tactics/weapons the Japanese used to fight tanks..

What do you mean with that? Suicide satchel charge attacks were really effective (althought costly) and Japanese had even their own (70 mm) at-rocket (put to service in july 1945). The only at-rifle was weak I'll give you that.

By the way, does anyone know anything about Chi-Ri medium/hevier medium tanks?